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Petrovskiy Speaks at UN Disarmament Conference

OW2304070190 Moscow in Japanese to Japan 1200 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Tokyo correspondent Potapov report]

[Text] A UN-sponsored conference on disarmament opened in Sendai City, Japan, on 16 April. We will now broadcast a report on this conference filed by Radio Moscow correspondent Potapov.

The United Nations has held the disarmament conference in Japan for two consecutive years. The first conference was held in Kyoto in April last year. Exactly one year has passed since then, and another large Japanese city, Sendai, has joined in the discussion of the disarmament issue.

The interval between the first and second conference is not too long, just one year. However, many major events and big changes have taken place in the international arena during this interval, and great results have been achieved in such fields as disarmament, arms reduction, and defusion of tension.

Both the Soviet Union and the United States have been jointly moving toward the conclusion of a treaty on reducing strategic arms. And there are good prospects for signing a treaty on reducing conventional arms in Europe by the end of this year.

Nevertheless, behind the favorable results and remarkable progress in science and technology, attempts are being made to modernize arms or improve their quality. This has aroused increasingly serious apprehensions among the international public. Under these circumstances, therefore, the theme for the disarmament conference held in Sendai was the advances made in science and technology and their impact on world peace and international security.

Judging from this theme, it is very clear why the United Nations chose Japan as the site for this conference. First, during the past few years Japan has undoubtedly become a leader in science and technology, and has surprised mankind with its advanced technology.

UN staff members, diplomats, military and disarmament experts, and famous scholars from over 20 nations, including the Soviet Union, have come to Sendai city. The Soviet delegation is led by Vice Foreign Minister Petrovskiy.

The opening ceremony for the conference was held at 1000 on the morning of 16 April. Following the opening ceremony, two plenary sessions were held on such themes as study of the new technology and security, and prospects of the post-cold war period.

Speaking at the first plenary session, Soviet Vice Foreign Minister Petrovskiy said that Soviet development of science and technology has been aimed at promoting their peaceful use. He explained in detail that the process of switching it to civilian use has been put on the right track. He also pointed out the basic achievements made in foreign policy and the shift the Soviey Union has made in military doctrine.

In addition, he explained once again the Soviet proposal for opening East-West talks on developing rules for the transfer of science and technology which can be used for both military and civilian purposes. Vice Foreign Minister Petrovskiy also denounced Cocom, the committee for controlling exports to the Soviet Union and socialist nations. The UN conference on disarmament in Sendai continued on 17 April.

Air Defense Chief Views 'Open Skies' Conference

LD2104134990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1209 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 22 Apr (TASS) [date as received]—The international "Open Skies" conference begins work on Monday in Budapest. The representatives of the 23 Warsaw Pact and NATO states will take part.

"The 'Open Skies' regime envisages flights by unarmed aircraft over the territory of member states. They will take place on a mutual basis for the purpose of monitoring military activity," Colonel-General of Aviation Igor Maltsev, chief of staff Air Defense forces, told a TASS correspondent in an interview. "This is the technical side of the matter."

In political terms, the "Open Skies" concept is called upon to become an effective means of strengthening confidence, and of eliminating possible suspicions and apprehensions concerning the state and the activity of the armed forces of those countries which agree on a treaty basis to open up their airspace.

It must be said, the general noted, that this idea is not new, and that it was advanced back in the early postwar years. However, due to the military and political relations which formed at that time between the USSR and the United States, it did not receive support and did not find due development.

Today, in connection with the changed international situation, an opportunity has emerged to return once more to such an idea. The USSR, the United States, Canada, and the other Warsaw Pact and NATO states have embarked on practical elaboration of it. In February this year an international conference on the "Open Skies" regime took place in Ottawa. It summed up the results of the first stage of talks, and revealed a number of matters which require additional study.

All possible eventualities, details, and procedures which are connected with the flights of inspecting aircraft and which would totally exclude the emergence of conflict situations, should be envisaged in the "Open Skies" agreement.

Currently, Igor Maltsev said, talks are being held in different areas connected with the reduction of armed forces and armaments in Europe. The sides have reached

the final straight in some of them. The "Open Skies" regime, in the overall context of the talks that are being held, and given observance of the security interests of all countries, will be a new step in strengthening confidence-building measures.

Future of Military Stability Pondered

PM2004141990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Article by Lieutenant General A. Politsin and Colonel V. Linkevich: "Stability and Confrontation"]

[Text] **The first real steps are now being taken in the disarmament sphere, the process of negotiations is in train in Geneva and Vienna on the subject of reducing nuclear and conventional arms, and the political settlement of regional conflicts has begun. At the same time, although the situation in the world as a whole is improving, the danger of war still remains.**

What is the level of stability, what influences the dynamics of its change and the state of the military-political situation in the regions to the west, south, and east of the Soviet Union? Some short analytical essays, which we begin publishing today, are devoted to answering these questions.

1. Europe

The processes of restructuring internal structures and interstate relations in Europe are positive on the whole. At the same time, the situation taking shape on the continent, particularly in its central part, cannot fail to cause concern. We are referring to German unification. Where will it lead? To increased stability on the continent or, conversely, to increased military confrontation? Everything will depend on the principles on which this unification is based. The United States and its allies want to see a unified Germany in NATO, where it could supposedly be kept a safe eye on. But, first, this would upset the military-strategic balance in Europe and, second, monitoring Germany's observance of the postwar terms is not the prerogative of the North Atlantic alliance but of the four victor powers—including the Soviet Union. It is not enough that a united Germany should only have responsibilities to the United States and the other members of NATO. Germany must also have the same responsibilities to the Soviet Union and the East European countries. The process of solving the problem of German unification must not cause concern to other states and peoples or shatter the atmosphere of trust built in recent years through joint efforts.

In our view, the solution of the problem of German unification must under no circumstances have a harmful impact on the stability of the military-political situation in Europe, which is still determined by confrontation between the two military-political alliances, the Warsaw Pact and NATO. Frequently published data shows that approximate parity exists between them as a whole. However, the presence of a vast number of troops (the number runs into millions) and weapons (tens of thousands of them) on both sides does not help—to put it mildly—to strengthen peace in Europe. In this connection, the transformation of both alliances from military-political into political-military organizations, and radical reductions in their arms and armed forces, are becoming the key issues of European security and stability.

The positive improvements that have emerged at the Vienna talks make it possible to look to the future with some optimism. One would like to hope that an agreement will be signed by the end of the year that will lead to the elimination of substantial lethal arsenals and a reduction in the level of military confrontation. At the same time, when tackling the problem of safeguarding European security and stability, one cannot ignore the significance of naval forces and naval activity in waters which lap the continent. The presence of long-range cruise missiles on ships which, even without nuclear warheads, are capable of resolving strategic tasks, turns a fleet into a powerful strike force. Both surface ships and submarines, in which the United States and NATO have a considerable advantage, essentially represent a means of combat best suited to a surprise offensive. This fully and primarily applies to the U.S. Navy, which, as history has shown, has often been used, including in recent years, as a means of putting military pressure on countries with regimes not to Washington's liking.

The proposals put forward by the Soviet leader in Murmansk and Belgrade underline the need to begin separate talks involving interested states—primarily major maritime states—on the question of reducing naval forces and naval activity. The Soviet proposals remain in force despite the fact that the United States and other NATO countries have responded with a refusal.

Nor can one fail to see other serious obstacles still in the way of further improving the political climate on the continent. For example, neither NATO headquarters nor Washington have abandoned the idea of modernizing their tactical nuclear weapons in Europe. Moreover, they do not confine themselves to just talking about this: They are actually taking real measures. The draft U.S. budget for fiscal 1990-1991 requests more than $112 million for the development of new missiles planned as replacements for the "Lance" missiles stationed in Western Europe. With these replacements, the missile range will be almost tripled to 280 miles.

The Soviet Union and its allies attach fundamental importance to the elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. Without this, stability and security in the region cannot be total and sufficiently reliable. What is more, as conventional arms are reduced, the destabilizing role of tactical nuclear weapons will inevitably increase. NATO's strategy of "nuclear deterrence" cannot but be a source of concern in this respect. Where is the dividing line beyond which the potential for nuclear deterrence becomes a potential for attack?

Both from the standpoint of determining the number of arms and forces and from the viewpoint of their structure, deployment, and training, of all military activity, our military doctrine rules out the possibility of launching an attack and conducting large-scale offensive operations. We look forward to appropriate reciprocal measures from the NATO countries. In our view, a real contribution to this has been made by the seminar on military doctrines, held at the initiative of the Warsaw Pact and involving representatives of the top military leadership from European states, the United States, and Canada. The businesslike, constructive exchange of opinions helped to improve mutual understanding and to move away from old dogmas and stereotypes in military matters.

Strictly honoring its earlier pledges, the Soviet Union is working for the adoption of new measures of notification, observation, and limitation of military activity at the talks involving the 35 CSCE member-states. The activity of ground forces is strictly monitored in line with the Stockholm accords. The time has come to extend this monitoring procedure to the activity of air and naval forces belonging to NATO and the Warsaw Pact.

Other joint measures could help to strengthen confidence between states, increase predictability in their military activity, and reduce the danger of military conflicts breaking out. The second stage of the conference involving 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries on the "open skies" problem, which is to be held in Budapest in May, should be perceived in this context, for example. This is an aim of considerable importance. But we should not confine ourselves to this: We should work toward reaching agreement on "open seas," "open land," and "open space." Unfortunately, so far no positive reaction to this Soviet initiative has been forthcoming from the West.

Initiatives proposed by states or groups of states, which aim to promote security with regard to certain regions of the continent, are important for strengthening stability and reducing the level of military confrontation. They include proposals on creating a nuclear-free corridor and a zone free of chemical weapons in central Europe; a zone of confidence, cooperation, and good neighborly relations along the dividing line between the two alliances' states; zones free of nuclear and chemical weapons in northern Europe and the Balkans; radical reduction in the level of military confrontation in northern Europe; and the transformation of the Mediterranean into a zone of peace and cooperation.

The Soviet Union is prepared to broaden collaboration and the search for accords with all states participating in the all-European process in order to radically reduce arms, achieve disarmament, and strengthen security and stability on the continent and good-neighborliness and cooperation between countries. In this context, we work on the basis that, as a whole, the European process is having a positive impact on stability in other regions of the world.

Bloc Maneuvers in Northern GDR Announced

PM2204195790 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report: "Maneuvers To Be Held"]

[Text] Berlin, 20 Apr—A tactical exercise involving Air Defense Forces from the GDR, Poland, and the USSR Western Group of Forces will be held in the northern GDR 24-25 April. The exercise is an integral part of the plan to ensure the Warsaw Pact armies' combat readiness. Temporary restrictions on the use of GDR airspace are being brought in with respect to civil aircraft for the period in question. This was announced here today by the GDR Ministry of Disarmament and Defense.

Karpov, Hungarian Official Discuss 'Open Skies'

PM1704131990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 11 Apr 90 Moscow Evening Edition p 4

[TASS report under general heading "Official Reports"]

[Text] V.P. Karpov, USSR deputy foreign minister, received T. Toth, representative of the Hungarian Republic at the session of the Warsaw Pact states' special commission for disarmament questions, 10 April.

They discussed questions of preparations for holding the second stage of the international conference for elaboration of the "open skies" regime in Budapest.

Shevardnadze Views Current International Issues

LD2204113190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1645 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Program entitled "The Foreign Ministry, Seventh Floor;" report on interview with USSR Foreign Minister Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze on 16 April, by correspondents Andrey Sisnev and Grachev, including recording of Shevardnadze's remarks made during interview—recorded]

[Text] [Sisnev] Hello, at the microphone are journalists Andrey Sisnev....

[Grachev] ...and Sergey Grachev.

[Sisnev] This week we were fortunate enough to take part in a meeting with Eduard Amvorisyevich Shevardnadze, our country's foreign minister. The minster held a substantive and straightforward conversation with a group of Soviet journalists on the 7th floor of the USSR Foreign Ministry.

[Grachev] Representatives of PRAVDA, IZVESTIYA, Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting], and other mass media had the opportunity to ask any questions that interested them and to receive exhaustive replies straight from the horse's mouth, as the saying goes. To start with, Eduard Amvorisyevich spoke of recent and forthcoming major events in international life. And naturally enough, he began with the Soviet-U.S. meeting held in Washington in early April.

[Shevardnadze] I believe the Washington meeting was useful—and the Americans agree with this—particularly as regards bilateral relations. Back on Malta this was designated a very important and topical area, and the presidents said that the foundation for stability must be laid. In that sense we had what I thought was a very interesting conversation. The working groups contained specialists and our respective experts, and up to 10 quite major agreements were sketched out: on trade, perhaps [words indistinct], on the peaceful conquests of space and in several other spheres—there were interesting proposals on ecology—quite a significant package. And this time the conversation on regional problems was useful. You will recall that in Wyoming we spoke of trying to move on from mutual understanding to mutual cooperation, and that is not just an empty phrase. That is working already. We—the Americans and our side—are trying hard in this respect, because good prospects really are opening up here for mutual cooperation. There are now more elements of mutual understanding on Cambodia and Afghanistan. I do not say that we see completely eye to eye—we still have major differences of opinion, particularly on Afghanistan. But all the same, gradually, step by step our positions are narrowing. As regards problems concerned with the negotiations on strategic offensive weapons, we also made progress on some matters: mobile missiles and some other problems connected with verification—the verification systems—and so on. They tabled some very significant proposals on chemical weapons. I believe that during Mikhail Sergeyevich's visit we will manage to sign a very important bilateral agreement on eliminating chemical weapons stockpiles. It was an interesting meeting with the president, it was very confidential, the conversation was very substantive and we covered almost the entire package of problems that will figure on the summit agenda.

And then there were various estimates in the United States. There were optimistic as well as restrained estimates, but this is not the main thing. The main thing is there are many areas of mutual understanding and that—regarding the question of disarmament, especially strategic offensive weapons—we have finally determined the positions and have agreed that even before Baker's arrival we shall exchange letters or our representatives so that we can prepare for this visit. Well, what are we striving for? It is well known, and has been carried on from Reykjavik, so to speak: To secure a 50 percent reduction in strategic offensive weapons. (?It would be pleasant) for all to put an end to the arms race, to stop the arms race, in every area, to define some sort of limit to the ballistic missiles, land-based seaborne and airborne and so on, because this is the main thing, and then negotiate further cuts.

And I think that both for us and the Americans, and for other states too, it is precisely this approach that is of fundamental importance. As for conventional weapons in Europe, we shall need some more time to work with our partners and allies and naturally with the Americans, but I think nevertheless that we shall succeed in preparing (?an agreement) this year.

Overall, we consider it a successful visit. Not every visit, trip or round of talks ends in major agreements. Sometimes there is a sort of quantitative build-up of issues, as it were, and then at a certain stage this crosses over for a new quality.

[Sisnev] The minister then shared his impressions of his tour of African countries. Some of our colleagues had a rare oppportunity to accompany the minister and see the head of Soviet diplomacy in action. And as Eduard Amvrosiyevich said, they realized that those trips are not some kind of entertainment but serious and painstaking work.

[Grachev] The visits to those African countries once again convinced us that we have to thoroughly revise our relations with those states and work out a new concept for those relations.

Africans today are having to face up to numerous difficulties of a social, political, and economic nature.

[Shevardnadze] Mozambique and, particularly, Angola have the biggest armies and they are quite well armed. They are good armies, but just look at how the people live, it's simply terrible. No state can endure such expenditure connected with war, domestic, so to speak, external and other factors. And indeed not only those countries, but other countries, too. In fact there are great opportunities and we have to master this science, the science of cooperation with the developing countries and

the third world. In those countries it is possible to seek ways, it is possible to seek ways of making our cooperation beneficial both to us and to them. So that's my first observation: economics and economic relations are now coming to the fore.

Second, there's the very great, tremendous interest those countries have in the sphere of science. What's happening is that they mostly train their specialists in the West, and that is where they settle; they do not return. It's a brain drain. We even tried somehow to estimate the approximate cost, how much the developing world is losing through this, and found that it was around 4,000 million every year [currency not specified] [words indistinct]. It's a loss, a direct loss for the developing world, this brain drain.

But they know there that cooperation with the Soviet Union in the scientific sphere is advantageous. They consider, and not without justification, that we have a solid science sector, particularly in fundamental research. We have noted that over the past few years, starting in 1985 when we began normalizing relations with the United States of America, there has been a certain earnest [as heard] attitude toward that process, a suspicion whether that definite closeness, the definite rapproachement was occuring at the expense of the Third World, whether there was some kind of deal between the two powers. During this visit, meeting many presidents, prime ministers foreign ministers and the public and so on, I saw that they understand that this was essential, that without the Soviet-U.S. summit meetings, without the Soviet-U.S. accords and without the expansion of the sphere of agreement between our countries, it would have been difficult to talk of the peaceful construction of the planet. They therefore see everything in a different way now, in a different way, and any progress—or at least this is the impression I got—any progress in this direction is welcomed by them and considered a substantial achievement for our ideas.

[Sisnev] And now we switch from events in Africa to European affairs. We met the minister on the eve of his talks with Gianni de Michelis, his Italian counterpart. It is, therefore, understandable why mention was made of the nature of and prospects for Soviet-Italian dialogue.

[Shevardnadze] In my opinion, especially after Mikhail Sergeyevich's trip, our relations with the Italians went onto a new stage, a new level. We have already worked on many projects, they are being implemented. It must be said that the Italians are acting more boldly than everyone, very, boldly and very persistently. And for this reason they are in the leading position, so to speak, in economic and scientific and technical cooperation. We have a special relationship with Italy; we can already talk about this. There is very emphatically a good, trusting relationship, and there is a large area of agreement on many questions as regards Europe, and world affairs, the Near East and other questions, the Horn of Africa. We have a very good basis for cooperation, it is true, on many issues.

[Sisnev] Next week Li Peng, the premier of China's State Council, comes to Moscow. The talks in Moscow will be a continuation of our contacts with our eastern neighbor. Our bilateral contacts reached a qualitatively new level after Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev's visit to China last May.

[Grachev] Generally speaking, in the opinion of the minister, the normalization of relations with Beijing is one of the greatest foreign policy achievements in the years of perestroyka, and this must be prized.

[Shevardnadze] The talks with Li Peng will be of fundamental significance. Fundamental significance. Why? Because in the conceptual sense we have resolves much. Resolved much, so to speak, including the fact that we have registered a normalization, we have normalized relations between our two countries. And now we need practical deeds, practical actions. I would single out two or three issues as the main features: first, economic cooperation. Incidentally, China's experience is useful to us. As you know, they have not shunned reform; economic reforms are under way there. They are very skillful at attracting foreign capital. Very skillful. We do not have enough of that experience, and there are many various obstacles. Then there are our bilateral relations. The opportunities here are unlimited. The Chinese say this themselves, and our experts believe the same. The volume of trade is growing, as are our direct contacts and other relations. They are very interested in developing scientific and technological cooperation, and we can only welcome this. There is great scope in this respect. That is the first thing.

The second thing is how to overcome military confrontation once and for all. That sphere was very costly for us, that confrontation, as I have frequently said. A time will eventually come when we sum it up and calculate, so to speak, it was in fact tens of billions, tens of billions. Much could have been avoided. I think this issue will be an important one, if not the leading issue, at the Soviet-Chinese talks. Talks are, in effect, going on and we are becoming convinced that there is a possibility of securing a real cut, on both the Chinese and the Soviet sides, a real cut in expenditure. Our states need this. Undoubtedly our consultations on border affairs will be continued, and there is one other strand—the position, the situation in the world and especially in the Asia-Pacific region.

It's a very great country, a huge state with a population of 1,000 million, and we have to think not just about the present day but about the next century as well, about how our descendants will work together. World politics without China would be unrealistic.

[Sisnev] And on that, in effect, as the minister put it, his report to the journalists came to an end, and we began asking questions. Many were interested in the situation concerning the two German states.

[Grachev] In reply to one of us, the minister said he was not concerned over the periodic consultations between

the Western countries on the German problems. After all, the Soviet Union also consults with its allies when necessary.

[Shevardnadze] What we shall arrive at in the final stage is another matter. So far, incidentally, as far as the six are concerned the agenda has not been agreed. We are still only in the initial stage. All the basic issues will be tackled within the framework of the six. This process is dragging on a little because the elections have been held in the German Democratic Republic and they have not yet come to a decision on participation, so to speak. They are going to participate, but they need representatives, specific individuals with specific positions. It's a new state of affairs.

Many, for example, believe that the process of German unification will go smoothly and very quickly. But I have doubts, serious doubts: They are, after all, different countries, which for decades have developed differently. It's not so easy to implement. They are talking of a common currency. This process might develop more slowly, and a great deal will depend on this, a very great deal, including the issue of membership of military-political blocs. If the process develops slowly—the issue of unification—then the idea of the GDR belonging to the Warsaw Pact and the FRG belonging to NATO is a realistic policy.

If the unification process is completed within a year, then the solution, so to speak, will probably be totally different. But the dual membership idea also has a right to exist. Without us, there will be no solution. It is impossible to find a solution without the agreement of the Soviet Union. It remains the responsibility of the four powers. And therefore I do not rule it out that the West, the Westerners might also seek a compromise solution.

[Sisnev] We asked Eduard Amvrosiyevich to return again to the forthcoming meeting between the two presidents in the American capital. What is the most that might be expected and what is the least? And what is the forumla for success?

[Shevardnadze] I have already listed a few things: I believe the most that can be expected is that the fundamental issue of a 50 per cent cut in strategic offensive weapons could be initialled, or in other words agreed. We could decide where our two sides stand on the main problems at the Vienna talks. A great breakthrough could be achieved on chemical weapons, and I have already said that a whole parcel of agreements on bilateral relations has been drafted—on the economy, trade, science and technology, so to speak, on global problems of cooperation. I think those are impressive things.

[Grachev] Eduard Amvrosiyevich used the expression "our allies" several times in his conversation, and a PRAVDA correspondent asked him to clarify his position on whether this expression is justified given the recent events in East Europe. This is the answer.

[Shevardnadze] As regards the obligations assumed under the Warsaw Pact, everything remains in force. Nobody has backed down. The time may come when it is necessary to look again at things and review the situation, but it will be not just up to us, NATO, too, will be transformed. And in this respect we have a good understanding with our allies. Good, but the military-political alliances should be transformed. But on the subject of obligations, I would stress that nobody has reneged on his obligations. If we speak from the point of view of the future, then if NATO is to continue in existence, then I believe the Warsaw Pact will also exist, since apart from everything else, it is in the national interests of those countries. We remain allies. Incidentally, at the meeting of ministers in Prague, nobody objected to an improvement in the Warsaw Pact, to a further improvement in the Warsaw Pact, including in its political mechanism, the political consultative committee, etc. Nobody spoke against it. Quite the reverse: They actively supported all our ideas—of setting up the post of general secretary, for instance. Previously Ceausescu blocked this, but now everyone is agreed on the idea of having a permanently functioning machinery, constant meetings, the formation of new groups of experts to study various problems of interest to our countries.

So the alliance exists, it's alive and functioning.

[Sisnev] One is aware that far from everyone in our country takes an unequivocal view of the changes in East Europe. Some are even openly criticizing the top leadership and blaming them directly for the loss of our sphere of influence, so to speak. We think the minister gave a convincing answer to such statements:

[Shevardnadze] Specific accusations have been levelled, so to speak, against the leadership and against specific individuals about us having lost East Europe as if it were our own property. But what could we do? What could we have done, as it were? Nobody is making any suggestions. What could we have done? Send in the troops, tanks, aircraft, artillery? Of course, you can start shooting, so to speak, and whatever else you like, but then we would have to cross out everything to do with perestroyka and democratization. And what would our people say? This has all happened in the past and people are tired of it, as it were, and it's even shameful to think back to (?a lot of things).

[Grachev] In our questioning we could not, of course, avoid the situation in and around Lithuania, or to be more precise, will not the exacerbation of passions after the Lithuanian parliament's hasty decision to declare the republic's independence affect Soviet-U.S. relations?

[Shevardnadze] My impression is that the Americans do not want the situation to deteriorate. After all, that decision was taken in unusual circumstances, to put it delicately. Such crucial decisions are not adopted overnight, so to speak. They got together suddenly, under the sway of emotions, without taking into account the interests of their own people, of their economy, their own

social development and that of the other republics, their neighbors and so on. So I still think that people will sort the situation out. They have to sort things out, and I think such a process is under way.

Each nation has the right to self-determination, of course, including the Lithuanian people. But what does self-determination mean? What does separation, secession mean? It's a process, it means talks, discussions, a referendum, debate in the Supreme Soviet, new relations, totally new economic, political and other relations. The other republics also have to put some thought into this. The idea of seceding from the union is very fashionable at the moment, but what about the relationship that have developed over the decades?

People are drawing comparisons and pointing to Luxembourg, but the state of Luxembourg did not appear yesterday. These relationships [changes thought] or Switzerland: The relationships have been built up over decades. Switzerland, I was told there that in the Federal Republic of Germany alone there are 450 joint enterprises. Not giants, but 450 of them, linked with the republic of South Africa and the whole world, trading with all states.

This has evolved, and so it exists. But we, our republics, want to restructure everything overnight and obtain everything that's to their advantage. But on independence, they take a decision just like that: It won't work.

[Grachev] In a short program we cannot give you a detailed account of the entire one and one-half hour conversation with the minister. Let me note in conclusion that we were satisfied with its content and atmosphere. Let us just hope that such meetings on the seventh floor of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs will become a fine tradition.

Greetings Sent to Beijing Peace Forum

LD2204024190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0115 GMT 22 apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 22 Apr (TASS)—In conditions of deepening global interdependence, comprehension of the fact that national egoism is counterproductive, and that peace can only be ensured on the basis of a balance of interests, is growing. This is discussed in a message of greeting from Eduard Shevardnadze, USSR foreign minister, to participants in the 14th conference of the "Peace Through Law" World Center which is opening today in Beijing—eminent practising lawyers and representatives of legal science from every continent.

International law is the mechanism of the quest for such a balance and the basis of cooperation linked with integrational processes and the internationalization of traditionally internal state issues in common interests, notes the greeting. The assertion of the priority of law in the practice of every country and in international life as a whole is organically linked also with the deepening of the worldwide processes of the democratication and humanization of relations between states, peoples, and individuals.

We in the Soviet Union are convinced that the world community has no other sensible choice besides the combining of efforts in the construction of a peace in which the law of strength will finally give way to the strength of law, emphasizes Eduard Shevardnadze's greeting. Our approaches to international law and order are also a reflection of internal processes directed at the formation of a society in which the law, expressing the will of the people, rules.

V.F. Petrovskiy Cited on Sendai Conference

PM2004150590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent I. Latyshev dispatch: "Dialogue of Politicians and Scientists"]

[Text] Tokyo, 19 Apr—The international Conference on Problems of Peace and Security has completed its work in the Japanese city of Sendai.

Forty-five prominent scientists and diplomats from 22 countries participated in the conference in the city of Sendai. The participants' chief attention was directed toward discussing questions concerning the role of nuclear power, space, information technology, and biotechnology in resolving specific disarmament problems.

Touching on the results of the conference's work in conversation with your correspondent, a participant in it—USSR Deputy Foreign Minister V.F. Petrovskiy—said: I see the significance of this conference as lying in the fact that it has essentially initiated a dialogue in the sphere of scientific and technical cooperation and on questions of disarmament. The further development of events in the world will depend on how the achievements of science and technology are utilized. And so it is very gratifying that the conference participants showed a very clear understanding of the need to take a number of measures in the future to prevent the use of the achievements of science and technology for military purposes.

'International Situation' Program Aired

LD2004212590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 20 Apr 90

["International Situation: Questions and Answers" program, presented by Konstantin Patsyuk, all-Union radio commentator on foreign politics, with TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev; international affairs journalist Boris Parkhomenko; his "colleague" Sergey Pravdin; and Yuriy Isayev, "our specialist on Latin American countries"]

[Excerpts] Greetings, esteemed comrades! We are beginning our program, which is built, as usual, on listeners' letters. Many of our listeners draw attention to the statement by Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze,

USSR minister of foreign affairs, in which he stressed that it was not possible to achieve agreement on a number of strategic arms reduction problems in the course of his recent talks in the United States. Now, many obervers assert, there are fears that it will not be possible to elaborate a draft treaty on strategic offensive weapons which is actually ready for signing in time for the forthcoming Soviet-U.S. summit meeting. What is the cause of the delay in the process of preparing the Soviet-U.S. treaty on reducing these weapons by 50 percent? I shall ask TASS military observer Vladimir Bogachev to answer this question.

[Bogachev] The Soviet and American sides have not yet managed to find a mutually acceptable solution on sea and air-launched cruise missiles at the negotiations in Geneva, and this circumstance is the main barrier on the way to reaching an accord on strategic offensive weapons. Washington is insisting, in particular, on a virtually total free hand in deploying cruise missiles on submarines and surface ships. The Soviet Union is insisting on their limitation and reduction, on the basis of observance of the principle of equal security for the two sides. The political and military leaders of the United States do not even bother to look for legal arguments to defend their stance, and do not talk any more about the need to maintain equal security for the sides. For example, U.S. Defense Secretary Richard Cheney states openly that his country sets itself the task of maintaining military superiority over the USSR, and is therefore against including the matter of sea-launched cruise missiles on the agenda for the negotiations.

[Patsyuk] Vladimir Ivanovich, what is special about cruise missiles? Why is Washington so insistently opposed to their limitation by treaty?

[Bogachev] Cruise missiles are very dangerous, destablizing weapons. These missiles have the possibility of going for a target at a very low altitude—down to 30 meters above the earth's surface—and to avoid air defense weapons on a route progamed in advance. Their accuracy is also very good. Washington once called cruise missiles a miracle weapon, capable of solving not only military but also economic tasks. USAF spokesmen stressed that for each dollar invested in the development [sozdaniye] of U.S. cruise missiles, the Soviet Union would have to spend four or five times more resources to defend itself against those same missiles. Thus, the development [sozdaniye] of cruise missiles pursues the goal of, and I quote, undermining the Kremlin's military and economic potential, and depriving it of the opportunity to reorientate resources to civilian purposes. In short, U.S. cruise missiles are aimed not only at our military installations, but also at our economy.

[Patsyuk] The West is now shouting about a hardening of the Soviet side's position at the negotiations on strategic offensive weapons and conventional weapons. Some cite interference in the negotiations by the Soviet military as explanation. What can you say about this?

[Bogachev] There can be no talk of any hardening of the Soviet delegation's position in Geneva. If we ignored the U.S. program to deploy thousands of cruise missiles, and did not take account of those weapons systems in the treaty which is in preparation, that would mean ignoring our country's security interests. Of course, the Soviet military participate in the negotiations and give their recommendations on various aspects of the treaty on strategic offensive weapons—as does the U.S. military, incidentally. Our military leadership does not and cannot have any special interests, separate from the interests of ensuring the security of the Soviet people.

[Patsyuk] It is being said that Washington is now trying to put pressure on the Soviet Union to achieve unilateral military advantages in the treaty by using our economic difficulties and the aggravation of interethnic relations. You touched lightly on that subject earlier on. Could you do so in more detail?

[Bogachev] Konstantin Nikolayevich, I think that such an evaluation of Washington's position at the negotiations on strategic offensive weapons is not without foundation. That same head of the Pentagon, Cheney, advocates a complete ban on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles with multiple re-entry vehicles. However, he believes that sea-launched missiles with multiple warheads should not be reduced or limited. The implementation of his proposal would lead to a severe violation of the present balance of the two countries' strategic forces and provide the United States with an advantage in strategic weapons many times over vis-a-vis the USSR.

[Patsyuk] Do you think, Vladimir Ivanovich, that a Soviet-U.S. treaty on strategic offensive weapons can nevertheless be concluded this year, despite all the current differences between the sides on strategic arms problems?

[Bogachev] I feel that the conclusion of such a treaty as early as this year is perfectly possible. However, success in the negotiations requires a patient search for solutions which do not undermine the two countries' security interests. It needs good will to achieve such an accord.

[Patsyuk] Thank you, Vladimir Ivanovich.

Many radio listeners touch on questions concerning the reunification of Germany. [passage omitted: list of listeners asking if Germany can be peaceful and neutral if it is in NATO. Others consider that the two Germanys should remain separate]

Engineer Solomon Moiseyevich Lipkind from Kuibishev writes that while the FRG and its NATO allies propose to include a united Germany as a whole in NATO, the Warsaw Pact countries, including the USSR, according to him, propose nothing.

First of all I want to say that the unification of Germany is the business of the Germans themselves. It is they, and no one else, who must decide how and in which forms

this will take place. But there are external aspects of the German problem as well, and here our country, together with the other three victorious powers, bears responsibility for the future role of Germany in the world, for it never again threatening its neighbors or anyone else, and for it not encroaching on the borders of other states.

For this reason the two-plus-four mechanism was developed to discuss the external aspects of the German question. These are the GDR, the FRG, and the four victorious powers. It is also proposed that other interested countries will also participate in this discussion. The mechanism approved is, as they say, a scheme which must accumulate parts and details, and one of these, probably the most important, is the status of the future Germany, including its relation to the blocs.

Yes, officials of NATO and a number of other countries which are members of that organization really do speechify in favor of the future Germany's membership of NATO. This is unacceptable for our country, since the present military-strategic balance of the two organizations , NATO and the Warsaw Pact, would be upset. So other variants are necessary.

Here Solomon Moiseyevich Lipkind is incorrect in saying that our country is not putting forward any variants. It is not so. One of the ideas on which I would like to dwell was expressed by Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, the USSR foreign minister, during his last meeting with U.S. Secretary of State Baker. Its essence is that a united Germany can be simultaneously a member of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact for a certain time—let's say for a transitional period until new European security structures are created. This idea, as it seems to me, is very interesting. No one, of course, considers it indisputable, but it can be a topic of normal, productive discussion, for this idea is based on the interests of both sides. If it is implemented the military-political balance will not be disturbed, so why not discuss it?

However, one gains the impression that the West, as before, is insisting on its own proposal, advantageous only to it; it simply sweeps others off the steps. That's a pity. What is the way out? It must be looked for on the path of compromises and, I repeat, on the path of consideration for both sides' interests. We are open to such compromises and expect the same from others. For the process of the unification of Germany must become part of the general outline of the all-European peace process, where a united Germany has an active role as an equal participant in Europe. [passage omitted: Parkhomenko comments on Israel's role in the Near East. He reviews progress in Israel's relations with East European countries and says that the policy of isolation has outlived itself; Patsyuk answers historical questions about reparations to the Soviet Union for damage done in the second world war. He reviews the agreements reached at the Yalta conference and blames the United States and Britain for blocking payments of reparations to the USSR and Poland from what were then the western occupation zones of Germany; Pravdin answers questions about U.S. military bases outside its own territory. He gives locations and focuses on the two bases in the Philippines, quoting U.S. press sources on their role and functions; Patsyuk informs a listener that all statues of Stalin in Mongolia have been taken down. That country is now doing much to commemorate its victims of the Stalin period; some listeners ask about El Salvador and the prospects for a peaceful settlement. Isayev reviews the course of the country's civil war and its effects to date; a student wants to know about Bhutan. Patsyuk provides factual background information on the country's politics, economics, and natural attractions]

"Observers' Roundtable" Views Current Issues

LD2204142490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1130 GMT on 22 April broadcasts its 30-minute "International Observers at the Roundtable" program, with presenter Gennadiy Vedenyapin and the radio's foreign political commentators Nikolay Agayants and Boris Andrianov.

The participants note that it is 120 years since Lenin came into the world to preach the doctrine of peaceful coexistence. It is now increasingly evident that this doctrine has gained international acceptance. Speaking at a conference recently, Cheney said that the positive trends visible of late in the USSR and East Europe will facilitate the conclusion of arms agreements. The threat of total war between the USSR and the United States is at its lowest since World War 2. While the U.S. military is generally cool to possible military budget cuts, even they see now that the money could be spent elsewhere. The paradox is that an attempt is now being made to spread the cost of defence among the U.S. allies, as witness Cheney's report to the Congress. Sooner or later, life itself will show that there is no alternative to the Leninist idea of peaceful coexistence, they conclude.

The discussion then switches to the background to the Jammu and Kashmir tension between India and Pakistan. It is stated that Pakistan's bellicosity has led to India's prime minister calling on the Indian people to be psychologically prepared for war; there has been a Muslim fundamentalist upsurge in the area, which, according to the press, has led to a mass exodus of Hindus. The long and the short of it is that there must be political compromise on both sides.

The program's final topic is Nicaragua. The participants note that on 25 April a new Nicaraguan president will come to power; Ortega has said that the transfer of power will go ahead whatever the conflict situation, but any hostilities during the transfer ceremony will result in the army taking steps to defend the locals and foreign visits. They detail the background to Thursday's agreement on a ceasefire as of midday 19 April and on the complete demobilization of the contras by 10 June. It would seem this is the end to the long-drawn out bloody conflict, they conclude.

'Top Priority' Aired; Lithuania Discussed

LD2304030990 Moscow in English to North America 2200 GMT 20 Apr 90

["Top Priority" program with (Jonathan Sanders) from the CBS Bureau in Moscow and Viktor (Borichuk) from the United States of America and Canada Institute; moderated by Sergey Goryachev]

[Text] [Goryachev] How do you do, ladies and gentlemen, welcome to "Top Priority." I'm Sergey Goryachev. One of my American friends called me the other day saying that all the news is coming from Moscow nowadays and he's probably right. We've had a very hot political week here in the Soviet Union. Lithuania failed to respond positively to President Gorbachev's order to rescind its unconstitutional independence legislation. At the end of the week, the Soviet Union stopped the flow of crude oil and gas to this republic. In Moscow, the newly-elected city council continued its first session, the majority of the deputies belong to the Democratic Russia group which is in opposition to the platform outlined by the city's communist party. We'll discuss these and other questions today with our guests, (Jonathan Sanders) of CBS Bureau here in Moscow, and Viktor (Borichuk) of the Institute of the United States and Canada. Viktor, you are the first time here on this program, could you very briefly tell us what is your position at the Institute?

[(Borichuk)] Well, I'm head of the department for studying domestic policy of the United States.

[Goryachev] Are you following domestic problems in the Soviet Union?

[(Borichuk)] No, in the United States.

[Goryachev] Are you following domestic problems in the Soviet Union as a citizen?

[(Borichuk)] You know, in days of perestroyka we start to do it.

[Goryachev] Okay. Since you have started to do it, then my first question will go to you. The central government seems to be getting a tougher stance against Lithuania—do you think that any hope of calm settlement has expired by today?

[(Borichuk)] You know when we review the situation in Lithuania we must keep in mind several ideas, first of all the domestic situation, second the international situation and events which could emerge from the decision in such a way or another way or the situation of Lithuanian secession. When we discuss now the situation in Lithuania, we keep in mind only tough measures of Moscow, for instance, and forget, look through the latest newspapers, radio broadcastings forget about adoption of the new law, the law on secession. [Unidentified voice says "Yes..."] It's great event and absolutely unusual for the international practice....

[Goryachev] You mean the fact that this legislation was passed?

[(Borichuk)] Yes, yes, nobody pays attention to this law, but it was so unusual for our judicial practice, for international judicial practice, and (?for) the future of the situation in Lithuania.

[Goryachev] (?But they seem) not to follow it, Jonathan, what do you think about...?

[(Sanders)] Well, I think the Lithuanians did not follow that law first of all because they acted before the law was passed. The Lithuanians have acted much more with their hearts than with their heads in declaring independence, it's become a very emotional issue. The people running their government there are not experienced politicians, they don't know the essential art of politics which is the art of compromise. And they've been pushing for independence as an ideal, but now they're stuck, they're intransigent on independence and they're having a problem in trying to find a way to save face so that they don't like....[indistinct interruption]. Well, what they have to do is find a way to save face for themselves as political actors and find a way so that they can help Mr. Gorbachev seem like he's winning, too. The longer they take in coming up with a settlement the harder it's going to be. One of the reasons that sanctions were imposed it seems to me is that the Lithuanians were too unwilling to make concessions and what they did was too little too late and now that the economic sanctions are beginning to have a bite they're beginning to step back. We hear there's talk about a freeze of their declaration of independence or a moratorium on their declaration of independence, and that's at least a sign of progress, a step in the right direction. There are some people there who understand politics. I'm not sure that Mr. Landsbergis is necessarily one of them, and I think in some ways the United States in the foreign policy game has been playing a very delicate role and perhaps maybe not playing it correctly. While they want to support psychologically a movement for independence for what they see as democracy and freedom in Lithuania, they also have to stay away from interfering in Soviet domestic politics. It seems to me that the problem has been that American foreign policy on this issue has not been made out of well-considered foreign policy goals, but rather has been made out of considerations of American domestic politics: what will look good in American politics, why George Bush has to look tough, why they have to appeal to the American right wing, and why a previous strategy I think they had of the president looking more presidential, being more neutral, letting the vice president say something, didn't work because the vice president may have put his foot in his mouth.

[Goryachev] Well Jonathan we'll talk about the United States' position towards the issue of Lithuania a little bit later, but as I understand, you think that the economic sanctions imposed on Lithuania are justified, right?

[(Sanders)] I think you can understand them from a political point of view. I'm not sure I would have done the same thing, but I understand why they were being done. And I think by the way that while there is a lot of

talk about Moscow being tough on Vilnius, I think that for the most part there's been a good deal of tolerance for them.

[(Borichuk)] Again I agree with Jonathan. You see, again we must remember—keep in mind two way of solution of this situation. Economic measures (?are) tough measures really, economic sanctions, and we have (?their) law, (?workable) law, for secession. [indistrinct interruption by Goryachev] (words indistinct) (?problem is) for me they only set aside (?of) the situation in Lithuania, I mean the Landsbergis decision and the decision of the Lithuanian parliament is violation of the constitution. It's absolutely bad from my point of view. Never in our history from the beginning of the October Revolution have we had due process of law, never in our history.

[(Sanders)] And not in the 19th century before that either.

[(Borichuk)] Yeah, yeah, yeah. Even in our history before the revolution, you are absolutely right. And again, again, having (?a workable) law they violate the constitution, violate the due process of law....[words indistinct]

[Goryachev, interrupting] Well, the problem is that they consider themselves to be occupied and thus they do not recognize that this constitution applies to them. That's (?half) of the problem.

[(Borichuk]) I know, but you see creating their law state from the very beginning by the violating of the law even with the situation if you consider themselves occupied country it's not the best way of doing busines in (?nowadays) world. This is my opinion.

[Goryachev] What impact do you think the economic sanctions will have on the population? [words indistinct]

[(Sanders)] It's odd, I think that the people who are going to feel the economic sanctions first are the Russian-speaking population there because of a lot of factory workers [indistinct interruption by Goryachev] are Russian speaking, the cut off of gas is first of all going to industrial enterprises, people are going to have to be laid off and they are going to feel the burden. But a large part of any population—working class population—unemployed,is unacceptable for more than a very short term it creates extremely destabilizd economic conditions and it will force the government there to take some kind of remedial action, which means taking actions that are either going to remedy the situation in a physical sense, getting more gas, where are they are going to get it, they're not. You can't push gas across the Baltic Sea, even if Sweden or Denmark wanted it to be there, (?if) there's no pipeline. Or take political actions that get the energy restored, and I think that's what's going to have to happen. So from a point of view of effective politics at least right now it looks like this tough measure is going to be an effective measure.

[Goryachev] Alright. Okay, go ahead, Viktor, you wanted to say something?

[(Borichuk)] I agree with Jonathan.

[Goryachev] You agree?

[(Borichuk)] Yes. Because, maybe you know why, because I'm a historian and I remember the experience of the United States. (?Weren't they trying in) their history in the middle of the 19th century to keep the union, unity of their state. Remember what kind of measure they decided to use?

[(Sanders)] That's right, they went to war, but of course there's nothing in the U.S. Constitution that allows a state to secede.

[(Borichuk)] Right, (?but it's getting over now to the finish of) the Civil War.

[(Sanders)] That's right.

[Goryachev] Right, we go now to the international aspect of the situation. President Bush is under serious pressure from at least some of the members of the Congress who are urging him to take a tougher stance towards the Soviet Union and special emphasis I think here is laid on the economic sanctions, on possible economic sanctions, against the Soviet Union, like, for example, not lifting the Jackson-Vanik Amendment or putting adrift the possible trade agreement between the two countries. A question to you, Jonathan, what do you think are the priorities of this administration, Lithuania or Soviet-American relations?

[(Sanders)] I think if you go by the president's most recent statement, he said that it's very tough to decide exactly what to do with the Soviet Union because relations with the Soviet Union are both so central and so delicate, and I think that's probably the right evaluation. It is a very hard thing because rhetorically and by conviction the American people want to believe in groups of people that are moving towards democracy and at least on some level that's what the people in Lithuania want. On the other hand, after all these years of the Cold War, the better relations with the Soviet Union, we're trying together to build some kind of new world order and any real shock to that new world order that is not yet fully formed could be a very fatal shock, so the President has to act carefully and expeditiously. That said there is a lot of pressure on him. I don't think it's pressure from Lithuanian-Americans particularly. It's pressure from political figures, from senators, from others inside and outside the administration. Some of it I believe is derived from people who no matter what gloss they put on it don't like a non-cold war situation, who feel more comfortable with the image of an enemy in the Soviet Union....

[Goryachev, interrupting] (?Yes) they got used to the old world, [words indistinct] new world.

[(Sanders)] They got very used to it and there's an anti-Soviet element and an anti-Russian element there as well as a pro-democracy element, and it's hard to figure out. The United States has most-favored-nation trading status with China, which murdered maybe a thousand young people in Tiananmen Square—this country is going away from democracy, and more towards Stalinism and yet a country like the Soviet Union that's trying to march away from Stalinism, we still don't have most favored nation trading status. That does not make a lot of sense to me.

[Goryachev] As for you, Viktor?

[(Borichuk)] Well for me the problem is more serious. It's not a question about Soviet domestic situation, not a question about Soviet-American relations, it's a question about a new mentality and a new world order, really. When we withdrew our troops from Afghanistan it was the beginning of a new way, of new mentality. Well when we proclaim our policy towards East Europe it was the same direction. Excuse me but when United States sent their troops to Panama it wasn't....

[Goryachev] New mentality....

[(Borichuk)] New mentality, yeah, yeah....

[Unidentified speaker] It was very old thinking.

[(Borichuk)] Yeah, and again when we discuss the situation round about Lithuania, Soviet-American relations, we must keep in mind the new order, new world order and new mentality. We start to create new relations between the countries and (?we must going down by this way)....

[Goryachev] We certainly must go this way....

[(Borichuk)] ...Without using forces, without using some tough measures and so on, keeping in mind law and order....

[(Sanders)], interrupting] I think that's right, and I think the new world order is just an infant and the infant is crying and being difficult and er....

[Unidentified speaker] ...very fragile....

[(Sanders)] And very fragile and delicate. And the adults have something else on their agenda, they're not all occupied with the new world order.

[Goryachev] Listen. Of course Mikhail Gorbachev has to take into account the reaction in the world, and in the United States in particular to the developments in Lithuania. In case Americans overreact—and this may happen, I don't know—but in case they overreact, do you think he will be ready to compromise, say, law and order in his own country and integrity in his own country (?for) relations with the United States?

[(Borichuk)] It's not so easy to answer your question—you know we could only guess....

[Goryachev] That's why I am asking it....

[(Borichuk)] ...We could only guess. But you know we have some experience of (?doing) with such kind of situation. One of these experiences is with the Helsinki process, (?from my) point of view. Maybe we must renew this approach to such a kind of situation. Helsinki process with participation of different countries, different opinions naturally, for discussion and preparation (?for) some or other way of decision.

[(Sanders)] I think that if the situation in Lithuania were to become so strained that the Soviet leadership believed that it was a threat to its domestic stability, that domestic consideration always takes precedence over foreign policy considerations and what was necessary, what would be necessary to preserve order and to preserve the existence of the Soviet Union would be taken and they would not pay attention to those external pressures. We've seen that happen time and time again, be it in the civil war or in the 1920's or in the 1930's, so I think what is necessary to be done will be done. We all hope that it doesn't get to that extreme.

[Goryachev] Sure.

[(Sanders)] And [words indistinct].

[(Borichuk)] My opinion is the priority is the domestic situation, the state of the union.

[Goryachev] Let's talk about the domestic affairs of the Soviet Union. We have about five minutes to go and what we see here is an economic decline. Now let me tell you that President Gorbachev calls for the radicalization of economic reform. That means that the program outlined by the government very recently is a failure?

[(Sanders)] Oh, I think the program outlined by the government is not enough, not bold enough. I think that the government's program has been watering down the good proposals made by people like Mr. Abalkin, to a lesser extent people like Mr. Shmelev from your institute, and I think that at some point very tough measures that are going to hurt everyone, very tough choices have to be made and they haven't quite been made yet. And the longer there's a muddle the worse the problems are going to be.

[Goryachev] By the way, Andrey Kortunov, the other panellist on this program who is currently in the United States, once said that the worse the situation is, the better—meaning that the worse the economic situation is the quicker the people will realize that in order to change their lives they cannot take half measures. They should act more actively. Do you agree with such an assumption?

[(Borichuk)] No, I am not agreeing. I'm not—the situation is very dangerous indeed, but saying the worse situation is for the better for the country it's something stupid it seems to me, really, from the political and economic point of view. But this law and discussion of this law in the parliament is the typical field of struggle

between old and new mentality. Look at one point. Fifty-five percent of taxation of, er....

[Goryachev] [Word indistinct], yes.

[(Borichuk)] is proposed.

[Goryachev] Yes.

[(Sanders)] Yes.

[(Borichuk)] It's all simply bigger than in any other country.

[(Sanders)] Well, I think (?quite)....

[(Borichuk)] Especially after Reagan, er, tax reform, you remember....

[(Sanders)] That's right, Reagan tax, now I don't think Reagan tax reform should be the model for the Soviet Union because it's not that progressive.

[(Borichuk)] Right, absolutely.

[(Sanders)] But it's—the idea in the debate now seems to be to punish the people who are enterepreneurs, to punish the people who by their initiative and by their energy are trying to build new kinds of structures that use profit motive to serve the vast majority of the people. They are not building steel plants. They are building factories that make clothes or small kinds of things and that's, that's very backward looking.

[Goryachev] So what we see is, on the one hand, calls for more radical reforms and on the other hand such kind of legislation being considered. It is very unconsistent, it seems to me.

[(Sanders)] Agreed, it's very unconsistent and I think there are people who have ideas about how to begin this very difficult process, the transition from total state control to a state control with a freer sector. No, this has never been done in the history of the world before.

[Goryachev] Mikail Gorbachev said at a recent Presidential Council that these reforms, his radical reforms, can survive only if supported by millions of people. I think it will be very, very difficult.

[(Borichuk)] I agree. Before the people can support what is called unpopular measures [indistinct interruption].

[(Borichuk)] I suppose people could support this reform but we need again, like in any other fields, we need time for understanding the idea of Gorbachev. Time for discussion, time for approval of his steps.

[Goryachev] But time is running out.

[(Borichuk)] Yes, yes, even in this room.

[(Sanders)] Yes, and time is running out very quickly.

[Goryachev] Right, our time is running out, too. That was "Top Priority" and my guests were (Jonathan Sanders) of CBS and (Viktor Borichuk) of the Institute of the United States and Canada Studies. Until next week, goodbye. I am Sergey Goryachev.

Western Criticisms of Lithuanian Actions Cited

PM2204181190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Single Edition p 5

[Roundup of TASS reports: "'They Are Wrong.' Western Press on Lithuania's Policy"]

[Text] Oslo, 20 Apr—The Norwegian Government does not intend to give Lithuania assistance in the form of oil supplies. "We received no specific promises about Norwegian aid," Lithuanian Prime Minister K. Prunskiene stated during her unofficial visit to Oslo.

During the talks with leaders of the government coalition parties and meetings with members of parliament the Lithuanian delegation tried to secure promises of economic aid from Norway. Above all, it was a question of supplies of Norwegian oil and gas. However, the Norwegian Government did not promise such assistance. The statements issued by Prime Minister Jan P. Syse and Foreign Minister K. Bondevik note that the Norwegian authorities cannot view or use oil as a policy means and that the question of oil supplies—or, more accurately, oil purchases—should be resolved with the oil companies. A spokesman for the Ministry of Oil and Energy reported that his department does not intend to issue any instructions to oil suppliers on this matter.

London, 20 Apr—Britain's BBC TV has also been devoting attention to these circumstances, stressing in a commentary on K. Prunskiene's visit to Norway that, despite her warm welcome, that country's government only promised economic assistance to the republic in general terms. As for oil and gas supplies, that was a matter for private companies. The latter agreed to supply oil on generally accepted business terms—that is, if Lithuania pays world market prices, rather than reduced prices. "The hope that Lithuania would be granted most-favored-nation status has not been borne out," the BBC sums up.

New York, 20 Apr—Commenting on the results of the talks which have just ended in Florida between the U.S. and French presidents, THE NEW YORK TIMES notes that "Both G. Bush and F. Mitterrand hinted that they attach greater importance to improving relations with Moscow than to an immediate settlement of the Lithuania situation."

"Privately," ABC TV stresses for its part, "many U.S. officials are expressing the opinion that the Lithuanians acted rashly in provoking a confrontation with Moscow."

Helsinki, 20 Apr—The Baltic republics are wrong to claim that they were occupied, that they are independent states, and that most countries have never refused to recognize them, the Finnish newspaper NYUKYUPYAYVYA [name as transliterated] writes,

analyzing the situation in Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia. After all, under international law an independent state must be in control of its own territory. The newspaper draws attention to the fact that the current complex situation has emerged at a time when the Soviet Union is stating its readiness and desire to become a rule-of-law state. Moreover, NYUKYUPYAYVYA stresses, the CSCE Final Act proclaimed the right to national independence and the inviolability of borders. That is why the CSCE countries cannot recognize the borders of the Baltic states until the USSR recognizes them.

Vienna, 20 Apr—From the historical standpoint Lithuania's demands to be granted independence seem justified, the Austrian newspaper OBEROESTERREICHISCHE NACHRICHTEN notes. However, the Lithuanian leadership, carried away by nationalistic sentiment, believes that its republic is the "hub of the universe."

Not only the Soviet Union but Western states have priority interests such as ensuring global detente between East and West, reducing arms, and improving the economy. All this is being put in the most serious jeopardy as a result of nationalistic actions.

United States & Canada

Senator Dole Says No Recognition of Lithuania

LD2204222690 Moscow TASS in English 2059 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] New York April 23 TASS—The U.S. Administration will not recognise Lithuania's independence, one of the most influential United States legislators and Republic leader Senator Robert Dole said in an ABC [word indistinct] programme.

Asked about his point of view on the possibility of Washington's recognition of an independent Lithuanian republic, he answered firmly that it would not happen. He said he did not believe the President would recognise Lithuania.

Kornilov on Brzezinski's Views on Lithuania

LD2004203590 Moscow TASS in English 1718 GMT 20 Apr 90

[By TASS political news analyst Yuriy Kornilov]

[Text] Moscow, April 20 TASS—In Russian literature there was a satirical character who stubbornly tried "to close America". But when he became convinced that all his efforts were in vain, he admitted: "This seems not to depend on me".

Zbigniew Brzezinski, a former assistant to the President for national security affairs, is more conceited: He believes he can "rescind" the Soviet Constitution with a stroke of his pen and even "close" the Soviet State. Read Mr. Brzezinski's lengthy opus in THE WASHINGTON TIMES newspaper.

"The piece deals with the situation around Soviet Lithuania, the topic now being discussed at length in the United States. This topic is covered differently. THE WALL STREET JOURNAL, for instance, has just issued the results of a public opinion poll which illustrate that six in every ten Americns are confident that for the United States it is more important to preserve friendly relations with the USSR than to protect Lithuanian separatists.

NEWSWEEK wrote much in the same vein a few days earlier.

These are reasonable arguments. Brzezinski's aim is to encourage and justify separatists and therefore he is ready to use the most surprising arguments. Those who favour Lithuania's separation from the USSR are known to frequently use unconstitutional methods and violate the country's basic law.

This is a fact, and it cannot be refuted. Brzezinski does not, in fact, deny it. His logic is: Yes, separatists might not fit into the constitutional framework, but there is no constitution in the USSR. "The Soviet Constitution is a piece of paper," he asserts. I would like to know his response if some Soviet political scientist or journalist spoke about the U.S. Constitution in the same insulting terms?

"Many Western, including American news organizations, touching upon the situation around Lithuania and Moscow's stand, note that any state, including the Soviet Union, is entitled to protect itself from a split. But Brzezinski contrives to design his own counter-argument. Yes, he says, the state has a right to protect itself, but the USSR is not a state.

Brzezinski is considered to be one of the most prominent American political scientists, specialising on Russia's affairs, and I am far from trying to assert the contrary. One is therefore surprised at his piece in which there is no serious analysis of the very complicated situation, but it abounds in unseemly and rough rhetoric and attacks against the USSR, couched in cold war style.

What aim is being pursued? In any case the aim is not to provide the American public with objective information and improve American-Soviet relations.

Americans Said To Support Bush on Lithuania

90UF0083 Moscow TRUD in Russian 15 April 90 p 3

[Report by TRUD special correspondent V. Sisnev: "Just Remember South Carolina... Americans Debate Events in Lithuania"]

[Text] Washington, April—Following the 11 March declaration by the Lithuanian Supreme Council of the "full independence" of its republic from the Soviet Union, the subject has been constantly covered in the newspapers and on the television screens. Stormy debates have also taken place in both houses of Congress. The House of Representatives demanded that President Bush immediately assume a harsher tone in the dialogue with the Soviet leadership, and if it uses force in Lithuania then, they say, it must be prepared for serious complications in American-Soviet relations. Similar admonitions were given to Secretary of State Baker on the eve of his recent meeting with the Soviet foreign minister...

But whereas in the past it was relatively easy to count on the success of any "fiery words" used to excite anti-Soviet passions, this is now much more difficult. Americans want to work things out for themselves before waving good-bye to everything that has been achieved in the dialogue between our two countries.

Washington correspondent for NEWSWEEK, Margaret Warner, offered a curious analysis in the latest issue under the headline "Ignoring the Politicians and the Sages." What she means is that President Bush is reluctant to follow the recommendations from the Capitol and certain experts, and instead is listening to his own common sense and his own opinion. "By disregarding the opinion of the Congress on the Lithuanian question," M. Warner writes, "Bush is now relying on the predominating public opinion." A NEWSWEEK poll

showed that by a majority of two to one Americans think that maintaining good relations with Gorbachev is more important than defending Lithuania."

A little earlier a similar poll had been conducted by the NEW YORK TIMES and the CBS television company and had concluded: "There is no confirmation that the test of wills between Gorbachev and the separatists in Lithuania has damaged his popularity, at least not at this time." Some 39 percent of those polled approved of how the U.S. President is conducting himself in this situation and only 19 percent were dissatisfied. A total of 41 percent supported the view that good American-Soviet relations are more important than supporting the efforts of Lithuania to break its ties with the Soviet Union. According to this poll, 31 percent of Americans hold the opposite view.

Incidentally, not all the "sages" share the position of the congressmen. There is very lively debate on a thesis put forward by professor of history at Columbia University, Eric Foner [name as published], who suggests that "there is a real and true parallel between Lincoln and M.S. Gorbachev" since Lincoln's position, like Gorbachev's, was that no matter how the union had been created it could not simply be cast aside. "So why," asks Professor Foner, "do we praise Lincoln, who started a war to save our union, while we revile Gorbachev for implementing milder measures?" He goes on to examine the precedent created by the state of South Carolina, which was the first to decide to secede from the American federation, which ultimately led to the Civil War.

And here is the assessment of the situation offered by Jean Kirkpatrick, who used to be the U.S. representative to the United Nations (she has been published in TRUD) and is now a political observer syndicated in dozens of American newspapers. She published an article entitled, "What Gorbachev Is Proposing Is Not So Unreasonable." Disregarding the assessments of national policy in the past and the present, let me say only that although she claims that "Gorbachev has again demonstrated his desire to handle this matter through some mutual agreement, but he is at the same time ready to use force where this cannot be achieved," her conclusion is well-considered and calm.

J. Kirkpatrick indicates that "Gorbachev has shown a desire to follow the provisions of the Constitution on the conditions for secession that have been ignored by all his predecessors." Moreover, she emphasizes that the very process of secession being proposed cannot be called unjustified, and that a two-thirds majority is needed for constitutional amendments and changes, and also a transition period. In general, in the opinion of J. Kirkpatrick, who can be very sharp and impartial, what Gorbachev has proposed is a "solution to the situation."

It is worth adding that all the statements cited are based on the premise that some form of constructive dialogue will take place with Lithuania.

Commentary Examines U.S. Views on Lithuania

LD2004110190 Moscow in English to North America 2300 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Vladislav Kozyakov commentary]

[Text] When we in the Soviet Union hear American officials calling for dialogue to solve the complicated problems around the constituent republic of Lithuania, we fully support these officials. We support them because both President Gorbachev and parliament insist on dialogue and the Constitution to settle the situation. Moscow has emphasized that if there is to be a dialogue the situation in Lithuania must be returned to what it was on 10th March before the republic proclaimed independence in haste and secrecy.

But the meaning Washington wants dialogue to convey is both strange and one-sided. It tries to teach the Soviet leaders lessons. When oil and gas deliveries to Lithuania were slashed to (?meet) the new economic relations with the republic, the White House made understood that there are limits to U.S. patience and that it is greatly concerned by this particular move. And some in the administration and Congress even suggest applying sanctions against this country by suspending trade talks or lifting contacts.

Does anyone believe in earnest that by trying to teach this country lessons or interfere in its affairs he can help settle the problems the nation is facing? And can dialoghue be a one-way street? The situation around Lithuania is rooted in the unwillingness of its leaders to abide by the Constitution and other laws on how a republic can secede from the Soviet Union. If American politicians truly want a dialogue they should advise the Lithuanian leaders that they should abide by the Constitution.

The understanding of what the West must do for successful dialogue seems to be gaining momentum in the West. The French foreign minister Roland Dumas has told the National Assembly that members of the European Community should not only address Moscow but give the Lithuanian people to understand that dialogue is all the more necessary to solve the complicated problems.

The Soviet Union is not alone to take an interest in the problems around Lithuania to be solved through dialogue. Other nations too take the same interest because the international situation depends on the course of the events in the Soviet Union. Most Americans too seem to understand this. They definitely disagree with those Washington officials who try to exacerbate the situation. In an opinion poll conducted by the NBC and WALL STREET JOURNAL, two-thirds of the Americans polled said their country must not interfere in the situation around Lithuania. And one out of six said that the United States must preserve friendly ties with the Soviet Union at all costs.

Bogachev on Planned U.S. Troop Cuts in Asia

LD2004195590 Moscow TASS in English 1936 GMT 20 Apr 90

[By TASS military writer Vladimir Bogachev]

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—The U.S. Administration which recently came under the fire of criticism in the Congress for the unwillingness to cooperate with the Soviet Union and other countries in easing the military confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region now announced that in the current century the United States does not intend to change the basic provisions of its military strategy in East Asia.

On April 18 U.S. President George Bush sent to the Congress a Pentagon report on the U.S. strategic concept regarding the Asia-Pacific region. It, specifically, follows from the report that in the foreseeable future the U.S. Armed Forces will remain stationed in Japanese territory, including the U.S. naval base at Yokosuka, and at the air force base at Misawa. The U.S. nuclear umbrella over the region will be preserved.

Military detente has started in the Asia-Pacific region in the recent years. But on the whole, the rates of the lessening of military confrontation in the region are much lower than in Europe, first of all for the reason that measures for the lessening of the danger of war in Asia have so far been taken only by the Soviet Union.

In accordance with the comprehensive programme of the Soviet policy in the Asia-Pacific region, set out by Mikhail Gorbachev in 1986 in Vladivostok and later specified in Krasnoyarsk, the Soviet Union has already made considerable cuts in its armed forces in the Far East, decided on the complete withdrawal of its troops from Mongolia and started decreasing its military presence in Vietnam.

The United States belated reaction to the changed situation in the world was more than modest. Washington has just announced its plans to cut the numerical strength of its armed forces in East Asia by ten per cent over three years. This means that 5,000 U.S. troops will be "compensated for" by the modernisation of U.S. armaments in the region.

Pentagon Chief Richard Cheney says that if U.S. troops are withdrawn from the Asia-Pacific region, a vacuum will be formed, the arms race will be started, tension will heighten and conflicts break out.

But it is said in Tokyo not without reason that the Pentagon proclaims the tasks of containing Japan's militarisation first of all for the purpose of justifying its demands for new military expenditures, also in the Far East.

Meanwhile, the world is entering a new period of international relations. Creating an effective forum with the participation of the leading Asia-Pacific countries to discuss and regulate important problems of the region becomes a priority. The solution of this task can apparently play a more important role in "containing the militarisation" of countries of the region than the planned military presence in lands of others for ten or more years.

Planned Soviet-U.S. Trade Talks To Be Held

LD2004224590 Moscow in English to Great Britian and Ireland 1900 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Soviet-American trade talks continue despite the Lithuanian crisis. Their next round, a Soviet Embassy official in France has told to journalists, will take place in Paris next week as was planned. The negotiators are expected to draft a new trade accord. The next step in this direction is to be the most-favored-nation status in trade to be granted to the Soviet Union by Washington. This may be expected even before a Soviet-American summit which is to last from 30th May to 3d June.

PRAVDA Chief Frolov Arrives in U.S. 21 Apr

LD2204053290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0402 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Washington, 22 Apr (TASS)—On Saturday [21 April] Academician I.T.Frolov, CPSU Central Committee secretary and editor in chief of the "PRAVDA" newspaper, arrived in the United States at the invitation of a number of influential scientific and public organizations.

In the course of the journey across the country, the CPSU Central Committee secretary will visit Los Angeles, San Francisco, and Washington. At the invitation of the authoritative Californian "Town Hall" public organization, I.T.Frolov will deliver a speech in Los Angeles on "perestroyka and humanism". He will also meet participants in the congress of the National Newspaper Association of the United States. [passage omitted]

In the course of the visit to the United States, I.T.Frolov will hold an exchange of opinions with G. Harrison and J. Nesbit, well-known American political and public figures, on the initiative of the renowned West Coast (?Esalen) Institute. The issues of the improvement and further development of Soviet-American relations, lending them more predictability and dynamism, as well as the expansion of interaction between the two countries in the most varied fields, will be studied.

At the next stage of the journey, in the U.S. capital, the CPSU Central Committee secretary will speak at an international symposium organized by the FIDIA [expansion unknown] research fund and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. Meetings are also planned with eminent representatives of United States political and academic circles.

This journey is gaining particular significance in light of the forthcoming summit meeting of the USSR and U.S.

presidents, which is aimed at becoming a qualitatively new stage in the continuation and expansion of Soviet-American dialogue.

China

Li Peng Pays Official Visit to Moscow 23 Apr

Seen Off at Beijing Airport

LD2304013190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0043 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Beijing, 23 April (TASS)—Today Li Peng, member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee Politburo, premier of the PRC State Council, left Beijing for Moscow on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet Government. He is accompanied by Qian Qichen, PRC minister of foreign affairs, and others officials.

This is the first visit to the USSR by the head of the Chinese Government since 1964 when Zhou Enlai visited the Soviet Union.

Among those seeing off Li Peng at Beijing International Airport were Jiang Zemin, general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee, as well as Yao Yilin and Wu Xuequian, vice premiers of the State Council.

Welcomed in Moscow

LD2304090490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 23 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] Li Peng, member of the Standing Committee of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party and premier of the State Council, began an official visit to our country today. [passage omitted]

A few minutes ago Li Peng arrived in Moscow. At the airport Li Peng and his wife were welcomed by Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov and his wife, Eduard Amvrosiyevich Shevardnadze, and other officials. [video shows Li Peng descending aircraft steps to be greeted by Ryzhkov and Shevardnadze]

Issues Arrival Statement

LD2304141190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1150 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow 23 April (TASS)—A written statement by Li Peng, premier of the PRC State Council, has been circulated here. It was made by him today on his arrival in Moscow for an official visit. The statement reads:

"I am very glad to have arrived in Moscow for an official visit to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics at the invitation of the Soviet Government.

"Last May General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev paid a visit to the PRC, and the normalization of Sino-Soviet relations was accomplished. In the past year, acting in the spirit of the joint Sino-Soviet communique, the Chinese and Soviet sides ahve secured fresh development of their mutual relations in the fields of politics, economics, trade, science and technology, culture, education, and so on. The purpose of my visit is to further this process. During my visit I shall be exchanging opinions with the USSR President Comrade Mikhail Gorbachev, Chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers Comrade Nikolay Ryzhkov, and other Soviet leaders on issues of bilateral relations and major international problems of mutual interest.

"The Chinese side is consistently striving to maintain and develop relations of friendship and cooperaton with all countries on the basis of the five principles of peaceful coexistence. The peoples of China and the Soviet Union are bound by their traditional friendship, and the prospects are good for the development of relations between our two great neighboring socialist states, the PRC and the USSR. We are sure that an improvement in Sino-Soviet relations will not merely serve the fundamental interests of the people of our two countries, but will promote the cause of peace and development in Asia and throughout the world.

"I should like to take this opportunity to express my highest regard for the people of the city of Moscow and the whole of the great Soviet people."

Statement Welcomes Visit by PRC's Li Peng

LD2204205190 Moscow TASS in English 2031 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 23 TASS—Premier of the Chinese State Council Li Peng, who is also member of the Standing Committee of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee's Politburo, arrives in Moscow today at the invitation of the Soviet Government, says an official statement released here today.

Li Peng, the statement notes, is well-known in the Soviet Union. He has met Soviet leaders more than once.

Hope is expressed in the Soviet Union that Li Peng's visit will help deepen relations of friendship and good-neighbourliness between the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic, strengthen trust and mutual understanding and develop cooperation in solving vital international issues, the statement stresses.

Li Peng Profile Published on Day of Arrival

PM2304085990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 23 Apr 90 Second Edition pp 1, 4

[Unattributed article: "Visiting the Soviet Union: PRC State Council Premier Li Peng"]

[Text] Li Peng, member of the CPC Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee and premier of the PRC

State Council, will arrive in Moscow today on an official visit at the invitation of the Soviet government.

Li Peng was born in the city of Chengdu, Sichuan Province, in 1928. Beginning in 1941, he studied at the Yanan secondary school, the Yanan Academy of Natural Sciences, and the Zhangjiakou industrial school. He joined the CPC in 1945.

Beginning in 1948, he studied at the Moscow Power Industry Institute, and while studying in the Soviet Union he was elected chairman of the Association of Societies of Chinese Students Studying in the USSR.

Following his return to the PRC in 1954, he worked at power industry enterprises. In 1955 he was deputy director and chief engineer at the Fengman power station, Jilin Province, and then deputy chief engineer at the Northeast China Power Industry Administration, and director of Fuxin power station, Liaoning Province.

In 1966 he was transferred to work in Beijing as chief of the city Power Supply Administration, and was acting secretary and party committee secretary of that administration.

In 1979-1983 he was PRC deputy minister of water resources and electrical industry, then minister and party committee secretary at the ministry.

In 1983 Li Peng was appointed deputy premier of the PRC State Council and became a member of the CPC Central Committee leadership group for financial and economic questions, where he was in charge of transportation, power supply, and extracting industry sectors.

Between June 1985 and April 1988 he also held the post of chairman of the PRC State Committee for Education.

Between May 1987 and April 1988 he was acting premier of the PRC State Council.

In April 1988 Li Peng was appointed premier of the PRC State Council at the first session of the NPC [National People's Congress], Seventh Convocation.

Comrade Li Peng was a member of the CPC Central Committee, 12th and 13th Convocations. In 1985 he became a member of the CPC Central Committee Politburo and Secretariat. Since November 1987 he has been a member of the CPC Central Committee Politburo Standing Committee.

Comrade Li Peng is well known in the Soviet Union. He has repeatedly met Soviet leaders.

People in the Soviet Union express the hope that the visit by the PRC State Council premier will serve the further deepening of the relations of friendship and good neighborliness between the USSR and the PRC, the strengthening of trust and mutual understanding, and the development of cooperation in solving the most important international problems.

TASS Views Significance of Li Peng Visit

LD2304095590 Moscow TASS in English 0925 GMT 23 Apr 90

[By TASS diplomatic correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 23 TASS—The official visit of Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng to the Soviet Union, which begins today, should become an important step towards the further development of the entire range of Sino-Soviet relations.

Li's visit to the USSR underscores the importance of continuing the Sino-Soviet dialogue at the summit level, which began a year ago and signalled the normalization of relations between the two countries.

A unanimous view was expressed in Beijing a year ago that bilateral relations can successfuly develop only on the basis of universally recognized principles of peaceful coexistence. The sides noted that they meant not a return to the relations of the 1950's but the departure from the confrontation that existed in the past.

Both sides expressed readiness to reduce troops deployed in areas of the Soviet-Chinese border and agreed to develop a respective treaty mechanism. They also decided to enhance the level of the talks on border settlement.

The USSR and China have ample opportunities for cooperation in trade, economic, scientific-technical, cultural and other areas. The need was voiced during last year's visit to put economic and scientific-technical cooperation on a long-term basis. Metallurgy, power engineering, transport and consumer goods production were named among the priority areas.

The new stage in Sino-Soviet ties was marked by appreciable headway in many areas. The two countries have revitalized a programme of scientific-technical cooperation. Their academies of science have restored links and an agreement of economic and technical cooperation, building and retooling industrial facilities has been signed.

Sino-Soviet trade turnover reached a record 2.4 billion rubles in 1989. An important document has been signed in Moscow recently, which envisages a boost in bilateral cooperation in the field of education in 1991-1995.

In an interview with the Soviet press ahead of his visit to Moscow, Li noted that after bilateral relations were normalized, Sino-Soviet ties had been developing in the right direction but could, in his view, advance more rapidly.

People in both countries hope that the present visit will give a fresh impetus to bilateral ties. It should affect all aspects of relations: politics, the economy, culture, science and technology, and should also help lower the level of military confrontation in border areas.

All these issues will be the topic of the forthcoming conversations and talks between the Soviet and Chinese leaders.

The program of the visit includes meetings at Soviet ministries and agencies, with representatives of the Soviet-Chinese Friendship Society and Soviet specialists who worked in China.

Soviet Sinologist Comments on Li Peng's Visit

OW2204191490 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Soviet Sinologist (Roginov's) commentary: "The Present Stage of the Development of Soviet-Chinese Relations"]

[Text] The current good situation in Soviet-Chinese relations did not appear spontaneously. It appeared only because the two countries, well aware of their genuine and mutual interests, have made unremitting efforts. The summit held last May was a milestone on this road and represented the peak of a complicated process which lasted many years in which the two great neighboring countries sought mutual understanding. If we recall that summit and the primary results embodied within the joint communique, we can happily state that thanks to the implementation of the principles of the Soviet-Chinese communique on 18 May 1989, good results have been achieved.

A few days ago, a press briefing for Soviet and foreign reporters pointed out: Since Comrade Gorbachev visited China in May 1989, the Soviet Union and China have been developing their ties well. Developments have been made in all fields, and more concrete work has been accomplished through a continuously thickening atmosphere of mutual understanding. The forthcoming visit to our country by the premier of the Chinese State Council will be, in line with today's demands and hopes, yet another milestone on the road toward expanding Soviet-Chinese cooperation and Chinese-Soviet ties.

Soviet Sinologist (Roginov) concluded that he felt the coming visit will, on the one hand, show the effectiveness of the policy adopted by our two countries in developing bilateral relations, and on the other hand, substantially deepen the path of our relations in a new context. This will conform to the interests of the people of the Soviet Union and China.

Li Peng Visit, Mongolian Foreign Policy Viewed

OW2004125890 Moscow International Service in Mandarin 1400 GMT 18 Apr 90

[Text] Listeners, people in the Soviet Union believe that the upcoming official visit to the Soviet Union by Li Peng, premier of the State Council of the PRC, is an important step in extending Sino-Soviet dialogue.

This remark was made by Perfilyev, first deputy director of the Information Bureau of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, at a news conference in Moscow on 17 April. While explaining the characteristics of Soviet-Sino relations as a whole, he stressed: Since Comrade Gorbachev's visit to China last May, the diverse links between the two countries have been marked by dynamism and an atmosphere of mutual understanding, as well as development in different areas.

The Soviet Foreign Ministry spokesman continued: The Soviet Union has made a positive appraisal of Mongolia's intention to develop normal relatons with all interested countries, especially with its neighbors in East Asia, without consideration of differences in ideology.

In commenting on the statement made by Mongolian Deputy Foreign Minister Oldzboy concerning the principle guiding Mongolian foreign policy, the Soviet diplomat said: This statement has summed up the measures adopted by Mongolia's leadership to reform international relations in line with the principle of new political ideas. Perfilyev expressed satisfaction with the present cooperation between the Soviet Union and Mongolia in the field of foreign policy. He expressed the belief that the adjustment of Mongolia's diplomacy in line with national interests and the needs of the country will further consolidate the foundation of coordination between the Soviet Union and Mongolia in the field of foreign policy.

He also told the journalists about an article by (Keratov), published by Moscow's (?NEWSWEEK) [xin wen zhou kan], entitled "China Is Seeking Stability." The article represents only the writer's understanding of China's conditions. He stressed that this article has nothing to do with the Soviet Union's well-known official position. The Soviet Union's principled line will remain unchanged. In other words, Taiwan is an inalienable part of China and is a province of China. The Soviet Union will not have any official contacts with Taiwan, and any form of political relations with the Taiwan authorities is out of the question.

Rogachev, PRC Press Department Chief Meet

PM1904145390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 17 April USSR Deputy Foreign Minister I.A. Rogachev received Li Zhaoxing, PRC assistant foreign minister and chief of the PRC Foreign Ministry Press Department, who is in Moscow for consultations at the USSR Foreign Ministry. Yu Hongliang, PRC ambassador to the USSR, took part in the friendly talks.

Northeast Asia

DPRK Embassy in Moscow Marks KPA Anniversary

SK2304083490 Moscow International Service in Korean 1100 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] A press conference was held today in the DPRK Embassy in Moscow on the occasion of the 58th anniversary of the founding of the Korean People's Army [KPA].

Major General Kim Chong-chang, military attache of the embassy, briefly introduced the history on the founding of the KPA and present situation while making remarks for reporters. He denounced the South Korean Armed Forces for participating in the "Team Spirit" military exercise.

He pointed out that the new peace proposals by the DPRK leadership brought about preconditions for the development of dialogue between the North and the South of Korea.

General Kim Chong-chang expressed thanks to the Soviet people who helped the Korean people during the 1950-53 war period.

Rogachev Talks With DPRK's Kang Sok-chu

PM2304092690 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 20 April I.A. Rogachev, USSR deputy foreign minister, held talks with Kang Sok-chu, DPRK first vice foreign minister, who was stopping over in Moscow en route to the UN General Assembly special session in New York. Certain aspects of the situation on the Korean Peninsula and the international situation as a whole were discussed.

Mistrust Still Impedes Korean Settlement

PM1904134190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 19 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[Feature comprising dispatch by TASS correspondent A. Zhebin from Pyongyang, dispatch by TASS correspondent V. Kuchko from Seoul, and P. Timofeyev report on interview with G.V. Kireyev, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Asian Socialist Countries Administration: "By the Last Wall. What Is Impeding Dialogue Between North and South Korea"]

[Text] Pyongyang—Through the army stereoscopic telescope the barely visible light gray strip in the distance appeared a mighty structure reminiscent of a fortress wall. This resemblance was intensified by the tightly closed gateway, which, judging by its size, could quite easily let a heavy truck or tank pass through. From the Korean People's Army post where foreigners are taken to look at the "symbol of national division" erected by the South Koreans, the vast concrete snake of the wall looked particularly unnatural against the backdrop of the surrounding peaceful—at first glance—landscape.

That was the view over the "front" line, as people in North Korea describe the almost 250 km strip of the demilitarized zone. Over 40 years of national division, mistrust, and suspicion mean that the demilitarized zone is now such in name alone.

Over the last few months, since the fall events in the GDR, including the effective opening of the border between the two German states and the dismantling of the Berlin wall, the DPRK press has made no comment on them. Information for the local reader about the changes in the GDR and in other East European states has been limited to brief official reports.

But the New Year speech delivered by Kim Il-song, general secretary of the WPK [Workers Party of Korea] and DPRK president, said that the DPRK "insists on smashing the barrier between North and South, free travel, and comprehensive reciprocal opening of the doors between the two parts of the country." Moreover, the speech noted that the "ferroconcrete barriers" must be eliminated "first of all." Although the Berlin Wall was not mentioned in this speech and there was only talk of "the opening of gates in the barriers dividing another country," I will voice my own personal opinion that the demand for the elimination of the "Korean wall," which is advantageous propaganda, was indisputably prompted by the response which events in central Europe elicited worldwide.

With the commencement of the latest U.S.-South Korean "Team Spirit-90" maneuvers Pyongyang announced its decision to break off all talks with Seoul, barring sporting contacts, until the end of these exercises. What is more, the DPRK has stated on several occasions that the stationing of U.S. troops in South Korea is the main obstacle to unification, including the establishment of dialogue and the development of contacts between the two parts of the country. It is well known that the operational leadership of virtually all South Korea's Armed Forces is concentrated in the hands of the U.S. general who commands the 43,000-strong expeditionary corps and is at the same time the head of the U.S.-South Korean joint command, set up in 1978. For this reason the DPRK press has declared South Korea to be a "full-blown colony of U.S. imperialism" and describes the Seoul administration as nothing but a "puppet clique with no real power."

The DPRK and South Korea each still regards itself as the "only legitimate state" on the Korean Peninsula and strives to ensure that its allies also display this approach. Pyongyang, in particular, sharply condemns Seoul's "northern diplomacy" aimed at normalizing its relations with socialist countries, and also its intention to join the United Nations. People here believe that this will "perpetuate the split" and enshrine the existence of "two Koreas."

Thus the elimination of the structure which people in the DPRK call the "wall" and people in the South call "antitank obstacles" would be rather just one of the first practical steps to clear the accretions of fear, bitterness, and suspicion that are so vividly embodied in this barrier.

Seoul—People describe the northern part of the Cholwon area, 80 km from Seoul and adjacent to the central sector of the demilitarized zone, as the "iron triangle." During the Korean war there was fierce fighting in this small area marked by three mountains. Now, 37 years later after the signing of the armistice agreement, normal life has still not returned to the ravaged land.

From the top of the hill where the Menkong observation post is located, the strip of fortifications extending several kilometers like a dam from east to west is clearly visible through binoculars.

"They are antitank obstacles," a division staff officer explained to journalists. "In our sector they are approximately 8.5 km long and over five meters high. You are seeing the fortifications which people in the North describe as the 'concrete wall' perpetuating our country's division."

Asked whether it is time in the current international situation for both sides to set about dismantling the barriers—concrete and other—the South Korean general said: "This is a matter for politicians. We military men must be ready to repulse a threat."

During conversations in Seoul officials invariably advocated dialogue with the DPRK, the start of inter-Korean contacts, and the peaceful resolution of conflict situations. "We and the North have the same goal—uniting our homeland—but the roads toward it differ. We believe that we must begin with active exchanges of people, the expansion of contacts, and the development of trade and economic ties in order to create an atmosphere of mutual understanding and trust between the two sides," Chung Suk-hong, assistant minister of national unification, said. "South Korea also proposes that the North and South sign a nonaggression treaty. A treaty which has legal force and provides guarantees, rather than a declaration, as the North Korean side is proposing. After this we could begin to discuss difficult military-political problems. We also believe that South Korea must be a participant in replacing the existing armistice agreement with a peace treaty."

The South Korean side blames the DPRK for the lack of progress in overcoming the split, claiming that, despite the tremendous changes in the world, "there are no changes in the North Korean leadership's policy," and that "although Pyongyang talks about peaceful unification, in fact it has not abandoned its previous course" and is continuing to ideologize the problem of the split.

"We cannot but be worried by the fact that the WPK's program and the North Korean Constitution contain provisions concerning the unification of the country by revolutionary methods," Chung Suk-hong, South Korean deputy foreign minister, said in conversation with me.

People in Seoul refer to the "North's military superiority," using this thesis to justify the presence of U.S. troops in the south of the Korean Peninsula. It has not as yet proved possible to find points of contact on the complex question of reducing military-political confrontation on the peninsula and seeking ways to overcome the split amid the atmosphere of mutual suspicion. The barriers of mistrust and hostility that accumulated during the "cold war" years seem far more solid than reinforced concrete.

USSR Foreign Ministry Commentary

The situation that persists to this day on the Korean Peninsula can be described as unique. For nearly 40 years an armistice has been in force between the Korean-Chinese side and the UN troops represented by U.S. combat formations. All attempts to conclude a peace treaty have so far ended in failure. Our country is linked with the DPRK by decades of friendship and close cooperation. The Soviet Union has no diplomatic relations and until recently had no contacts at all with South Korea. The situation is changing now.

Soviet-South Korean scientific and trade ties are developing vigorously. Kim Yong-sam, cochairman of South Korea's ruling Democratic Liberal Party, recently paid a visit to the USSR. Direct air links have been established between Seoul and Moscow. The dynamics of our relations allow us to suppose that in a few years the Soviet Union will have equally intensive contacts with both North and South Korea. What is impeding the process of Korean unification and what ways of normalizing relations between the two countries do people in the Soviet Union see? Our correspondent P. Timofeyev asked G.V. Kireyev, chief of the USSR Foreign Ministry Asian Socialist Countries Administration, this question.

[Timofeyev] To attempt to give a brief answer to the question as to what is impeding dialogue between North and South Korea, it is the tension that has persisted on the peninsula for more than 40 years and the mutual mistrust and suspicion. Regrettably, it has not hitherto proved possible to eliminate them.

Given contemporary realities, the creation of an atmosphere of stability and security on the Korean Peninsula must, in our view, be the top priority in resolving the Korean problem. We believe that all forms of inter-Korean dialogue must be supported.

Above all I think that the arms race on the Korean Peninsula must be halted. Obviously, the stockpiling of arms in North and South is fraught with the danger of conflict. Both Pyongyang and Seoul are aware of this danger—moreover, of late they have realized it increasingly acutely. The DPRK's initiative regarding the

phased reduction of the North and South Korean Armed Forces to 100,000 men on each side by 1992 is constructive.

A reduction in the U.S. military presence in South Korea would also undoubtedly help to normalize the situation on the Korean Peninsula. Washington has announced the first steps in this direction. During the first phase of the U.S. troop withdrawal—in 1991-1993—it is intended to withdraw 2,000 U.S. Air Force servicemen from South Korea, along with approximately 5,000 ground forces personnel. I would like, however, the United States not to stop at this. We want foreign troops to be withdrawn from other states' territories, including South Korea.

Questions relating to the Korean Peninsula, like the situation in Afghanistan and Cambodia, are the subject of constant discussion between us and the Americans. This topic is broached in talks at all levels. I must say that the dialogue has become much more thorough and constructive of late. Neither we nor the United States are now interested in exacerbating the situation in the region. Each side consults and exchanges information with its ally on the peninsula, but we have no right to make any decisions behind the Koreans' backs. The way to North-South unification—and it is, I believe, inevitable—lies through peaceful dialogue between Pyongyang and Seoul. They themselves must, beyond a shadow of a doubt, determine the forms, methods, and specific time of reunification. It is our profound conviction that Korean unification can only result from an expression of the will of the entire Korean people and must be implemented by peaceful, democratic, and nonviolent means.

Soviet Historian Views Who Started Korean War

SK2204225490 Moscow International Service in Korean 0900 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Interview with Soviet historian Mikhail Smirnov by an identified reporter; passages between quotation marks are recording of Smirnov in Russian fading into Korean translation by announcer]

[Text] We will carry the talk by Soviet historian Mikhail Smirnov. While expressing his completely personal view on the situation leading up to the 1950-1953 Korean War and a lesson from this war, Mikhail Smirnov said:

"Positive military construction based upon partisan units started in North Korea right after the country was liberated. Pyongyang Military School and Central School charged with training security personnel and similar institutes opened in 1945 and 1946. They became the foundation of the Korean People's Army, which was founded on 8 February 1948.

Similar events also took place on the southern half. A law on founding the national armed forces composed of approximately 100,000 was adopted on 30 November 1948 in the ROK. As a result, new military units and combined units were founded with the direct assistance of Americans. President Syngman Rhee did not express any hope for constructive dialogue with Kim Il-song. Rather, he declared on 30 September 1949:

I firmly believe that, from a psychological perspective, now is the most appropriate time to take aggressive measures. We must drive Kim Il-song's personnel into mountainous areas, where we will gradually starve them to death. At that time, our defense line must be strengthened along the Tuman River and the Yalu River.

These events took place in the wake of a military and political confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union. The two Korean states exercised the jurisdiction of their respective regime upon the other side's territory [as heard]. Also, confrontational spirits prevailed. What served as an indirect momentum that endorsed the assertion that problems be solved militarily was the victory of the Chinese revolution."

Regarding the reporter's question of what he could say about outside forces' role in the preparations of the Korean War, Mikhail Smirnov said:

"It is clear that outside forces played a role. Just like the Soviet Union gave assistance to North Korea in founding its army, the United States gave similar assistance to South Korea. Without such assistance, neither of the Korean states would have been able to found their armed forces. Therefore, this means that the powers got indirectly involved in the preparations of the Korean War. In addition to this, as a result of the withdrawal of the Soviet and U.S. forces from the Korean peninsula, the political groups in the North and South, which were hostile to each other, could act freely in essence. I think that this is one of the most important factors that helped in the start of the war. Also, I would like to stress that the leaders of the two Korean states respectively had a certain degree of political connections with Washington and Moscow. I think that as a result of the 1950 visit to Moscow by Kim Il-song, the Korean leadership may have come to believe that we supported a military solution to the reunification problem. It may have come to believe so also because of the fact that, in carrying out his activities, Stalin had used such a method."

Foreign historic documents on the Korean War doubtlessly prove the notion that the North Korean side's acts hastened the start of this war. However, Soviet historians have a completely different view. What do you think of this?

Regarding this question, Mikhail Smirnov said:

"The (?Pyongyang) side prepared this war. Over this issue, the study of history in the Soviet Union has had the following view, that is, approximately 10 divisions of the South Korean armed forces launched a surprise attack across the 38th parallel against the North Korean territory early on the morning of 25 June 1950. I think that all of this is contrary to fact. I think the fact that we have persistently maintained this view for many years can only be explained by the fact that ideology has

played an excessive role in the overall aspects of the study of history and, in particular, Soviet-Korean relations. If, believing their power, [alleged] aggressors had started the war, how can it explain the fact that the North's forces occupied Seoul as early as 28 June and later occupied almost 90 percent of the territory of the southern half?"

Regarding the question of whether there is a danger of a breakout of a new war on the Korean peninsula, Mikhail Smirnov said:

"As long as there remains a difference in the political attitudes of the two Korean states toward the division of Korea and how to solve this problem, there will exist such a danger. However, a fundamentally different approach to resolving regional disputes in view of the overall political atmospheres of the world has drastically reduced such a threat. I think that an important lesson from the Korean War is that no dispute can be resolved through means of force [sillyoguibangboburonun]. If there is anything that is solved through means of force, a serious and, at times, tragic accident will not be avoided. Big countries had walked painful roads through Vietnam and Afghanistan for a long time until they realized this truth. It will be a dangerous illusion in the future, too, to continuously adhere to means of force. History has proven to us that we cannot ignore the principle of history and that of social development. There is only one way out, that is, dialogue. The earlier the dialogue starts, the less painful it will be for the reformist procedure participants in such dialogue."

Japan's Kaifu Comments on Relations With USSR

PM2004132790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 p 3

[Interview with Japanese Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu by special correspondent P. Vedenyapin and own correspondent N. Tsvetkov in Tokyo: "Sincerity Is His Creed"; date of interview not specified]

[Text] [KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Mr. Prime Minister, tell us a state secret. You are the first of the "Showa generation"—those born after 1925—to become a parliamentary deputy, then a minister, and now head of government. What is the secret of your political success? Your youth alone?

[Kaifu] In 1960, at the 29th general election, I was elected to parliament at the age of 29 and became a deputy in the House of Representatives. Last year I was elected prime minister, the first representative of the "Showa generation" to hold this post. There is no secret here. I simply tried to do my duty conscientiously at this stage in my political activity. Of course, I was supported by my teachers and comrades, above all by former Prime Minister Takeo Miki, now deceased. But there was, of course, simply luck...

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] You have more than 30 years experience of parliamentary activity, and this has probably enabled you to single out with some degree of certainty the main quality necessary for a politician...

[Kaifu] When people ask me for a "shikishi" (a special sheet of paper on which Japanese write a kind of motto and their autograph—correspondents' note) as a memento, I write just one word—"sincerity." This word is, in my opinion, the most important. When I first submitted my candidacy to parliament, my motto was as follows: "Foolish political antics are unworthy of an honest man. If you do not support the weak, your policy will not be viable. You need a policy which will help you cast light on shadow." I am still loyal to this motto today, and I have no intention of changing it in the future. Only a sincere policy is effective toward my own people, and I believe that it will also triumph in international policy.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Mr. Prime Minister, you and President Gorbachev are the same age, you were born in 1931. As a representative of the same generation of politicians as Gorbachev, what do you think of the first USSR president?

[Kaifu] The fact that our generation of politicians has such outstanding leaders as President Gorbachev gives me a sense of confidence. Since he came to power, substantial changes have occurred in the Soviet Union. I am pinning great hopes on the policy of perestroyka which Gorbachev is implementing, benefiting the cause of stability and peace on the planet.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Our next question concerns Japanese-Soviet relations. There have been negative elements in our countries' history which have given rise to mutual mistrust, and this is still impeding the improvement of bilateral relations. However, times are changing. In this context, our attention is drawn to the recent statements made by S. Abe, former general secretary of Japan's Liberal Democratic Party [LDP], and also by I. Odzawa, former LDP general secretary, which the Japanese press regarded as something of a departure from Japan's traditional course of "indivisibility of politics and economics" in relations with the USSR. In other words, a departure from the policy of linking economic cooperation between our countries with the resolution of the "problem of the northern territories." As head of the Japanese Government, what could you say on this subject?

[Kaifu] International relations are undergoing unprecedented changes. A new international order is developing on the threshold of the 21st century. Under these conditions, a radical improvement in Japanese-Soviet relations would be a boon for the peoples of both countries. I think that it is the duty of both Japanese and USSR leaders to endeavor to achieve this.

The question of the northern territories—which may be described as a relic of World War II—is still unresolved in Japanese-Soviet relations. For this reason our countries have not as yet concluded a peace treaty. That is, Japan and the Soviet Union have still not created a firm political foundation on which to base genuine mutual

trust. I believe that the aforementioned question should not be abandoned because it is hard to solve. We must continue the quest for ways to resolve it through frank political dialogue, thus promoting the development of Japanese-Soviet relations. After all, the return of the northern territories is something to which all Japanese aspire. But the Japanese people are endeavoring to establish truly stable relations with the USSR.

This approach was the basis of our country's proposals in May 1989, at the Moscow meeting between the Japanese and USSR foreign ministers. We made the following proposal: While considering it highly important to solve the question of the northern territories, we must help to broaden all spheres of Japanese-Soviet relations and to develop bilateral ties and humanitarian contacts. These proposals were by and large received positively by your country's leadership.

Japan will continue to pursue this course. In my view, S. Abe's and I. Odzawa's recent statements illustrate this. I also share their desire to overcome the current deadlock situation and to radically improve our relations. I wrote this in a personal message which Mr. Abe gave to President Gorbachev during his visit to the USSR. I then received a response from President Gorbachev. In it I believe that the president expressed the idea that the problem may be solved in this way.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] It is planned that M. Gorbachev will visit Japan in 1991. Do you, Mr. Prime Minister, intend to visit the USSR?

[Kaifu] President Gorbachev recently confirmed his intention of visiting Japan in 1991, stating in a personal message: "I believe that a Japanese-Soviet summit meeting will be an important landmark in bilateral relations and will give them a new quality." This approach merits a lofty assessment. For my part, I intend to make every effort to ensure that the first visit to Japan by a Supreme Soviet leader is of truly historic significance, opening up opportunities for the normalization of bilateral relations.

It is extremely important both for the world and for stability in the Asian-Pacific region, and also for the further improvement of East-West relations, for Japanese-Soviet dialogue at summit level to continue subsequently. On this premise I also intend to study the question of my visiting the USSR.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] In your opinion, what will Japanese-Soviet relations be like in the 21st century?

[Kaifu] I believe that the tendency to turn away from East-West confrontation to dialogue and cooperation will be further developed in the 21st century. I believe that a new chapter will open up in Japanese-Soviet relations next century. What do I have in mind? First, a peace treaty will be concluded—and this is a guarantee of firm mutual trust between our peoples. Second, various spheres of cooperation—economic, scientific, technical, cultural, and humanitarian—will be dynamically developed. Third, Japanese-Soviet relations could be a significant factor in the system of the world community, without confining themselves to bilateral relations.

In order to bequeath this kind of Japanese-Soviet relations to future generations, we must strive to improve them today with supreme responsibility. I am firmly convinced of this.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] What do you think about Japan's role in ensuring collective security in the Asia-Pacific region? How do you see the USSR's degree of involvement in this process?

[Kaifu] The Asia-Pacific region is continuing its dynamic development, and its significance for world politics and the international economic order is becoming so great that one may speak of the 21st century as the century of the Asia-Pacific region. Japan's policy in the region consists of making a substantial contribution to the stabilization of the political situation and in promoting the region's economic prosperity.

Unfortunately, various political conflicts and clashes, which are a source of instability, have not yet disappeared from the Asia-Pacific region—the Korean and Cambodian problems and Japanese-Soviet relations, for example. There is also the concern of countries bordering on the Soviet Union regarding the presence of a large Soviet troops contingent in the Far East. It is extremely important in this situation to find means of further strengthening stability and peace in the region. I believe that the priority task is to establish relations of trust between all countries in the Asia-Pacific region and to settle all conflicts. I am prepared to make maximum efforts to achieve this goal.

At the same time a process is under way in Europe which also has serious problems, whereby these problems are being radically resolved and the preparation of the next CSCE has begun.

I would like the USSR to actively implement in our region the policy of "new thinking," which has been manifested in European affairs, and also to make a greater contribution to the resolution of the aforementioned problems. From this viewpoint I welcome the recent trend toward the establishment of interstate relations between the USSR and South Korea.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Substantial democratic transformations are taking place in the USSR and Eastern Europe. You probably saw this for yourself during your visits to several East European states this January. What impressions did you glean from this trip?

[Kaifu] I regard the current changes in the USSR and East Europe as evidence that, throughout the long era of "oppression," "confrontation," and "stagnation," the peoples accumulated the energy to crave freedom,

democracy, peace, stability, prosperity, and happiness. There is no force that could have suppressed this powerful energy.

Modern politicians must not make erroneous assessments of the events that are taking place. They must give the appropriate response to these changes. In this situation, realizing its role and responsibility to the world community, Japan intends to make a vigorous contribution, using existing economic, scientific, and technical potential. This is what I call "good will diplomacy."

I well remember what the leaders of Poland and Hungary said during my visits to these countries. They said: "However difficult it may be, our reforms must not be reversed." Japan intends to cooperate with the group of 24 countries (this group, formed in 1989, comprises the United States, Japan, and the West European countries. The association's aim is to offer economic asistance to East European countries—correspondents' note) and to react keenly to the needs of the East European countries which are implementing a course of democratic transformations.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] It is said that, prior to your election to the post of prime minister, you and your wife often went for invigorating runs around the imperial palace in Tokyo. Now you are always surrounded by guards and everything indicates that you have had to bid farewell to sport...

[Kaifu] It was no accident that I chose that route—the area around the emperor's palace is very picturesque at any time of year. Moreover, it is well known that running is beneficial to the health. I used to go running virtually every morning. Now it is a very rare occurrence. Unfortunately, my official position must be taken into account...

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] Your family's life probably also changed after you became head of government. In particular, Japan's "first lady"—your wife—probably has to perform new duties...

[Kaifu] My wife lives with me in the official residence and attends official functions. She does, of course, now have a considerable number of new concerns. For instance, during the recent general elections she had to represent me in my electoral district since I myself was busy and simply unable to put in an appearance. My wife tries very hard to help me and I am deeply grateful to her for that.

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] The Japanese newspapers publish a special column every day entitled "The Prime Minister's Day" in which they provide a detailed description of the head of government's work schedule. These articles indicate that you have more than enough to do. How do you manage to be "on form" with such a packed schedule?

[Kaifu] I am indeed very busy every day. I have numerous meetings and parliamentary debates... The day flies by in a flash. That's life... I reckon that in order to remain efficient and to to succeed, you need first to sleep well, second to eat well, and, last to find time to visit the swimming pool. I try to go swimming at least once a week...

[KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA] What would you like to say to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA's readers?.

[Kaifu] I believe that Japanese-Soviet relations can only be improved as a result of the attainment of mutual understanding between our countries' peoples. I would like people to realize that the entire Japanese people aspires to see the return of the northern territories. Let my answers to KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, including this point, be my appeal to your newspaper's readers and the whole Soviet people.

Petrovskiy Calls for 'Real Deeds' From Japan

LD2004210190 Moscow TASS in English 2026 GMT 20 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Vladimir Solntsev]

[Text] Tokyo April 20 TASS—"The Soviet Union seeks real deeds in all areas of relations with Japan. It is high time to have tangible results in the Soviet-Japanese dialogue," visiting Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskiy said in an interview to TASS and KYODO TSUSHIN correspondents.

Touching upon Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev's visit to Japan next year, Petrovskiy said it was very important to know what real deeds would accompany the visit.

Visits of heads of state are now instrumental in boosting bilateral and multilateral relations. The Soviet presidents visit to Japan cannot certainly be an exception. We want it to be accompanied with tangible results for the international community and the countries of the Asia-Pacific basin, and certainly for our bilateral relations." [quotation mark as received]

The same is expected from Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze's visit to Japan due this year.

It is very important to search for areas of concord and possibilities to get results of negotiations now that the world is witnessing rapid changes, and it is required to strengthen regional and international stability.

"While from the aesthetic view point one can speak about art for the sake of art, world politics no longer accepts the dialogue for dialogue formula," Petrovskiy said. "Dialogue is now needed for practical, tangible actions. Soviet diplomacy will not be short of ideas."

"The Soviet side has done much to demonstrate its intention to lead things towards a reduction of military confrontation in the Asia-Pacific region, towards making the region a zone of cooperation and close interaction between states in all areas," Petrovskiy said.

"But cooperation is not a theatre of one actor. It presupposes the participation of other regional scene actors. Therefore we propose that a dialogue should begin within the framework of Asia and then of the whole of the Euroasian area."

"Such a dialogue may begin with confidence-building measures the choice of which is very wide. We are ready to consider any confidence-building measures that would help change the military-political climate in the region. Naval confidence-building measures could be the beginning. Agreements to prevent incidents on the seas are a major element of creating an atmosphere of confidence.

"The USSR has such agreements with a whole number of countries, including the United States, and they prove very useful practically. In the sphere of confidence-building measures the Soviet Union is open to a very broad dialogue with the Japanese side.

"[Quotation mark as received] Noting the importance of a parallel advancement in all areas of cooperation, Petrovskiy said that along with the dialogue in the military-political sphere, intensive economic cooperation is no less important.

"If normal and fruitful cooperation is developing with those countries in the region with which the USSR does not even have diplomatic relations, we are entitled to expect that such cooperation should be a normal component party of our interaction with the countries with which we do have diplomatic relations.

"We favour paralel constructive efforts in all areas of cooperation," Petrovskiy said.

MPRP Leader Ochirbat Sends Thanks to Gorbachev

PM2004160590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Message from G. Ochirbat, chairman of the Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party Central Committee, thanking CPSU Central Committee General Secretary M.S. Gorbachev for congratulations on his election; date not given]

[Text] To Comrade Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev, general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee

Esteemed Mikhail Sergeyevich,

I express sincere gratitude to you for the cordial congratulations and good wishes on my election as chairman of the MPRP [Mongolian People's Revolutionary Party] Central Committee.

I wish you and the entire Soviet people great successes in the historic cause of restructuring Soviet society on a democratic basis and in the struggle to strengthen world peace and international cooperation.

[Signed] G. Ochirbat, chairman of the MPRP Central Committee

Nikitin Receives Mongolian First Deputy Premier

PM2304081990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] On 20 April V.V. Nikitin, first deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, received D. Byambasuren [name as transliterated], first deputy chairman of the Mongolian Council of Ministers.

During the meeting a number of specific questions of trade and economic cooperation between the two countries were examined.

Southeast Asia & Pacific

Aquino Rejects Calls To Break Off Bases Talks

HK2304051990 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] President Corazon Aquino has rejected calls by some legislators not to hold talks with the Americans on the issue of the military bases.

Meanwhile, reports say some American officials are urging that the bases be removed and assistance to the Philippines be suspended if no agreement is reached by both sides on the bases issue.

Philippine congressmen have termed such a move blackmail, which is why they are urging President Aquino not to engage in negotiations with the Americans. The president has said that the government will hold a dialogue with the Americans, while she has called on her officials to clearly define their position and demands at the coming negotiations.

Background to Military Bases Negotiations Viewed

HK2304051190 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 22 Apr 90

["Commentary" by Viktor Vladimirov]

[Text] The talks between Washington and Manila to be held in the middle of next month are only preliminary talks. This was stated by President Corazon Aquino during a press conference at Malacanang. The talks will not tackle the issue of the future of the military bases, whose treaty expires in September 1991. One year before the treaty ends, the Philippine Government must declare whether or not it wishes the military bases to stay. Because of this, the decision by the Aquino government will depend on the results of the coming preliminary meeting next month. As President Aquino has said, this meeting will determine whether or not negotiations on the bases' future will be held.

So what will both sides discuss during this preliminary meeting? On the Philippine side, the main issue involves seeing that Washington fulfills its financial obligations to

Manila for the use of its military bases at Clark Field and Subic Bay, as well as for its other military installations.

As we all know, the U.S. Congress slashed $96 million from its payments to the Philippines, and it seems likely that this decision is final. Consequently, many sectors in the Philippines are asking if the United States can be trusted during the preliminary talks. On the other hand, those who support the retention of the bases say that this is the way to ensure that financial and military support is given to the Philippines. Meanwhile those who oppose the bases' retention include members of the Philippine Senate.

It is no accident that Washington has appointed Richard Armitage as head of the American panel for the talks. Armitage, a former defense secretary, is responsible for the U.S. military and political strategy in the Asian-Pacific region, especially involving military assistance. He is an expert on Philippine affairs and is thus an advocate of the retention of the bases in the Philippines and of the American presence in the region.

Washington's position on all this is no secret, and further pressure on Manila can be expected to ensure that a new agreement is signed so the bases at Clark Air Base and Subic Naval Base can remain in the Philippines.

The position of the Philippine Government is a difficult one, with President Aquino apparently still not having made a decision on the issue. According to the president, such a decision will be based the national interest. Therefore, Washington should realize that a decision on the matter of the bases' retention should be based on Manila's wishes.

Outstanding Amount Owed for U.S. Bases Revised

HK2304052390 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] The United States has neglected to pay the full amount for its use of its military facilities in the Philippines. This was declared by Foreign Secretary Raul Manglapus during a press conference. He said that this year, the United States debt to the Philippines amounts to $222 million, and not $96 million as earlier reported.

The Military Bases Agreement expires in 1991, and the American position on this has been to retain its bases in the Philippines.

State of Philippine Agrarian Reform Analyzed

HK2004041790 Moscow in Tagalog to the Philippines 1300 GMT 19 Apr 90

["Commentary" by Vassiliy Filipov]

[Text] The DAILY GLOBE, a Manila newspaper, has remarked on the controversy involving leading officials of the Department of Agrarian Reform by pointing out that personalities are not the issue at stake, but the Philippines' social and economic problems. Solutions to these problems have not been found. The DAILY GLOBE points out that this matter was placed on the back burner after the coup attempt last December by members of the Armed Forces. The same has happened with the talks involving the military bases, as well as the continuing problem of the insurgency.

All these issues make up the political dilemma facing the Philippines today. It will be recalled that President Corazon Aquino, during her campaign for the snap presidential elections, declared that her main platform was the implementation of agrarian reform, whereby land would be given to the landless. Her words filled the Filipino with great hope, as his main dream is to own his piece of land. However, this move by President Aquino was opposed by the small but powerful group that owns nine-tenths of the Philippines' fertile land.

The first decree issued by President Aquino stated that the first phase of the agrarian reform scheme would be completed by 1992, involving an estimated half a million hectares, which the government would purchase from large land-owners to be parceled out to the small farmers for a price. However, much time has gone by and, sadly, the program's first phase has still not been implemented.

Figures released for 1988 show that only 100,000 hectares of land were released. During the past year, only 20,000 hectares were released. All these do not even comprise 300,000 hectares.

If the next phase of the agrarian reform program continues in this fashion, we can say that by 1992, the program will have failed.

It is depressing to consider the numbers of landless farmers who are waiting to receive their parcels of land, especially when compared to those few who have received theirs. At present, only 100,000 farmers and their families have received their land ownership papers. Meanwhile, the big landowners have found ways to circumvent the law, even after having pledged to distribute their assets to their plantation workers.

Such an example can be seen in the Luisita sugar plantation in Tarlac, owned by President Corazon Aquino. Luisita is the main agricultural plantation that was scheduled to be parceled out to its workers. However, it transpires that the promised shares will not be released for 30 years or so. Furthermore, those due to receive shares will be checked to determine how long they have worked on the plantation. This means that only the regular fulltime workers, who make up a small number, will be the ones to receive shares. The part time or seasonal workers, who make up the majority, will not receive anything, even though they have been engaged in bone-breaking work for the plantation for a long time.

This system, epitomized by the Luisita example, is mirrored in other large estates. Reports say the owners of these estates continue flouting the law. Meanwhile, it has been reported that these landowners have hired armed men to scare off farmers who are due to receive their

share of land. It is estimated that a total of 152 landowners employ private armies. The majority of these can be found in Negros, where the country's largest sugar plantations are located.

This whole scenario shows that all efforts towards agrarian reform will come to naught. Even sadder is the fact that such a situation is a threat to the Philippines' political stability, according to a statement by General Ramon Montano, a top military official.

Just recently, a big group of landowners set up their own political party, declaring that they will oppose the government's agrarian reform program. They also declared that they would support whichever agrarian program protects their interests. It is obvious that the problem faced by the agrarian reform program can only get worse, as can the insurgency. Some reports say the rebels have done better than the government in that they have been giving out land free to peasants in this part of the country. The solution to the dilemma facing the Philippines rests on the matter of giving land to those farmers who have long dreamed of owning their own land.

Would-Be Defector To Be Deported From Australia

PM2004100990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 19 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[Own correspondent A. Ivkin dispatch: "This Had Not Been Expected..."]

[Text] Sydney, 18 Apr—While the Soviet passenger ship the Taras Shevchenko was moored in the port of Sydney in March this year, a crewman, 33-year-old A. Yeremin (a storeman), defected and requested political asylum from the Australian authorities (PRAVDA for 15 March this year).

Having considered the reasons for his request (all this time A. Yeremin was kept in jail as an illegal immigrant), the Australian immigration authorities have found them unconvincing and have decided to deport A. Yeremin back to the country of which he is an official citizen. The deportation from Sydney will be carried out 23 April by air and at the expense of the transgressor himself (he will be handcuffed and under guard), because it seems that he went ashore carrying an unusually large amount of West German marks and U.S. dollars.

Near East & South Asia

TASS Reports Release of U.S. Hostage Polhill

LD2304061490 Moscow TASS in English 0606 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Washington April 23 TASS—One of the United States hostages held in Lebanon, Robert Polhill, 55, was released on Sunday, Presidential Press Secretary Marlin Fitzwater confirmed in Islamorada, Florida.

Polhill had been captured in Beirut by the Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine three and a half years ago. On Sunday, Polhill was handed over in Damascus to Edward Djerejian, U.S. ambassador to Syria. Fitzwater said the United States is pressing for the release of all hostages in Lebanon and thanked the parties involved, Syria in particular, for their assistance in efforts towards the release of hostages.

Seventeen westerners, including seven Americans, are still held captive in Lebanon by various groups.

The last American hostage released in Lebanon was U.S. hostage David Jacobsen who was kidnapped in Beirut in May 1985 and released in November 1986.

The longest-held captive in Lebanon is ASSOCIATED PRESS correspondent Terry Anderson. He was captured on March 16, 1985, and remains in captivity.

PLO, Soviet Jewish Officials Meet in Moscow

LD1904220490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 19 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] The settling of the occupied Palestinian territories with new Israeli citizens, who are emigrants from the Soviet Union, has caused Palestinian Arabs special concern in the past few months. Today's Moscow meeting between leaders of the Palestine Liberation Organization and representatives of Soviet Jewish organizations and the Jewish intelligentsia was devoted to this issue.

[Correspondent Dorenko, identified by caption] Palestinians have been holding meetings with Jewish communites for 14 years now. This is the first time such a meeting has been held in Moscow. An explanation of the sides' positions was required. According to certain estimates 750,000 Jews will be leaving in the next five-six years. Most of them will settle in Israel, a proportion of them on lands seized from Palestinians.

[T.G. Golenp[illegible]iy, editor-in-chief of the newspaper YEVREYSKIY VESTNIK, identified by caption] Just as Germans and Armenians have left and are leaving the Soviet Union, [Jews] are undoubtedly leaving for the same reason, namely: socio-political and economic instability. This is one issue. The second issue, or the second cause, I should say, is the anti-Semitism which has raged throughout the country with impunity. There is a chain reaction, a panic taking place here.

[Dorenko] Manifestations of anti-Semitism in our country are not approved of by Palestinians, either.

[Abu Mazin, member of the Executive Committee of the Palestinian Liberation Organization, identified by caption in Arabic with superimposed Russian translation] I think that Jews are being pushed towards emigration by talk about pogroms and beatings. I don't believe that these pogroms are possible. But the rumors about them are directed towards intimidating Jews and provoking

their departure. The Palestinians are not agains emigration altogether. But Jews fleeing from the Soviet Union are being left with no choice. There is only unlimited entry to Israel. There they receive benefits if they go to the occupied lands. A great emigration means a great Israel: these are the words of the leader of the right-wing bloc, Shamir, and they sound alarming.

Now the Israelis are justifying themselves: only an insignificant proportion of Jews from the USSR has settled on the occupied territories. But this is today—and illegal settling is continuing and the Palestinian Liberation Organization is proposing a dialogue in order to achieve peace for Palestinians and Jews. We will be conducting meetings with Jewish communities of various countries in order to bring pressure to bear and to convince the Israeli authorities of the need for negotiations and an international conference on the Near East.

[Dorenko] The Soviet participants in the meeting share his conviction of the need for a peaceful dialogue. [Video shows footage of above Moscow meeting; Golenpolskiy speaking, seated at table; Abu Mazin speaking]

Jewish Official on Delegation Talks

LD2004164790 Moscow International Service in Arabic 1700 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] A roundtable meeting on the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union to Israel has been held at the Institute of Orientalism, in the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Moscow. The meeting was attended by a PLO delegation, led by the member of its Executive Committee, Abu Mazin [Mahmud Abbas], and a group of Soviet scientists and social figures belonging to the Jewish Cultural Enlightenment Society in Moscow. The meeting was arranged by the Institute of Orientalism and the Soviet-Arab al-Bayruni Publishing Company. Here follows a statement made to our correspondent by Professor Vitaliy Naumkin, coordinator of the roundtable meeting and famous Soviet scientist specializing in Eastern and political studies:

[Begin Naumkin recording] We took the initiative to hold this meeting, the first of this kind, between a PLO delegation and a delegation of representatives of the Jewish community and Jewish intellectuals in the Soviet Union. I believe that such a meeting in the present circumstances is of great importance because it gives us the opportunity to move toward peace in the Middle East, and toward understanding, or more understanding between all the peoples of the world and the various nationalities in the various countries, including the Palestinians and the Jews. Without understanding between the Palestinians and the Jewish communities in all the countries of the world it is not possible to achieve a real peace and stability in the Middle East.

As Comrade Abu Mazin said, the topical issue today is the emigration of Jews from the Soviet Union. This unfortunate issue is giving rise to many questions and protests in various countries, including the Soviet Union and in the Arab countries of the Middle East. Under these circumstances this meeting was held so that an exchange of viewpoints could take place between a top-level PLO delegation, led by Abu Mazin, member of the PLO Executive Committee, a group of Soviet Jewish intellectuals, including doctors, lecturers, writers and actors, and prominent figues from Jewish cultural and educational organizations.

Despite the existence of specific disagreements and different viewpoints, in my opinion this meeting proves that there is an understanding of principle on the importance of human rights, and on the importance of achieving peace in the Middle East and granting the Palestinian arab people their legitimate national rights. The meeting also proves that the Jewish community in the Soviet Union is in its majority in favor of this legitimate right for the Palestinian Arab people, and of the establishment of a just peace in the Middle East based on the principle of two peoples, two states—in other words, the recognition of the state of Israel and the recognition of the legitimate rights of the Palestinian Arab people, including the establishment of an independent Palestinian state. [end recording]

Commentary Examines Soviet Emigration to Israel

LD1904153890 Moscow World Service in English 1110 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Aleksandr Pogodin commentary]

[Text] At a meeting at the Soviet Foreign Ministry, Soviet and Palestinian representatives have paid special attention to Israel's unlawful actions to settle down immigrants from the USSR and other countries in the occupied Palestinian lands. Here is a commentary by Aleksandr Pogodin:

This problem has featured rather prominently in the Arab countries, with the Soviet Union increasingly coming under fire. For one thing, Islamic Conference officials argue that the course toward a mass emigration of Soviet Jews encourages Israel for more expansionism and aggression. Demands have been voiced in the Arab world to restrict emigration to Israel from the USSR. It has also been alleged that the Soviet Union is reconsidering its Middle East policy as a whole.

One certainly has to draw a strict distinction. The right to travel from one country to another is a universally-accepted principle, legally stipulated by appropriate international agreements. Nor, incidentally, are there any restrictions in the Arab countries on the score, so it's just unnatural to raise the issue of a kind of obligation on the part of the USSR to put an end to immigration to Israel.

It's another matter if we speak about settling down immigrants from the USSR in the occupied territories. Inasfar as that is concerned, the Soviet position is quite tough. Resolute protests against such a practice have

been presented to the Israeli Government through diplomatic channels. Practical measures have been applied too. This country has suspended plans for direct air lines with Israel until its authorities guarantee that citizens leaving the USSR won't be settled down in the occupied lands.

The Soviet Union is known to have been acting vigorously in the United Nations to get Israel [to] stop colonizing these territories. This problem has been discussed on the top level between the USSR and other countries, the United States included. The official U.S. position on the issue, incidentally, is opposed to the creation of new settlement in the occupied lands. However, this hardly agrees with restrictions on the Soviet emigration to the United States. But this is a special subject for discussion.

As for this country's overall stand over the Middle East problem, it remains unchanged. This is the recognition of the rights of all countries in the region to guaranteed existence, including the Palestinians' right to set up a state of their own, a solution to the whole range of issues at an international conference with all the sides concerned taking part, including the PLO and UN Security Council permanent members.

Although slowly and with difficulty, the process of a settlement has been gathering momentum, but the charges addressed to the USSR can only hinder this process.

Cross-Border Subversive Operation Thwarted

PM2004121590 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[IZVESTIYA special correspondents A. Itskov and A. Karpov report: "River of Our Alarm; Border Guards Arrested a Group of Intruders Sent to Our Territory From Afghanistan"]

[Text] Dushanbe-Pyandzh-Moskovskiy-Termez-Moscow—A junior observer of the border detail reported by telephone to the chief of the "Kupletin" outpost:

"An unidentified aircraft has just crossed our sector of the USSR State Border at high altitude and has begun to penetrate deeper into Soviet territory."

This was the very first report about the notorious flight by the U.S. spy pilot Powers who was shot down in Soviet airspace by the air defense forces 1 May 1960.

As if through an irony of fate 30 years later in the same place, in the same sector of our state border a combat alert signal sounded once again. This time a large group of armed persons from the Afghan side secretly crossed the border river Pyandzh on a raft and landed on the Soviet side. Each of the intruders knew his part of the maneuver perfectly well. Four of the landing party immediately rushed to cross the plowed border strip [kontrolno-sledovoy polosy], several men armed with submachineguns lay on the sand spit in order to provide fire cover for their possible withdrawal if they were seen by the border guards. Only one person—a tall, stately, fair-haired man—remained by the raft, obviously deciding not to push his luck further.

Everything happened literally in a matter of minutes. The border guards of the "Kupletin" outpost immediately cut off the four from the main group. Those who were closer to the water rushed back to the raft. But the stately fair-haired man was already feverishly rowing on his own to the Afghan side. From there, from the bank a group of military cameramen, who were clearly not of Afghan origin, recorded on film and videotape this entire scene from various points.

The instruction to the field commanders of the armed Afghan opposition originated precisely from these people of "non-Muslim appearance." This is what it said, translated from the English: Establish and consolidate reliable contacts with the local population in the territory of the Soviet Central Asian republics—involve Soviet citizens in unlawful operations and use the persons so recruited as a springboard to groups and organizations fighting against the official authorities....

In Dushanbe's remand jail [sledstvennom izolyator] we talked with the "heroes" of this operation who had been caught by the Soviet border guards. They were Abdulgafur, son of Bobokul; Abdulkhoshim, son of Menglikul; Kholmirzo, son of Ergash, and Abdulsattor, son of Abdulgafur [names as transliterated].

"We, of course, did not at all expect such a turn of events. We were constantly told that crossing the Soviet border and taking literature to Soviet territory was absolutely safe, that people there are waiting for these books which bring the truth about Islam. In fact it was not at all like that. We were arrested right away, when we had hardly set foot on the Soviet side of the river. One more person came with us. He was armed and pretended that he was going to protect us. We did not know who this guy was, but it was clear that he was a foreigner—he had blue eyes, and he spoke in a language we did not understand.... At the operation's most critical moment the guard left us to the mercy of fate and escaped.... Were we promised some reward for crossing the border? All we got was jail...."

Our interlocutors, of course, did not, and, perhaps, could not know that they were only ordinary pawns in a large and crafty game by the Pakistani, Saudi Arabian, and U.S. special services directed at destabilizing the situation in the Soviet Central Asian republics. Back in 1986 during the "Islamic games" against Moscow, as Zbigniew Brzezinski, former assistant to the U.S. President for national security affairs, called these hostile actions, the so-called program "M" was born. According to scant information which trickled into the world press, this program envisaged the gradual provocation of "anti-Moscow sentiments" in the USSR's Central Asian

republics, and whipping up separatist nationalist tendencies. It is no accident therefore that one often finds such publications as "Jihad—the Holy War Against the Infidels" among the propaganda literature seized from violators of the Soviet border in recent months. It is typical that those who send this kind of contraband "printed matter" did not at all try to conceal or mask their return address. Rather the reverse. We saw on the title page of many of the publications seized by the border guards a violet bookplate bearing the inscription: "Book from the personal collection of Latifa, leader of the Islamic party of the north of Konduz Province." There's no denying: Publicity not only generates trade, but also contraband.

Incidentally, regarding trade. One of the most dangerous results of program "M" which we have mentioned is the increase of contraband narcotics trade in the border regions of Soviet Central Asia. In just one 50-km section of the state border guarded by the Moskovskiy Red Banner border detachment of the Central Asian border district 22 intruders have been arrested already this year. During a thorough search hard drugs were found on most of them and were confiscated. In the case mentioned by us the sender's address was also not unknown. Narcotics were taken to Soviet territory by members of the armed opposition group directly subordinate to an engineer called Bashir. He is by no means the only "specialist" in smuggling narcotics. As is clear from evidence provided by the smugglers caught by the Soviet border guards, members of the detachments of Azadbeka [name as transliterated], Ahmad Shah Mas'ud, Mavlana-Bergy [name as transliterated], Mullo Khasana [name as transliterated] and other leaders of the Afghan armed opposition and the so-called "local spiritual authorities" are engaged in shipping the poison to our territory.

The "secret operations" on the Afghan-Pakistani border using the traditional caravan routes and passes do not stop for a single day. Weapons are often sent to Afghanistan in exchange for narcotics. This forced Melvyn Levitsky, U.S. assistant secretary of state, to acknowledge in THE PAKISTAN TIMES the existence of a situation where U.S. military aid to the Afghan opposition is being used "to encourage the production and smuggling of narcotics." According to Western specialists this business annually exceeds $10 billion. According to evidence in the U.S. press, about 70 percent of heroin used in the United States and 85 percent in West Europe is of Afghan or Pakistani origin. Our southern borders have not been spared by this criminal business.

Captain A. Poperechnyy, chief of one of the outposts on the Soviet-Afghan border, said:

"Our border details have often found caches containing narcotic substances from 'over there.' Quite recently, for instance, we seized 1.5 kilograms of hashish hidden in reed beds on the river bank. The recipient of the "merchandise" was also caught at the cache. He tried to flee from the detail soldiers and as he ran he lost... gold coins minted in tsarist times. An investigation is now under way which will answer the question as to where this imported hashish was ultimately being sent. As stipulated, specialists carried out a thorough laboratory analysis of the narcotics seized. It turned out that they were obtained from the so-called "golden crescent"—Pakistan and the regions of Afghanistan bordering on it. As is known, the raw materials for the production of narcotics are not cultivated in the north, in the regions bordering on the Soviet Union.

What forces are directing the activity of the border's violators on the Afghan side? It is worth recalling that in December last year IZVESTIYA reported that in Tajikistan, as a result of an operation carried out by the KGB in conjunction with the border guards, a reconnaissance team of the Afghan armed opposition was exposed and neutralized. The tasks which the members of this group carried out were various but as old as the hills. The main one was the destabilization of the political situation in Soviet Central Asia, the creation in the territory of the Tajik Soviet Socialist Republic of a base to overthrow the constitutional system and to found an Islamic state. The means of attaining this goal are also old hat: Bribery, ideological conditioning, and smuggling narcotics and weapons. One of those carrying out this action was a certain Davlyatov—a native of Tajikistan, recruited by Pakistan's special services and sent to our country by people from the gangs of engineer Bashir's grouping. Because Davlyatov was caught red-handed during a spying operation, he soon confessed everything. And the court, taking into account the sincere confession, reduced significantly the penalty imposed on him.

Having visited several detachments serving on our southern borders, we were convinced that there is plenty of evidence of hostile activity against our country. All this is very alarming. Both for us, and for our Afghan friends in Kabul. Lieutenant General Paykar [name as transliterated], chief of one of Afghanistan's Ministry of State Security directorates, stated recently that the Afghan side is very concerned about the armed opposition's subversive activity against the Soviet state. "We for our part," he said, "are using the maximum effort to thwart this subversive activity, and we are striving to help the Soviet border guards."

Wakil Leaves Moscow for New York 21 Apr

LD2104123490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1040 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 21 Apr (TASS)—Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil, who was here on a stopover from Kabul, left Moscow today for New York to take part in a special session of the UN General Assembly on international economic cooperation.

A. Wakil was seen off at the airport by Yuliy Vorontsov, USSR first deputy minister of foreign affairs.

Sub-Saharan Africa

TASS Reports Thwarted Coup Attempt in Sudan

LD2304083490 Moscow TASS in English 0828 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Cairo April 23 TASS—A coup attempt was thwarted in Sudan this morning, the MENA news agency reported from Khartoum.

According to MENA, the armed forces arrested a group of young officers and retired military officers who intended to overthrow the regime of general 'Umar Al-Bashir.

Commentary on U.S. Initiative for Sudanese Peace

EA2004180790 Moscow International Service in Amharic 1530 GMT 16 Apr 90

[From the "Africa As We See It" program]

[Text] A while ago U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Herman Cohen, during an official visit to Khartoum, tried to bring about a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the country. A spokesman for the National Salvation Revolution Command Council, Sulayman Muhammad Sulayman, confirmed that the Sudanese military government basically supported his initiative. Here is a commentary by Aleksandr Mikhaylov:

Although the Herman Cohen initiative has not yet been made official, according to Colonel Sulayman, a proposal exists providing for a cease-fire between the government and the Sudanese People's Liberation Army [SPLA] rebels and the establishment of a democratic system in the country.

It will be recalled that so far, the Khartoum government has not agreed with the SPLA leaders' assertion that the problem can only be resolved under a democratic system. The Cohen initiative deserves consideration from the point of view of the rebe?s. Incidentally, two days before Col. Sulayman made his statement, the leader of the military government said brilliant victories had been won in the Sudan under military regimes, but the civilian governments had rendered the country corrupt and chaotic. As is known, 'Umar al-Bashir's regime is the (?third) military government in the history of independent Sudan.

Insofar as 'Umar al-Bashir made the statement while addressing soldiers, he might have been seeking to please the supporters of his June [1989] coup. However, it cannot be denied that 'Umar al-Bashir's military government has failed to improve the country's economy and to end the civil war during the past nine months. Although the government has made some achievements, such as signing a merger agreement with Libya and a new agreement between four Arab countries, which are positive steps in the diplomatic field, Sudan has not improved its image in the international arena.

This raises the question: How do the military leaders view the country's future? In his recent statement to the Kuwaiti AL-ANBA, 'Umar al-Bashir said his government was ready to hold a constitutional conference without pre-conditions. He went on to say that Sudan's future political system was under study.

However, Sulayman's statement [word indistinct] clearer. We can deduce from it that the situation has changed since Herman Cohen visited Khartoum. Nonetheless, Col Sulayman's statement raised further questions. For example, the spokesman indicated that the military government did not object to the country's moving to a multiparty system; but he also said that the political parties existing prior to the coup could not be reestablished. Does this mean that it will be the military regime which will decide which parties and political organizations can be established in the country?

The colonel said a political system enabling the masses to exercise power rather than one involving political parties should be established. This is a [word indistinct] idea. However, it raises the question: How do the masses assume power? Does the military regime intend to abrogate shari'ah law during the transition to a new political order? As is known, the SPLA leaders have refused to hold talks with government delegates unless the shari'ah laws are abrogated.

It is clear to all that unless peace prevails in the south of the country, the general problems will not go away. Accordingly, if the military regime can promptly reply to all the questions raised and resolve the problem peacefully, we shall also be able to voice appreciation, as 'Umar al-Bashir did to the Sudanese soldiers, concludes our commentator Aleksandr Mikhaylov.

'Escalating War' in Horn of Africa Viewed

EA1404205390 Moscow International Service in Somali 1600 GMT 13 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Vladimir Borisov comments on the escalating war situation in the Horn of Africa: [passage omitted]

Some years ago, the leaders of East and West saw that it was unnecessary to continue arming these regimes. These regimes in the Horn of Africa have not received the full extent of assistance, either from the East or West, that they did earlier. Things are now completely changed, as the USSR and the United States have agreed to review tense points throughout the world. They have also agreed to withdraw their forces from this region. The United States has resolved to halt military aid to Siad Barre's regime in Somalia. At the same time, the USSR and the GDR have agreed to reduce drastically their arms deliveries to the Ethiopian Government. The USSR and United States have also agreed recently to find solutions to the problems prevailing in this region, especially in Ethiopia.

Although much has not been achieved, the regimes in Ethiopia and Somalia have made attempts to hold talks

with opposition forces. This has been brought about by the efforts of the major world powers, who appear to be encouraging dialogue between the warring groups and the ruling regimes. This political assistance by the major powers may bring peace to this region.

The role played by the major powers in bringing about changes in southern Africa brings further hope for peace in the Horn of Africa. This hope is being shattered by the new look that the war situation in the region is assuming. The vacuum created by the USSR and United States has already been filled by Israel and the Arab governments. After restoring diplomatic relations with Israel, the Addis Ababa regime had found another source to obtain the armaments it needs. To counter this, many Arab countries have extended large quantities of armaments to Somalia, Sudan, and the Eritrean liberation forces. Israel has utilized the opportunity to expand the friction that exists between Israel and the Arab world.

This will now overshadow the question of the Palestinian problem. The Continued war situation in the Horn of Africa will become a stable center for a foreign conflict whose solution is not in sight. Finally, it appears that another knot of conflict which will be very difficult to untie has emerged in the Horn of Africa.

Reporter Comments on Socialism in Ethiopia

EA2104221690 Moscow International Service in Amharic 1530 GMT 18 Apr 90

[From the "Africa As We See It" program]

[Excerpts] We present to you a commentary sent to us by German Ustinov, who is an IZVESTIYA reporter based in Addis Ababa:

Pictures of Marx and Lenin no longer appear in Ethiopia. However, although the pictures of these founders of the Workers Party of Ethiopia [WPE] officials' ideology have been removed from public view, nothing has been said officially about the matter. A long time has passed since the WPE Central Committee regular session was held. It is not only ordinary members of the party who are in confusion, but many members of the Central Committee as well. Leaders of local party organizations are also confused.

Nothing was mentioned at the 11th regular session about ending the previous ideology of Marxism-Leninism. If anything was known officially, it was that Mengistu Haile Mariam, secretary general of the party Central Committee, had said that the path of transition to socialism is a long-term task. Referring to the economic crisis in the country, he said the socialist path of development has not pulled Ethiopia out of poverty after 16 years. The economic crisis facing the country demands urgent action. Ethiopians have hopes for the new economic policy. [passage omitted]

Continuing his commentary, German Ustinov says that Ethiopian journalists recently (?told) him that the process of perestroyka has begun in their country. It is impossible to ignore the current events in the USSR and Eastern Europe. We also must have the ability to abandon systems which do not provuce any results in our country, they said. We must not be hindered by ideology in eliminating our mistakes.

Economic planning is hard work. The results of the 11th regular session of the WPE Central Committee have started to bear fruit, indicates the reporter. The price of 100 kg of teff [staple food] was 170 to 180 birr one month ago. Farmers were then not permitted to sell their products freely. They were forced to sell to the government. Now, the ban has been completely lifted. The farmers and traders have been freed. The verandahs have now started to fill up with grains. Mills are also busy. The price of teff has been reduced. This is good news for the people.

The regular session said that all parties, organizations, and groups can take part in the political life of the country. This includes the opposition. The one precondition for this is the preservation of Ethiopia's territorial integrity.

It has been said that the WPE itself will change its structure. It was naive from the beginning to say that it would play a vanguard role in a country where there is no working class. This is why it has changed its name to the Ethiopian Democratic Unity Party. It is believed that the new party will be establivhed by the coming WPE congress. The new party will aim to work largely on the social base. Anyone can participate as a member. It is known that the party has its own program. All this is correct, says the reporter.

Concluding his commentary, the reporter says that military socialism in Ethiopia in the 1970s and 80s damaged the country's health. It is necessary to remove tumors and establish a modern and healthy system, which is up to date and supported by the people.

East Europe

Soviet-Hungarian Economic Talks Produce Protocol

LD2304131290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0643 GMT 23 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Akylbek Saliyev]

[Text] Budapest, 23 Apr (TASS)—Hungarian-Soviet economic talks, which have been assessed here as rather difficult, have resulted in the signing in Moscow of a protocol on trade turnover and payments for the current year. Together with agreements concluded previously, the full total of trade turnover will amount to R7.6 billion, 3.7 billion of which will be accounted for by Hungarian exports, while the volume of imports will amount to R3.9 billion. The particular feature of the current document is that from next year calculations in

trade operations between Hungary and the USSR will be carried out in freely convertible currency at world prices.

The transfer to freely convertible currency, local newspapers point out, will put an end to the tranquil life of the heads of many Hungarian enterprises. Henceforth there will no longer be the guaranteed Soviet orders which were previously provided for by interstate agreements. This will entail a cutback in production, and as a result an increase in the number of unemployed.

The main share of Soviet deliveries to Hungary will as before comprise raw materials and fuel. The provision stipulated in the protocol on maintaining the volume of oil and energy supplies at last year's level is therefore evaluated very positively here. All the more so in that there are things to compare this with. Hungary recently purchased for "hard" currency 200,000 tonnes of Iraqi oil at prices higher than the Soviet prices. J. Bethlen, one of the authors of the Hungarian Democratic Forum economic program, made an interesting pronouncement in this connection, when he said that any economic integration with the Soviet Union yields a positive result.

Hungary's Orban Views Relations With USSR

LD2204210390 Budapest MTI in English 1912 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 22 (MTI)—"Hungarian-Russian relations should be founded on a completely new treaty," it was said by Viktor Orban, member of the Federation of Young Democrats' (FYD) board, who was speaking to MTI's Moscow correspondent on Sunday, adding that an honest, and correct relationship should be created with the Soviet Union.

As already reported the delegation of the FYD arrived in Moscow on Saturday, intending to travel on to Vilnius to attend the Congress of the Sajudis. The Soviet authorities however prevented them from doing so by giving various reasons.

Hungary should secede from the Warsaw Treaty, which is neither a treaty nor an alliance but an imperial dictatum, Mr Orban said. According to the FYD's view however, this should take place not like a "coup". Hungary could guarantee its security with bilateral treaties and he could also propose to the Russians such a treaty which takes into consideration the security interests of the superpower. Mr Orban added that a referendum should be held in Hungary on the issue of seceding from it.

Speaking about the Soviet troop withdrawal Mr Orban termed it improper that the Soviets are demanding 42,000 million forints in reparations for their property left behind. If they should however insist on these reparations, the Hungarian side ought to deduct damages caused in 1956, he said.

According to FYD's leader, secession from the CMEA cannot mean the abandoning of the Soviet market, but rather enables a stronger market presence. The autonomy of the Baltic states could also result in the expansion of markets for Hungary, Mr Organ reasoned.

Southern Forces Begin Withdrawal From Hungary

LD2104002190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1702 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Sergey Ivanov]

[Excerpts] Budapest, 20 Apr (TASS)—A train carrying a tank battalion of the tank regiment of the Budapest-Nikolayev guards tank division left the railway loading junction near the town of Esztergom today in the direction of the Soviet-Hungarian border. This marks the start of an intensive period of withdrawal of Southern Group of Forces subunits from Hungary. [passage omitted]

As at 20 April 1990, 2,500 soldiers and officers of the Southern Group of Forces, including members of servicemen's families, and around 900 units of combat equipment have left Hungarian territory, and almost 40,000 tonnes of material-technical supplies have been moved out. The progress and organization of the withdrawal indicate that the complete withdrawal of Soviet forces from Hungarian territory will be accomplished within the specified time, that is, before the end of June 1991.

GDR Defense Minister on Soviet Troop Presence

LD2204012990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1151 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Berlin, 21 April (TASS)—"The National People's Army will exist on the territory of today's GDR so long as the two alliances—NATO and the Warsaw Pact—remain in Europe," Rainer Eppelmann, minister of disarmament and defense of the German Democratic Republic, declared. He added that "while NATO troops are located on the territory of the FRG, Soviet troops will also be on the territory of the present GDR". R. Eppelmann gave an interview today to TASS correspondent Oleg Moskovskiy in connection with assuming the post of GDR minister of disarmament and defense last Wednesday [18 April].

Before his appointment to this post by the GDR People's Chamber, the 47-year-old R. Eppelmann had, for the last 15 years, been pastor of the Berlin Evangelical Church community, having studied theology in a church school. He did alternative military service as a bricklayer in the construction troops. R. Eppelmann is one of the founders and leaders of the "Democratic Awakening" party.

R. Eppelmann highly praised the restrained and calm position of the leadership of the National People's Army which, according to him, has made a worthy contribution to the development of democratic transformations in the country. The minister said that one of the main

tasks of the National People's Army remains as before, the "effective defense of the country from outside attack."

The head of the Defense Department considers that progress at the Vienna talks on conventional armed forces will make it possible to move rapidly to a cut in the military budget, and also to far-reaching cuts in troops and weapons in central Europe.

R. Eppelman explained that he is in favor of the 12-month military service which has already been introduced in the GDR.

"We shall embark on bold steps in the conversion of military production. This makes it possible to resolve many economic problems in the GDR of an economic as well as social nature," R. Eppelmann said in conclusion.

Gen. Lushev Talks With Eppelmann

PM2304093190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[TASS report under the general heading: "Official Reports"]

[Text] Berlin, 20 Apr—Army General P.G. Lushev, commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces, has arrived in the GDR capital at the invitation of R. Eppelmann, GDR minister of disarmament and defense.

A meeting was held between R. Eppelmann and Army Gen. P.G. Lushev. During the talks questions of further improving the mechanism of cooperation within the Warsaw Pact framework were discussed.

R. Eppelmann reaffirmed the GDR's adherence to the Warsaw Pact Organization and to the republic's alliance commitments. He noted that, in the event of the two German states being united, it would be necessary to find a solution in line with the interests of all interested parties. The talks were attended by Admiral T. Hoffmann, commander of the GDR People's Armed Forces.

Vorobyev Discusses Troop Withdrawal From CSFR

LD2104203990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1400 GMT 21 Apr 90

[From the "I Serve the Soviet Union" program: interview with Colonel General Eduard Arkadyevich Vorobyev, USSR People's deputy and commander of the Central Group of Forces, by program presenter Kim Kukholev; in Czechoslovakia "a few days ago"—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Vorobyev] The schedule for the withdrawal of troops is being adhered to in full, and we are even slightly ahead of schedule in removing supplies and materials. The schedule is in principle agreed until the end of the withdrawal, 1 July 1991. Any problem that arises that is not within my competence is reported to the commander in chief of the Ground Forces or to General Staff and is quickly resolved in a positive way. [passage omitted]

[Vorobyev] The agreement has been signed. The Soviet troops are leaving, under control, in strict adherence to the schedule. The quantity of troops and equipment being withdrawn is closely agreed on with the Czechoslovak side, and is known to it. I must say that no one can reproach us as far as our sincerity in observing the agreement is concerned. [passage omitted]

As far as the installations belonging to the Soviet Union are concerned, several variants have been thought up for disposing of them. In the first place, selling them to the Czechoslovak side; creating joint enterprises; selling them to Soviet departments in Czechoslovakia, such as Sputnik, Inturist, Sovtransavto [all tourist agencies] and others; selling them to Czechoslovak enterprises and cooperatives; selling them to individuals, or even to firms from other states. The question of compensation for the present damage has been considered and we have not ruled out compensation for possible ecological damage. Much positive work in recultivation is being carried out by the forces of the troops being withdrawn.

[Kukholev] Nevertheless, answer the following question: in the town of Turnov, where one of our military units is stationed, I saw an 11-storey building, built from our reinforced concrete blocks, and a five-storey building. The Czechoslovak side is demanding that we pull these buildings down and take them with us. How do you view this?

[Vorobyev] I view this negatively and can tell you officially that this will not happen because on the 11th [month not specified], when we had a joint (?defense council) meeting, this was removed from the agenda and the Czechoslovak side agreed that these statements by local joint Soviet-Czechoslovak commissions for inspecting installations do not have any basis. We will insist and fight in every way that no Soviet installation of value to us be removed, demolished, or smashed simply because someone wants to.

[Kukholev] Is the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Czechoslovakia a blow to the friendship between the Soviet and Czechoslovak Armies? What is your opinion?

[Vorobyev] In my opinion it is not. Of course, the change in the absolute majority of the leadership in the higher echelons of power in authority and locally, and the elimination of party organs in the Czechoslovak Army, of course, disrupted and hampered contacts formed earlier; they have become complicated. However, I do not make a tragedy out of this. I am convinced that everything must fall into place. Everything invented and everything alien will go and fall away; the husk will be sifted out and the grain will remain. If the Czechoslovak Government will undertake work aimed at strengthening friendship with the Soviet Union, then there certainly will be this friendship. Moreover, it will be cleaner and better because it will arise on a basis of equality and true,

not assumed, mutual respect and understanding. That is my position. [passage omitted]

[Kukholev] Some of our listeners may have the impression that the Central Group of Forces is engaged solely in withdrawing, but this is not the case, for the troops evidently are continuing to carry out their international mission: Soldiers are on duty, they train, they study.

[Vorobyev] That is absolutely so. We have everything planned very precisely. Some prepare to withdraw, some are withdrawing, and the other formations and units are engaged in military and political preparations. So now, in May, the results of the winter period of instruction will be summed up in accordance with all the rules and with all the strictness demanded of troops in the results of their training during the first half of 1990. [passage omitted]

Polish Group Visits CPSU Central Committee

PM2004145590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Second Edition p 5

[TASS report: "At the Invitation of the CPSU Central Committee"]

[Text] A group of workers of the SdRP [Social Democracy of the Polish Republic] headed by W. Huszcza, member of the SdRP Central Executive Committee, visited the Soviet Union 16-19 April at the invitation of the CPSU Central Committee.

The Polish comrades had meetings and talks with N.Ye. Kruchina, member of the CPSU Central Committee and administrator of affairs of the Central Committee, and at the CPSU Central Committee International Department, in the course of which a number of questions of the development of interparty cooperation were discussed.

TASS Reports Polish Solidarity Congress

LD2304115290 Moscow TASS in English 1141 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Gdansk April 23 TASS—By TASS special correspondent:

Today is the last day of the Second Congress of the Polish "Solidarity" trade union. Delegates are discussing the main document of the forum—the draft of the programme resolution. Debate focuses on the key problem of whether "Solidarity" should be a trade union, a political party, or both.

The second round of elections to the 97-strong all-Poland commission will be held today. Chairmen of regional "solidarity" sections and the trade union's president will be included in the commission automatically. The congress will have to elect only 59 members of the commission. Ninety-four candidates have already been nominated. The first round of the elections, held later last night, did not yield the necessary results.

The delegates passed a decision calling for pre-term general parliamentary and presidential elections next spring in order to step up the ongoing reforms.

Poland's Economic Reform Efforts Examined

90UF0006A Moscow EKONOMIKA I ZHIZN in Russian No 12, Mar 90 p 21

[Article by Yelena Babak, Warsaw-Moscow: "From a Polish Notebook"]

[Text]**We are following the economic reforms in Poland with a passion: There are many similar problems in the economies of our countries.**

Recently a delegation of the USSR Union of Journalists familiarized itself with the new stage of economic reform. Poland started sooner than we did. Various versions have been tried. It is extremely important for us to know both the successful experience of the neighbors and the innovations that did not turn out. Perhaps it is even more useful to know the mistakes, inasmuch as the years of transformations in Poland have still not enabled the country to overcome the crisis.

...But life in Warsaw is taking its normal course. Marszalkowska Street is buzzing with life. Young people are laughing light-heartedly. National heroes in bronze and granite look aloofly from their pedestals at human concerns. The streetcars are clanging. In the Old City, this medieval section of Warsaw, little children are feeding the pigeons and, as 200 years ago, a carriage rattles over the cobblestones.

On a bench in the square, two elderly men are talking loudly. It appears that old friends have met.

"A disgrace!" says one of them with indignation. "Our bakery raised the price of bread once, and then a second and a third time. One asks how long will it do this. Soon people will not have enough money for bread. They should show me the person who allows such prices!"

A vain wish! There is no such specific person in Poland today. Prices are dictated by his majesty the market: The formation of a free market began in August of last year.

Bitter Pineapple

Oh, would that there were such stores in our country as there are in the Polish provinces where there are splendid still lifes in the shop windows. What can be said about Warsaw, about pineapples, bunches of bananas, and fish and meat delicacies! There are practically no lines, and where would they come from? Prices are denoted in five-digit figures.

Since January a program for dampening inflation began to be conducted in Poland. (It is frequently called by the name of its author, Leszek Balcerowicz, the deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers and minister of finance.) In accordance with the program, the state cut subsidies for the production of almost all kinds of

products. And prices immediately began to rise spontaneously: for bread, meat, sugar, gasoline, housing...

We bought a long loaf of bread in Warsaw for 2,500 zlotys [Z]. They say that 10 years ago this was considered a fairly good monthly salary. Relatively recently, as in our country, city transportation was paid for with small change—with groszy. No one abolished the grosz. It simply became unnecessary. Today you have to pay Z240 on a Warsaw streetcar. For comparison, the average salary in December in four of the basic branches of industry (the most highly paying) was Z645,000.

The state abolished subsidies for the production of cellulose, and immediately the price of paper increased sharply. Newspapers and journals became more expensive. The circulation of even the most loved and widely read publications is falling.

Simultaneously with the unrestrained increase in prices, salaries were frozen.

"Never mind pineapples," our new acquaintances said in conversations, "as long as we have enough for bread and milk."

Which is a lesser evil: a shortage of cheap commodities or unattainable abundance?

The Polish market became full not owing to an increase in the output of products, but owing to a decrease in demand, or, to put it another way, owing to a reduction in consumption by a majority of the population. The volume of industrial production in recent months was reduced and, according to the estimates of economists, it will drop again in the near future by five percent. In the editorial office of the newspaper ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE (the Polish EKONOMICHESKAYA ZHIZN) they relate: The letters of economists from the local areas are filled with alarm—will not the reforms end with the fact that physically there will be fewer and fewer products?

Here and there strikes occurred with demands to raise salaries. Alarm is building up in connection with the swift growth in unemployment. Nonetheless, public opinion polls indicate: Trust in the government is as high as previously. First, Balcerowicz presented a plan of action which, although promising difficulties, was well-composed and well-reasoned. Second, it provides, so to speak, for "a lowering in the rates of price increases." Putting it more simply, the increase in prices should slow down. The most difficult times should end within half a year. But this is a period that is visible.

Credit Is Dangerous Now

It would be incorrect to think that the state is not trying to influence the market elements. State subsidies are retained on individual types of products (coal, milk). State orders are established for enterprises, and the output of priority commodities is encouraged through favorable taxes. There is a ministry of the domestic market (the former ministry of trade). It is obliged to submit concepts to the Sejm for the development of the consumer market.

Many types of activity have been legalized that were earlier considered the "shadow economy." Flashy signs with the inscription "Kantor" (money exchange bureaus) are appearing in Warsaw in which currency is exchanged. They sell dollars, marks, and rubles for gold and, the other way round, gold for foreign currency. Journalists from ZYCIE GOSPODARCZE have been mentioning for a long time, what kind of activity is now forbidden? They recalled only pimping.

Specialists explain a lot of the troubles with references to the monopoly of the producer, including the current super prices. This ailment struck the Polish economy as profoundly as it has ours. The antimonopoly law adopted several years ago did not work. Many economists believe that Balcerowicz's program itself should undermine monopoly. If this does not happen, it means that the deputy premier was unable to reason out his own plan to the end.

Everything that is being done, according to the ideas of the authors of reforms, is directed at democratization and reinforcing the economy. But just when will the adopted measures give a return? During that time, on the other hand, the life of a majority of the population will get worse and more difficult.

The idea of privatization—the sale of state enterprises for use as private property—caused and continues to cause an uproar. It is perceived quite ambiguously in Polish society. However, it is clear that tremendous resources are needed for such purchases, and do many people have them? The main volume of industrial products, as previously, are produced in the state sector.

I think that our directors will envy the Polish colleagues. The Ministry of Industry (it united all industrial ministries) does not interfere in the daily operations of enterprises. They only pay taxes into the budget.

The reforms "suited the needs" of successful enterprises. There is open rejoicing in the firm "Eksbud": So the building materials get more expensive, but there are no problems with supplies.

Enterprises like this also welcome the domestic convertibility of gold. Its mechanism is as follows. Every enterprise that exports its commodities is obliged to sell hard currency to the state bank at the daily rate of exchange. Any enterprise has the right to replace zlotys in its account with hard currency.

"In the end, we will turn down unreliable partners!" said the managers of the Kielce paper factory on this matter. "And we will buy raw materials abroad."

And, nonetheless, it is now very difficult even for the strongest collectives. Our directors who like to cry on account of "an exorbitant tax" for the wage labor fund very likely never dreamed of Polish taxes, even in a

nightmare. With an increase in the volume of production of one percent, wages "have the right" to increase by not more than 0.3 percent. Otherwise, the increased tax on wages is right up to 500 percent.

The wages of Polish workers is formed in an interesting way. In answer to the question on the amount of wages, people answered:

"You will not believe it, but I do not know..." It turns out that earnings in large measure depend on various supplements—on children, on overall length of work service, on length of service in a given place. There are many increments, and everything cannot be remembered because it is something we are not used to.

Moreover, wage indexing has been introduced in Poland, and under conditions of inflation people receive monthly supplementary sums. This system eases the social tension in society somewhat, but it does not provide an incentive for the end result of labor very well and, consequently, it does not harmonize well with the present reforms, we were told at enterprises. It seems that a strict minister of finance has not yet succeeded in getting fully involved with the system of wages.

It has become dangerous for enterprises (and, indeed, for individuals as well) to take bank credits—one can be ruined by the payment of interest.

Halina Koch, an economist in a fruit-processing plant near Lublin, related: Up until last year, the factory enjoyed credit privileges. Now the privileges have been abolished; the interest rate has increased to 40 percent. There are greater expenditures for the factory. But it is impossible not to use credits because otherwise the peasants cannot be paid for berries and fruit.

"I understand that it sounds unappealing, but social needs will have to be reduced," said Director Wladyslaw Mazur.

It is known how various of our collectives make a profit. And I asked a provocative question:

"But if you increase the price? Your jams are very tasty."

"We cannot!" the director recoiled. "We will go bankrupt. We have 50 competitors, and none of them has raised the price."

And we were still amazed why, with generally high prices, jams and compotes remained cheap!

In the search for additional income, many enterprises are beginning to engage in work that is unusual for them. The construction firm "Eksbud" undertook, for example, the restoration of ancient manuscripts. An extremely creative organization—the Union of Journalists—had earnings through the mediation of equipment sales. Is this bad or good? It cannot be said unequivocally. One thing is clear: Only those will be able to survive who are able to work with great efficiency, and who are the most aggressive and enterprising. It is toward this end that the recent Polish reforms are directed.

SFRY Returns Tourists With No Hard Currency

LD2304132190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1100 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Several hundred Soviet tourists who arrived by train from Chop at the Yugoslav town of Subotica, tried in vain to get permission to continue their journey through Yugoslavia. Either they did not possess the $200 in convertible currency that is now required to be changed into Yugoslav dinars, or else they did not want to change it. The Yugoslav authorities have banned entry to tourists from the countries of Eastern Europe, the Soviet Union, and Mongolia who do not change that amount of money. Quite a number of Bulgarian, Polish, Romanian, and Soviet tourists who did not have convertible currency had gathered at the railway station in Subotica. All of them claimed not to have known of the new regulations governing entry into Yugoslavia, introduced on 21 April.

After clarifying the government decision, the local authorities returned all the Soviet citizens who had gathered at Subotica without hard currency to Chop.

West Europe

Lithuanian Premier Prunkiene Arrives in Denmark

LD2104150490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0940 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Copenhagen, 21 Apr (TASS)—K. Prunskiene, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR, and A. Saudargas, minister of foreign affairs of the republic, arrived in the Danish capital today at the invitation of the Presidium of the Parliament of Denmark. They will meet the leadership and parliamentary deputies, the Danish prime minister, the minister of foreign affairs, and representatives of the country's business circles.

According to the opinion of Danish political observers, the Lithuanian representatives will be seeking support for Lithuania's separation from the USSR. It is not ruled out that they will also raise the question of possible deliveries of Danish oil to the republic. However, according to the KRISTELIGT DAGBLAD newspaper, the government of Denmark is not apparently inclined to give economic assistance in possible purchases of oil and gas by Lithuania.

'Restrained' Response for Oil Request

PM2304095990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 22 Apr 90 p 3

[Own correspondent dispatch: "Danes Fail To Deliver"]

[Text] Copenhagen—Danish politicians, the mass media, and members of business circles are keeping a careful eye on the difficult situation developing in and around Lithuania. On Saturday in Copenhagen the republic's Prime Minister K. Prunskiene, accompanied by Lithuanian Foreign Minister A. Saudargas, began her meetings with Danish Government leaders.

Denmark has officially expressed its "full support for the Lithuanian people's desire to secure national self-determination." Condemning the "Soviet sanctions" against Lithuania, Danish Foreign Minister U. Ellemann-Jensen urged Moscow and Vilnius to show restraint.

At the same time most political observers here share the opinion that, while offering Lithuania's new leadership moral support, the Scandinavian countries, including Denmark, are in no hurry to supplement this with any concrete material aid.

At a brief press conference in Copenhagen it was announced that Denmark's Chamber of Commerce is beginning the implementation of a "Baltic project" designed to "study the opportunities for establishing closer links between Danish firms and the Baltic republics and also for broadening cultural cooperation with them." The project, which is intended to run until the end of the year, envisages the exchange of trade delegations and the holding of two business seminars on economic problems. Some 500,000 kroner have been allocated from private funds to finance these measures.

However, the journalists gathered for the news conference were concerned with a quite specific question: Will the Lithuanian prime minister be able to reach an agreement with the leaders of the Nordic countries on Scandinavian oil shipments to the republic following the drastic cuts in supplies of "Moscow" raw materials?

As is well known, K. Prunskiene did not succeed in securing guarantees from the Norwegian Government on this score in Oslo, where she made her first stopover. Private companies stated their readiness to sell oil but on the usual terms, that is, for hard currency. According to experts' calculations, Lithuania would need to "shell out" $55 million to cover its monthly oil consumption, which is 500,000 tonnes. Vilnius does not have that kind of money. Moreover, a host of additional technical questions linked with transporting the raw material, unloading it in Lithuania, and delivering it to consumers also arise. Danish private firms have adopted the same position as the Norwegians. As for the state viewpoint, Danish Energy Minister J. Bilgrav-Nielsen disclosed that if requests for help are received from the Lithuanians, the answer will be as follows: "The Danish state does not sell oil."

Elbowing my way with difficulty through the crowd of journalists surrounding K. Prunskiene, I asked her to comment on this restrained reaction from the Scandinavian states. The prime minister replied harshly: "For some reason people think that Lithuania will not survive without oil and gas. Moreover, at meetings here we have already noticed some trends which can be regarded as a manifestation of possible interest in oil shipments. Where will we get the currency? Don't worry, we will earn it..." I was unable to ask the prime minister how, since a British journalist pushed me aside and took the guest away to pose for a photograph with the Lithuanian tricolor in her hands against the backdrop of Copenhagen.

Norwegian 'Toughness' on Oil for Lithuania Noted

PM2204195090 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent V. Shmyganovskiy under the general heading "Lithuania Situation as Viewed by the World's Press": "Norway"]

[Text] Oslo—Lithuanian Prime Minister K. Prunskiene and republic foreign minister A. Saudargas have completed their first foreign trip, to Norway. Both the press and the authorities stressed the unofficial nature of the visit: The guests visited Oslo and Stavanger at the invitation of the three parties making up the current government coalition. Jan Syse, head of the cabinet, received the delegation, in his words, purely as the leader of the conservative Hoyre party.

All these stipulations by no means overshadow the certain toughness shown by Norwegian officialdom over the Lithuania crisis. The Soviet ambassador was even summoned to the country's Foreign Ministry to be told that all questions pertaining to the crisis should, in the Norwegian side's opinion, be resolved through dialogue and without pressure and sanctions so as in no way to harm East-West relations, which have been developing so successfully of late.

Stating to NTB [Norwegian Wire Service] that the blockade (of oil and gas supplies) marks "recognition" of Lithuanian sovereignty—since you cannot boycott your own country—K. Prunskiene went on to say that Lithuania cannot now rely on the Soviet Union as a trading partner, and other suppliers are having to be sought in order to ensure oil purchases.

Arriving in Oslo, she expressed surprise at Jan Syse's statement that Norway had not promised to be such a supplier.

The Norwegian Government does not trade in oil, and the state's Statoil company operates independently, like any private corporation. For its part, Statoil stated that it would treat Lithuania like any other purchaser and would require payment in hard currency at world market prices. Moreover, the potential clients were even advised to look to other Western countries' oil markets, where oil can be acquired more cheaply—since the "black gold" drilled in the North Sea is very highly priced because of its quality.

The following statements in the newspaper ARBEIDERBLADET were also discouraging: "If Norway became involved in a conflict between the USSR and Lithuania by supplying oil for political motives, it could create a precedent in international law...

"The processes taking place in East Europe and the development of East-West relations are too important to allow our foreign policy to be guided by emotion and sympathy."

Here is what Kai Eide, secretary of state in the Prime Minister's Office, said in an interview with AFTENPOSTEN: "Now is not the time to be making spur-of-the-moment, ill-considered decisions... We should be attentive and not allow ourselves to get embroiled in the conflict."

Memo to FRG Expresses Doubts About Article 23

AU2004125690 Frankfurt/Main FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE in German 20 Apr 90 p 1

["C.G." report: "Moscow Rejects Article 23"]

[Text] Bonn, 19 April—In a memorandum conveyed to the FRG Government, the USSR has expressed reservations about establishing German unity under Article 23 of the Basic Law. The Soviet ambassador to the FRG, Kvitsinskiy, who will soon be promoted to deputy foreign minister in Moscow and chief negotiator at the "two-plus-four" talks, has submitted the corresponding statement to the office of the chancellor. The text is not a formal note. The day before, the USSR ambassador to East Berlin, Kochemasov, had conveyed such a memorandum to the new GDR head of government, de Maiziere. In this memorandum, the USSR criticizes Kohl for those parts of the planned state treaty between the FRG and the GDR that have so far become public, because this document conceives Article 23 as the basis for German unity. In Moscow's view, the state treaty is also a hasty move on the part of Bonn, because the GDR is to be pushed to give up essential rights in the spheres of economic, fiscal, and social policy. The Soviet paper does not mention the term "NATO." Bonn considers the Soviet move to be an attempt to clearly define Moscow's stance for negotiations at the time the new GDR Government assumes office and prior to the "two-plus-four" talks.

Meanwhile FRANKFURTER ALLGEMEINE has learned that the Polish Government will provide draft border treaties to the governments of the GDR and the FRG within the next few days, even as early as during GDR Foreign Minister Meckel's visit to Warsaw on Monday [23 April]. According to Poland, a formal treaty should be negotiated and a final version prepared, ready to be signed even before the conclusion of German unity and in addition to the planned declarations by the parliaments and governments of the two German states; in Warsaw's view, the treaty should be signed and ratified by the parliament of a united Germany upon conclusion of unification. It was stated that the Polish Government would convey copies of the draft treaty to the four victor powers of World War II and that it wants to conduct talks on it parallel to the "two-plus- four" consultations.

German Developments Termed Destabilizing

90UI00467 Moscow VETERAN in Russian No 12, 19-25 Mar 90 p 12

[Article by M. Aleksandrov: "The German Problem and European Stability"]

[Text] "The 'cold war' is over," a "transition from confrontation to cooperation has been made," "the threat of war has receded," "the USSR's international stability and security have largely grown." These now-customary phrases have seemingly become so firmly rooted in our consciousness that questioning them is somehow not done.

Nonetheless, I would venture to surmise that in the past several months international stability not only has not strengthened but, on the contrary, has weakened. Against the background of a seemingly positive trend toward disarmament, changes have been occurring in Eastern Europe which are fraught with the danger of a sharp destabilization of the international situation.

The pivotal problem is the German question. No one has canceled the responsibility of the four victor-powers for German affairs. However, their approaches to the future international status of a united Germany do not correspond to one another.

And it is not a question of some people being opposed to German unification, but of NATO wishing to see a united Germany a member thereof and insisting on this.

H. Kohl is perfectly definite in pointing to this. In an interview with a program on Central German Television on the results of his visit to Moscow he declared without beating about the bush: "We are a part of NATO and we will, of course, remain a part of NATO. Under no circumstances will we agree to a neutral Germany. This, I believe, is no longer an issue in Moscow either. This was manifested quite clearly in the course of our discussions."

Despite H. Kohl's optimism, the ambiguity nonetheless persists. In a recent interview given by Foreign Minister E.A. Shevardnadze on board an aircraft, it was clearly pointed out that he disagreed with the idea of a united Germany's membership in NATO.

There is nothing more dangerous in international politics than a lack of clarity and ambiguity in parties' positions. History shows that one party's underestimation of the other party's readiness to resort to extreme measures for the defense of its national interests leads to the most serious international crises. The Caribbean crisis, the most dangerous in the postwar era, perhaps, developed precisely according to this script. At that time N.S. Khrushchev underestimated the readiness of the United States to employ military force to prevent the

deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba. The Americans, in turn, underestimated the readiness of the USSR to attack the NATO grouping in Europe in the event of a U.S. attack on Cuba.

Given a dangerous development of events, precision in the positions of all parties is essential, otherwise a crisis is unavoidable. This is particularly important for such a key area of the world as Germany, where the two most powerful military groupings face off.

Yet there are already signs that the development of events in this area is assuming an uncontrollable nature. The process of Germany's unification could begin spontaneously, on the spur of the moment. Highly indicative in this connection is the evaluation of French Foreign Minister R. Dumas: "Events are now developing so rapidly that German reunification could occur from day to day. This is the general opinion. When elections have been held in East European countries, and they will take place in the GDR on 18 March...a new GDR team will shortly after be raising the question of reunification."

If the coalition supporting H. Modrow is defeated following the elections and forces advocating the immediate unification of Germany, given its continued membership of NATO, come to power, this could exacerbate the situation in the extreme.

The natural question arises: What opportunities do we now have for really influencing German affairs? Can we prevent unification on the spur of the moment if it takes a direction contrary to the interests of our security? The sole such safeguard, I believe, remains solely the Group of Soviet Forces in the GDR. Of course, we could obtain certain support on the part of forces of the GDR left, but if they prove to be in the minority, they will be unable to actively influence foreign policy decisionmaking.

The West seemingly is not averse to the continuation of our forces in the Eastern zone of Germany even after the country's unification within a NATO framework. Even projects in which the NATO zone would not incorporate the territory of the present GDR are being put forward. These plans are reminiscent, however, of the theater of the absurd. It would appear that Soviet forces would be stationed on the territory of a country belonging to the opposite military alliance. This alone could serve as a cause of conflict between them. And what would happen to the GDR People's Army? Would it be a member of the Warsaw Pact or NATO or would it be disbanded? In the last two cases the strategic balance would change manifestly to the Warsaw Pact's disadvantage.

The NATO people's aim emerges distinctly enough: having achieved Germany's unification within the NATO framework, to squeeze Soviet forces out of the Eastern zone "peacefully," so to speak. NATO Secretary General M. Woerner makes altogether no secret of this. He recently declared plainly that there were no objections "to some Soviet forces remaining in East Germany for the time of the transitional period, but it is clear that this status could not last forever." At the same time, however, this demand does not extend to the American forces, and M. Woerner sets no limit on their stay in Germany.

All this points to the selfish interests of the NATO states endeavoring to thereby achieve a strategic preponderance over the Warsaw Pact in Europe. It is incomprehensible only to whose interests all this corresponds and whether European stability would be more reliable in the event of the USSR's departure from the eastern part of Germany. After all, the tension created in this connection would simply lock in the interbloc confrontation in Europe. And whereas Washington generally has an interest in interbloc confrontation (for the purpose of preserving levers of influence on the allies in Europe), it is incomprehensible how this fits into the foreign policy line of the West Europeans striving, as they maintain, for the creation of a united Europe. The Soviet Union also advocates a united Europe, the disbanding of the military blocs, and the creation of an all-European system of collective security. The neutralization of Germany could be a first step in this direction since a natural neutral zone would be created between the two alliances.

However, Germany's neutrality is not to the liking of our Western partners. They have advanced the proposition that a neutral Germany could slip out of control and create a new threat to European security.

Also highly unconvincing in the proposition that "being in NATO, Germany would be more controllable." Having strengthened its economic and military potential, it could, without leaving this alliance here, begin to make territorial claims on its neighbors. Even the present H. Kohl government is refusing to guarantee Poland's Western border. But what if an even more right wing, nationalist government were to assume office? Meanwhile the policy of "appeasement" which was pursued by the Western powers in respect of Germany in the 1930's and which led to WWII is giving rise in many people to fears that history could repeat itself. For some reason or other I am not wholly confident that on this occasion the "Western democracies" would firmly rise to the defense of the interests of Poland or Czechoslovakia, not to mention our country.

How could the USSR with regard for past experience agree to leave Germany solely in the care of the West? After all, the Soviet people would once again have to sort out the consequences, and under less favorable strategic conditions than now, what is more. And Western politicians are evidently also lacking in farsightedness. After all, Germany's territorial claims could, in the event of its continued membership in NATO, also involve their own countries in a military conflict with the Warsaw Pact.

German neutrality is not, I believe, as bad as people are attempting to portray it. If the appropriate measures in the sphere of inspection are provided for, it would even strengthen stability in Europe. Such measures might include a reduction in the numbers of the German army to a minimal level, the preservation in Germany of a

certain minimum number of troops of the four victor-powers, a mechanism for the monitoring of arms production in Germany, and a number of others. If our Western "partners" are sincerely interested in the process of reducing confrontation and establishing cooperation with the East, they should agree with this form of German neutrality or the other. For our part, it is evidently time to clearly state that the Soviet Union will not under any circumstances forgo its responsibility in German affairs and will, in accordance with the UN Charter, make use of all means at its disposal to prevent German unification on terms undermining the USSR's national security. Naturally, the decision on the adoption or nonadoption of such a declaration cannot be the prerogative only of the country's political leadership, even if collegial. It is the cause of the entire Soviet people.

For this reason the idea of a referendum on the German question expressed by E.A. Shevardnadze would seem correct. Time is pressing, and evidently we need even now to begin discussion of this matter in the Supreme Soviet lest there be a repeat of the situation in which the Soviet people had to pay an inordinately high price for certain decisions secretly adopted by Stalin and his closest associates in the prewar years.

Belousov Speaks at Munich 'Conversion' Fair

LD2004211190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1131 GMT 20 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondents Lev Volnukhin and Nikolay Kalintsev]

[Excerpts] Munich, 20 Apr (TASS)—[passage omitted]

A Soviet exhibition, "Conversion-90", was formally opened today at one of the biggest pavilions of the industrial fair complex here. It has been organized jointly by the USSR Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the Munich Fair and Exhibition Society. [passage omitted]

It is no coincidence that the "Conversion-90" exhibition is being held in the FRG, the center of Europe, said I.S. Belousov, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, in his speech. He recalled the words of a joint statement signed in Bonn last year by M.S. Gorbachev and H. Kohl, which noted that Europe, which suffered more than anyone else in two world wars, is obliged to give an example of the maintenance of a stable peace, good-neighborliness, and constructive cooperation.

I.S. Belousov set out the main areas of the state program for the conversion of the defense industry, designed to run until the year 1995. Its implementation, he stressed, is proceeding at an accelerated rate. There is reason to believe that in five years time the relative share of civilian output at enterprises of the defense industries will reach 65 percent.

In conclusion, the Soviet representative called on business circles of the West to actively participate in this process and to make maximum use of the opportunities now opening up for intensifying trade and economic cooperation. [passage omitted]

Deputy Minister Adamishin Meets Irish Delegation

PM2004153790 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Meetings in Moscow"]

[Text] A conversation was held in Moscow 18 April between the Irish Parliamentary delegation headed by S. Doherty, chairman of the Senate, and USSR Deputy Foreign Minister A.L. Adamishin devoted to discussing problems of the all-European process.

On the same day the Irish visitors had a conversation at the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations.

Lukyanov Holds Talks With Doherty

PM2304085390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[TASS report: "Parliamentarians Received"]

[Text] On 20 April A.I. Lukyanov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet, received an Irish Parliamentary delegation headed by Senate Speaker S. Doherty.

A.I. Lukyanov drew the guests' attention to the main tasks in the sphere of domestic and foreign policy on whose resolution the USSR Supreme Soviet and the country's leadership are currently working. He talked about the measures aimed at implementing economic and political reform, at settling interethnic relations, at further easing international tension, and at developing constructive cooperation among the peoples of Europe and all other continents.

Expressing gratitude to the USSR Supreme Soviet for its cordiality and hospitality, S. Doherty and the other delegation members noted that people in Ireland are following with great attention Soviet people's efforts to implement in practice the course of renewing all spheres of society's life and sincerely wish them success. The great importance of perestroyka in the USSR for positive change in the world was stressed.

Both sides reaffirmed the desire to further strengthen and develop Soviet-Irish cooperation and expand interparliamentary ties, which could really promote the deepening of collaboration in other spheres, too.

Taking part in the detailed talks, which were held in an atmosphere of mutual understanding and amicability, were G.V. Uranov, Soviet ambassador to Ireland, and P. McCabe, Irish ambassador to the USSR.

Falin Receives Visiting Europarliamentarians

LD2004165590 Moscow TASS in English 1158 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—The head of the Soviet Communist Party Central Committee's International Department, Valentin Falin, today received a delegation from the Europarliament Socialist Group, headed by group chairman Jean-Pierre Cot.

The delegation is staying in the Soviet Union at the invitation of the Soviet Parliament and the Soviet Committee for European Security and Cooperation.

The sides had a frank and constructive discussion of a wide range of issues connected with perestroyka and the general European process.

Latin America & Caribbean

Shevardnadze Receives Departing Nicaraguan Envoy

PM2204164390 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Unattributed report: "Talk Held"]

[Text] E.A. Shevardnadze, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and USSR foreign minister, received Ernesto Castillo Martinez, Nicaraguan ambassador to the USSR, 21 April in connection with his forthcoming final return home.

Mutual satisfaction was expressed with the progress of the processes of national reconciliation and consensus in Nicaragua. These processes are a substantial contribution to the cause of a political settlement in Central America.

Both sides stressed that over the past few years the Soviet Union and Nicaragua have achieved a high level of collaboration in various spheres. All this is a valuable political asset which must be preserved in the future in the interests of both countries' peoples.

E. Castillo expressed gratitude for the support given him in carrying out his mission in the Soviet Union.

PRAVDA Interviews Abalkin on Cuban Visit

PM2004152590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Second Edition p 6

["Topical Interview" in Havana with L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, by own correspondent A. Moiseyev: "Leonid Abalkin: 'We Value Friendship With Cuba'"; date not specified]

[Text] Havana—The 20th session of the Soviet-Cuban Intergovernmental Commission for Economic, Scientific, and Technical Cooperation has ended in Havana. The final document and a protocol on trade and payments in 1990 were signed. After the commission completed its work, I asked L.I. Abalkin, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and head of the Soviet delegation, to answer a number of questions.

[Moiseyev] Leonid Ivanovich, how do you assess the results of your talks with the Cubans? What conclusions did you reach?

[Abalkin] Above all, the contacts were successful if only because they made it possible to find a concerted understanding of the problems. I wish to emphasize that here, in Havana, we have agreed to strengthen the historical, traditional Soviet-Cuban ties. The Soviet economy today cannot do without Cuban sugar, say, which makes up 30 percent of all the sugar consumed in our country, or nickel, just as Cuba cannot exist without our oil. This is the complementary nature of our economies.

[Moiseyev] If the Soviet economy goes over to regulated, planned market relations, how will this affect our ties with Cuba?

[Abalkin] This will require serious changes in the organization of cooperation and, above all, the in-depth study and renewal of it. Incidentally, we have signed a document which states that the contracting parties recognize the need to radically improve economic relations between our countries.

[Moiseyev] Leonid Ivanovich, at home we are trying increasingly resolutely to abandon administrative-edict methods of managing the economy. And yet here in Cuba, as is well known, such methods are, on the contrary, being strengthened. Will this discrepancy not influence our cooperation?

[Abalkin] If we have announced that one of the most important indications of the new political thinking is recognition of every country's freedom to choose its own political structures and methods of leadership, why should we abandon this principle here?

There are methods which meet with understanding and broad approval among the Cuban population. For example, I have visited several so-called construction contingents. If I were to take a negative attitude toward these ventures, I could call them "military-labor detachments." But I have seen the enthusiasm of the people making up the contingents, the voluntary nature of their participation, their readiness to "exert themselves" in labor, and the specific methods for encouraging work. There is a tremendous desire to get into such a contingent. I believe that it is necessary to look at and compare the realities with the specific historical situation, and not think from a general philosophical standpoint.

People in Cuba are following attentively what we are doing in the Soviet Union. And I have recently noticed

here real shifts in their understanding of what we want to restructure. Fidel Castro devoted a lot of time to our delegation. He took a lively interest in the processes under way in the USSR.

[Moiseyev] What, in your view, are the prospects for economic cooperation between the USSR and Cuba?

[Abalkin] I would single out three areas. The first is connected with strengthening and stabilizing the existing relations, which are founded on the real complementary nature of our economies. The second consists in developing new forms of cooperation and involving nontraditional spheres—this concerns, above all, pharmaceutics, medical preparations and equipment, the use of scientific achievements in biotechnology, etc. And the third is the search for a flexible, improved economic mechanism consonant with world market conditions.

I wish to say the following to those people in our country who call for the curtailment of relations with Cuba. We value friendship with Cuba, and historically, we have good ties with it. This small country has always been among the first to extend to us a helping hand in hard times. Let us recall the earthquake in Armenia, when Cubans gave their blood for the injured, or the disaster in Bashkiria, when Cuban physicians sent us the best medicines in the world for the treatment of burns and helped to save many Soviet people. We recently visited two Havana hospitals. In one a group of our former servicemen who received serious injuries in Afghanistan is receiving a course of treatment. In the other there are more than 100 children who suffered in the Chernobyl tragedy. F. Castro declared in one of our conversations that Cuba is ready to receive from the Soviet Union up to 500 Afghan veterans and up to 10,000 Chernobyl children.

We have no doubts about the fact that ties between the two countries can expand successfully. The growth in our trade serves as an example of this. We have signed a protocol which provides for an increase of more than eight percent in Soviet-Cuban commodity turnover this year. It will reach the hitherto unprecedented level of R9.2 billion. So, in principle, the prospects are rich, but great work will, of course, be required.

Abalkin Cited on Soviet-Cuban Trade Relations

PM2304095190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 4

[Dispatch by own correspondent A. Kamorin: "USSR-Cuba: Volume of Trade Increased"]

[Text] Havana—On Tuesday the session of the intergovernmental Soviet-Cuban commission on economic and scientific and technical cooperation ended in Havana. Two Soviet-Cuban protocols were signed. They summed up the commission's latest session and defined the volumes of bilateral trade for the current year of 1990.

Of themselves these measures are of a rather routine nature, repeated every year in Havana and Moscow alternately. But this time the intergovernmental commission's session took place within a "field" of intense interest.

The day before a number of Western media had made forecasts about the possible economic "rupture" or at least "cooling" of our relations. Evidently they were considering the repeated statements by U.S. officials that Soviet aid to Cuba remains "the last obstacle to the radical improvement of relations" between Washington and Moscow.

On the other hand, the prospects of Soviet-Cuban economic ties were discussed in our country's parliament and several press organs. The question of the preferential price which the USSR pays for Cuban sugar was a particularly acute problem.

Expectations for changes in the preliminary forecasts were also to a certain extent linked with measures by the Cuban side. Proceeding from the watchword "prepare for the worst while hoping for the best," the Cuban leadership has recently been preparing for the so-called "special period in peace time" by which is meant the introduction of an emergency situation in the economy, which could be caused by the cessation, for some reason or other, of deliveries from the Soviet Union of vital importance to the country.

But these forecasts were unjustified. According to the protocol signed, this year the volume of reciprocal trade turnover will increase over eight percent, totalling about R8.9 billion. Addressing the press conference in Havana, L.I. Abalkin, the head of the Soviet delegation, expressed his personal conviction that with the correct organization of matters this growth could continue right up to the doubling of the scale of cooperation.

Although, according to the statement made by L.I. Abalkin in Havana, an accord has been reached on the elaboration of "radical measures to increase the effectiveness of cooperation," lending them specific detail is a matter for the future. So far, to all appearances, compromise has been reached on vexed positions, proceeding from the wish of the Cuban side.

At a press conference your IZVESTIYA correspondent asked L.I. Abalkin about the prospects for extinguishing Cuban debts to the USSR, the size of which, about 15.5 billion rubles, was made public last months and generated great interest among the Soviet public.

"Figures like these often have a shock effect," the head of the Soviet delegation replied. We are encountering a

situation where unprepared people react inadequately to them. Obviously, one of our domestic problems is not to throw out information to an unprepared public and to know how to comment on and explain the sources and reasons for particular phenomena.

"As for the problem as a whole," L.I. Abalkin continued, "it will require considerably more time for analysis and study and will be the topic of discussion. This is not a question for the intergovernmental commission, it is a question for relations between the two countries' governments."

Vorontsov Meets Mexican Minister in Budapest

LD1304171190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0818 GMT 13 Apr 90

[Text] Budapest, 13 Apr (TASS)—Yuliy Vorontsov, the USSR first deputy foreign minister, today held a friendly conversation with Mexican Foreign Minister Fernando Solana Morales. It was stated with satisfaction that the USSR and Mexico are united by their striving for constructive interaction in the interests of tackling radical problems of modern times. Their cooperation in various spheres are based on the principles of noninterference, mutual respect, and partnership which, in the opinion of the two sides, are universal and definitive for interstate relations.

Supreme Soviet Session

Moscow Radio Airs 21 Apr Supreme Soviet Session

Military Pension Bill Debated

LD2104172490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 21 April begins broadcasting a recording of the 21 April session of the USSR Supreme Soviet held in the Kremlin. The session begins with a discussion of a bill on pensions for military personnel. Shcherbakov, chairman of the Committee on Labor and Social Issues, justifies having special arrangements for military personnel, as opposed to those that apply to civilians—this is the case in most countries of the world. He outlines some of the pension levels for the main ranks, and levels applying to invalids in different categories.

At 1520 GMT Shcherbakov replies to questions submitted in writing and from deputies in person.

At 1530 GMT Deputy Kulikov speaks on the bill, mentioning concerns expressed by servicemen in letters to the ministry about the need for special additions in some circumstances.

At 1537 GMT Lukyanov proposes that they listen to another four deputies before making a decision.

At 1538 GMT Deputy (?Ochirov) starts speaking. He recommends that the law be passed in its first reading. He cites Yazov and other officers' proposals on removing limitations on servicemen's pensions if they left service earlier than originally planned, asking what has happened in relation to these.

At 1540 GMT Deputy Klochkov supports the law, and proposes that it be adopted. He speaks about proposals received by the committee relating to servicemen who were injured during service. He therefore proposes that rules relating to injured World War II veterans be changed, and that the pensions for women who took part in the war be increased.

At 1545 GMT Deputy Y. Sokolova speaks on behalf of the wives of servicemen. She expresses the opinion that resources must be found to raise the pensions of veterans of World War II. She would like the law to be adopted, but with amendments submitted here.

At 1549 GMT Deputy Podziruk states that the law should be adopted, but criticizes a number of articles in it, including the fact that there is no upper limit on pension payment.

At 1554 GMT Deputy Britvin speaks about issues relating to the border troops and privileges which they need to protect, and about the special problem of helping World War II border troops veterans.

At 1558 GMT there are brief interventions by two more deputies.

At 1603 GMT Lukyanov asks the deputies present to register again before proceeding to vote. Lukyanov now proposes a vote on a resolution to approve the first reading of the bill on military pensions, and pass it for consideration by other committees.

First there is a proposal that a new committee—on internationalist servicemen, to include not only Afghanistan veterans—be formed. This, if formed, will be one of the committees to which the pensions bill be referred. A vote is taken on whether this matter should be discussed, and it is in favor. Lukyanov announces a proposal that a chairman of the committee be elected, in the person of Deputy Pavel Shetko—this is passed. Discussion follows, on the membership of the committee. The formation of the committee is then approved by a vote. The figures are not announced.

At 1618 GMT a vote is finally taken on the above resolution, which Lukyanov declares to have been passed. No figures are announced.

At 1620 GMT discussion returns to the bill on pensions for the population in general. A deputy from Kirghizia makes a special plea for the highland shepherds of his region. Further short interventions by several deputies on local aspects of pension arrangements, including special provision for workers in harsh northern regions, occur.

At 1639 GMT Deputy Ismailov comments on the usefulness of the discussion, despite doubts over a quorum. Deputies Doga, Panfilova, and Kosygin speak on special provisions relating to women.

At 1655 GMT Lukyanov proposes how the discussion should continue following the break. He announces a break.

General Population Pensions Bill Cited

LD2104211490

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1700 GMT on 21 April continues broadcasting its recording of the 21 April session of the USSR Supreme Soviet in the Kremlin. It continues immediately, with the recording of proceedings following the break. Deputy Gritsenko reports on discussions held in the Commission for Social Protection, Labor, Wages, Prices, and Taxation, of which he is chairman, making frequent reference to various special lists of people working in particular industries or particular geographical areas who currently qualify for special pension supplements. Should this system continue? He asks.

At 1716 GMT Shcherbakov speaks again, saying that there have been thousands of questions and suggestions on the bill, including those from individual workers, to

which it is physically impossible to reply in any meaningful way. He refers to the responsibilities of the All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions and the Ministry of Health in some of the special pension provisions sought. On the question of special rates for people working in the cold North or in the hot South, he argues that other countries do not make such special provisions. He says the government's position is that money should be spent on improving conditions and the environment rather than on compensation: "Ecology, not special allowances," as he puts it. He refers to some jobs where special provision is being sought, in particular jobs in civil aviation where conditions do not match those in other countries.

At 1735 GMT Lukyanov invites Orlov, first deputy minister of finance, to speak. Orlov says he will have to bore the assembled deputies for a couple of minutes by explaining the structure of the budget and quoting a number of figures. He does so, concluding that the main fact to bear in mind is the deficit with which the house will be faced when it comes to discuss the 1991 budget in three or four months' time.

At 1743 GMT Lukyanov calls a vote on how to proceed. There is no majority for a legislative decision on the pension bill today. Only procedural matters can be decided. Nevertheless, today's discussion has been useful, and has clarified the fact that parliament should decide only on the general question of pension arrangements, with that of special supplements being left to the government.

At 1747 GMT Lukyanov announces that complaints have been recieved about material published in OGONEK—the editor of which is a member of the house—supposedly defaming the Armed Forces. He thinks the matter should be referred to the Committee on Glasnost and the commission on Deputies' Ethics. General assent for this suggestion is recorded.

At 1749 GMT Lukyanov goes on to suggest a timetable for the work of the Supreme Soviet for the coming days.

At 1753 GMT Lukyanov reads out announcements from deputies, including one from Medvedev concerning reductions in oil and gas suplies to Lithuania not affecting other republics.

At 1755 GMT Deputy Chairman of Chamber Oleynik speaks, referring back to suggestions made earlier that shots of the sparsely-peopled chamber should not be shown. He thinks such shots should be shown.

At 1759 GMT Deputy Kucherenko questions aspects of the timetable for next week, asking when time is going to be found to complete work on the bill on taxation of enterprises, if the pension bill is still not resolved.

At 1800 GMT Lukyanov says he feels the pension bill should be wrapped up before the end of next week.

At 1802 GMT Deputy Kugultinov raises the case of Deputy Gamzatov, who has been accused by the journal ARUMENTY I FAKTY of failing to attend parliamentary business. Kugultinov points out that he has been ill in the hospital for some time and that his name should be cleared of the accusation. Other deputies contribute remarks on the case.

At 1805 GMT the recording ends, without any announcement in the chamber that business is at an end. The studio announcer says that that was a recording of today's sitting.

Bureau is texting Lukyanov remarks at 1753 GMT on impact on other republics of the cutoff of oil and gas supplies to Lithuania.

Supreme Soviet Plenary Session Begins 21 Apr

LD2104063590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] At this moment, the third session of the country's Supreme Soviet is beginning its work at a plenary sitting of the chambers. Today, the deputies plan to end the discussion of the USSR law on pensions for the citizens of the country and to vote on it article by article.

Report on Pensions Presented at Session

LD2104081890 Moscow TASS in English 0718 GMT 21 Apr 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 21 TASS—The Soviet parliament met today to adopt a bill on pensions. The bill, discussed in the second reading on Thursday, makes pensions dependent on one's "labour contribution" and provides for pensions for all categories of people.

It guarantees pensioners' social protection through regular rises in pensions in accordance with changes in the cost-of-living index.

Before putting the bill to the vote, deputies heard a report by Vladimir Shcherbakov, chairman of the State Committee for Labour and Social Issues.

He submitted a bill on pensions for the military for the first reading discussion.

Decision Postponed

LD2104200090 Moscow TASS in English 1225 GMT 21 Apr 90

[By TASS Parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 21 TASS—The Soviet parliament, which had an extra working day today, failed to complete the discussion of a bill on pensions as deputies disagreed over some of its provisions.

The bill provides for a marked improvement in the position of pensioners. Its implementation will require R34 billion a year in budget allocations in addition to the R65 billion allocated for the payment of pensions now.

During a nationwide discussion of the bill, which preceded the parliamentary discussions, many people proposed extending the list of population categories entitled to pension benefits.

But the government and the parliamentary commission which drafted the bill propose, instead of extending the list of benefits for bad working conditions, improving these conditions.

However, demands for benefits for workers in various industries and regions prevailed in today's discussion.

The chairman of the State Committee for Labor and Social Issues, Vladimir Shchrbakov, pointed to the "futility of such an approach."

He said "everyone considers one's job to be the most difficult one, but then all people have the right to pension benefits."

The disagreement and and lack of a quorum for voting prevented the passing of the bill. The parliament decided to discuss it again next week.

Also today, the parliament approved the first reading of a bill on pensions for the military. The bill provides for an increase in their pensions by 15 to 20 per cent on average, and in pensions for war invalids and the families of killed soldiers—by 30 to 40 per cent.

The parliament set up a new parliamentary Committee for the Affairs of Afghan War Veterans. Afghan war veteran Pavel Shetko, 28, of Mink was elected committee chairman.

Lithuania Embargo To Affect Other Republics

LD2104211590 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1753 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Remarks by Supreme Soviet Chairman Lukyanov during the 21 April proceedings of the USSR Supreme Soviet at the Kremlin—recorded]

[Text] Deputy Medvedev asks me to make known to the Supreme Soviet that the economic measures that were adopted by the president and the government—as you will recall, restricting supplies of oil and gas to Lithuania—will have an impact on other republics. The government is aware of this. The Presidential Council, too, is aware of this. You know that these questions are being resolved. Measures are being adopted so that the population will not be affected by this, but in principle these measures were forced. You know that. I am simply communicating to you this note from Deputy Medvedev. I am obliged.... [changes thought] He has asked me to read it out at the sitting of the Supreme Soviet.

Finance Commission Official on Economy

LD2004104890 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] We begin with the latest news of our parliamentarians. According to the rules, Friday is a day when the commissions and committees are at work and as usual we are linked by direct line with our corrrespondents' point at No. 27, Kalininskiy Prospekt, in Moscow. Over to Vladimir Markin, our station's parliamentary reporter:

[Markin] Today is probably one of the most interesting days in the work of the committees and commissions because the range of issues under discussion is wider than ever before. Judge for yourselves: There are issues involving the Meskhetian Turkish population, the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear electric power station, and an examination of the most important draft bills that are still to be considered during this session.

You see how difficult it is to choose just one issue to talk about in detail: Nevertheless, a choice has to be made and I have chosen the Planning, Budget, and Finance Commission, which at this moment is discussing the results of the fulfillment of the state plan and budget for the first quarter, the state of monetary circulation in the country, and the results of foreign political activity.

With me is Anatoliy Nikolayevich Saunin, deputy chairman of this commission. My first question to him is this: Judging from the report of the State Committee for Statistics, which is now being discussed, the results of work during the first quarter show that no breakthrough in the development of the country's economy, as was mapped out in the program for its recovery, has in fact taken place, and that the situation has even deteriorated. What are the main reasons for this, in your opinion?

[Saunin] The main reasons, as we are being told today by representatives of the government, lie in the fact that the restructuring of our economic mechanism is allegedly taking place. The reasons for this are losses of working time, our interethnic conflicts, and many other subjective factors. This has, of course, exerted an influence upon the development of our national economy. But, in the opinion of the commission, this is not the main thing. The main reason no doubt amounts to this, that the program which was put forward by the government for this year, the program for the recovery of the economy which was adopted at the Second Congress of People's Deputies, is not being implemented today. And it is incapable of being realized, as many deputies have said, because unfortunately it was in many respects designed for administrative methods of implementing economic reform. It is impossible to change to a market economy by trusting, first and foremost, that commands will be issued from the top.

[Markin] Anatoliy Nikolaevich, aren't we paying too high a price for such (?lessons) by the government in trying to change the situation in our economy?

[Saunin] Unfortunately the price really is very high, because today I would say the situation in the economy is not just simply deteriorating, but all the processes of a crisis have manifested themselves in a very substantial way. The government is now coming out with a package of proposals for accelerating the changeover to a market economy. Unfortunately, we do not yet know what this package contains, but I expect that any vote of confidence in the government has already reached its limit, so to speak. Generally speaking, as they say, there is indeed a limit to the patience both of the people and of its representatives, the people's deputies. As far as I know, under the rules of the session, the government must be heard on this question before the short holiday that will take place from 28 April to 10 May. It is planned that the whole of this package will be examined, immediately after the holiday, no doubt on 10 or 11 May, but we are expecting that the package must be a radical one overall. One cannot take half steps these days because then we really will find ourselves at the bottom of the abyss.

[Markin] Well, let's hope that a full step is taken and that we don't take half a step backwards.

Commission Analyzes Economic Performance

LD2004205990 Moscow TASS in English 2045 GMT 20 Apr 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent]

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—The main economic indices worsened in the first quarter of 1990, because previous command methods of economic management have been undermined, while new market mechanisms have not been created. The planning, budget and financial commission of the Council of the Union, one of the two chambers of the Soviet parliament, came to this conclusion after today's hearing on the results of the Soviet Union's social and economic development in the first quarter.

Describing the situation in the Soviet economy, Vadim Kirichenko, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Statistics, stressed that the gross national product reduced by one per cent as compared to the first quarter of 1989, the productivity by 2.2 per cent. Production output reduced by 1.2 per cent in the first quarter.

Kirichenko and other senior executives of the central economic institutions believe that the slowing down of the country's economic development rates is mostly the result of the growing losses of working time brought about by strikes and interethnic conflicts, the reduction in output in arms-manufacturing industries as a result of conversion and the closing down or temporarily stopping the enterprises which do not meet basic ecological safety requirements.

It was pointed out at the hearings that the tense situation on the consumer market is the most serious problem. The gap between the reducing production volume and the growing incomes of the population (by 13.3 per cent in the first quarter) continues to grow. As a result, the unsatisfied demand in goods and services, which is estimated at R165 billion, is not reducing. Taking into account this figure, inflation was estimated at 8 per cent by the committee for statistics. However, the volume of money printed in the first quarter of 1990 exceeds the corresponding figure for 1989 by 26 per cent.

Members of the commission expressed confidence that the solution of the consumer market problem is inseparably connected with speeding up the transfer to a market economy. A programme of the radicalisation of the economic reform was twice discussed by the Presidential Council, and in may the government intends to submit to the parliament a package of corresponding bills.

Committees, Commissions Meet 20 April

LD2004154190

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1100 GMT on 20 April carries a four-minute report by Lyudmila Semina on the work of the Supreme Soviet commissions and committees. She dwells in particular on the work of the Planning, Budget, and Finance Commission which heard the government report on the results of the implementation of the plan and the budget of the country for the first quarter of the year, the state of monetary circulation in the country, and the results of foreign policy activity. "The results are distressing," she says. "They bear witness to the fact that there has been no radical turning point in the development of the country's economy." "The situation has even got worse," Semina says. "The dynamics of the development of the country in many of the most important directions have slowed down. The material and financial imbalances of the national economy continues to grow stronger. The process of the collapse of the consumer market and the disorder of monetary circulation in the country is accelerating. The growth of monetary emissions and inflation are going out of control. The situation in this sphere is critical," Semina says. She continues: "Measures outlined in the program for financial improvement have not been implemented. The tasks of reducing the unprofitability of factories, of the receipt of resources from the distribution of loans among enterprises and organizations, the release of budget allocations in connection with the alteration of time limits for implementation of centralized measures to raise the people's standard of living, the reduction of expenditures on defense, and so on, have not been fulfilled." Semina continues: "The situation with the development of foreign economic ties is complicated and complex. Exports have decreased, imports have remained practically at the same level." She says the deputies noted that these results lead one to conclude that the former command and administrative methods of management have been

undermined, while the development of a new mechanism of economic regulations is not yet complete.

Semina then briefly touches upon the work of the Committee on Agrarian Questions and Food which sat jointly with the Commission for Industry, Energy, Equipment, and Technology and discussed the development of serial production of machinery to introduce progressive technology and new forms of production organization into agriculture. Moscow domestic Service in Russian at 0900 GMT on 20 April carries an Aleksandr Ruvinskiy report on the 20 April meetings of Supreme Soviet committees and commissions, which adds that in the agrarian committee meeting "Pugin, minister of automotive and agricultural machine building, was obliged to admit that today there is no complete system of machines for any type of production or for any agricultural crop." "Comrade Silayev, deputy chairman of the Council of Ministers, spoke of the need for closer cooperation with foreign firms and foreign engineers and the need to buy equipment from them."

Foreign Economic Relations Termed 'Critical'

LD2004194290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 20 Apr 90

[From the news feature "Supreme Soviet Diary", presented by Olga Vasilenko]

[Text] [Vasilenko] A certain measure of optimism was present at the beginning of the address by Dmitriyev, one of the leaders of the Commission on Foreign Economic Relations. Here is what he said:

[Begin Dmitriyev recording] The outline export and import plans was approximately fulfilled. The trend toward a stabilization of commodity circulation, after two years of apparent decline, continued. Customs income—that is, the contribution these foreign relations bring to the state budget, rose by even more than was planned for the quarter. There was an increase in imports of consumer goods, particularly medicines. The number of joint enterprises has increased—307 are already working, out of a total of 1,540—and they are expected to produce output this year to an approximate value of R1 billion.

In the area of what might be called economic diplomacy, a large-scale agreement has been concluded between the Soviet Union and the European Community, which will give our industry access to the Common Market. The Bonn meeting on an economic framework for the all-European process was successfully concluded. And it looks as though we shall soon succeed in agreeing on observer status at GATT.

But these positive results should not obscure the fact that the overall situation in foreign economic relations is pretty critical, requiring attention and corrective action. The stabilization of which I spoke earlier is taking place for the moment at the cost mainly of growth in imports and not in exports, and as a result an imbalance in the country's foreign payments: Its foreign debt is accumulating and is approaching a point beyond which we simply have no right to go. More and more reports are appearing in the foreign press of defaults on current accounts by our foreign trade organizations, and these facts are true. They result in unpleasant phenomena such as a decline in the Soviet Union's standing as a business partner, and sometimes even a refusal to have dealings with us, which can have an effect on the size of deliveries that had already been stipulated contractually. [end recording]

Soviet Legal Committee Discusses Bills

LD2004172990 Moscow TASS in English 1700 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—By TASS parliamentary correspondent:

The Legal Committee of the Soviet Parliament held a meeting here today to discuss the bill on Soviet militia.

People's Deputy Nikolay Strukov said that the bill took into account the opinions of law enforcement workers, scientists, and lawyers. He noted that the need to ensure more protection for the civil rights and interests of citizens, to enforce law and order and to combat crime, could be met by stepping up the work of internal affairs bodies, including the militia.

In conditions of growing democracy and glasnost it is necessary to have legal acts regulating the militia's work, he said. The submitted bill stems from existing norms that have withstood the test of time and its provisions are in keeping with international standards.

Sticking to the essence of the document, the working group ammended the bill submitted by the USSR Council of Ministers with due account for the proposals and remarks made by people's deputies during the preceeding committee meeting. The structure of the bill was altered and several new articles were added.

The committee meeting was addressed by militia workers, who dwelt on the problems of using special equipment and legal control over inquiry methods. It was noted that the status of investigating bodies within the structure of the USSR Interior Ministry has still not been determined. There were several proposals to depoliticise internal affairs bodies.

In view of the submitted proposals, it was decided to edit the bill and then submit it to the session again.

The bill "On the Protection of the President's Honour and Dignity", which was submitted for the committee's consideration, came under fierce criticism. The bill was found to be poorly drafted from the legal point of view. It was unanimously decided that the bill required radical improvement.

The committee also heard a report by People's Deputy Nikolay Galushko on the drafting of a bill on the "USSR State Security Committee."

Laptev Previews Supreme Soviet Agenda

LD2004162290 Moscow TASS in English 1603 GMT 20 Apr 90

[By TASS parliamentary correspondent Andrey Orlov]

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—A package of 15 or 16 government bills aimed at speeding up economic reform will be submitted to the Soviet parliament before the end of the current session or at the beginning of the autumn one, Ivan Laptev, chairman of the Council of the Union (one of the two chambers of the Supreme Soviet) said at a briefing here today.

This week he attended a joint session of the Presidential Council and the Federation Council, which discussed a plan for the introduction of a market system.

According to Laptev, the parliament plans to analyse another 20 bills at the current session, including the bill on the press, rules of leaving and entering the USSR, amendments to the Law on Cooperatives, resolutions on Chernobyl clean-up measures and on preventive anti-AIDS measures.

Asked whether the Soviet parliament intends to discuss problems dealing with the reunification of two German states and the development of relations between the USSR and a united Germany, Laptev pointed out that it was the prereogative of the parliamentary committee on foreign affairs. "However, if the committee finds it necessary, it can submit this issue to a plenary session of the USSR Supreme Soviet," he said.

Committee Hearings on Chernobyl Aftermath

90US0807A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 16 Apr Morning Edition pp 1-2

[Article by IZVESTIYA parliamentary correspondent V. Dolganov: "Chernobyl: Concerns and Expectations"]

[Text] The 12 and 13 April parliamentary hearings on Chernobyl became the main and most crucial issue at the joint sessions of the Ecology and Rational Use of Natural Resources Committee and the Health Committee. Prior to the session an appeal from the residents of the city of Korosten, Zhitomir Oblast, was distributed among the deputies. Among other things the appeal stated that if the "Supreme Soviet continues its silencing policy and does not help the Chernobyl victims," the people from the areas exposed to radiation were ready to display no confidence in the deputies and to wage their own struggle for the life and good health of their children. In that struggle they were ready to apply "extreme economic and political measures."

But I think that it was not the forceful appeal that influenced the key in which the Chernobyl problem was debated in the parliamentary committees. The picture that gives no reason for optimism has been composed from the data provided by the representatives of the Ukrainian, Belorussian, and RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] governments, by the deputies who visited the area, and by scientists and experts. Therefore, it was not accidental that the Supreme Soviet has included the adoption of a decision on measures for the elimination of the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station] disaster aftermath on the agenda for its next working week.

Procrastination is the same as death—was the idea expressed by K.I. Masik, deputy chairman of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Council of Ministers. The idea was supported by some impressive data. According to him, about a million and a half people in the republic live under the influence of Chernobyl factors, and that number includes 250,000 children. Over 150,000 had received the so-called iodine shock which affected their thyroid glands.

The Ukrainian SSR government designed and presented to the Union government several times its complex program on eliminating the consequences of the disaster. However, all the financing was done on a residual principle; the program never came to be realized to its full extent. The current program presented by the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers requires R16 billion, though according to K.I. Masik it covers only a minimum of needs. The investment of this sum cannot be spread over the years: People should be relocated from the contaminated areas; they have to be provided with safe food; the medical care has to be improved considerably.

A.T. Kichkailo, deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Council of Ministers, stated that 256,000 hectares of grassland and 80,000 hectares of arable land in his republic cannot be used now. Seriously contaminated territories still have 164,000 people living on them. This situation is growing worse from day to day.

During the two days the deputies continually criticized the report by V.Kh. Doguzhiyev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and chairman of the state governmental commission for emergency situations. Vitaliy Khusseynovich tried to justify himself by saying that it was not a government program but just a preliminary plan of urgent measures.

Most of the people's deputies who took part in the discussion considered his reasoning rather unconvincing. Deputy N.N. Pribylova was upset by the fact that the Gomel and other oblasts cannot get the equipment helping to diagnose damage to the thyroid gland. Another point of contention was that the centers coordinating the research have been changed four times already: from Leningrad to Moscow and then to Kiev. At present neither the necessary financing nor coordination exist any more.

Deputy Yu. N. Shcherbak insisted that we need to know the name of each of the 600,000 people who helped to eliminate the consequences of the Chernobyl AES disaster. All of them need special attention, and should be under constant observation and treatment. However, the present medical histories of the people who sacrificed their health and energy to Chernobyl very often omit to indicate WHERE they have been and the radiation doses they received. A most serious examination of the big-capacity-channel-reactor type of reactors should be undertaken immediately, and the outdated reactor of the first unit at the Chernobyl AES should be stopped.

Deputy V.A. Chelyshev took the floor several times during the two days. He expressed his concern at the absence of proper radiation control of food supplies coming from the disaster areas.

Practically all the deputies and guest experts spoke categorically against the index of 35 rem "forced on us by the government." According to the USSR Ministry of Health this is a dose of radiation that a man can be exposed to without any damage to his health for an arbitrary 70 years of his life. But doses differ. Can this concept also be applied to the Chernobyl victims? Can it be used for unequal doses of radiation? So far there are more questions than answers. An employee of the Ukrainian Agricultural Academy, E.M. Borovetskaya, read an address from almost 500 scientists of the country involved in radiobiology and physiology research. The address speaks about the lack of confidence not only in this concept, but also in the majority of its creators. As we know now they were the people who openly lied to the population in the first post-Chernobyl days and months.

Yes, it is a well-known fact. However, as he was answering questions, Chairman of the Goskomgidromet [State Committee for Hydrometeorology] Yu.A. Izrael disclosed several facts that some deputies and representatives of the press viewed as sensational or close to such.

According to him, all the reliable information about the real state of affairs at the Chernobyl AES and in the disaster areas was sent immediately to the leaders of the Union government. Yu.A. Izrael listed the reports prepared by the Goskomgidromet for Moscow during the very first month after the catastrophe, and named head of government N.I. Ryzhkov and his two deputies as their permanent addressees. It was mentioned that E.K. Ligachev, A.V. Vlasov, and V.I. Vorotnikov had also had that same information.

We tried to evaluate the doses of external and internal radiation which the people received at every point of the contaminated territory, said Yu.A. Izrael, so that the authorities could quickly decide to evacuate the people. As early as 2 May 1986 the Goskomgidromet representatives insisted at the meeting of the governmental commission on Chernobyl that the people should be evacuated from the entire 30-km zone, but....

During the two days the people's deputies often talked about the "secrets" that became tragedies not only for our country. They wanted an item included in the draft decision of the Supreme Soviet about the global character of the disaster and about it being the largest in our century; such a statement was introduced in the document. They also insisted that every person involved in the disaster be named in the document: those who had caused the catastrophe as well as those who multiplied its consequences by "keeping the secret," by their belated decisions, and by the half-measures taken to eliminate them.

A letter signed by a group of parliamentarians was distributed among the deputies. The main theme of the letter was the same as that of a number of speeches. In short, the letter states the following: False evaluation of the results of the Chernobyl disaster is still affecting government policy. This policy aims at keeping people on the contaminated territories so that the current economic indicators are preserved as well as the Chernobyl AES itself.

The representatives of the rayon and city authorities from the areas located along the sinister radioactive track spoke indignantly about the production of milk, meat, and other products on their territories. Such products can carry the radioactive substances over long distances. Nobody knows to whom and where they are sent, and how they affect the health of the people who have no idea WHAT they are eating.

A lot was said about the conditions of life for the people remaining in the contaminated areas. As the majority of the deputies think, these conditions are almost critical. Paying these people allowances of R15 when no food is available, without even mentioning safe food, can only be qualified as an insult or a miserable handout, said Deputy E.P. Tikhonenkov. He himself had visited the affected areas as a member of a deputies' group, and spoke of the ineffective decontamination, of the preventive iodine treatment which existed only in the ministry reports, and of many other things.

It might be reasonable to use E.P. Tikhonenkov's proposal and to conduct a most serious parliamentary investigation of the situation as it is now, four years after the Chernobyl catastrophe.

In general the discussion was rather heated; at times there were mutual accusations among the deputies and representatives of various agencies. But in my opinion it was the profound and principled character of the debate that made it so valuable. We will have to give up hopes of eliminating the aftermath of the disaster at the fourth unit of the AES in the nearest future. The money that we will need for this is going to be quite different from the sum initially quoted.

Against this background of general concern and distress, of relentless arguments, and of a search for the best solutions, one speech sounded a sharply discordant note. I cannot but mention the words of the Academician I.V. Petryanov-Sokolov, who aroused the indignation of the

entire audience when he compared the number of Chernobyl sufferers with the annual number of automobile accident victims. His call for the concept of "justified risk" seemed strange and out of place. As for his suggestion not to spend 30 billion for evacuation (probably better spend the money on automobile transportation improvements), I do not think I can add anything to that.

Now the draft decision will have to be discussed in the Supreme Soviet.

Political & Social

Gorbachev Gives Lenin Anniversary Speech

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["Speech on Lenin by M.S. Gorbachev, USSR President and General Secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at Ceremonial Meeting Devoted to the 120th Anniversary of V.I. Lenin's Birth"]

[Text] Comrades! It is the mark of a genius to be needed by people at all times, and to turn a new facet toward them on every occasion. Perestroyka reveals the true Lenin to us. At the same time, his political and theoretical legacy, and the man himself, are today once again at the center of the ideological and political struggle. And the stake here is the socialist choice of perestroyka itself.

Lenin made a unique contribution to the development and implementation of the socialist idea. Through all the shocks of our century—its errors and tragedies—that idea continues to make a path for itself. Without Lenin, without October, it would have been impossible now to pose in such a new way the world-historic question of the criteria of human progress and of the inherent worth of the individual.

Lenin's world is unbounded. It embraces all spheres of human existence: the life of society in all its manifestations and components; the position, role, and destiny of all classes and social strata—of workers, peasants, the intelligentsia, women, and young people. It is a world which includes everything, from everyday human concerns to the largest problems of world politics; from moral principles to legality and order in the state; from the principles of political tactics to the philosophical intepretation of global processes. Whatever we might take from this, it would still be impossible to exhaust it in one speech.

We have now understood that Lenin demands full and comprehensive, not selective, study—in the full richness of his creative achievement.

What is most topical for us now is the methodology of Leninist thought, the dialectics of his approach to all problems, and the turning-points in the historic experience he has bequeathed to us, which retains its lasting significance.

Lenin remains with us as a major thinker of the 20th century, who, having mastered a huge arsenal of knowledge contemporary to him, penetrated deeply into the secrets of the life of society.

Lenin remains with us as an example of a politician for whom the use of power for some narrow, let alone selfish aims, is alien, and who is capable, whatever turn events and the political struggle take, of not losing sight of the main thing: the people's interests.

Lenin remains with us as an example of a revolutionary, prepared for a decisive and irrevocable step in a most difficult situation: when the country had come to the brink of the revolution and was afraid of it; when immense, powerful people's forces came out in order to enrich history by creative endeavor—but these very forces could also have turned into an element of destruction.

The secret of Lenin's influence on history lies in his ability to assess precisely the driving forces and to combine in politics what is inevitable at a given moment with what has a future.

We especially value Lenin's dialectical potential as a politician and theoretician for transition periods, in the conditions of a quickly changing situation, his ability to take in the sum total of contradictory factors and to determine the main trend, to foresee possible variants of the course of events and build an effective policy: That is Lenin's great art which we must learn and relearn.

This anniversary of Vladimir Ilich has come at an exceptionally acute watershed of perestroyka. The process of changes has brought society to a point of high tension. Perestroyka has become life itself. It has forced many things to be rethought, to be revised, including things in our past. People are turning to the sources and want to understand what kind of a society is this which came out of the Great Revolution and which now required a new revolution of no less significance for itself and for the entire world.

Now it is especially important for us to determine our stand on this, for in the history of the 20th century perestroyka has already made itself felt as an event which can only be measured by the yardsticks of great social revolutions.

But it is precisely because of the assessment of perestroyka's place in history and of its social essence that an openly destructive tendency has clearly come to light in the approach to Lenin. Its danger lies in its primitivism, in the use of methods involving a shortcut, but in reverse. Its objective is to identify Lenin with Stalin, to wipe out all of our history and depict the October Revolution and what followed as nothing but a mistake, even as a crime, before the people and humanity. The attack on Lenin from this quarter is intensifying the conservative upswell in the CPSU and society.

This is how the covert and overt opponents of perestroyka gain the opportunity to appear in the role of the saviors of Leninisim.

Yes, it is essential for us to reinterpret Lenin, his theoretical and political creative genius, while at the same time freeing ourselves both from distorting and canonizing his conclusions. It is necessary to separate the things that will remain in the intellectual, cultural, and spiritual treasure houses of our society, as an active element of progress, from what belongs in the past.

But disrespect for Lenin is unacceptable. The arrogant, essentially vulgar slandering of him as a man is immoral and groundless. The attempts to cast doubt on the nobleness of his goal and the purity of his intentions are foolish. Yes, it is high time we put an end to the absurdly mindless treatment of Lenin's name and image, to the way in which he has been turned into an icon, and now we know well why this has been done. But we resolutely condemn any outrage against the memory of Lenin, whatever form it takes and wherever it takes place—here in our country or abroad. The sooner we overcome our facile perception of Lenin, the better we will realize his greatness, the extent to which he is contemporary with and necessary to us. However, this is no simple matter, because this image of him as leader was built over decades, and was single-mindedly propagated for a definite policy and ideology. But to turn our backs on the real Lenin on such a pretext would mean severing the roots of society and the state and bankrupting the minds and hearts of generations to come. To defend Lenin does not mean to worship a God. In defending Lenin we are paying tribute to that which has been created by generations of Soviet people, and we are defending our search today and our socialist future.

The stormy, contradictory, heroic and dramatic times of Lenin have gone. They have become the past, our history. And we must know this history, free of myths and lies. It is instructive and necessary for the formation of the political and moral culture of our citizens, and for a patriotism and internationalism that are conscious and based on genuine knowledge and conviction. Lenin did not like loud words about patriotism, and he left us an unsurpassed example of the political and moral combination of patriotism and internationalism. He was a fierce enemy of any nationalistic conceit and chauvinistic displays. When it was necessary, he pronounced his famous words about what is the real import is of the national pride of the Great Russians (vol. 26, pp. 106-110).

A member of the gentry by birth and a member of the intelligentsia by upbringing and education, Lenin was striking for his closeness to the people. For him the working people were not some lump of clay which you could mold in any way you like, and were not targets for charity from above. The revolution and socialism, according to Lenin, were the living creation of the masses themselves. That is a fundamental Leninist idea. We especially understand the significance of it and are striving to implement it today, when perestroyka has awakened all of society, when new natural laws of its development are taking shape and life is offering the most complicated problems, each of which often demands unusual solutions.

Nevertheless, on occasion one can hear reproaches. The party, they say, embarked on perestroyka without having a plan thought out in detail; it did not foresee everything for years ahead. Some say that some things should have been done earlier, while others say that this or that should not have been done at all, or should have been done this way and not that way. There is a nostalgia for the old approaches, cramming schemes into life and forcing them on the people regardless of realities. But, you see, we have had all this, and we know what it led to. Schemes were invented, imposed on society, and whatever did not fit in with them was excised as alien and hostile.

[Text] The whole organism of society became locked when it was deprived of the oxygen of movement. The ideas, the public psychology and the consciousness of the masses were deformed. Having embarked upon the path of perestroyka, we must remember this lesson well and not give in to the usual temptation of sitting down in our offices and thinking out recipes which will cure us of everything and return society to health.

We are indeed very used to ready made recipes. Generally speaking, one can understand the longing to get back to an excessively organized life. After long years of domination by the administrative and command system, in no way are we able to cure ourselves of the disease of directives, of the habit of thinking in stereotypic ways, and doing things upon instructions.

Socialism is the living creativity of the masses. Let us think about this well-known definition. The creativity of the masses is so diverse and unpredictable. It has become so diverse and unpredictable that it cannot be put in advance into the framework of some particular chart.

The mind of tens of millions of creators, Lenin said, creates something immeasurably higher than the very greatest and genius- inspired vision (vol. 35, p. 281).

Perestroyka gives everyone the opportunity to be themselves and the chance to take part in history. Herein lies its liberating significance, herein lies the great chance for the whole country finally to realize its mighty potential.

Plans and projects are needed and there is no need to prove how great was the significance that Lenin attached to them. But he considered them to be lifelike and fruitful only in the event that they were the result of the theoretical interpretation of real processes and actions of the masses. He called upon the party constantly to relate its intentions and programs to the expectations and the feelings in the people. If that is not done, then any policy, correct though it may be in theory, is liable to turn out to be without foundation. And he warned: Millions of people will never listen to the advice of the party if that

advice does not correspond to what they are taught by the experience of their own lives (vol. 32, p. 178).

Marxism, therefore, was never dogma for Lenin. At the very beginning of his activity he wrote: It is not a question of repeating from memory old conclusions that have been drawn by the classics, but of using the methods of Marxist research for the analysis of the new political situation (vol. 7, p. 237). Herein lies the key to the understanding of the major turns which Lenin made at crucial moments in historical development.

Every such turn was won with difficulty. He had to fight not just with himself, not just with political adversaries, but also with the strong pressure on the part of party comrades who reproached Lenin, sometimes of being oblivious to principles, sometimes even of departing from Marxism.

In reply to them, Lenin wrote: If the course of history was evolved differently from what we expected—in a more original, more distinctive, more colorful way—there is no need to become like those old Bolsheviks who on more than one occasion have already played a sorrowful role in the history of our party, repeating meaninglessly a formula **learned by rote,** instead of **studying** the distinctiveness of the new living reality (Vol. 31, p. 133). Such people, Lenin added, need to be consigned to the archives of Bolshevik prerevolutionary curiosities. It may be called the archive of old Bolsheviks (Vol. 31, p. 134)

Sarcastically smashing the self-infatuated narcissistic revolutionaries, Lenin warned that a revolution which took such people seriously would hopelessly perish and deservedly so (Vol. 36, p. 301).

In this part of my speech, I am deliberately giving so many quotations here so that we can feel the very manner of Lenin's pronouncements on a theme which is so topical for us.

At sharp turns, Lenin even had to enter into conflict with his colleagues, and to speak out in ultimatums against the opinion of the majority. The Brest peace is a classic example.

No less an acute situation evolved at the turn to NEP [New Economic Policy]. A participant in the events of those years, describing one of the sittings of the party summit, reports: At first, perhaps only Krasin and Tsyurupa agreed fully with Lenin. All the others were either silent or dug in their heels. And this is how Lenin reacted. I quote: When I look you in the eye, you all seem to agree with me, and say **yes.** But when I turn away, you say **no.** You are playing hide-and-seek with me. In this event, let me then play my role in one of the games accepted in parliaments, too. When the parliament expresses no confidence in the head of government, he hands in his resignation. You expresed no confidence in me during the conclusion of the Brest peace, although even fools now realize that my policy was correct. Now once again, you are expressing no confidence in me on the question of NEP. I draw from this the conclusions drawn in parliaments and hand my resignation to the two higher instances, the Central Executive Committee and the plenum.

Ultimately, Lenin's arguments and the logic of life gained the upper hand, and NEP became party policy.

For all his love of theory, when life required a change in his point of view Lenin did not take account of any postulates or seemingly sacred dogmas, but was guided by what, in his own words, formed the living spirit of Marxism: concrete analysis of a concrete situation (Vol. 41, p. 136). When reflecting on the lessons of Lenin, it is necessary to remember that he lived in a cruel age steeped in violence, when revolutionaries, even the greatest humanists among them, had, in the figurative expression of one Bolshevik worker, to hide their souls.

Today one hears quite often: Did we need the October revolution at all? Wouldn't it have been better for Russia to stop at the February revolution? Such arguments, absurd with regard to the past, have a demagogic aim, as a rule, in the struggle of ideas and politics; and the antidote to them is the facts. Undoubtedly, the February revolution was a very important event in our national history, but the fact is that the bourgeois-Menshevik government did not solve the main issues of the Russian revolution—neither peace, nor bread, nor land. The country was sliding toward a national catastrophe.

Later, rejecting the accusation that the Bolsheviks had deliberately drowned the country in blood, Lenin said: Would there have been even one idiot on Earth who would have bothered with a revolution if you—meaning the Mensheviks and the Socialist Revolutionaries—had really started a social reform? Why didn't you do it? Lenin asked (Vol. 40, p. 179).

Lenin sought in every way possible to avoid the civil war. Shortly after Kornilov's rebellion, the Bolsheviks offered the other socialist parties a compromise: The Bolsheviks did not lay claim to participation in government and would refrain from putting forward immediately the demand for the transfer of power to the proletariat and the poorest peasants and from revolutionary methods of fighting for that demand, and the Mensheviks and Socialist Revolutionaries would form a government, without the bourgeois parties, wholly and exclusively responsible to the soviets, and that would guarantee the peaceful forward movement of the revolution and the **peaceful elimination** of the struggle among the parties within the soviets (Vol. 34, p. 135).

It is worth recalling all this, because today some, through ignorance and others deliberately, extract from the chain of events episodes, documents, and facts and ascribe to Lenin a tendency to violence.

Lenin always strove to exhaust all the possibilities for political solutions to the limit. They even spoke of a whole Leninist theory of compromises. There is no place for violence against people in our ideal (Vol. 30, p. 122).

Those are Lenin's words. That is what everybody who really wants to understand Lenin must comprehend. This example has been cited not only as an appeal to the genuine facts of history and not just a tribute to knowledge of the real Lenin. It is very important today for us in another respect, as well.

The country is in a revolutionary ferment. Again it is passing through a steep pass in its history, in search of justice and prosperity. The policy of perestroyka offered by the CPSU and which has inspired the majority of the people is equal to the revolutionary tasks which objectively face society. The methods of implementing this policy are directed toward restraining the stormy process of profound transformation of the country within the framework of the democratic process, and on the basis of agreement and consolidation of the people, toward preventing a breakdown into the chaos of civil and interethnic conflict, with violence, casualties, and blood. Although, in some areas events are breaking out of this framework and we have, unfortunately, come up against the grave consequences of this.

In this situation I pose the question: Do those who speak all the time about the specter of a civil war, virtually inuring people into thinking about it, and who are kindling confrontation in society and between nationalities, who are sowing intolerance and hatred and creating images of enemies to right and left, do they understand where this is leading? Or perhaps they deliberately want chaos and disintegration. We need to act in accordance with logic and common sense. Power must move reforms in all spheres of life, create conditions for the cohesion of society, and firmly stand in defense of the law. But populistic speculation and abuse of democracy and glasnost only incite people toward destructive and ruinous actions. What can they lead to? We must know our own history well in order to study the politics of a country such as ours.

Comrades, in today's arguments about socialism, in seeking a new face for it, we can understand many things better by turning to the evolution of Lenin's views of socialism. Lenin perceived from Marx great caution and responsibility on the subject of all kinds of fantasies about the future and attempts to depict it in some definite form. Although, in the workers movement pressure was constantly felt: Give us a specific ideal, give us an image of the society for which we are fighting.

We can also discern a tribute to the largely abstract and theoretical ideas of socialism awaited by the masses—let us say it openly—in Lenin's outstanding work "The State and Revolution," which was written on the eve of the October Revolution.

But in spring 1918, in "The Next Tasks For Soviet Power," when Lenin already had definite practical experience of revolution and could consider its important lessons, he began to think in a new way about socialism. It was not for nothing that, during the transition to NEP, Lenin recalled and referred on several occasions to this brochure and the articles written in March-May 1918. It was stressed that already then, in the polemics with the leftwing communists, he was upholding the need for a search for reformist, step-by-step methods of economic construction and forms of going over to socialism (Vol. 43, pp. 205-217; Vol. 44, pp. 197, 225; Vol. 44 [as published] pp. 156, 221, 225). This fact once again confirms Lenin's realism, his determining feature as a politician and theoretician. He did not think of bringing in socialism by implanting it as a doctrine. Instead his concern was to put living conditions right, to administer the country in the completely new conditions created by the revolution, and to work for the vital interests of the people.

The civil war interrupted his search for the most expedient road to a new society. The actual course of events overturned any hope of breaking through to communism by means of a cavalry charge. The most valuable thing in Lenin's ideas about socialism and his main contribution to the working-out of the socialist idea are contained in his works on NEP, his policies on it, and, of course, in his testament. This is precisely where a new stage in Lenin's work on the theory of socialism begins. Clearly, quite a bit of intellectual effort is still required in order to sort out where his ideas were heading as he analyzed accumulated experience, the real state of society, and the mood of the masses. We still have to reconstruct with maximum historical accuracy the logic of his arguments and conclusions.

Later, as we know, Lenin called it a mistake to try to make a direct transition to communist production and distribution (Vol. 44, pp. 151, 157). The question is: Was he talking only about the policy which was being carried out in 1918-20? After all, this policy, as Lenin himself said several times, was dictated first and foremost by the circumstances of extremely fierce civil war and foreign intervention, of collapse, famine, and the threat of a complete disintegration of the ties holding society together.

Or was it a question of something more? All things considered, he was thinking of the entire concept—as it had evolved after Marx—of the transition from capitalism to socialism. Lenin accomplished a vast amount of work in this direction, although he did not succeed in working out an integral concept of the transition to a new society in Russia. But the time has come to consider once again whether, in the context of the entire political struggle in the party and society under way then, was the NEP for him just a tactic to gain breathing room, or was he broaching a reinterpretation of the place of the October Revolution and the new Russia in the destiny of world civilization and trying to fill the socialist idea with new content at a time when the anticipation that world revolution would triumph had not been realized?

If you take a fresh look at everything that Lenin did in his last years, what he wrote about, what he criticized, what he spoke out against, and what he insisted on, and if you attempt to pinpoint the main element in all this,

you could undoubtedly say that these were efforts to achieve a new understanding of socialism, to unite people who were divided by brutality and hate, and to involve them in creative work. Or, as we would say today, it was a consolidation of all who were willing to participate in, to join, or at least to assist in Russia's civilized development, in its aspiration for social justice and the well-being of the working people.

Hence the idea of a link-up and a just correlation with the entire peasantry and the desire to bring to the side of the new authorities the intelligentsia and specialists, and generally all who were willing to come to terms with the people's choice. Hence the idea that it was imperative to assimilate all the achievements of world civilization, and the shift of the center of gravity from political struggle to systematic cultural work in the broad sense of the term, embracing relations between classes and the economy, as well as culture proper. Hence the insistent demand that levers of economic development such as the market, trade, finance, and capital—including foreign capital through concessions—should be grasped. Hence the attempts to reach agreements with those in the international workers' movement who did not accept the October Revolution. Hence the orientation toward coexistence and cohabitation with the peace party in the Western bourgeois camp.

In essence it was a revolution within the revolution, perhaps no less deep than the October Revolution. And, particularly importantly, it was a **peaceful one which opened up the prospect of the gradual self-reform of society on socialist principles.**

It is precisely in this way that one can interpret the idea of civic peace, the question of which Lenin raised in 1921 and which he linked directly not only with the prospects for the development of the country, but also with world policy (Vol. 44, pp. 78, 80).

Unfortunately, Lenin was given too short a time as the builder of a new society in conditions of peace. His radical alteration of his view of socialism was not properly understood and evaluated by his comrades-in-arms. And some of his last pieces of advice, whose implementation could have decisively affected the whole subsequent development of the country and the fate of socialism, itself, were simply ignored. This resulted in deformations and many tragedies.

Of course, no one intends to carry over to our time and to perestroyka the tasks which Lenin had sensed and which he had seen at the end of his life, or to regard his ideas as direct instructions for us. But, in their scale and nature, in a method of thinking, these are analogous tasks.

The most general and fundamental thing which makes such a comparison apt is that it is now, just as it was then, a matter—I Repeat—of a revolution within a revolution, of a realistic path for moving towards a new society, of the most effective forms of implementing the socialist choice. It is precisely for this reason that when we conceived and commenced perestroyka we turned first of all to Lenin's final works. We drew from there the confidence that we had entered upon the correct even though difficult path.

The actual policy of perestroyka was, of course, determined by our specific conditions.

Nevertheless, not only in principle—because that was a transitional stage where a new society was being formed—but in the main directions of transformation work, the analogy with Lenin's period is obvious. As then, the issues have to be faced head on. We need a new economy, the reorganization of the political system. We need a truly federal state. The whole of our party is now preoccupied with these problems. The Supreme Soviet, the president, and the government are busy with them. The drawing up of an effective economic policy and a full-blooded market are tasks of foremost importance, together with land reform on the basis of the law on land and the return to the land of the peasant as its undisputed owner. The question of whether we will manage to make the breakthrough to satisfying the needs of people and improving their lives depends on the extent to which we proceed firmly and consistently to resolve these tasks.

That is precisely why presidential power is now solidly engaged on the radicalization of the economic reform. The cardinal question of the whole of our development is connected with this. The matter concerns the concept of fundamental transformations of the basis, and hence also the superstructure, in all institutions of society. Such is the thrust of the changes anticipated. Does it correspond to the choice that has been made, and to the strategic directives of perestroyka, to our movement toward humane, democratic socialism?

My answer is: Yes, it does correspond to them. The market and new forms of management based on reformed ownership relations are not contra-indicated for socialism, because socialism means freedom, living creativity of the people, it means social justice and protection, and the people's well-being. By the same token, we are drastically changing many of our ideas about socialist society, we are progressing in our understanding of the essence of socialism, and in turn, this facilitates our practical work. We are making the correct choice. This is a radical change in our point of view, even within the context of perestroyka itself. It is not an act of desperation, but a considered program of consistent steps towards a new economics of socialism.

The political reform, as everyone has already sensed, also brings with it immense newness. Under perestroyka, the first elections to republican and local soviets have taken place. They have advanced the political reform to all corners of the Soviet state. New people have emerged in the bodies of soviet power. A new body of deputies is forming. It will have to tackle the tasks of perestroyka in direct, living contact with its electors. We are on the right path here, but we should not oversimplify the situation. In many soviets the people who have taken up leadership

are inexperienced in politics, and not weighed down by experience of running management, not knowing all these problems yet as they should, or what the real responsibility for everything taking place on the territory entrusted to them is. All the more since, judging from many signs, not everyone in the new soviets has understood that the elections, the campaign, and the rallies are behind us, and that people are waiting for decisions and concrete deeds. Difficult work is to come, speaking in Lenin's words, of unifying the stormy pulse of rally democratism of the working masses, which beats like spring floodwaters bursting all the banks, and **iron** discipline in working time (Vol. 36, p. 203). The law on local self- government provides the soviets with the material base for independent, truly state activity.

The soviets must become a truly authoritative and active force in which the people have confidence, and which they can rely upon to uphold their interests and defend their rights, and to resolve the amassed problems. It is important that, while asserting their independence, they should at the same time feel that they are links in a unified system that stretches up to the supreme power in the country, and that they can count on unfailing assistance and attention. In short, in the new conditions we must recreate the genuinely Leninist spirit of soviet power as the most democratic and effective power at the service of the people.

The third decisive element in our country's new society is the federative structure of our multi-ethnic state. Here, too, there is much that is instructive in Lenin's experience, not least in the evolution of his views on this issue that was so important to the Russian revolution.

Before the world war, while regarding as economically progressive the unifying trend that had been created by capitalism, like most Marxists Lenin was antipathetic toward the ideas of a federation and decentralization (Vol. 24, p. 143). At the same time, he always resolutely upheld the right of secession for those who did not want to remain in a centralized state. However, as a result of the ethnic movements that flared up during the war, and particularly as a result of the revolution that had begun in Russia, Lenin underwent an abrupt change of mind. I believe that this change of mind over nation building should, together with Brest and the NEP, be classed among **Lenin's great insights.**

As you know, right to the very end he had to wage a bitter struggle on this issue—not just with his opponents, but also with his comrades-in-arms in the party. The victory of the October Revolution raised the question of self-determination to the practical level. The construction of a new society in Russia was inconceivable without sorting out the way nations and ethnic groups would live together. But the great liberating revolution, targeted as it was against the tsarist autocracy and absolutism, was naturally enough accompanied by a powerful centrifugal tendency. In the wreckage of the empire, the upsurge in self-determination spawned quite diverse forms. Purely ethnic-inspired entities emerged; autonomous oblasts and territorial entities appeared with a specific ethnic gloss. Large autonomous entities based on purely economic interests sprang up in the provinces of Russia and the Ukraine. Much of this proved to be short-lived, but the very diversity was characteristic of a genuinely popular revolution.

It was clear to Lenin that the unity of the country, which he always preferred, could be preserved only through an exclusively voluntary federation, with unconditional recognition of the right to self-determination, right up to separation. Lenin had to wage a real fight with Stalin and his supporters, who did not see any difference between the Russian Federation and a union federation and were altogether of the view that all talk of sovereignty and the status of national states was a tactical move or, as Stalin put it, a political game which some people had begun to take seriously (vid. IZVESTIYA TSK KPSS, 1989, No. 9).

Lenin allowed the possibility of various types of federation, with varying levels of ties among national formations which were prepared to join together in a union. Such a union of nations, he wrote, would not encroach on anybody's independence, but would only create another, **new tier,** a federation of **equal** republics. He even insisted that a detailed code, which would mark the start of a new culture of interethnic dealings, should be drawn up. Moreover, he believed that it should be drawn up not by officials from the central apparatus, whom, as we know, Lenin strongly suspected of having great-power ambitions, but by people from the nations themselves (Vol. 45, pp. 357,361).

Of these ideas, a significant proportion remained unimplemented, or else they received merely formal recogntion. The course of a unitary state was imposed on a multinational country. Of course, even in these conditions the country achieved impressive results, including the national life of many peoples. We can lean on this in our present plans. However, a disregard for the laws of national development built up by degrees the problems which have finally burst to the surface at this new sharp turning in history.

Right now a very difficult searching is going on in the country. Recently we have managed to think over many things. The party has proposed a platform on a nationalities policy in present-day conditions. The Congress of People's Deputies and the Supreme Soviet have reached such vitally important decisions as the laws on linguistic and economic independence. A law on the procedure for secession from the USSR has been adopted. The renewal of the union treaty is in progress.

We are currently at perhaps the most crucial stage of law-making connected with the destiny of the Soviet federation. Lenin's ideas for federation and for types and levels of interrelations are the key to our present endeavors. We are convinced that ultimately it will prove possible to harmonize interethnic relations. Only calm and judicious work within the framework of the

law—not the separatist and extremist actions that we have come up against in the Baltic region, the Transcaucasus, and a number of other regions of the USSR—will bring us to a goal that meets the fundamental interests of all nations, and will give second wind to our great, multiethnic community.

Comrades, a **Communist Party** that is both **renewed** and reformed should operate in the new society which we are moving toward through perestroyka. The 28th CPSU Congress is looming. History itself dictates in matters concerning the party the need for a turnaround comparable in significance with the formation of the new-type party under the leadership of Lenin. The CPSU Central Committee platform and the draft rules, which communists and the entire public are discussing today in a lively and critical manner, initiated a fundamentally new stage in the development of the Communist Party.

What connects the formulation of the issue with the Leninist party tradition? Primarily, the dependence of party development on a change in the objective situation in the country and the world.

At that selfsame 10th Russian Communist Party-Bolshevik Congress, which we usually recall only in connection with the resolution on party unity, a resolution was passed on questions concerning party construction. It rejected the possibility of an absolutely correct form for the organization of the party and for methods of party work, a form suitable for all stages in the revolutionary process.

On the contrary, it was stated there that the form of the organization and the work methods would be exclusively determined by the specifics of the given, concrete historical situation, and by the tasks which would ensue directly from that situation ("The CPSU in Resolutions...", issue 9, Vol. 2, p. 323).

From the beginning of that period of peace after the civil war, the transition of the party to a new condition turned out to be particularly painful. This is understandable, because it was already integrated into state power, which moreover was based on the dictatorship of the proletariat. The danger of the moment was acutely felt, when, as is stated in the resolution, centralization in the party developed a tendency towards it becoming a bureaucracy, and towards an isolation from the masses (ibid., p. 235); when the single ruling party during the civil war became accustomed to commanding everyone in a commissar-like way; when necessary privileges became grounds for abuses of various kinds; when a slackening of the spiritual life of the party began, and when symptoms emerged of a day-to-day degeneration as well. Generally, this led to an internal crisis of the party. All this is taken from the the resolution (ibid.).

The congress saw the way out as being the broad development of an internal party democracy. From Lenin's final works we know how intensely he sought a way to stop this ruinous tendency, and through the inclusion of the party masses—the lower ranks of the party—how he sought to give the party a new aspect equal to the new situation in the country. But unfortunately, he himself was no longer able to participate in the implementation of these plans. The transformations in the party which had become essential in the 1920's ended up in Stalin's hands. This turned out to a disaster for the party, for society, and for socialism.

In quite a short period of time the party turned into virtually a component part and tool of the command and administrative system, with far-reaching consequences which are felt even today. From this stems the conclusion that today we cannot simply restrict ourselves to the restoration of Leninist norms of internal party life. The restructuring of the life of the entire country poses a task which is incomparably greater in scale. Society needs a vanguard party of socialist choice, operating by exclusively democratic methods under the conditions of glasnost, a law-governed state and political pluralism. Only by acquiring the ability to work in these new conditions can the party lead the majority of the people, uniting all strata of society and the various nationalities in the movement toward a humane and democratic socialism.

The CPSU has a great tradition with regard to convincing the masses that it is in the right. It is this party which in just a few months in 1917 was able to win the goodwill and support of the broadest masses. The people followed the Bolsheviks, Lenin explained, not because their agitation was more skillful. No, the point is that their agitation was right and true (Vol. 40, p. 69).

The February Revolution brought to the surface of political life many politicos and demagogues concerned not so much with the country's misfortunes, but instead with their personal ambitions and with their strivings for a political career. Millions of high-flown words praising His Majesty the People, and The People, The Liberator, rained down on the workers, the peasants, and the soldiers making their heads spin. The exploitation of the masses low level of political development and the frank manipulation of them through deceit, flattery, endless promises, and worthless sops (Vol. 31, pp. 158)—Lenin rejected all of these. We are not charlatans, he said. The only thing that has been the ruin of all revolutions has been the phrase-mongering and adulation addressed to the revolutionary people. Marxism teaches one not to give way to the revolutionary phrase, particularly at that moment when it is particularly popular (Vol. 31, pp. 105, 108).

And so? From February to October under conditions of absolute freedom of choice and the acute rivalry of a multitude of parties, the Bolshevik Party grew from several tens of thousands into hundreds of thousands, and eventually tens of millions. From the point of view of the ability to conduct a battle for influence among the masses, the current turn in the life of the country demands from the party no less political activism. The Bolshevik art of convincing the people of one's rightness needs to be revived, competing with anyone and not complaining that we have, as it were, been left without

support, that we have been thrown to the whim of the crowd and are not being protected from the informal groups, and so on. And at the same time we must be prepared for political coalitions and compromises and constant interaction with various social movements.

In renouncing governmental functions here, the CPSU does not free itself from responsibility for the state of affairs in the country. The people will judge the party not only by slogans, platforms, decisions, and calls but first and foremost by the quality and the results of the work of communists in labor collectives and in all political, cultural, administrative, and economic sections in society.

Comrades, the discussions which have unfolded in society have also encompassed the sphere of the theoretical and ideological foundations of the party. Naturally, the issue of **Leninism** has also come into the field of dispute. And at the same time some people are conducting this dispute from nihilistic or, I would even say, agressive positions.

The unacceptability of a pedantic and dogmatic use of this concept, the interpretation of which has virtually been inherited from Stalin, is now evident. It is precisely this which has engendered a speculative, and at times simply cynical, attitude toward Leninism. And for the majority of people, who are remote from theory, it started to be perceived as a type of religious dogma, the content of which was not always thought about. The term Leninism itself arose in Menshevik circles long before 1917. It is typical that they wished to set Lenin's views in opposition to Marxism by these means. At the beginning of the 1920s Lenin's companions-in-arms also started to use this concept to designate a new stage in the development of Marxism. This met with his side's opposition, not only out of modesty, but also because Lenin never claimed to have created a special integral theoretical and philosophical system. He sincerely considered himself to be only a student of Marx, and considered his contribution to the theory to be only a part of Marxist teachings. It is necessary to be very responsible regarding the issue of such a theoretical and political category as Leninism, without which correct understanding of the progress of humanity in the 20th century is simply unthinkable. And we should not yield to the pressure from wreckers or plain knuckleheads as regards history and theory.

For us, Leninism remains a living and effective theoretical, ideological, and moral force. We are now restoring the true readings of Lenin, and are trying to do this in a creative way. It has never and will never be simple. We are actively engaged in doing this in the course of perestroyka, because of the very difficult problems that it has thrown up. Much has been done, but there is still more that remains to be done in the period before the 28th CPSU Congress, at the congress itself, and during drafting of a new party program. By relying on all that is enduring in Lenin's spiritual legacy, by arming ourselves with modern knowledge, and by assimilating the most recent achievements of the science of man and society, we will seek our own answers to the problems and challenges of **our time.**

Comrades, our society has no reasonable alternative to socialist perestroyka. It is a complicated but unavoidable way out of a difficult spot—this is the road of genuine progress. And on this road we cannot do without Lenin's legacy, enriched with the experience and lessons of our and the world's most recent history. The success of perestroyka will mean an unprecedented step in the deployment of all civilization. It could be the start of an epoch featuring such enormous transformations—essentially a revolution—which could, by its noncoercive and democratic methods, and by its results lead the world to the very meaning of man's existence on earth, as Lenin dreamed. [applause]

CPSU Leaders at Lenin Ceremony Listed

PM2104163390 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[TASS report: "Ceremonial Meeting in Moscow"]

[Text] Perestroyka has brought Vladimir Ilich Lenin—the leader of October and the founder of the Communist Party and the Soviet state—even closer to us. We check the progress of transformations against Lenin's profound thought. Lenin's immortal lines teach us to objectively assess both our achievements and our shortcomings, and to learn the necessary lessons so as to continue the revolution. The "current moment" brings us back again and again to the works and counsels of this great thinker and man.

A ceremonial meeting devoted to the 120th anniversary of V.I. Lenin's birth was held at Moscow's USSR Bolshoy Theater 20 April. Representatives of labor collectives in the capital and the Moscow area, and party, soviet, and public organizations gathered there along with people's deputies, scientific and cultural figures, Soviet Armed Forces servicemen, and veterans of the Leninist party. Foreign diplomats and guests attended.

Taking part in the ceremonial meeting were M.S. Gorbachev, V.I. Vorotnikov, L.N. Zaykov, V.A. Kryuchkov, Ye.K. Ligachev, Yu.D. Maslyukov, V.A. Medvedev, N.I. Ryzhkov, E.A. Shevardnadze, A.N. Yakovlev, A.P. Biryukova, A.V. Vlasov, A.I. Lukyanov, Ye.M. Primakov, B.K. Pugo, G.P. Razumovskiy, D.T. Yazov, O.D. Baklanov, Yu.A. Manayenkov, Ye.S. Stroyev, G.I. Usmanov, and I.T. Frolov; members of the USSR Federation and Presidential Councils; and the chairmen of the USSR Supreme Soviet chambers.

The ceremonial meeting was opened by Yu.A. Prokofyev, first secretary of Moscow CPSU Gorkom [City Party Committee] and member of the CPSU Central Committee Russian Bureau.

The Soviet national anthem was played.

The "Lenin Speech" delivered by M.S. Gorbachev, president of the USSR and general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, was listened to with great attention.

The participants in the ceremonial meeting enthusiastically sang the "Internationale."

A grand ceremonial concert was then held.

Lay Wreath at Lenin Mausoleum

LD2004161690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1400 GMT 20 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Good evening. Moscow, Red Square. Today, on the eve of the 120th anniverseary of the birth of Vladimir Ilich Lenin, the leaders of the country and party laid a wreath at the Mausoleum of the founder of the Soviet state. [video shows Gorbachev, with Yakovlev and Ryzhkov to his right, and Lukyanov to his left, walking toward mausoleum. Behind them, among others, are Ligachev, Zaykov, and Shevardnadze. Follows and close-up, left to right of screen, of Ryzhkov, Gorbachev, and Lukyanov, with shevardnadze behind them. Yakovlev, Zaykov, (?Frolov) and Yazov then come into view. Wreath laying not shown]

USSR Law on Local Self-Government, Economy

904A0317A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 15 Apr 90 Morning Edition pp 1-2

["USSR Law on the General Principles of Local Self-Government and the Local Economy in the USSR"]

[Text] Local self-government in the USSR is part of the socialist self-government of the people and is intended to ensure the realization of the rights and liberties of the citizens and their independence in the solution of questions of the territory's social and economic development, and protection of the environment.

This law determines the general principles of local self-government and the local economy in the USSR.

Section I. Concept, System, and Principles of Local Self-Government

Article 1. Concept of local self-government

Local (territorial) self-government in the USSR is the self-organization of the citizens for the solution directly or through the bodies they elect of all questions of local significance, proceeding from the interests of the population and the salient features of the administrative-territorial units on the basis of the laws, and the pertinent material and financial base.

Article 2. System of local self-government

1. The system of local self-government incorporates the local soviets of people's deputies and organs of territorial public self-government (district and residential complex councils and committees; block, street, neighborhood, community and village committees; and other bodies) and also local referendums, citizens' meetings and assemblies, and other forms of direct democracy.

2. Local self-government is exercised within the bounds of the administrative-territorial units.

3. The village soviet, community (rayon), and city (municipal rayon) may be the primary territorial level of local self-government.

With regard for local conditions and national singularities, the union and autonomous republics also determine other levels of local self-government.

Rural localities, communities, and cities may unite in associations for the more efficient realization of their rights and interests.

4. The organs of local self-government function in close interaction with the work force, public organizations, and movements and create the conditions for the realization by each USSR citizen of his constitutional right to participate in the management of state and public affairs.

Article 3. The local soviets of people's deputies—basic component of the system of local self-government

The basic component in the system of local self-government are the local soviets of people's deputies as representative organs of power. On their territory the soviets coordinate the activity of the entire system of local self-government.

Article 4. Basic principles of local self-government

Local self-government is exercised on the principles of:

the people's free expression through the soviets of people's deputies, local referendums, and other forms of direct democracy;

legality;

the self-sufficiency and independence of the soviets of people's deputies and their responsibility for the solution of questions of local significance;

protection of the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens;

the electivity of the soviets of people's deputies and the organs of territorial public self-government and their answerability to the population;

glasnost and the consideration of public opinion;

the combination of local and state interests.

Article 5. Realization of the citizens' rights in self-government

Citizens residing on the corresponding territory directly decide most important questions of local significance, elect the organs of local self-government, and adopt

decisions on their dissolution in accordance with the laws of the union and autonomous republics.

Article 6. Principles of determination of the jurisdiction of the organs of local self-government

1. The organs of local self-government at the primary territorial level are endowed by this law and the laws of the union and autonomous republics with their own jurisdiction. The jurisdiction is determined with regard for the possibility of its independent realization at this level and may not be changed other than by law.

The local soviets of people's deputies of various levels have the right:

through mutual agreement, to reallocate among themselves individual powers in the field of economic building and general amenity provision with regard for local demographic, territorial, and economic conditions and national singularities;

to transfer some of their powers to organs of territorial public self-government.

2. To the jurisdiction of kray and oblast soviets of people's deputies there may pertain powers relating to the organization on a contract basis of the economic and general amenity servicing of rayons and cities, interterritorial activities, financial assistance for balancing local budgets in instances determined by law, methods assistance, and the assurance of legality in the exercise of local self-government.

3. The local soviets of people's deputies form their authorities and determine their powers in accordance with the laws of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics and independently determine their structure and list of personnel.

The executive and administrative authorities of the local soviets of people's deputies are subordinate only to the soviets that formed them and are guided in their activity by the USSR Constitution, the constitutions of the union and autonomous republics, and the laws of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics.

4. Relations between local soviets of people's deputies are built in accordance with legislative enactment of the USSR Supreme Soviet and the supreme soviets of the union and autonomous republics.

5. The local soviets of people's deputies have the right to form territorial and interterritorial as well as sectoral and intersectoral organs of administration and to reorganize those they have created and approve their structure and lists of staff.

6. The organs of territorial public self-government may in accordance with the laws of the USSR and union and autonomous republics be endowed with the rights of a legal entity.

Article 7. Legislation governing local self-government and the local economy

1. Local self-government is regulated on the basis of the USSR Constitution by the constitutions of the union and autonomous republics, by this law, and by other laws of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics.

2. The effect of the laws of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics on local self-government also extends to mono-functional communities (the grounds of military encampments and closed-type communities).

Section II. Economic Foundation of Local Self-Government

Article 8. Economic base of local self-government

Natural resources (the land, its interior, waters, forests, and flora and fauna) and municipal and other property serving as a source of income of local self-government and for the satisfaction of the socioeconomic requirements of the population of the corresponding territory constitute the economic base of local self-government.

Article 9. The local economy and its composition

1. The local economy provides for direct satisfaction of the population's requirements and the functioning of the system of local self-government.

2. The local economy consists of enterprises (associations), organizations, establishments, and facilities of the production and social infrastructure which are the municipal property of the corresponding administrative-territorial unit.

3. The local economy may incorporate with the consent of the proprietor enterprises (associations), organizations, and establishments that are not part of municipal property and whose activity is connected predominantly with service.

With the consent of the population and the organs of local self-government, the local economy may also incorporate facilities created as a result of the labor participation of the citizens or acquired on the basis of their voluntary contributions.

4. Within the limits of their jurisdiction the local soviets of people's deputies may accord the enterprises (associations), organizations, and establishments which are a part of the local economy preferential right to use of local land and other natural resources and material-technical supply from local stocks.

5. The local soviets of people's deputies have the right without concordance with the higher authorities to create enterprises, organizations, and general amenity establishments from their available resources.

6. The local soviets of people's deputies coordinate the activity of the enterprises (associations), organizations, and establishments of the local economy.

Article 10. Municipal property

1. Municipal property constitutes the basis of the local economy. Administration and management of municipal property are exercised on behalf of the population of the administrative-territorial units by the corresponding soviets of people's deputies and the bodies they empower.

2. Property transferred free of charge by the USSR, the union and autonomous republics, and other subjects as well as property created or acquired by the local soviet of people's deputies from resources at its disposal pertain to municipal ownership.

The local soviets of people's deputies have the right to submit proposals concerning the transfer or sale to municipal ownership of the administrative-territorial units of enterprises (associations), organizations, establishments and their structural subdivisions as well as other facilities pertaining to other forms of state ownership if they are of particular importance for catering to the municipal-social and general amenity needs of the population of the given territory and to the functioning of the local economy.

The procedure of the transfer, purchase, or sale and the list of state property handed over free of charge to the ownership of administrative-territorial units of various levels and the procedure of examination of disputes arising here are determined by the USSR Supreme Soviet and the supreme soviets of the union and autonomous republics respectively.

Article 11. Relations of the organs of local self-government and the enterprises

The economic relations of the organs of local self-government and enterprises (associations), organizations, and establishments which are not part of municipal ownership are built on a tax and contractual basis.

Article 12. Planning of a territory's socioeconomic development

The local soviet of people's deputies independently draws up and approves plans of the territory's socioeconomic development within the limits of its authority, proceeding from material-financial resources, the maximum enlistment of local resources and production potential, and the interests of environmental protection.

Article 13. Material-technical supply and commodity exchange between territories

1. The material-technical supply of the organs of local self-government and facilities of the local economy is exercised under the conditions of the full economic independence of the participants in economic activity on the basis of direct contracts concluded between them and also by way of wholesale and retail trade in the established procedure.

Given centralized allocation, the material resources necessary for a territory's socioeconomic development, service of the population, construction, environmental protection, and satisfaction of other local needs are allocated to the local soviets of people's deputies by the appropriate authorities of the union and autonomous republics.

2. Community exchange between territories is exercised under conditions of the openness of the territorial markets. Local soviets of people's deputies do not have the right to impose restrictions on imports and exports of products and commodities outside of the corresponding territory.

Article 14. Participation in foreign economic relations

1. The local soviets of people's deputies organize foreign economic relations and participate in them on the principles of currency self-support in accordance with the laws of the USSR and union and autonomous republics.

The local soviets of people's deputies promote the expansion of the foreign economic relations of enterprises (associations), organizations, and establishments located on their territory; the development of the export base; and an increase in output (operations, services).

2. The local soviets of people's deputies and the bodies they create have the right:

to conclude contracts with foreign partners for the realization and acquisition of products from available currency resources or on another basis;

to create joint ventures for the manufacture of consumer goods; to render consumer services; and to participate in the creation of joint scientific, cultural, tourist, and fitness-rehabilitation centers with foreign partners and other economic and S&T cooperation organizations associated with providing the social and production spheres with modern equipment and mechanization facilities for housing-public utilities and municipal services and enterprises for the processing of agricultural products and with the development of their material base;

to organize border and coastal trade.

Section III. Financial Basis of Local Self-Government

Article 15. Financial resources

The financial resources of local self-government consist of budget and extra-budget resources of the local soviets of people's deputies and also the resources of other organs of territorial self-government.

Article 16. The local budget

1. The local soviets of people's deputies independently draw up, approve, and fulfill the budgets of the corresponding territories in the interests of the population.

Interference of the higher authorities in the process of the elaboration, approval, and fulfillment of local budgets is not permitted.

2. The minimum amounts of the local budgets are determined on the basis of the quotas of budget provision per inhabitant determined by the union and autonomous republics.

Article 17. Revenue of the local budgets

1. The budgets of the primary level of local self-government include, in full, the following revenue:

income tax from USSR citizens, foreign citizens, and stateless persons residing on the territory of the local soviet;

the tax on the kolkhoz [collective farm] members' wage fund;

the tax on the production cooperatives;

land rent;

ground rent, which may partially be centralized in the budgets of the union and autonomous republics;

local taxes and dues.

The local budgets include in full also the following revenue:

profits (income) tax and the fees for natural resources from enterprises (associations) and organizations which are a part of the local economy and also from joint ventures in accordance with the shares in them of the local soviets of people's deputies;

a territorial tax levied on the profits (income) of union, republic, and other enterprises (associations) and organizations which are not part of the corresponding local economy at rates determined by the laws of the union and autonomous republics within the limits of the established amount of the profit tax of these enterprises (associations) and organizations going to the budgets of the republics;

fees for labor resources;

income tax on kolkhozes, consumer cooperative societies, and public organizations;

stamp duty and fees for patents for individual labor activity;

proceeds from the leasing of property which is part of the municipal ownership of the local soviets of people's deputies;

other income in accordance with the laws of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics.

3. Payments into the local budgets at stable long-term rates are made:

from the payment for natural resources;

from turnover tax;

from other revenue stipulated by laws of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics.

The rates of payments into the corresponding local budgets are approved by the higher soviets of people's deputies depending on the sum total of revenues of the local budget and the social norms determined by the organs of state power of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics.

4. The rate of the payment for labor and natural resources are stable and long-term and are determined by laws of the union and autonomous republics. They may be differentiated depending on the employment situation and economic evaluation of the natural resources of the territories.

Enterprise payments are made to the budget according to the location of the enterprises, their affiliates, and other structural units and subdivisions. The distribution of the payments of enterprises with affiliates on a given territory is effected proportionate to the proportion of their workers in the total numbers of those employed at the enterprise.

5. In accordance with the laws of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics, the local soviets of people's deputies determine:

the rate of profit tax for enterprises and other facilities of the local economy pertaining to municipal ownership;

local taxes, dues, and imposts.

6. Subsidies, subventions, and financial aid from higher budgets may be channeled into local budgets.

The local soviets of people's deputies have the right to accord individual payers benefits pertaining to taxes and payments into the corresponding local budget.

Article 18. Expenditure of local budgets

1. Local soviets of people's deputies independently:

determine the directions of the use of local budget resources and spend budget resources;

increase within the limits of their available resources the rate of expenditure for the upkeep of housing and public utilities, health care, public education, social security, culture, sport, and internal affairs authority and environmental protection establishments and determine supplementary benefits and aid for assistance to individual categories of the population;

determine the amount of expenditure for the upkeep of organs of local administration;

form reserve funds.

2. Additional revenue obtained in the fulfillment of the local budgets and also the amounts of excess income over expenditure formed as a result of overfulfillment of

revenue or savings in expenditure remain at the disposal of the local soviets of people's deputies, cannot be confiscated, and are used at their discretion.

Article 19. Extra-budget funds

1. The local soviets of people's deputies form extra-budget funds, which include:

supplementary income and economized financial resources obtained from the implementation of measures organized by the local soviets pertaining to the solution of economic and social problems;

voluntary contributions and donations from citizens, enterprises (associations), organizations, and establishments;

income from local bonds and local cash and commodity lotteries and auctions;

fines exacted from enterprises and organizations for having obtained unjustified profits (income) in connection with inflated prices (rates) for products (operations, services);

fines for environmental pollution and the irrational use of natural resources and other violations of environmental protection legislation and sanitary standards and rules and also payments compensating for damage caused. The sum totals of these fines and payments are used for environmental protection and recuperative measures;

fines for administrative offenses committed on the territory of the local soviet and also cash stoppages imposed by the pertinent people's control authorities;

50 percent of concealed or understated income uncovered by inspections of enterprises (associations), organizations, and establishments located on the territory of the local soviet of people's deputies;

income from the sale of ownerless or confiscated property;

other extra-budget resources.

2. Resources of extra-budget funds are kept in special accounts opened in banking establishments, cannot be confiscated, and are spent at the discretion of the local soviets of people's deputies.

3. The local soviets of people's deputies may, with the consent of enterprises (associations), organizations, establishments, and the population, pool their resources and budget and extra-budget resources for the construction, expansion, renovation, and maintenance on a several basis of facilities of the social and production infrastructure and also for environmental protection measures.

Article 20. Foreign currency funds

The local soviets of people's deputies have the right to form foreign currency funds from deductions at stable long-term rates from the currency proceeds of enterprises (associations) and organizations.

Article 21. Financial resources of territorial public self-government

1. The financial resources of territorial public self-government are formed from voluntary contributions and donations by enterprises (associations), organizations, establishments, and the population and from the income of enterprises which have been created and activities which are performed.

2. The local soviets of people's deputies have the right to transfer part of their financial resources to the organs of territorial public self-government.

3. The organs of territorial public self-government:

independently use the financial resources at their disposal in accordance with the goals of their activity, including for the upkeep of the bodies they form;

have the right to open cash transaction accounts in banking establishments.

Article 22. Participation of the organs of local self-government in credit relations and the organization of monetary circulation

1. The local soviets of people's deputies and other organs of local self-government are legal entities and have the right:

to avail themselves on a contract basis of credit for production and social purposes;

to participate with their own resources in the creation and the activity of financial-credit establishments on a joint-stock or share basis in accordance with the laws of the USSR and union and autonomous republics;

to create special funds and transfer them to any banking establishment as resources for extending credit to special programs and measures for the accomplishment of territorial tasks.

2. The local soviets of people's deputies have the right to put together territorial consolidated financial balance sheets. The corresponding state and public authorities and enterprises (associations), organizations, and establishments submit to the soviet of people's deputies and its executive and administrative authorities the information necessary for their compilation.

Section IV. Guarantees of Local Self-Management

Article 23. Assurance of the authority of the organs of local self-government pertaining to development of the territory

Questions of the creation or conversion of economic and social facilities and the use of natural resources on the

corresponding territory are decided only with the consent of the local soviet of people's deputies.

Regardless of their jurisdiction and form of ownership, enterprises (associations), organizations, and establishments do not have the right to make alterations to the plans of their activity on questions stipulated by a contract with the local soviet and are obligated to coordinate with the appropriate soviet of people's deputies activities that could have environmental, demographic, or other consequences affecting the interests of the population of the territory.

Article 24. Assurance of socialist legality

1. The decisions of referendums, citizens' meetings, gatherings, local soviets of people's deputies, and organs of territorial public self-government must not be contrary to the laws of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics.

2. The local soviets of people's deputies have the right:

to present to a court of law or state arbitration tribunal demands concerning recognition as invalid enactments by organs of state administration, local self-government, enterprises (associations), organizations, and establishments violating the rights and legitimate interests of the citizens residing on the given territory and the powers of the local soviet of people's deputies and also have the right to suspend, prior to the adoption of a ruling by the court of law and the arbitration tribunal, the operation of the disputed enactments of the organs of local self-government and enterprises (associations), organizations, and establishments;

in the event of natural disasters, ecological catastrophes, epidemics, epizootic disease, fires, and breaches of public order to implement special measures provided for by law for securing citizens' personal safety, protecting their rights and legitimate interests, safeguarding all forms of property, and upholding law and order;

to adopt decisions in instances provided for by law determining administrative responsibility for violations thereof;

to exercise other powers stipulated by laws of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics.

Article 25. The binding nature of decisions and protection of the rights of local self-government

1. Decisions of a local referendum on questions within the jurisdiction of local self-government as determined by laws of the union and autonomous republics are binding on the corresponding soviets of people's deputies, organs of territorial public self-government, and all organizations and citizens on the given territory.

2. The decisions of the local soviets of people's deputies adopted within the limits of the powers determined by this law and other laws of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics are binding on all enterprises (associations), organizations, establishments, cooperatives, public organizations and their authorities, officials, and citizens located on the administered territory.

3. Enterprises (associations), organizations, establishments, and citizens bear responsibility, including property responsibility, before the organs of local self-government for making restitution in full for losses inflicted by their decisions, actions, or inaction on the interests of the population, the local economy and the environment and also damage caused as a result of nonfulfillment of the decisions of the organs of local self-government.

The rights and legitimate interests of the organs of local self-government are protected by a court of law or state arbitration tribunal in accordance with the laws of the USSR and the union and autonomous republics.

Disagreements arising between local soviets of people's deputies of different levels on questions of a change in their competence are examined in the procedure determined by the laws of the union and autonomous republics.

Article 26. Responsibility of the organs of local self-government

The organs of local self-government are responsible for the legitimacy of the decisions they adopt.

Disputes pertaining to the restoration of violated rights of enterprises (associations), organizations, establishments, and citizens arising as the result of the actions or inaction of the organs of local self-government are settled in a court of law or state arbitration tribunal.

Damage caused as a result of unlawful decisions and actions or inaction by the organs of local self-government is compensated by them in full to the enterprises (associations), organizations, establishments, and citizens from their own resources.

Article 27. Examination of the proposals of the organs of local self-government

The highest organs of state power and administration of the USSR, the union and autonomous republics, and the all-union and republic bodies of public organizations are obliged to examine and take account in their activity of the proposals of the organs of local self-government and to communicate to them the results of the examination.
[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR.
[Dated] Moscow, the Kremlin, 9 April 1990.

Shevardnadze on Introducing Confederate Relations

LD1704213490 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1918 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 17 (TANJUG)—Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze announced the possibility of introducing confederate relations among soviet republics at a news conference today.

This is the first time such a possibility has been officially mentioned. Shevardnadze said that the new federal treaty, currently under preparation, would provide for different kinds of ties—confederation, federal or other.

We can discuss anything, but these are processes that take time, Shevardandze said.

The Soviet foreign minister repeated that each nation, including the Lithuanian one, had the right to self-determination. He stated that the majority of Lithuanian people supported secession, but that not all of them were aware of the possible consequences.

Secession from the Soviet Union is a long and complex process and must be preceded by a referendum, Shevardnadze said.

Answering a question on the manner in [word indistinct] developments around Lithuania would influence U.S.-Soviet relations, Shevardnadze said that he got the impression during a recent visit to Washington that the U.S. side was against an intensification of tension in Lithuania, and credited the United States for leading a sensible policy so far.

Democratic Platform Coordinating Council Meets

LD2204005890 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2050 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Video report by correspondent I. Istomin; from the "Television News Service Program"]

[Text] Events of the past weeks have shown that the left wing in the CPSU is continuing to take on an organizational shape.

[Correspondent I. Istomin] A session of the Coordinating Council of the Democratic Platform of the CPSU opened today in Moscow. It is discussing the issue of its attitude toward the CPSU letter in favor of consolidation upon a basis of principle. The speakers voiced the opinion that a growing apart [razmezhivaniye] in the party is inevitable since the conservative wing has set itself up against the democratic forces. But most of the democrats are in favor of remaining in the party until the 28th congress, otherwise the movement will become weak and unfocused, they think. It was also noted that organizational work, even in the Coordinating Council itself, is not yet sufficiently established to separate from the CPSU. Its own paper is published irregularly and its material basis is very weak. Tomorrow is the second and final day of the session. On the agenda are the issues of a draft program statement, preparations for the second all-union conference of the Democratic Platform, and elections of delegates for the 28th Congress of the CPSU. [video shows conference in process]

Democratic Platform Attack on PRAVDA Rebutted

PM1804143590 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 18 Apr 90 Second Edition p 4

[Aleksandr Ilin article under the rubric "Pointed Remarks": "Who Is 'Persecuting' Whom?"—carried as part of "Discussion Pamphlet No. 24" feature]

[Text] I still cannot understand the aggrieved attitude of certain writers of letters to the PRAVDA editorial office who feel confused at the broad spread of opinions, views, and ideas in the "Discussion Pamphlet" and who feel nostalgia for unequivocal clarity and definition. I regard this as a consequence of a refusal to think independently and of the inveterate habit of deriving from articles in PRAVDA virtual directives on how to act and behave in all eventualities in life.

It has to be admitted that there was a time when there was some basis for such expectations and conclusions. And the reason for the start of publication of the "Discussion Pamphlets" was that the newspaper has resolutely abandoned the outmoded practice of dictating and issuing instructions. The new way of conducting a precongress debate that is open to the most diverse opinions, including ones that do not coincide with the editorial office's opinion, has met with support from most readers. Other sections of the newspaper are also publishing articles whose authors express personal views and opinions presupposing the possibility of a further exchange of opinions and sharp polemics.

I will say straightaway: I have been and I remain an advocate of this kind of approach to the precongress debate. But I think I am beginning to understand those readers who wanted clarity: Whom and what can be criticized, and what and whom should not be criticized? Over the almost four months of publication of our "Discussion Pamphlets" it transpires, for instance, that you can freely discuss the CPSU Central Committee precongress documents, support some points, criticize some points, and propose both additions and clarifications. Anyone who leafs through the PRAVDA file for this period will easily see how many criticisms have been made here of the most important provisions of the draft Central Committee platform for the 28th congress and the new CPSU Statutes and how keenly and sincerely the authors of letters, commentaries, and theoretical articles analyze the problems of renewing, cleansing, and democratizing the party. And how sharply they criticize not only the errors and miscalculations of "times long gone," but also those made in the course of perestroyka. Indeed, the purpose in conducting the debate is to reveal the diversity of views and opinions and to try together, jointly to find the optimum ways out of the crisis.

No matter how they try, no one will find in the "Discussion Pamphlets" even the slightest attempt by the editorial office or the CPSU Central Committee to call any of the authors to order, to put them in their place, or to indulge in name-calling. Moreover, the publication of "Discussion Pamphlets," which have contained by no

means incontestable material, met with support in the resolution "On the Newspaper PRAVDA." As any unprejudiced reader can judge, that is the position of the CPSU Central Committee.

A very different position was displayed by the authors of a letter published recently in ARGUMENTY I FAKTY (No. 15). Stating that the "conservative section of the party and state apparatus which has brought the country to the brink of economic and political disaster is making fierce attempts to carry out an antiperestroyka coup within the party on the eve of the 28th CPSU Congress," the signatories of the letter begin their list of these "attempts" with a remark about "persecution of reformist communists" in PRAVDA.... So you cannot help regretting your naivete in your approach to the question of who can and who cannot be criticized.

A principled attitude toward the baseless accusations contained in this letter is expressed in the PRAVDA editorial "For Consolidation on the Basis of the Principles of Perestroyka." But there are also grounds and a need for me to express my own viewpoint.

I admit that I felt the greatest astonishment when I saw among the authors of the letter to ARGUMENTY I FAKTY the signatures of V.N. Lysenko, now an RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputy, and V.N. Shostakovskiy, rector of the Moscow Higher Party School, who are both members of the Coordinating Council of the Democratic Platform in the CPSU. I would have thought that it is wrong for them, of all people, to complain about PRAVDA, which has given them both—more than once!—the opportunity to express, as the letter puts it, the "seditious" thoughts of representatives of the "Democratic Platform." Back on the eve of the February Central Committee Plenum they were participants in a "roundtable" at the editorial office discussing ways of renewing the CPSU (PRAVDA for 4 February this year). While a number of the participants in this debate were entitled to complain to us, since it did not prove possible to give them all "play" in the newspaper, that certainly does not apply to Lysenko and Shostakovskiy, whose viewpoint was set out in quite considerable detail in the report. Incidentally, they themselves did not make any complaints to the editorial office at the time.

When they approached PRAVDA with the proposal to publish the "Democratic Platform," the answer was once again in the affirmative. The document was published in full in "Discussion Pamphlet No. 11" together with a detailed report on a "roundtable" at the PRAVDA editorial office in which, once again, V.N. Lysenko and V.N. Shostakovskiy were active participants. On the eve of publication Lysenko visited the editorial office, had a look at the text of the report, and again made no major comments—and he had the right to do so.

In this connection it is reasonable to ask: Just who is afraid of "open and honest competition among ideas and positions," as the authors of the letter to ARGUMENTY I FAKTY declare, and who is "persecuting" whom?

But maybe Lysenko and Shostakovskiy do not categorize themselves as "reformist communists?" Okay, let us together leaf through the "Discussion Pamphlets." The very first issue back in December (1989) published an article by S. Dzarasov, chief of the USSR Academy of Sciences Political Economy Department, entitled "Party Reform. What Should It Be Like." In my view, it is hard to suspect the author of conservatism. On the contrary, many of his ideas prompted reproaches from certain readers precisely because of they were bold and innovative in a way unfamiliar in such articles. Some of the opponents' reactions were published: It is a debate, after all.

"For Cardinal Renewal of the Party"—I think the very headline of the article by Lvov worker V. Chuprun ("Discussion Pamphlet No. 2") indicates the author's position quite clearly. The most diverse viewpoints, including radical ones, were featured in the roundup "Reactions, Reactions...." ("Discussion Pamphlet No. 3")—the bold and critical approach of some of them attracted the attention even of a writer in MOSKOVSKIYE NOVOSTI, and criticism is something that that paper knows about.

An unprecedentedly broad response was evoked by Natalya Morozova's article "From a Nonparty Viewpoint" ("Discussion Pamphlet No. 5"); the editorial office acquainted readers with reactions to this article—ranging from delighted to sharply critical—in "Discussion Pamphlet No. 14" ("Moral Crisis or Start of Cleansing?").

The editorial office can scarcely be accused of attempting to defend the position of "conservative forces" over the article "Whom Are the Waves Overwhelming?" ("Discussion Pamphlet No. 13")—about the reasons for the downfall of a number of party committee leaders at local level. And about the futility of attempts to keep afloat by those who are behind the times, are trailing after events, and are cultivating "nostalgia" for the past.

Nor were we scared by the trenchancy with which problems were raised in the article by Doctor of Philosophical Sciences A. Butenko "What To Restructure Into What?" ("Discussion Pamphlet No. 10"). Even though the author expresses extremely radical views that until recently appeared, so to speak, "unpublishable." Alternative drafts and proposals, particularly those regarding the CPSU Statutes elaborated by the Moscow Interclub Party Group, which, as we know, is very close to the "Democratic Platform," have also been published in the "Discussion Pamphlets." We also acquainted readers with the proposals of a group of communists in Zelenograd regarding the temporary status of delegate to party congresses and the mechanism for party referenda.

Just the other day PRAVDA published the draft "Marxist Platform in the CPSU." However, it is impossible to list everything.

I would merely like to recall the editorial office's desire also to reflect as fully as possible the opinions of ordinary workers and peasants—those who only rarely write to the newspaper. A series of such materials has been published: "Who Will Heed the Workers' Voice?" ("Discussion Pamphlet No. 7"). "Let's Not Get Deflected From the Mainstream" ("Discussion Pamphlet No. 8"). "Why Workers Are Biding Their Time" ("Discussion Pamphlet No. 9"). "Communists of the Shop Organization" ("Discussion Pamphlet No. 12"). "The Word of Communist Workers" ("Discussion Pamphlet No. 17"). "With Whom Will We Get Out of the Trench?" ("Discussion Pamphlet No. 18"), and others.

Our authors include party workers, ordinary CPSU members and nonparty people, engineers and academics, representatives of the creative intelligentsia, party veterans, and so forth. USSR People's Deputies A. Chabanov, R. Medvedev, K. Kravchenko, G. Kulik, and E. Gams have also spoken out in the "Discussion Pamphlets." Of course, each of the authors has his own viewpoint, and there is nothing surprising in the fact that almost all articles evoked mixed reactions and a desire to argue.

The issue of the "Discussion Pamphlet" that presented the "Democratic Platform" also evoked many reactions. Their senders, reflecting on the provisions of this platform, expressed a number of critical opinions on the document itself and on the position of its compilers.

Especially as in their articles in other newspapers both V. Lysenko and V. Shostakovskiy and other "coordinators" openly talked of what they preferred not to discuss at the PRAVDA "roundtable." For instance, of the inevitability, in their opinion, of a split in the CPSU and of the need to create another party. In its resolution of 19 March this year "On the Situation in the CPSU" the "Democratic Platform" Coordinating Council, making a most negative assessment of both the February and March CPSU Central Committee Plenums, frankly stated its intention of proposing "to begin the process of forming a new political party on the basis of the 'Democratic Platform' and the IRG (Interregional Group of Deputies—A.I.) platform without abandoning the struggle for a majority at CPSU conferences and congresses." The resolution outlines organizational steps: holding a "Democratic Platform" congress, registering its supporters, "taking the initiative of forming party districts," "nationalizing CPSU property and transferring it to the soviets," and organizing factions of Democratic Platform supporters in soviets at various levels....

Everything seems extremely clear. However much you may wish to, you cannot discern even a hint of "open and honest competition among ideas and positions" in the categorical formulas of the "resolution" branding the party "elite." This resolution emerged long before the CPSU Central Committee open letter, which the resolution's authors see as an attempt to "immediately close the valve of 'internal party democracy'" and to resort to strong-arm methods.

It is easy to see who really opted for methods of another kind instead of "broad and free debate" and who is laying claim to ultimate truth.

...I have been rereading over and over again the letter of the "nine" in the popular weekly and I simply cannot understand why the comradely dialogue which PRAVDA has conducted with its authors has produced a crude charge of "persecution of reformist communists." Does absolutely anything go in the system of measures that the "coordinators" of the "Democratic Platform" deem to be necessary? Why, when they accuse others of a lack of respect for communists, do they display such an unceremonious lack of respect for their opponents, to put it mildly? Is name-calling the road to dialogue?

But I am convinced that today we need dialogue like the air that we breathe. There is a need for open debate—without omissions and accusations "after the event." Without dubious ploys to discredit those with whom you recently sought the truth at the same "roundtable." Or did our partners in the debate set themselves different goals even then?

Brutents Views Expulsion of Radicals

PM2004150290 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 15-16 Apr 90 p 2

[Interview with CPSU Central Committee member Karen Brutents by Ezio Mauro in Moscow—date not given]

[Text] Moscow—"We want to reform the party, they—I am talking about the leaders—want to destroy it. I think that remaining together is immoral." Karen Brutents, one of the strong men of the Central Committee, a convinced Gorbachev supporter, explained the reasons for and aims of the great "purge" of radicals which the CPSU leadership has launched with a view to the congress.

"Our condemnation stems from the need to make things clear and not from the fear that in a multiparty system the CPSU will be doomed to a fate similar to that of many East European communist parties," Brutents explained.

"Of course, this lesson is not wasted on us, but conditions are different. Those parties were at the head of authoritarian, bureaucratic systems separated from the masses and their leaders were deaf to the challenges of the day. This is not true in our country because perestroyka started within the CPSU."

[Mauro] But after five years of perestroyka, with the conservatives opposing any reform, the party has declared war on the left-wing radicals, threatening them with expulsion: Why has Gorbachev changed enemies?

[Brutents] Gorbachev's position has not changed. We know very well that the conservatives are no better than the radicals, and in some respects they are even more dangerous. But the radicals, as you Western journalists call them, are working for something which cannot be ignored—an outright organized split.

[Mauro] Why is the party responding to the threat of a split with the threat of expulsion?

[Brutents] It is easy, because we must defend ourselves. Any party in the world would do so. We have a duty to make things clear to those who have not yet understood what these forces are planning. The Central Committee's open letter to the communists had this objective—to reveal the radicals' strategy, which in many respects is still concealed, and to make everybody understand that they are planning to create a party within the party, as soon as the time is right to do so. We say to their leaders that this party can be formed if they wish, but not within our party. If you are with me you cannot work against me.

[Mauro] Do you confirm the Central Committee's accusation that the radicals want to destroy the party?

[Brutents] I am not an investigator and I do not want to question their intentions. I know that the supporters of the Democratic Platform include many comrades who are sincerely worried about perestroyka and I certainly do not regard them as our enemies simply because they have signed this document. But I also judge the specific actions which many radicals are taking, and I clearly see that they are aimed at destroying the party and creating a new one.

[Mauro] But should a party which has now chosen the path of "democratic socialism," as the CPSU platform stipulates, not accept different views within it?

[Brutents] Certainly, and we accept them, but there is a limit: Nobody can sit back and watch the organization of a split, or the birth of a real faction. We want the CPSU to exist and live, to be reformed and recover its lost positions, and this cannot be reconciled with the line followed by those who want to destroy it.

[Mauro] If the radicals, after excommunication from the Central Committee, leave the party, will the CPSU not be mutilated on its left wing?

[Brutents] I do not think so. The West must not make the mistake of confusing the democratic and progressive part of the CPSU with the so-called radical section. Let us not forget that we have 20 million members and there are around 100,000 radicals: I think that the left wing or the democratic wing is rather bigger than that group.

[Mauro] The fact remains that the radicals were very successful in the last elections at the party's expense, as the Moscow and Leningrad results show. How do you explain that?

[Brutents] By the fact that their program contains just and attractive proposals. But also, and more especially, by the fact that criticism is very profitable in our country. And to criticize, you just need a big mouth, but it is much more difficult to understand and decide what needs to be done to put goods back in the empty stores, to clean up Moscow's dirty streets, and to run the city. Let the radicals form their party, since they have already started to do so. Let them do it, and we will then see in what way they are better than us.

[Mauro] Is there not a danger that this split and these expulsions will make Gorbachev a prisoner of the conservatives?

[Brutents] No, Gorbachev will never seek refuge among the conservatives. I am sure of that. This is partly because I think that the strength of the conservatives has been rather overestimated. Gorbachev will continue to play his role, as he is doing now, at the head of the state and party.

[Mauro] Does this mean that he will not abandon his post as general secretary at the congress?

[Brutents] No, we cannot afford that. His authority is now necessary to the state and the party. On principle, the separation of the two posts is right, but this is not the time to do it. In our country, we say that every season has its fruit.

Presidium Session Discusses Chernobyl Measures

LD2104192990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 21 Apr 90

[From the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] An announcement has just been received on an extended session of the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers. Matters relating to the further conduct of a complex of works to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Electric Power Station [AES] were examined. As was noted at the session, the main problem has been and continues to be the safety and health of people residing in the affected regions. It is precisely this that determines the princpal substance of the measures to eliminate the consequences of the accident in the next few years and in the future.

As a result of an exchange of opinions, the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers approved the republican programs for eliminating the consequences of the Chernobyl catastrophe on the territory of the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR], the Ukrainian SSR, and the Russian Soviet Federative Socialist Republic [RSFSR]. The proposals by the State Commission for Emergency Situations of the USSR Council of Ministers on the adoption of two programs—a state program of urgent measures to eliminate the consequences of the accident for the years 1990-92, and a program of a long-term nature—also was adopted.

The state program of urgent measures provides for the continuation of work to resettle the population, to improve medical aid for persons affected by radiation, to provide the population with clean foodstuffs, and to raise the standard of social protection for affected people, primarily children and the elderly. With the aim of improving medical aid for the population, it is planned to strengthen the material and technical base of treatment and scientific-research institutions, to expand the network of such institutions, to set up a special system for checking on the population's state of health and its rehabilitation, and to draw in additional high qualified specialists to work in these regions.

It is planned to allocate R16 billion for the implementation of this program. As far as the long-term program is concerned, the Presidium of the USSR Council of Ministers has instructed the State Commission for Emergency Situations of the USSR Council of Ministers, the USSR Gosplan (State Planning Committee), the union republics councils of ministers, and the USSR Academy of Sciences to develop it in conjunction with interested organizations and on the basis of achievements of Soviet and world science. It is proposed to involve major Soviet and foreign scientists and specialists in the formation of the program.

The decision was made to create a special subdepartment to organize the fulfillment of the programs adopted, within the composition of the State Commission for Emergency Situations of the USSR Cuncil of Ministers. It is envisaged that analogous subdepartments will be formed in the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, and Belorussia. The proposal by the RSFSR Council of Ministers for the creation of a republican scientific center for radiation medicine in Bryansk was supported.

The program of urgent measures to eliminate the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES is being submitted by the country's government to be examined by the USSR Supreme Soviet.

Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, chaired the Presidium session and spoke at it.

Ligachev Remarks to 21st Komsomol Congress

90US0814A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 15 Apr 90 p 3

[Speech by Ye.K. Ligachev, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, at the 12 April evening session of the 21st Komsomol Congress]

[Text] I would like, first of all, to thank you for having expressed a desire to hear my opinion on this issue.

It is easy for me, incidentally, to answer this question. Viktor Ivanovich will confirm that several years ago, at a meeting of the party Central Committee, we very comprehensively examined the idea of the creation and development of a youth economy.

It may be said that we gave this idea our blessing at that time. It was then specifically expressed in corresponding government decisions. So we all initiated this together. I can see that it is growing into something big and significant, even going by the figures you have cited here and the extent of the manufacture of products as a whole. I highly approve of this. That is, the position which I held at one time is preserved. I believe that you are putting the issue in entirely the right way. It would seem to me that this important work, which, as I believe, you are performing with clean hands, with prudence and intelligence, and quite efficiently and usefully, is in need of support. Preferential taxation included. (applause).

If you so entrust me, I will immediately lend my voice and attempt to persuade my Politburo comrades and M.S. Gorbachev personally. Although I do not guarantee a swift decision, for we have now embarked on different conditions of political life where not only does the Politburo decide such matters but legislative instruments are formulated by the Supreme Soviet and our parliament.

Do you think I am avoiding this issue? I am simply explaining to you what complexities and difficulties lie ahead for us and I call on you for a highly efficient management of the youth economy so that we may respond in deeds, as they say. (applause).

I have received many requests to meet with individual delegations. I did so yesterday and this morning for about 30-40 minutes and then I held a big meeting during the 12 o'clock break. I would ask the comrades who have applied to me, many written inquiries, I could come here tomorrow a little earlier also, and I will also be here in the break in the first half of the day, so meetings could be held. I am satisfied with the meetings there have been. I remember my Komsomol [Communist Youth League] youth, I remember my two Komsomol congresses, the 11th and 12th.

I would like to say one thing to you, comrades. You have heard the parting words of Mikhail Sergeyevich here, but this is what I would like to say to you.

I do not know whether there has been discussion in this sphere. Working now as a member of the present political leadership, I have felt particularly strongly that politics is something which requires on the one hand improvement, but on the other, continuity. I believe that a weakness of ours is the fact that, having initiated very important revolutionary changes, we have to a lesser extent than before been making use of our history, our past, and the entire wealth of experience which has been cultivated by mankind. Our fatherland included. I do not wish to tutor anyone and engage in edification here but when you examine the issues, remember the generations which created the Komsomol and developed it. It needs to be restructured with regard for continuity and all that is illustrious and valuable which the Lenin Komsomol has achieved. (stormy applause).

Without a combination of the dialectical, this and the other, there is neither present nor future.

I wish you success, I wish you a successful continuation of the congress and its completion, undoubtedly, in confirmation of what the Communist Leninist Youth League was, is, and will be. For a renewed viable Komsomol! (Stormy applause).

Says Peasants Must Attend Congress

LD2004224690

[Editorial Report] Moscow Television Service in Russian at 1922 GMT on 20 April broadcasts the "View" program, which includes a seven-minute interview with Yegor Ligachev, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, beginning at 2026 GMT.

The interview begins with shots of Ligachev surrounded by young people while signing copies of a book. An unidentified correspondent asks Ligachev why he is the only member of the Politburo attending the Komsomol Congress sittings. Ligachev replies: "I have been instructed to attend by the Politburo and by Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev personally. Being a disciplined sort of man, I am obeying instructions! Furthermore, I will say that I am interested in the problems you are discussing in the Komsomol, among young people. I believe that we shall all embark upon the right road; I am profoundly convinced of that. Whatever you may say about Ligachev, including on the 'View' program." Amid much laughter, Ligachev confesses that he cannot remember what the 'View' program has said about him; he does not often get a chance to listen to the program, but "some things are indeed said." He has, however formed his character pretty solidily, and he says if he responds to such things, "then one should respond where it is a matter of principles, about the main, most important thing. For to respond to everything that is said is not natural, it is quite impossible; indeed, it is hardly correct, because in that case there is no pluralism of opinions."

The 'View' correspondent points out that 78 members and candidate members of the CPSU Central Committee are taking part in the Komsomol congress: "What is this, a CPSU congress or something" the correspondent asks. Ligachev replies: "Well, I reckon young communists were never superfluous in the Komsomol: These were always the ones who stabilized the Komsomol, who did the creating and forming. So from my point of view that is a positive aspect. What worries me somewhat—and unfortunately it's not just among you in the Komsomol—is that the stratum, so to speak, of peasants and workers is rather small. That is something that concerns me. Just look what has happened in some of our republican parliaments, in oblasts and kray soviets, and in the Supreme Soviet, too—there are not very many either. I think we would be making a big mistake if we go to the congress without workers and peasants. That will be a bad thing, comrades. I am a member of the intelligentsia myself. But I have been linked with these people all my life, and I know their political and moral power.

"A party and state without workers and peasants is nothing at all. I say that quite frankly. It is a mistake to think that someone or other wants to divide the intelligentsia and the workers. If the intelligentsia wants our society to develop and wants it to go where we are heading, so to speak, in order to improve our people's lives, to enrich it spiritually, and to genuinely involve people in government, then workers and peasants must occupy an appropriate place. That is an extremely important matter. For in the contrary case, as we observe, the workers will seek a way out of this situation. If they are not included in state bodies, if they are not in party bodies, if they are not present at conferences and congresses, then it is quite natural that they will create their own parties, their own organizations, and will defend their own interests. Well, we've launched into theory a bit here!"

Ordinary people, the correspondent says, regard a Politburo member like Ligachev as distanced from the everyday concerns and difficulties of the population. Speaking from a personal viewpoint, Ligachev replies: "I live on my own salary, I have no possessions of value; now we have given up all the dachas, I live at home—please come to my home, I invite anyone who wants to come." This comment which is greeted with laughter. "So I have no special privileges, I have a car for my own use, I have a salary. And as for my family, I have a son. He is a professor, a doctor of sciences, a head of department and a splendid lad. Incidentally, he went to work on seven student work projects and youth projects. I have a grandson, a military man who teaches in a military institute. I have a wonderful wife, and I've just got a daughter-in-law. There you are, a good communist familiy! A party family! Everyone is concerned about politics," Ligachev asserts, adding that the family discusses politics at home. As Siberians, they make wide use of the cultural opportunities in Moscow, the Bolshoy Theater and concerts: Moscow is perhaps better off culturally than in other regards, he adds.

Asked if he misses Siberia, Ligachev says he does: "I have lived three times in Moscow and three times returned to Siberia, and if necessary I am ready to go right now!" Siberia, he says to general laughter, is his homeland and a remarkable region. "Will you show what I'm saying on 'View' or not?" he asks, exchanging jocular remarks with young people on the charms of Siberia and the efficiency rating of his interview.

Congress Debate Speakers Listed

90US0796A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 13 Apr 90 p 1

[Unattributed "Information Report" on 21st Komsomol Congress]

[Text] A. Sharonov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet subcommittee for youth affairs, addressed the 12 April 1990 morning session of the 21st All-Union

Leninist Communist Youth League [Komsomol] Congress to present the report of the group of USSR people's deputies from the All-Union Leninist Communist Youth League.

Komsomol Central Committee secretary V. Zyukin presented a report on the Komsomol Rules.

The following took part in the debates on the reports: V. Chirkov, first secretary of the Mezhdurechenskiy Komsomol Gorkom [city party committee], Kemerovo Oblast; V. Kudlash, first secretary of the Belorussian Komsomol Central Committee; V. Fronin, chief editor of KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA; L. Bunakov, first secretary of the Komsomol Sovetskiy Raykom [rayon party committee], Volgograd City; O. Ganin, Komsomol committee secretary at the Perm State University; I. Tasmagambetov, first secretary of the Kazakh Komsomol Central Committee; I. Mamayko, student at the Velemichskiy Secondary School, Stolinskiy Rayon, Brest Oblast; Yu. Shakirov, associate in the department of political history and scientific socialism at the Novomoskovsk branch of the Moscow Chemical-Technological Institute, Tula Oblast; V. Kushnikov, first secretary of the Khanty-Mansiysk Komsomol Gorkom, Tyumen Oblast; A. Nasyrov, first secretary of the Uzbek Komsomol Central Committee; V. Svinarenko, student at the Kagalnitskiy Secondary School No 1, Rostov Oblast; M. Kalinov, first secretary of the Mary Komsomol Oblast Committee. First secretary of the Ufa Komsomol Gorkom I. Yulbarisov read out a statement on behalf of the Bashkir delegation.

Nationalities State Committee Viewed

90UN1370A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 30 Mar 90 p 1

[Article by V. Zenkovich, TASS parliamentary correspondent, Moscow: "In Everyone's Interest—USSR State Committee on the Problems of Nationalities Is Established"]

[Text] For the purpose of improving state management in the sphere of nationalities development and interethnic relations, the third session of the Supreme Soviet adopted the USSR Law "On the Formation of a Union-Republic USSR State Committee on Problems of Nationalities."

G.S. Tarasevich, chairman of the Commission on Nationalities Policy and Interethnic Relations of the Soviet of Nationalities of the USSR Supreme Soviet, talks about its tasks.

It is hardly legitimate to speak of the revival of the People's Commissariat for Nationalities Affairs which existed at the dawn of Soviet power. The paramount task of that department, which, incidentally, was headed by I.V. Stalin, was to establish Soviet republics and to prepare them for unification with the Union SSR [Soviet Socialist Republics].

In 1923, by a decree of the VTsIK [All-Russian Central Executive Committee], the People's Commissariat for Nationalities Affairs was abolished. By that time, Stalin already possessed enough power, and this kind of organization was already of no use.

The Council of Ministers of the country submitted the idea of reviving this state institution for examination at the session of the USSR Supreme Soviet.

There exists in the country powerful legislative structures in the area of nationality policy and interethnic relations. But there are no executive structures!

There is no end of work for the new committee. This includes the resolution of questions associated with an increase in the legal status of national autonomies and the restoration of rights of peoples who were repressed in the years of Stalinism, improvement of the national-state system, assistance in the development of the national cultures of low-population nations, and protection of their economic interests.

To cope with all of this, the state committee must be given the necessary coordination-administrative authority and rights. I do not envision its work without the participation of permanent representatives of the union republics.

Of course, it is incumbent mostly on the republics themselves to be concerned with questions of interethnic relations. Incidentally, in the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic], Lithuania, and Azerbaijan, decisions have already been made concerning the establishment of republic committees on nationality problems. But it happens very frequently that it is not possible to resolve questions at their level. Take, for example, the protection of the interests of the low-population nationalities of the north. The development of oil and gas fields there is conducted by ministries and departments of a union and not a republic significance. The resolution of these problems could fall within the jurisdiction of a state committee.

Abalkin Discusses Concept of Party Platform

PM0504101090 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 30 Mar 90 First Edition p 2

[Article by Academician L. Abalkin under the rubric "Discussion Platform": "A Time for Answers, or What the Party Platform Should Be"]

[Text] The keen interest in the Central Committee Platform and the forthcoming party congress is prompted by the growing anxiety in society. This is due not only to the state of the consumer market, the urgency of ecological problems, and the scale of crime. Something bigger is at issue—the country's future, the past that has come to an end, and gloomy predictions for the future. All this could disturb anyone's equilibrium, even someone with fairly strong nerves.

To be frank, it must be admitted that society seems to have gone astray and become bogged down in the quest for a way out of the crisis that grips it. It is tired of the weight of questions besieging it. It cannot go on like this for long. The time has come for answers.

The party's prestige and political influence will depend largely on its ability to provide answers—convincing answers—to the questions posed by life. On whether it can propose its own understanding of the accumulated problems, its own interpretation of the past and present, and formulate an action program capable of leading society first to recovery, then to prosperity. The people cannot live without that prospect, without a unifying and elevating idea.

I.

Life itself, with its implacable logic, called into question the correctness of the socialist choice made by our country. This question cannot be evaded. A clear stance is necessary here, based not on lightweight assessments, but on a comprehensive analysis of the past and present both of our country and of the world community.

This analysis shows: **Socialism as an influential avenue of social thinking and a powerful political movement did not emerge by chance.** The entire course of social development in the 19th century and the accompanying exacerbation of social conflicts urgently demanded the formulation of an alternative to the existing capitalist system. The socialist choice was that alternative.

The validation of this choice and the formulation of the means of social renewal of society demanded enormous efforts and gave birth to a whole constellation of giants of theoretical thinking. They not only founded the socialist doctrine, but also left an ineradicable imprint on the history of social science. Along with the founders of Marxism-Leninism, such names as P. Lavrov and G. Plekhanov, P. Kropotkin and M. Tugan-Baranovskiy, A. Bebel and K. Kautsky, A. Labriola and A. Gramsci, O. Bauer and R. Luxemburg make up the glory of socialist theoretical thought.

The distinctive characteristic of Marxist socialist thought is its openness and receptiveness to changes in social life. It inherited at birth and absorbed into itself the most valuable elements accumulated by social science. Any attempts to break this genetic link and break with the powerful mainstream of humanitarian thought inevitably led, and still lead, to dogmatism in theory and sectarianism in politics.

Unfortunately, all these things have happened. And what our party is up against today—the loss of initative, decline in prestige, and lessening of influence among the masses—has its roots in a serious crisis in theoretical thought. This is manifested in disregard for the changes taking place in society, intolerance of dissidence, and the tendency to confuse wishes with reality. Without overcoming this crisis, we cannot seriously talk about a renewal of the party.

Human society has now changed, and changed fundamentally not only compared with how it was in the last century, but compared with its nature in the early part, and even the middle, of the prsent century. Naturally, many established ideas have become hopelessly obsolete. **We are faced with the need for a theoretical breakthrough, a major leap forward in the devleopment of socialist thought.** A new paradigm is needed—a totality of theoretical concepts and propositions reflecting the more profound degree of understanding of social processes and the new state of the subject under study.

From the outset the socialist movement came out openly as the voice of the interests of the working class. These interests were not seen in a narrowly selfish light, but were identified with the progress of production forces and the interests of the majority of mankind. That is the crux of the matter. This is the key to an understanding of the dialectics of the class element and the panhuman element. Failing to understand this, disregarding it, or misrepresenting it can lead to serious deformations of the socialist ideal in theory and in practice.

The split that occurred in the socialist movement in our own century introduced hostility and alienation to the movement. The adverse effects of this can still be felt to this day. I believe the conditions are now ripe for overcoming this spit and achieving a growing mutual understanding within the socialist movement.

If we examine the socialist movement from a broad historical standpoint, for all the diversity of program principles and methods of struggle, it developed throughout the last century as a powerful, worldwide current. Its flow was uneven and its results far from uniform. But to confine the analysis solely to one area of this all-embracing stream is to display an unforgivable narrowness of vision and deliberately to distort the conclusions. It is to underestimate the radical changes that have taken place in the world under its influence.

There is every reason to state that **without the socialist movement, without the October Revolution and the social democratic influence, human society today would be different.** Much that has become the norm in the practice of what are usually called civilized countries is the direct or indirect result of the struggle for socialist ideals.

II.

In calling for the revolutionary renewal of society it is necessary, at least in general terms, to outline its future shape. Naturally, this approach carries a risk of imposing preconceived patterns on life. It would be frivolous to underestimate this risk. But it is equally dangerous to plunge into the stormy sea of revolutionary changes without a clearly defined goal and program of action. The trial-and-error method is not suitable for a serious political party.

The need to formulate a fundamentally new concept of socialism is not just another slogan. It is a break with the formulas discarded by life, the closing of a chapter on the

historical past. Here it must be borne in mind that ideas about socialism cannot remain unchanged, ossified. Otherwise they inevitably turn into dogmas. Experience shows that **the concept of socialism is a function of time**.

While recognizing this, we must avoid arrogance about our predecessors. We sometimes think that we have all but captured the will-o'-the-wisp of absolute truth. But here we share our predecessors' illusions: That is exactly how things seemed to them, in their day.... Yes, there is much that we understand better today than they did. But not because we are smarter or more farsighted. Our superiority stems from only one thing—the greater volume of accumulated information and the possibility of using it in theoretical generalizations. You only have to know how to use this opportunity skillfully.

Social progress tends to step up the demands on the socialist society, raising, so to speak, the level of the criteria by which the building of that society is judged. That is why we cannot today operate on the basis of assessments that were developed in the twenties and later incorporated in a rigid normative structure. The modern approach should be different, enriched by the experience and wisdom of the years we have lived through.

Yes, the country has changed beyond recognition over the decades. It broke out of patriarchal structures and mass illiteracy, gave the world the first experiment in planned organization of economic life and universal employment, and acquired mighty economic, scientific, and technical potential. The efforts of several generations which devoted their lives to building socialism have not been in vain.

But the society that was created proved to be weighed down by an immobile economic structure, universal state control, and the absence of democratic institutions. The pitiless personality cult was a tragedy for the people. Elements of new social relations failed to form an integral whole. Without completing the transitional period, the country turned off onto a side branch of social development that was in many ways an impasse.

The efforts made could not radically change the situation. And it must be said quite clearly that socialism cannot be deemed to have been built if the alienation of the worker from the means of production has not been overcome in society, the food and housing problems have not been resolved, and the principles of people's power have not been established.

The historic task that has fallen to the lot of present and future generations of Soviet people is to finish the job of building a socialist society. A society that we can be proud of, that commands respect.

One of the most fundamental provisions of the new concept of socialism should be a clear understanding that it can only be established if it absorbs all the wealth accumulated previously in the course of the development of human civilization. Only by absorbing this heritage and integrating it into its own socioeconomic and political structures can socialism become established as a new social system.

But this simple, self-evident truth unfortunately seems difficult to grasp. Simplistic ideas to the effect that we and capitalism should be opposites in every way still have repercussions to this day. As P. Chaadayev wrote in his historical reflections on the fate of Russia, "one of the saddest features of our unique civilization is that we are still only in the process of discovering truths that have long become truisms elsewhere."

The center of the contemporary concept of socialism is the nature of its economic system. This should incorporate diverse forms of ownership and economic management, free rivalry among them, the right of every worker and collective to choose the most rational means of applying their efforts, and the existence of a developed market mechanism supplemented by the methods of planned regulation of the economy and social protection for the population.

The socialist economy should, on the one hand, be highly efficient, receptive to scientific and technical innovations, and oriented toward the consumer, and on the other, exclude all forms of alienation of the worker from the means of production. This can be seen as a way of combining the general economic forms that have evolved over many centuries of natural selection with socialism's inherent principles of organization of economic life.

Socialism presupposes the formation of a developed and all-embracing system of self-government, from local or municipal self-government to the exercise of statewide functions. **Only democracy developed to the point of the full realization of the self-government principle can offer a pattern for the structure of political life that is appropriate to socialism.**

Much is currently being written and said about the rule-of-law state and the paramountcy of the law. A complex and long road leads to this objective. But we must rid ourselves of the illusion that we can change our lives by adopting new laws. The rule-of-law state is only a part of the civil society. And success is achieved through real change in the whole range of social relationships that are entwined in our daily life, our ideas, and the motives for our behavior.

Jean-Jacques Rousseau once wrote that there are laws more important than state laws. "Laws of this type are not engraved in marble or bronze, but etched in citizens' hearts; they form the true Constitution of the state; their force is renewed every day; they supplement and bring back to life the other laws, which grow old and fade; they preserve the spirit of state institutions among the people and imperceptibly replace the force of authority with the force of habit. I am talking of morals and customs, and in particular public opinion."

Enormous work lies ahead to rework and form all the structures of the civil society, the entire system of social and spiritual relations, interpersonal contacts, and family structures. Much must be changed in the patterns of our thinking, in the mass mentality. This is perhaps the most difficult of the tasks facing us. We want to change life for the better. But to this end we ourselves must change.

The formulation of a modern concept of socialism presupposes an understanding of the natural diversity of its forms and models. This approach is by no means dictated by opportunist considerations. **Social development and social progress are capable, in principle, of many alternative versions. Only the past has no alternative.** That is why the impression is created that what happened in life was the only thing that could happen. But that is not the case. History is only one of the possible options, realized in practice.

III.

A bold and scientifically verified look into the future cannot diminish the urgency of the problems that have accumulated, which brook no delay. The platform should therefore also contain a kind of minimum program—an answer to the question of how to halt the development of negative processes and stabilize the economic situation in the country.

Naturally, the CPSU cannot take upon itself the resolution of all these questions. But its political and moral duty is to propose a sure way out of the crisis and warn against ill-considered actions and dangerous illusions.

In dismal situations people are inclined to believe in miracles. They listen with almost childish naivety to those who offer simple formulas and promise rapid recovery. As long as this recovery happens quickly, is painless, and preferably involves no exertion on the part of the patient.

The simplest thing is not to create, but to rework "fairly." The impression arises that modern society is infected with a kind of shareout virus. There are many versions of it—take away the apparatus' privileges and immediately improve the position of all strata of society; catch the mafia with the help of monetary reform and, again, stabilize the market at a stroke; keep all the resources in your "own" republic (oblast, city) and immediately get rich.

The more attractive these myths appear, the more dangerous they are. But we have seen all this before.... The search for the enemy, the desire to tackle social problems by reworking things. If we are guided by these slogans, we can only repeat, in a new spiral, what we have seen before. But it is impermissible, even criminal, to forget the lessons of history.

Clearly, sharing out resources does not increase them. If production is not growing, but declining, it is no use expecting a better life. And it is not a question of endlessly urging people to work harder. We have had that before, too. **The whole question is what must be done, and how, so that people strive—and are able—to work well and as efficiently as possible.**

The answer to this question cannot be a matter solely of formulating tasks in the most general terms or putting forward slogans. We need serious analysis, we need to bring in the professionals, practical people, pragmatists in the best sense. We need to draw up a program of well coordinated measures and actions presupposing the formation of diverse forms of ownership and the formation of a market mechanism and an appropriate economic milieu for the display of initiative and enterprise.

The core of this program is the switch to a market system. This is possible only as a result of a conscious choice based on a clear understanding of its inevitability and the associated difficulties. Politicians, in implementing this program, must be extremely honest both to themselves and to the masses whom they are leading toward this goal.

It must be fully recognized that the transition to the market system cannot be simple and painless, that it cannot be carried out "on the cheap." A price—a considerable price—will have to be paid. This is, of course, unpleasant. We are reluctant to do it. Nonetheless, all world experience has shown that there is no other way to a modern, highly efficient economy that is receptive to scientific and technical progress and oriented toward the consumer.

And the longer this transition is postponed, the higher the price that will have to be paid. If not by us, by our children. Otherwise the country has no future.

Nonetheless the question arises of social compensation for the transition to the market system and of minimizing the losses that arise. A society that considers itself socialist cannot be indifferent or neutral toward this question. It must without fail protect the poorly off strata of the population (pensioners, students, large families), as well as people with fixed incomes—teachers, doctors, servicemen. They must not suffer.

For the others, the compensation will be freedom of economic activity and the opportunity to receive an income in proportion to their real contribution to augmenting society's wealth and satisfying the consumers' needs. **The policy of the state, in market conditions, should be to ensure protection for the weak and freedom for the strong.**

The modern-day market is the best school of rational economic management, for which there is no substitute. Its formation is one of the main conditions for strengthening our country's integrity and renewing its federal structure. And alongside the growth in the diversity of forms of ownership, this process creates the economic basis for the consistent democratization of public life.

The practical implementation of the planned program requires a strong and powerful authority with wide public support. No radical reform can count on success without these conditions. What society needs most today is civil peace and the attainment of nationwide consensus. The question is whether the party is capable of being the integrating force in such a consensus, the mouthpiece of social expectations. The answer to this question is the answer to the challenge of the time.

IV.

The right to leadership cannot be won once and for all. It requires constant reaffirmation, new efforts every time. Here much depends on the depth of theoretical analysis and the ability to express the changes taking shape in society and rally people around a political platform.

As yet, unfortunately, in virtually all these respects the party is not demonstrating the qualities of a political leader. The errors committed in the past are compounded by constantly belated assessments of the rapidly changing situation, vagueness of stance, irresolution, and the loss of the theoretical initiative.

In order to regain the people's confidence and head the processes of perestroyka, the party needs radical renewal. I do not think this is only a question of its organizational structure, methods of activity, and the structure of the apparatus. Important as they are, these are only the instruments of policy, not its content. What needs renewing first and foremost is the party's theoretical foundations, its political line, strategy, and tactics.

Of course, **the party has been and must remain a voluntary union of like-minded people.** And everyone who joins the party thereby expresses agreement with its program provisions and takes on certain responsibilities.

Who can and should be united by the party? Whose interests is it called upon to express? These questions have become more or less central in the course of the precongress discussion. Dissatisfaction with the proposed answers is increasing. The reason, I think is that we are trying to resolve the problem from the wrong end, so to speak, according to patterns that are already obsolete.

As the party of the socialist choice the CPSU unites or, more accurately, should unite all who share its program goals and its course of renewing society and establishing socialism. The interests of the most diverse social strata and groups which associate their future with the socialist choice are interwoven here. The party unites them in its ranks, and it is their interests that the party expresses in its policy. As for professional and other special interests, their expression and protection require not political parties, but diverse social associations and movements.

A union of like-minded people requires consensus on the main, key questions. Otherwise, how can you call it like-mindedness? But unity on the principles does not rule out broad debates, diversity of opinion, and autonomy of party organizations and individual communists in their practical activity.

However, today we are seeing differences by no means only in details. We are faced with fundamental disagreements on the most vital questions of theory and policy. These predetermine the probability of a split, the danger of which must not be minimized. The truth must always be confronted.

A split will inevitably weaken the party. But trying to preserve unity artificially, at the cost of unprincipled compromises, could lead to even more adverse consequences. The solution is to rally all those who care about the future of perestroyka and the interests of renewing socialism, to rally them around this chief, uniting principle. **What the party needs today is not a split, but a purge.** A purge of conservatives who are committed to dogmas and do not want renewal, and of would-be liquidators who reject the struggle to establish the socialist ideal.

The clarity and precision of the political platform should form a basis against which everyone can measure himself and decide voluntarily whether he agrees with the party's political line and is prepared to march with it and in its ranks along the hard path of renewal, or whether he intends to step aside.

As a political party, the CPSU cannot renounce the struggle for influence and power. But it must conduct that struggle in an alliance, a bloc with all forces and social movements that adhere to the common positions of the socialist choice and democratic renewal. At the same time it must be implacable where the country's socialist choice is called into question, where the interests of the working people are flouted, and where the turbulent waves of nationalism, chauvinism, and totalitarianism come to the surface. A struggle is a struggle.

Recognizing these realities, the party must master the art of the political struggle and its modern democratic methods. Acting within the USSR Constittuion, it is called upon carefully to preserve and defend its sovereignty and independence in defining its political line, building its organizational forms, and choosing its leaders.

TV Chairman Discusses Media Future 11 Apr

LD1304165490 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1855 GMT 12 Apr 90

["Ostankino Conducts a Dialogue" program featuring the 11 April news conference by Mikhail Fedorovich Nenashev, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, with domestic correspondents; prepared by the main editorial department for Moscow television and radio programs—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Nenashev] Good day! Let's begin our work. I imagine that you are mainly interested in how things are going, is everything going smoothly with us. We are

living with the same concerns and the same difficulties with which all people are living. As far as what has happened since our last meeting is concerned, with regard to our own affairs, our changes, with regard to those that were announced at our first meeting and with regard to those which, if you like, were promised: A whole range of steps have been taken in the further development and improvement of news and information on radio and on television. This is understandable—news and information is a most important function of television and radio.

More than three months ago we expanded the "Vremya" news program. We put it out not just in the evening, but at 1230, 1830 and at 2100 [Moscow time]. Of course, any changes, any alterations, manifest themselves in different ways and it should not be said that no difficulties and problems are arising here. Overall our news and information has been received with great approval, although it does give rise to a lot of questions, including questions of a professional nature. No doubt you, too, have some questions to raise.

No blending of different genres takes place without some pain, both where content and style are concerned. One cannot fail to take into account stereotyped conceptions and habits. Sometimes, you know, both in the newspapers and on radio and television, we don't take kindly to losing some particular feature or other. I'm talking frankly because I expect you will have questions: We have experienced definite contradictions in this respect with regard to the Sunday news and information programs: "Seven Days" and the "Vremya" program.

"Seven Days" is to a greater degree an information and publicizing program. We never set it up in confrontation to or in opposition to the "Vremya" program when we took "Vremya" off altogether on Sundays, something that we didn't do on the other days. We did give rise to a whole range of questions, and in the end we considered it expedient to bring back the "Vremya" program. The physical joining together of the "Vremya" program and the "Seven Days" program doesn't work. We are now working on this. The general view both of the writers and the editors is that we should return to this "Seven Days" program shortly, but we have to work at and think about the question of how its place should be determined and how it should relate to the "Vremya" news and information program.

Political programs and political dialogues of the social and political editorial department are building up from the viewpoint of interest and attention. Here we are trying more and more really to form a dialogue. These are really only the first steps now, but it seems to us that there is a future for a program like "Vesy" [The Scales] in the literary and artistic editorial department. Perhaps it isn't the very best of titles: It is a question, so to speak, of a dialogue, of polemics. I don't know whether you have been able to see it, but I thought it was interesting to see the polemics between writers and literary specialists like (?Zolotukhskiy) and (?Kozhenov). I believe that there's something productive here, when we don't just talk about polemics but when the polemics are seen, when we don't simply talk about different ideas and thinking differently, but when we show it and confirm it on television. I think that television needs this.

The Sunday sermons: We are continuing these, as we told you on that occasion. As before, of course, not everything works. But I'll tell you frankly that we are getting more and more favourable reaction. I don't know what you thought about the talk given by the schoolteacher in the last Sunday sermon, but it was quite interesting, because practice shows that if the person giving the Sunday sermon talks about things that really do concern them, things that he really does know about and know well, and things that concern not just him alone, then this is very well received.

As yet, of course, we are not getting a dialogue in full measure. Perhaps you journalists and we radio and television journalists both still suffer nevertheless from the monologue. We were brought up on the need to edify, on the need for monologue, and even now, despite the fact that a great deal has changed in our approaches and methods, nevertheless monologues predominate. And there's a lot of edification! Especially with us. We need dialogue particularly, we need live perception by our audience. I said the last time and I repeat it now: those programs which are presented to an audience and with an audience work and are interesting. The participants in such programs are then not simply a viewer or a listener but an active coparticipant.

Of course we are not yet able to say that we have formed a rating system for viewers' assessments of television programs. A rating system does exist, but some very serious work has still to be done on it.

I think that the general process of politicization which characterizes the life of our society today is exerting an enormous influence upon the content of the work of television and is at the same time giving rise to a whole range of questions which one cannot fail to talk about. We receive many criticisms, and these are being made more and more frequently in the press nowadays, to the effect that we talk a lot. Sometimes the listener tuning in to the first program, the second, the third, the fourth and the fifth program finds that for hours there is nothing but polemics on all five programs. I have experimented and I have cited specific days at staff meetings—I don't want to return to it. You must agree that this cannot be right in the way that the programs themselves relate to each other. The politician, the public figure, has become the main hero of television and radio. We have been brought up—at least my generation has been brought up—in the belief that before they take up politics people have to eat, drink, work, clothe themselves, and provide themselves with shoes. If they are going to do nothing but engage in politics without dealing with those things, then what is going to become of politics? Naturally, therefore, the question arises of where is the person who sows and plows and feeds the country, who builds, who teaches,

who heals? We are not giving enough attention to him in our programs and in many cases he is not the main hero of these programs. I beleive that this is a very serious question.

The regulation of the creative process is something that comes together in a complicated and difficult way. Why complicated and difficult? Because with us in many instances it is based upon purely administrative methods in the old way. There are no legal norms; there are no normative rules and statutes. The times themselves are raising more and more acutely the question of the structure itself of central radio and television, its place and role in the country and the system of relations between central radio and television and the radio and television services in the oblasts, towns and republics.

The latest events in Leningrad give rise to a whole range of serious questions. You are aware that on 6 April a group of deputies of the Leningrad city soviet effectively occupied a television studio in Leningrad, somewhere around 2100. with the support of some journalists—without their involvement I think it would have simply been impossible—this group of deputies removed the management and without authorization made changes to the broadcast program. Furthermore, if you saw this on Leningrad television, it was presented as if it were a new stage in glasnost in Leningrad and was accompanied with an invitation to others to follow this example.

How do we assess this fact? I would like to say directly that we regard it as an extremely dubious effort to assert glasnost by illegal methods. We made the facts known to the city soviet, stressing that we respect the deputies of the Leningrad city soviet, but we resolutely oppose illegal methods with regard to central television. We have sent a commission. We believe that these questions should be solved not in an atmosphere of polemics and confrontation, but the situation has to be studied on the spot, we have to meet and talk to people, and only then take a sensible decision.

Today central radio and television is one of the most important media for exerting an effective influence upon public opinion in the country, and an active process of decentralization could lead to a loss of central television. We consider that we have to move along a path of strengthening the development of central state television and of strengthening the development of local television, using the same principles by which all television throughout the world is developing, be it state television, central and local television, state and municipal television. Throughout the world this is the only path. I think that such is the way for us, too.

That is what I wanted to say in my statement. Let's now move on to the question in which you are interested. Please go ahead.

[(?Linnik)] Moscow Radio external broadcasting, (?Linnik). You are in favour of some 10 percent of technical resources being allocated to alternative television. Does this picture of your position correspond with reality?

[Nenashev] My point of view is that alternative television under our conditions today is essentially a reality; it exists. You can object to it or not object to it, but it is there. We have video television, a whole network of it in our country. It exists. And it is a great pity that it has existed for a very long time outside central television. This isn't because central television intends to take command of it, but the whole misfortune of our video amounts to the fact that in many cases sometimes—perhaps it's too strong to say in many cases, not infrequently, I'd put it like that—it enjoys material that is not of the best, and here material from central television, say, or the involvement, the creative involvement, of our editorial departments, professional ones, in the making of television output, television films, for video, would no doubt be fruitful. Or take cable television. It, too, to a certain extent is alternative today, it exists. It exists in many towns. I think that this process will develop further, since many of our newspapers and magazines are already now thinking about copying some of their best material in parallel onto video. I think that that, too, is a reasonable desire. Why shouldn't they have the right to do so if it is interesting? Does this mean that if there is to be alternative television, then state television, central television but not just central television, that it will then become official, commanding television, as it were, and that it will not be the vehicle for any different thinking, for any pluralism? I certainly do not consider that pluralism of opinions will not be displayed on television, on central, state, television. without it, creativity is simply impossible.

[Arseneyev] Arseneyev, IZVESTIYA. Could a situation arise in which a number of local broadcasting studios, say, following Leningrad's example, began to consider themselves independent of central television, while others remain on the central television platform? How would that situation look in the country and what specific steps are being taken for you to bring into proper order the legal provisions or any other normative documents or regulations? To whom are you making approaches? How do you see the future?

[Nenashev] I am deeply convinced that both local television and central television are a part of and will remain a part of specific bodies, soviet bodies, and the question about the system of relations between central television and local television is a question concerning relations between central state authority and local authority. That is the first thing that I would like to say. As far as the real situation is concerned, in Leningrad, say, I would not want to run ahead of these events. Why? Because in the first place we have sent a commission, they will sit down at the table and study things carefully. But I'd like to say specifically what it's a question of. The fact is that the question of Leningrad television being central television is not one that has been made up. In real terms today it is not just oblast television and it is not just city television. You have to agree that that is so. Furthermore this is not just a reality which has come into being today. It is something that has been determined deliberately. I

would like to tell you that back in 1979 a decision was adopted specially by the USSR Council of Ministers—it was signed by Comrade Kosygin—on the setting up in 1983 of a fifth experimental program of Central Television based on the programs of Leningrad television. So this did not simply come into being by accident, as if Leningrad first began to broadcast to Novgorod and Pskov; then to the Baltic Republics; then to Petrozavodsk and Arkhangelsk; then to Yaroslavl, Kalinin, and Tula; and then Leningrad television arrived in Moscow. No. A special decision was taken to set up this kind of experimental fifth channel of central television. And I'll also tell you that the technical program through 1993 contains plans for this fifth program—the Leningrad program—to become an all-union program. As far as its material and technical base is concerned Leningrad television today is bigger than, say, well let's take one of the republican ones, Belorussian television, say, it's bigger even than Belorussian television, and this was planned not with a view to using these capacities for Leningrad and its oblast alone—that would simply have been irrational—but with a view to using them for the whole country. [passage omitted in which Irina Petrovskaya of ZHURNALIST asks about how the interests of journalists will be protected and Nenashev stresses the importance of the collective and says he's sure that sooner or later all journalists will work on contracts determing on a legal basis the duration of their involvement; another questioner asks why television seeks a special press law for itself and is told that the reasons for this were given in detail in the Supreme Soviet; a SOVETSKIY EKRAN correspondent asks about whether Soviet viewers are going to see more feature films and Nenashev talks about the quality and cost of films; and another journalist raises the question of showing more material devoted to veterans and the veterans movement]

[Unidentified correspondent] You have remarked several times that you are not satisfied with the present-day structure of the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting and relations with the republican and local committees and this is indeed so because this structure came into being during the times we describe as the times of stagnation. But talk about changing the structure and improving it has been going on for a very long time. Could you mention any specific, practical developments or plans which ought to take place in this area?

[Nenashev] They have indeed been going on for a long time. But unlike the press we are still in a very restricting grip of a technical and production nature. What do I have in mind? Well, it was evident to me, and now life itself is pushing us in this direction, that the channel should lie at the basis of the organizational and creative structure, that is how television is structured throughout the world. One has the first program, its direction, and a whole group of associations around that first program, around the channel—and so on with the second channel, the third channel, the fourth channel, and the fifth channel. If it were possible to imagine all these channels being fully developed tomorrow, then one could immediately implement this structure. But the whole problem now is that if we were to determine now this channel structure—as it exists throughout the whole world—then we would find ourselves with some very great discrimination because the potentials for the channels would be extremely small. The difficulties here are very great, even. For us, say, it is perfectly obvious that there is a need for the second program, the second channel, to be developed as the Russian Channel. Why? Because already all oblasts and autonomous republics in the Russian federation work on the second program and cooperation between central television and these oblasts and republics on the second program would also take place along those lines. But a whole series of questions arises here. If this second program is turned over fully to the Russian federation today, what will then remain within the framework of central television? Then we would have to transfer the USSR Supreme Soviet to the first program. Why? because tomorrow the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet starts work and the next day it will be the Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies, which will also be working on the second program. A complicated situation arises. How is it possible to part from it in this respect?

I am answering your question directly. I consider that the structure we should have is obvious. It must be determined according to our basic programs, according to our main channels. At the foundation there should be the program direction, the general direction, managing both the equipment and the creative process directly. In the long term, creative production associations must be set up around these channels. If and when we go over to the contract system no doubt it will be on the basis of programs and not editorial departments, once again just as is done throughout the world, because the editorial department is also an administrative tool to some extent, and it only exists with us today because the editorial department does not specialize strictly according to channel—the Moscow editorial department is the only one that does so. But we find ourselves in a very complicated and restricted framework where technical possibilities are concerned. In many cases, if you like, they are an obstacle to our changing this structure right away. They hold back the changing of this structure, although in my view this process now needs to be speeded up very seriously. [passage omitted in which Novdeyenko of EKRAN SSSR asks if Nenashev agrees that artistic programs are in a state of crisis to which he replies that they are a weak spot, but there are many reasons for this]

[Unidentified correspondent] Another question which I have to say is targetted somewhat at the future. We are moving toward a multiparty system, albeit slowly. Historically, for a long time the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting has, generally speaking, been the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. How do you see the various parties of the

future or those already in existence exerting an influence or being represented in the mass media and in particular on television and radio in the future?

[Nenashev] I'll tell you frankly, at the moment I cannot imagine it in any way. why? Because in order to imagine something you have to have some realities from which to proceed, realities in the form of public movements that have already been formed, not to mention organizations and parties within the system of our public life. So far there are few of these and there is nothing at all as yet within the Gosteleradio system. It is extremely difficult, therefore, to picture this here. But I think that it must make its appearance here, not from the viewpoint of party adherence, not from the viewpoint of an organization, but from the viewpoint of opinions, polemics and dialogue, of pluralism itself which is legitimate and natural. I see this only in that form. And of course in sensible amounts.

More and more frequently now—especially in the process of the discussion of the press law, and this is absolutely natural, because discussion itself is the circulation of views an opinions—we sometimes talk about the freedom of the press, the freedom of the newspaper, the freedom of the magazine, the freedom of television: I think that this—like any other freedom—is always limited. I personally, for example—and I do not wish to conceal this—do not believe in a newspaper, a press, or a television that is independent of all and everything. I simply do not believe in the existence of that kind of newspaper and I do not believe in the existence of that kind of television.

Nowadays we often say.... [changes thought] In our desire to prove that a complete freedom of that kind is possible we sometimes in my view even display an extreme point of view which I think is very dubious. What point of view? We say in all seriousness that in society, in the history of society, there exist three authorities which determine the legal pivot on which any society rests—the legislative power, the executive power and the judicial power. Now in our country to an extent greater than in any other there are people who say at the top of their voices that no, there is another power, a fourth power, that has a right—the power of the media. And I think to myself as someone on that particular side, on the media side, that I ought to be glad about this, but I don't think that I would very much like to live in a country where there was a fourth power. Why? Because in that case I would not be protected by this legal, legislative, basis, if media power were to have equal standing with legislative, executive, and judicial power. All we professionals understand how powerful our weapons are. We can do anything with an individual. And if we, too, were to be recognized as constituting a power, to what extent would he then be protected, that individual?

In my view, therefore, this is a very serious question. Why? Because those restrictions, restrictions that are not in any way hidden, by which democratic and bourgeois-democratic states are guided—like Finland—are evidence that no, it does not have the right to be the fourth power. There are three powers. And when one's talking about information, about the press, radio, and television, they are controlled, they always belong to someone.

Take Finland. In this respect they have a very tough system of relationships. Why? Their state televison and radio system is governed by an administrative council of the legislature—for some reason it's called an administrative council—we're always frightened by the word administrative, they for some reason or other aren't frightened by the word, they have an administrative council, but it's a legislative council. The 21 members of this administrative council include representatives of all parties represented in the legislature. Their most important task is first and foremost to measure out strictly the participation of the parties and their platforms and opinions as expressed on television. That is one of its most important tasks, to ensure that in this respect there is no disruption of the equilibrium. I think that we, too, will no doubt develop along the same path, taking into consideration the legislative and the democratic experience and the legislative democratic practice that has been built up in these countries.

Perhaps we should conclude our news conference at this point. I would like to thank you for taking part and to say once again that we will be meeting you regularly as promised every quarter. It remains for me only to wish you optimism, good sense, and even greater concern for the destiny of our country and the fate of our earth.

Thank you.

Emergency Oxygen Masks To Be Added to Aeroflot

PM2304080990 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 p 2

[Unattributed report: "Following Our Articles"]

[Text] It was long thought that depressurization could not occur on Aeroflot aircraft. And if it did, there would be no harmful consequences for passengers. This highly popular view held by the former leaders of the USSR Ministry of Civil Aviation resulted in the complete absence on all types of aircraft currently flying of individual equipment to protect passengers against the cabin becoming depressurized or filled with smoke. However, it transpired that such incidents are not so unusual these days, and are by no means safe as far as passengers are concerned.

This was discussed in O. Karmaza's article "Crew in Accident Again" (KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA, 9 February 1990). The editorial office has received an official reply from A.F. Aksenov, USSR deputy minister of civil aviation, which states, in particular:

"The Ministry of Civil Aviation shares the writer's opinion about the need to protect air passengers from the consequences of cabins becoming depressurized or filled with smoke....

"The Ministry of Civil Aviation and the State Civil Aviation Scientific Research Institute consider it necessary to make it compulsory for Soviet passenger aircraft to be fitted with individual oxygen apparatus in the event of cabins becoming depressurized or filled with smoke.

"The Ministry of Civil Aviation and the State Civil Aviation Scientific Research Institute will uphold this position when clarifying the Flight Safety Norms in 1990 and will demand that the Ministry of the Aviation Industry fit oxygen systems for passengers to all Il-96-300 and Tu-204 aircraft, and retrofit such systems to aircraft currently in service (the Il-86, Tu-154M, and others)."

New Olympic Committee Chairman Elected

LD2004093990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 0830 GMT 20 Apr 90

[from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Excerpts] A plenum of the Soviet Union's National Olympic Committee [NOC] has taken place in Moscow, at which its members met the request by Marat Gramov to resign as chairman of the NOC. The nominations of Vitaliy Smirnov, chairman of the RSFSR State Committee for Sport, Yuriy Titov, president of the International Gymnastics Federation, and Nikolay Rusak, chairman of the USSR State Committee for Sport, were put foward for the vacant post. [passage omitted]

By a majority vote Vitaliy Smirnov was elected chairman of the USSR NOC. [passage omitted]

Economic

Joint Venture Used To Evade Customs Duties

90UF0093A Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 14 Apr 90 Second Edition p 1

[Article by SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA correspondent V. Ogurtsov: "Who Are You, 'Inkompeks'? (What Alerted the Taganrog Customs Officials)"]

[Text] Rostov Oblast—The diesel boat "Velikiy Pochin" was ready to pull away from the pier of Taganrog seaport and the customs officials were still checking the cargo papers. According to these papers the joint Soviet-Finnish-West German enterprise "Inkompeks" was going to ship 3,000 tons of cast iron slabs to Italy. Inspectors L. Chernyakov and G. Vokhmyanina knew that the metal had been bought from a foundry and then resold to the joint enterprise by the "Impakt" cooperative; they also knew that most probably the metal would be remelted. The West is quite openly hunting for our raw materials, the main reason being that even our finished products are sold at a much lower price than scrap metal on the international market. Still, all this was purely emotional and the customs employees had to use fully official reasons to stop the shipment. First, the joint enterprise had no right to serve as an intermediary. Second, it did not get reregistered as it should have done by 1 April.

This incident could be considered just one of many such occurrences which Rostov customs officials record practically every day. However, there is one dangerous "but" which might lead to unexpected results.

The gist of the matter is that the "Inkompeks" label was not used to register some real enterprises in the state registry for participants in foreign economic relations as has usually happened. This time the name was hiding entire agencies. Among others there were the former Ministry of Medium Machine Building, the Ministry of Automotive and Agricultural Machine Building, and the main Computer Center of the State Planning Committee. As an exception, there is a purely producing partner—the industrial association "ZIL."

The ministries do not produce anything but paperwork, so a legitimate question may arise: What can the bureaucrats do for their foreign partners? It seems that there is only one answer: provide the widest range of products from the hundreds of enterprises subordinate to them. And surely one can find anything in the list attached to the registration card. The founders of the enterprise used some obscure logic to persuade the USSR Ministry of Foreign Economic Relations and received a permit from the ministry to export products other than their own. They were allowed to export petroleum products, nonferrous metals, rare and rare-earth metals, timber, paper, hides, food, and rare fabrics. They did not forget to include even caviar in the list, as well as 40 other things produced by "somebody else" and every one of those can be also divided into many types and categories.

In other words, the ministries received the benefits allowed for joint enterprises and thus released themselves from licensing their products and paying customs duties and state taxes. This is not just a conjecture on our part. The "Agreement on Joint Enterprises" states their purpose in black and white: "To develop the export of goods produced at their (meaning the ministries'—Editor) enterprises and at other joint organizations." Previously, every plant had to receive a license prior to any negotiations with the foreign partner. But now they can export anything they want to under the cover of "Inkompeks." The gates at customs are wide open.

What does one call this? One of the customs officials found a rather colorful name for the system: "the economy of easy virtue."

New Aircraft Carries Out Initial Flight

LD1704224490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1155 GMT 17 Apr 90

[Summary] [no dateline as received]—A new aircraft—Il-114—carried out its first demonstration flight for Soviet and foreign journalists today. It is designed to carry 60-64 passangers and to cover distances of up to 1,000 miles. It can develop speeds of up to 500-550 km per hour. The new aircraft is to replace the An-24, and it consumes almost 50 percent less fuel than its predecessor. It can also be used to transport freight and to detect fish.

Conditions Leading to Shortages Explained

904D0093A Moscow RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA in Russian 27 Mar 90 pp 1-2

[Letter to the editors from worker L. Anikeyev, member of the CPSU Central Committee: "Is the State Committee for Statistics Not Tricking Us?"; and report on related interview with Otto Latsis, doctor of economic sciences, by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA economic editor Valeriy Badov: "An Ark in Shallow Water"]

[Text] **Letter to editors**

Esteemed editors! Your newspaper (30 January 1990) published a report from the USSR State Committee for Statistics on the socioeconomic development of the USSR in 1989. Everything was fulfilled and overfulfilled, elevated, and accelerated. Even our per capita meat consumption is not just a couple of kilograms a year, as in Sverdlovsk, but all of 67 kg.

But where is it all going? In the stores there are no television sets, radios, washing machines, refrigerators, watches, cameras, hosiery, footwear, or furniture. Not to mention meat. What happened? After all, even during the times of stagnation almost everything could be found in the stores. I understand that our legacy from Stalinism and Brezhnevian stagnation is to blame for all of this. But that does not make it any easier, for even 50 years ago one could by household soap and school notebooks.

Where did it all go? Perhaps the pensioners are getting much larger pensions or the cooperators have 10 television sets and eight washing machines each? But it could not be that anyone ate 200 kg of meat in a year. This is physically impossible. Perhaps the enterprising cooperators are getting rid of the goods abroad. Or are our statisticians pulling the wool over our eyes?

Explain, please, what is happening? The people around me are asking me, a member of the CPSU. They are saying that communists have messed up the country. How, then, am I, a CPSU member, to blame? I have gained nothing from this.

They say the "apparatus," which opposes the economic reform, is to blame for all this. What is happening with our economy? After all you are the workers' newspaper.

Respectfully, L. Anikeyev, CPSU member, worker. Moscow.

[Badov] Otto Rudolfovich, a report by the USSR State Committee for Statistics on the fulfillment of last year's plan were published recently. The "man on the street" does not have time to analyze such extensive documents. Yet, as we can see from the example of the letter from reader L. Anikeyev, "Is the State Committee for Statistics Not Pulling the Wool Over Our Eyes?" people are bothered by the strain on the consumer market.

[Latsis] First of all I would like to take note of the great improvement in the work of the statisticians themselves. They are now much less concerned about the propaganda in their work, i.e. "showing" success. And they are providing much more material for analysis which helps us to see the real condition of our economy. But still it is no accident that the RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA reader asks this question: Is the State Committee for Statistics by any chance pulling the wool over our eyes? Everyone can see the striking contrast between what is reported by statistics on the production and delivery of goods and the half-empty shelves in the stores. If, according to statistics, certain goods are being produced in smaller quantities, the decrease is not enough to explain the collapse that is taking place on the market. The output of certain items may have been reduced by one or two percentage points, but the goods have disappeared from the stores completely. What has happened? This is not a collapse of production but a collapse of the market. This process has long been known and explained. Its essence is simple: The goods arrive, but the mass of money swallows them up before they have a chance to appear on the market. We, who for decades have been developing an "anti-market" consciousness, cannot comprehend these subtleties.

Sometimes you hear placating remarks: It is not a problem that something is missing from the store since on the other hand it is full of household refrigerators. No, it is a problem! This is the worst variant of the condition of trade. Moreover, attempts to create some kind of "order" out of this disorder through sales, coupons, and "sales by invitation" only exacerbate the collapse of the consumer market. It seems to me that the variant adopted in Moscow of closed sales for the various enterprises, scientific research institutes, and offices is the worst. It is the most disadvantageous for the population and the most beneficial for speculators and trade swindlers. These sales put us in their power. I think we will achieve a good deal by applying pressure to eliminate certain of these "distortions." We must take on the entire system. I should like to turn the discussion to the condition of the economic reform as a whole.

Bills for the "Kosygin" Reform

[Badov] As one of our readers put it, the ark of the reform has been led into shallow waters by the bureaucracy of departments. Some fans of rigid administration

almost seem to be celebrating. They are saying they told us in advance that a market economy is not for us.

[Latsis] You are right, and now we are seeing a kind of renaissance of conservative ideas. We can hear them moaning loudly about what perestroyka has led us to. And would it not be better for us to return to the administrative system where the Gosplan [State Planning Committee] clearly prescribed and distributed: what, to whom, and how...

[Badov] ...It is the same as "the leader of a wild tribe dividing up the spoils," as one of the delegates of the miners' strike committee put it at a recent roundtable discussion in RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA.

[Latsis] ...It might cost us quite a bit to get things back on track. We have already gone through this. I recall quite well how the reform of the sixties failed. Many of today's difficult problems were generated by this 20-year "leeway" or postponement. What should have been done 20 or even 40 years ago we are undertaking now with a historical delay. Why has the time to pay up come so late? During the years of stagnation we were handed immense untouched supplies of Siberian oil which was cheap to extract and costly to sell. Then we were still lucky: a 20-fold jump in oil prices.

[Badov] So the Tyumen oil was like an oxygen tent for the administrative system.

[Latsis] Yes, it prolonged its agony for another decade. Were it not for this boost, estimated at roughly $200 billion—a fantastic sum!—it would have been clear to everyone that actually the normal functioning of the economy would have come to a halt not in the middle of the eighties but as early as the middle of the seventies. These exports provided an immense addition to the national income and covered the extreme ineffectiveness of management. Were it not for petrodollars, the economic reform would have had to be started much sooner. But now we are reforming the economy under conditions in which, on the contrary, the cheap oil has been used up, expenditures on its extraction are growing, it takes enormous capital investments just to remain at the level already reached, and world prices have dropped by a factor of three to four as compared to the "peak" at the beginning of the eighties. But that is just one factor. Of course there are many others as a result of which the 20 years we lost are costing us a great deal. We have lost time but we have gained experience which shows that there is no possibility of developing in the old way. A return to the administrative system is unthinkable. But it is to some people's advantage to blame everything on the reform. How can we seriously speak about what the economic reform is to blame for when in practice it has not yet started.

[Badov] This conclusion will surprise many.

People's Commissariats and Syndicates

[Latsis] It is necessary to distinguish such things as the ideology of reform, the laws of reform, and the practice of reform. What is currently reigning here? The ideology of reform is holding sway: articles, scientific works, speeches. The names of economists who were banned 20, 10, or five years ago are now on everybody's lips. We have recognized and even legally rehabilitated Kondratyev, Chayanov, Yurovskiy, and other great Russian economists who were precipitously and arrogantly dismissed at a time when the rest of the world knew and respected them. The most outstanding of the Soviet economists who are still living have finally been allowed to publish, and we are even listening to their advice. They were in disfavor during the times of stagnation. Over the course of 20 years my colleague, G. Lisichkin, wrote four doctoral dissertations on various subjects. He is a Doctor of the Soviet Union four times! He was kept from defending his dissertations because of commandments from the proper authorities. Such were the customs in social sciences under the leadership of the unforgettable S.T. Trapeznikov. This routine has been smashed.

But the penetration of valuable scientific ideas into practice—here there is little progress. Sometimes people reproach us economists, saying: What is the result of your advice? But what kind of result can there be from advice if the doctor gives you a diagnosis and you do not want to hear about it or take the medicine he prescribes? What can the doctor do? The ideology and practice of reform do not go hand in hand. For example, there is the Law on Enterprise. In terms of its overall ideology this law, as well as the entire complex of decisions of the July 1987 plenum, is an immense step forward. It is almost enough of a basis for creating an entire economic mechanism. Only one small thing is missing: a decision to abolish the ministries. We gave the enterprises rights, and we wrote them into law; but in practice we did not grant them because we did not take these same rights and functions away from the ministries.

[Badov] Why was there such a strange compromise between the two antagonists, the ministry and the independent enterprise?

[Latsis] Why? Because of fear, probably. It is frightening to move forward abruptly. One wants to retain certain supports.

[Badov] But we lived for about eight years under Khrushchev without branch ministries and we did not suffer...

[Latsis] Not only those eight, but also the first 15 years of Soviet power. From the beginning of the NEP [New Economic Policy] until its end we had no ministries. The people's commissariats were created in 1932. And the time of the most successful economic development in all

of our history was in the twenties. At that time production and the branches were controlled by syndicates—voluntary associations of enterprises created on a democratic basis.

[Badov] Now it seems that there is a spontaneous process of erosion of the ministries...

[Latsis] There is no erosion of ministries taking place. They are just changing their appearance.

The Market—A "Rose" With Thorns

[Badov] A change of masks?

[Latsis] Yes, of course. What became of the first reduction of the administrative apparatus? The administrative apparatus was reduced by 600,000 "above" and was inflated by 700,000 at the enterprises. Many units of the ministries changed to scientific production associations, state production associations, and concerns.

[Badov] I had in mind something else—the creation of mixed structures: state-cooperative, joint stock, interbranch...

[Latsis] Everything is more complicated. I do not wish to say anything bad about all the scientific production associations, concerns, and associations. Some of them are authentic. In order not to be deceived again by the change of masks of the command system, we must resolve to abolish branch industrial ministries—all or almost all of them. We should probably retain what the Yugoslavs call large systems, for example, railroads and energy systems where a direct centralization of management is inevitable. But if we merely abolish the ministries while retaining the previous legal and economic environment, the new associations will become the same kinds of bureaucratic organizations. When there are shortages in the marketplace and you cannot buy raw materials, processed materials, or batching items and you have to go with your hand out to whomever is distributing them, then it is all the same—whether it be a ministry or an association. In reality it is the same monopolistic bureaucratic master.

[Badov] Does it not seem to you that during the years of the reforms we got further away from the market rather than coming closer to it?

[Latsis] There is no doubt that we moved further away. And I wish to discuss this. Let us return to our discussion of the three levels of effect of the reform: ideology, legislation, and practice. In ideology I think we have done all we can. We have said everything that was previously forbidden. Of course we have not created unanimity in market, commodity-monetary, and value thinking, but there is no need to strive for that. There are economists who think in the old way and they should be able to express themselves. But the main thing is no longer to prohibit economists who think scientifically from expressing themselves. Nobody has any reason to complain anymore. We are beginning to be able to calmly study any scientific ideas from Adam Smith to Ota Sik. But in the legislative sphere and the practice of the reform we have done far from everything. There neither was nor is any wholesale trade. And it cannot begin with a reform of price setting. And we have not even begun this. What kind of reform can there be and how can we begin discussions of the practical costs of the market system if we have not even begun to create it? There has been much talk about it but it has never been in operation for a single minute! The market system means free prices. All we know is that we all shout in unison, including those who are in all ways in favor of the market: Do not touch prices! This is the kind of "market" we have imagined. Like a rose without thorns. But such a plant does not exist in nature. The market is a rose with thorns.

The Catastrophe of 1988

The market is unthinkable without the strict partnership relations inherent in it. But how hard it is even to hear mention of this. Ours is the only country in the world where there are strong "anti-market" feelings. Perhaps Albania has them too. But for the rest of the world the market is something axiomatic. It will not help to discuss this theoretically here. All we need to do is look and see how all mankind works. But with all the talk, because we have taken no real steps along the path to regulated market relations we have managed to make some serious mistakes in the current economic policy. They have absolutely nothing to do with the mechanism of the reform or with the "elements" of the market. The main catastrophe occurred in 1988 when two crushing blows were dealt to the state budget (I shall discuss them below) and, through it, to the market. And the day came when the public was hit with the news of the gaping multibillion-ruble hole in the state budget.

[Badov] And before this, did we have a "chronically" healthy budget?

[Latsis] Over there, under Reagan, they had to be concerned about the deficit, while here in reports about the state budget, incomes exceeded expenditures by exactly such-and-such a number of rubles. The Supreme Soviet approved 35. And this was the first time it was stated publicly.

And in July 1989 Gosplan Chairman Maslyukov, speaking at the session of the already new Supreme Soviet, said that in fact in 1989 they had planned a deficit of R120 billion. Somewhat later the new finance minister, Pavlov, said that because of additional measures they had managed to reduce this deficit to R92 billion. So we have three official figures for the deficit of the state budget for 1989: 35, 120, and 92 billion. The last figure is close to the truth.

The former minister, Gostev, admitted that the deficit had existed previously. Why was nothing said about it? In the statistical collection "The USSR National Economy in 1988," in the table "The USSR State Budget" in the section entitled "Revenues," there is the

line which reads "Money borrowed from the state loan fund to cover difference between expenditures and revenues." It tells us about the deficit for the first time, beginning in 1985.

[Badov] The "loan fund"—is this the money of depositors in savings banks?

[Latsis] These are bank resources, including the money of depositors. Unfortunately, our bank is not separated from the Ministry of Finance. Actually the State Bank should not be under the jurisdiction of the government but only the Supreme Soviet. Then the government could not simply order the bank to issue and print money. A deficit is a deficit. And there really is no money; but for the government, it is as though there were some. And this is the most fatal thing.

Double Bank Shot

A deficit in the range of 20-25 billion would not be acceptable for the current scale of our economy. But we have already gone far past this mark after the two crushing blows to the budget which I mentioned above. But when did the collapse occur? It began in 1986 when, without lifting a finger to overcome the real causes of drunkenness, they decided to sharply reduce the sale of alcoholic beverages. The boozing did not decrease, but income was turned over to the moonshiners. The second blow, the hardest one, was dealt in 1988 when there was a fantastic growth of state capital investments. We darted in exactly the opposite direction of the one we seemed to have chosen. The amount of capital investment has continued to grow and there is an immense amount of incomplete construction. And instead of trying to reduce it, as was absolutely correctly envisioned by the decisions of the June plenum of 1987, a year had not passed before capital investments started pouring out of the state budget like a river. And the main ones to blame for this, of course, are the departments.

[Badov] But how could this creeping revision of the decisions of the June plenum of the Central Committee take place?

[Latsis] It is by no means creeping, but, rather, revolutionary in its scale. It seemed that they had begun to implement the plenum decisions. Construction projects with an overall estimated value of R24 billion were frozen. But then during 1988 they rashly began new construction projects with an overall value of R59 billion. I will not say that this was a direct sabotage of the plenum's decisions. One way or another we ended up in a new round of "cost-based" planning. A precipitate, erroneous course was taken in investment policy. The government did not anticipate its actual consequences.

[Badov] But could this inscrutable course develop out of the sum of partial decisions?

[Latsis] It did develop out of a sum of partial decisions. Things "came together." Although they gave the enterprises the right to create development funds independently, they did not take the money away from the ministries. And to the ministries it makes absolutely no difference whether the investments produce a return in two to three years or whether they will be "tied up" in unfinished walls for another 20 years.

[Badov] Perhaps these capital investments from the treasury are the guarantee of their continued existence.

[Latsis] Yes, this is precisely what I wanted to say. The ministries not only retained their former bureaucratic indifference to the possibility of a return on "free" investments but also had a direct interest in sharply increasing this harmful activity. Since the beginning of perestroyka the position of the ministries has been unenviable. In general they have been demoralized and criticized, reduced, abolished, and "merged." The opinion has been created that they are not needed at all. And they have begun to zealously provide themselves with work for tomorrow. They have begun even more actively to squeeze every last penny out of the treasury in order to begin new construction projects as rapidly as possible. Alas, to this squandering of budget funds was added the extremely dangerous activity of the enterprises which, having been given the right to earn money with economic accountability, were also in a great hurry to "stake out" their investments. And the material resources ended up even more dispersed.

The Problem When Credit Is Cheap

In my view, in order to avoid falling into this "funnel" we should have sharply reduced centralized state capital investments. The money should have been directed through channels of economic accountability where in principle it would work much more effectively. Still, we could not cast the investment process out to the arbitrary will of fate. After all, even in the capitalist world there is centralized regulation of the movement of the resources of enterprises. There they use for this such a flexible and powerful lever as a changeable interest rate on bank credit. For example, the Federal Reserve System in the United States checks on bank credit operations each day. For them money is a costly commodity. The situation in our country is such that it is simply advantageous to be in debt... Just as before, credit costs nothing here; it is excessively available. In the first place, the rates are low; in the second place, the bank does not find out whether the given enterprise is creditworthy. As a result, the dispersion of funds has accelerated sharply through the old ministry channels; and in addition to this it has started flowing through the channels of the enterprises which have been given free reign with funds. The government is even proud—with some justification—that is has restrained itself so far and is not repeating the mistakes of the sixties which defeated the reform. Then the same thing began to happen: The enterprises increased their accumulations and began to spend them. They were not given money with which to trade: All

material resources were distributed, as ordered, through "cards." The resources remained in the hands of the Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply] and the ministries. But the main thing is that very quickly this "hard-earned" money was simply arbitrarily taken away from the enterprises. They decreed: Deduct a certain amount into the budget—and that was it.

The enterprises now have R100 billion in free money. The government is not making claims on it. Let us say that this is good, but the bad thing is that no economic lever has been activated so that this money will be used for reimbursing centralized budget expenditures. And in fact the money ends up neither in budget channels nor in channels of economic accountability. It becomes stuck in the bog of "incomplete construction." And it is not the reform in its initial design that is to blame for this; it is the unfinished work on the part of the government.

A Turn Toward Realism

When people tell me that the plan and the market are incompatible, I answer that the plan and the market are inseparable. The plan does not work in our country, because it is not controlled by the market. And the market does not "arise," because it is not controlled by the plan. To this we add the drop in oil prices and the very unsuccessful ways of saving hard currency when we began to economize on consumer goods which are very advantageous for the country's budget. And then there are also the consequences of Chernobyl—another blow to the budget. And in its wake were other cataclysms: the earthquake in Armenia, the destabilization in the Transcaucasus... This is why the union treasury has emptied out during the past two or three years.

[Badov] Yet the collapse of the consumer market undermines the political base of the economic reform. The rank-and-file consumer is grumbling. Will the extraordinary government measures rectify the situation?

[Latsis] Still I think that one useful change has taken place. While in 1988 the resultant force of all the efforts of the government automatically led to the destruction of the market through the growth of the deficit, in 1989, although it was a period of fluctuations, real steps were taken toward stabilization. For 1990 it is planned to have a deficit of "only" 60 billion. This is a very important turn toward realism. Healthy measures have been earmarked for a real reduction of capital investments and defense expenditures. Something is also being done to increase budget revenues. It has been recognized that a growth of income alone will not be enough; it is necessary to cut expenditures further. This is the government's general intention expressed in N. Ryzhkov's six-year program. It is reasonable and, in terms of the means applied, it is correct. Question: Will we succeed in fulfilling it? And another question is still of considerable importance: Will the people wait six years?

[Badov] There is another question: about the further postponement of the switch to market relations...

[Latsis] This absolutely cannot be called a postponement because the government has a schedule of actions, including a switch to market relations between 1992 and 1993. Incidentally, there never has been an earlier target date. The price-setting reform was planned for 1990. It has now been put off until 1990-1991.

[Badov] We are always returning to the "accursed" question about prices and price setting...

[Latsis] Life itself is returning us to it. One cannot deceive economic laws. When the state is capable of regulating prices it does not have to impose them. It is possible to influence prices through economic methods: commodity flows, control of budget investments, the interest rate. Well, what small part—several hundred basic prices out of many millions of items on the products list—will the state plan? There is the persistent idea that market prices are high and state prices are low. All practice refutes this. In the FRG prices are set by the market. An overall rise on the average level of three percent is considered high and unacceptable. Some people put our inflation at seven to eight percent and others put it at 11 percent. It is even a mystery to me how they get that. How can one measure inflation in prices that are not comparable? Our inflation is expressed more in the length of the waiting lines than in the increase in prices. When they talk about a two-percent price increase the people simply laugh.

Who Is There, on the Shadow Side?

[Badov] There is still a total redistribution of income going on behind the scenes of the commodity deficit. We have already heard rumors that R150 billion are in the hands of the shadow economy and that it is bucking for power. The figure of R500 billion acquired by the wheeler-dealers is even being mentioned. How do you regard these figures?

[Latsis] In the first place, let us straighten out what the shadow economy is. The scientific understanding of it does not square with the more widespread ideas. The "simple" person, the nonspecialist, might not know this difference and be honestly deceived. It is terrible when such an approach is taken by a person with a scholarly degree. He takes certain quantitative estimates and conveys them to the public without scientific interpretation. And the public adds what it has heard to their own idea. They think the shadow economy is theft and speculation. Yes, the shadow economy also includes the "black market" economy, that is, all kinds of theft. But this is only a part, and a quantitatively small one, of the shadow economy. The bulk of the activity of the shadow business takes place under the respectable shelter of state property. A large "item" of its profits comes from income from padding. If you pad construction work or products that are either not produced or are rejected, you have still paid all of the wages and bonuses. On a national scale this amounts to gigantic amounts of essentially stolen funds. It is not the profits of some mythical or real underground millionaires but the unearned wages of

millions of "law-abiding" workers and employees. This illegal gain is not transformed into capital for underground business but is used on the consumer market. This is where the income of speculators comes from, but it comprises only a part of the shadow circulation.

In the past we have zealously prohibited any entrepreneurial activity; and in so doing, we have simply caused the shadow economy to grow. For example, nobody has an excavator for his own private use; but in any dacha location or village one can see an excavator digging a basement for the dacha owner and a crane installing the slabs. Buildings have been constructed from materials the state does not trade in. This too has stimulated the immense circulation of the shadow economy. And a typical representative is not an underground millionaire but the warehouse supervisor or work supervisor from the neighboring construction site. You are completely in his power. He names both the price and the conditions. And he can inflate them. He does not pay taxes to the state. Why has this "entrepreneurship" not evoked a heated protest among the people? Here we get out of economics and into the sphere of politics and social psychology. In general, the shadow economy today is the subject of political speculations. There is no question that it exists and is flourishing; but it is not the cause of the deformations of our economy but a consequence of our criminal state appropriation of everything and anything.

Put Your Cardboard Sword Back in the Scabbard!

The shadow economy is nothing other than a result of the irrationality of our state economy. But the most important thing is that we cannot simply confiscate this shadow economy and its capital. In order to expropriate it we would have to improve the entire national economy. One of the widespread populist illusions is that it would be possible to take away the capital of the "shadow businessmen" by a simple monetary reform. It is impossible to take anything away from dishonest people without affecting honest ones. An enthusiast of this idea, Professor Sergeyev, guarantees that he will not touch earned income if the owner submits a declaration of where he earned such a large sum. On a national scale this device can only get us peanuts from some absolute fools. The professor will not collect the promised tens of billions by this primitive method. Why is he waving this cardboard sword? He depicts the shadow economy as a toothless dragon. This is naive. It has teeth and it can bite. You cannot conquer it with such cheap tricks.

[Badov] And the form of transformation of the capital of the shadow economy is quite different from the monetary form.

[Latsis] Of course. I do not wish to repeat arguments that are known to all intelligent economists. It is necessary to fight intelligently against the shadow economy. And the main thing is not to lose sight of the fact that our poverty was not caused by the shadow economy. Although this is a problem, it is secondary. The main ravager is our state itself—primarily in the form of the ministries—and our inefficiency. The diversion of the northern rivers was halted, but they have already managed to write off a half billion rubles' worth of preparatory work. They decided to build a tractor plant in Yelabug when we already produce five times more tractors than the Americans do. True, they are poor tractors, but it would be more advantageous and less expensive to reconstruct old plants that are in operation. Instead, but we decided to waste our money on new ones. They are going to build petrochemical complexes in Tyumen Oblast. At first they mentioned five and assured people that they would cost no more than 20 billion. It turns out that they were actually thinking about 41 million, but in reality it would be no less than 90-100 million. Then they said all right, they did not need five, they would construct two or three. I tried to find out from the minister: Are you in a position to construct even two? He answered: I cannot even build two. This conversation was held in front of witnesses. But then a board of experts convenes and, finally, after the construction is under way and agreements with Western firms have already been signed, the experts announce that upon inspection of the three sites on which these complexes are standing it turns out that two of the locations are inexpedient and the third might be all right but only if the conditions of the agreement with the Western firms are revised. The conditions are such that things are upside down: They get all the profit and we take all the risk. But it turns out that the agreements had already been signed. Only the state could squander these tens and hundreds of billions. The shadow economy could not afford this "scale."

The Parable of the "Above-Plan" Tank

[Badov] They say that it is impossible to restructure our economy without our returning to the world economy. But now we have proclaimed free activity of the producers on the foreign markets. Then we immediately put obstacles in their path. How do you regard this?

[Latsis] All kinds of miracles are taking place here. I am now following with interest the case of the ANT state cooperative concern, which has become the talk of the town. And the more information I get, the more questions I have. Incidentally, in none of my communications did I find out to whom these tanks were sold. How could there be even one tank "above the plan"? This leads to the next question, which is: How did it end up in the hands of the cooperative, and what kind of cooperative is it that acts on the basis of what one general told another general on the telephone? I have many questions about the actions of the cooperative. And I also have questions about the functioning of state industry. Why is the scandal called the ANT affair and not the Uralvagonmash affair?

[Badov] The creation of really new foreign trade structures—free economic zones, joint enterprises—is now being held up on the pretext of high state interests.

[Latsis] And during the years of stagnation many disadvantageous and even dangerous transactions were concluded for utilizing our mineral resources. They have now ended up with consequences that are destructive to nature and people. And these enterprises sometimes cannot be used at full capacity now. They are used at one-fourth to one-tenth of their capacity. This is the only way the environment can somehow stand up under it. And this being the case, the effectiveness is altogether different. We are promised immense profits but we have only losses.

[Badov] The peculiarity of these transactions is the wretched compensation plan...

[Latsis] Yes, in the first place there is the wretched plan and in the second place, nobody is responsible for anything.

[Badov] And when fundamentally different, civilized proposals arise, say, to purchase the plan for the joint enterprise from the state and develop some kind of resource, voices immediately start ringing out, saying: How can you allow foreign capital in our country?

[Latsis] If this is a market transaction where capital investments, risk, and profit are on a parity basis and the state merely checks on the legality of it and the trade unions look out for the interests of the workers, then this is acceptable. If the investors have invested their own money there is a guarantee that they will not throw it to the wind. But in a ministry, where the concept of "their own money" is laughable because it is "nobody's," nobody is looking out for what happens to the investments.

We will really be included in the world economy when, say, the Western investor constructs his own enterprise in the Soviet Union and we construct our Soviet enterprise in Japan or Brazil.

[Badov] For a very large number of people the very idea that foreign capital might come to our country again is a challenge.

[Latsis] This is simply a transfer of words from past experience, from recollections of prerevolutionary Russia. All historical and economic conditions in the world have changed radically. And the real functioning of capital in our joint enterprises is altogether different. Our misfortune is not that we are threatened with an influx of foreign capital; the problem is that, unfortunately, it is not threatening us.

Who "Does Not Believe" the Economic Barometer?

[Badov] When you hear talk that they want to transform us into a raw material appendage of the West, it is terrible to hear; for, largely because of the closed nature of our economy, we are already a kind of raw material appendage.

[Latsis] What can we say? We made ourselves suppliers of irreplaceable raw materials for companies abroad. We have nothing else to sell. And this makes us vulnerable. I published an article in issue No. 17 of KOMMUNIST, and I must admit I thought that it would have the effect of an exploded bomb. Alas, I must assume that the alarming warnings contained in the article were not noticed. I think this was because the apparatus has become accustomed not to "believe" what is shown on the economic barometer, a custom that goes back to the times of stagnation. In the article I cited figures that stunned even me: The export prognosis for the development of our petroleum industry shows that even with the capital investments that we can allow ourselves for the next five-year plan, by 1994 our exports of petroleum to capitalist countries will have dropped to nothing.

[Badov] But that is our major source of hard currency!

[Latsis] That is just it. We are now arguing about whether to buy grain abroad or equipment. In four or five years it might be that we will have nothing to buy them with.

[Badov] It is easy to imagine what consequences curtailing the imports of food would have for the people...

[Latsis] This is what I am talking about. The stagnant economy has exhausted itself to a much greater degree than some people imagine. From this standpoint we are far behind. It has long been time to change over to market relations in order to feed ourselves.

[Badov] So the clock is already running.

[Latsis] Of course. The clock is ticking. Life is forcing us to walk through the thorns to an effective economy. We might be so late that we will have to pay large debts in hard currency similar to those that Poland is now paying.

[Badov] In the draft platform of the Central Committee they use the term "plan-market economy." This smacks of a compromise between proponents of the market and "improved" directive planning.

[Latsis] In this case, I believe the time limit for compromises has passed. We must finally decide to take the high road to a regulated market.

New Economic, Financial Weekly To Debut in Jun

LD2204225390 Moscow in English to Great Britain and Ireland 1900 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] The Soviet Union's first economic and financial weekly, BUSINESS AND BANKS, has been launched by a commercial information consortium. Its members include the news agency INFORMBANK and four leading Soviet banks. The first issue is due to appear in June.

The new weekly is to provide regular coverage of the current world and domestic market prices of the main industrial commodities and foodstuffs, raw materials, as well as foreign currency exchange rates. It will carry

banking information, economic reviews, and forecasts by leading foreign and Soviet experts.

Legal documents that have not been widely published in the country so far are expected to be of special interest to all organizations and enterprises that use bank services. The new weekly's supplement, FOREIGN BUSINESS REVIEW, is to cover the activities of major foreign banks, international financial organizations, leading foreign firms, world trade developments, and changes in the world market. Such information is believed to be essential for all those who are implementing the economic reforms in this country.

Scientific

'Cosmos-2074' Satellite Launched 20 Apr

LD2104073890 Moscow TASS in English 0733 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 21 TASS—A satellite was launched by a Cosmos booster rocket in the Soviet Union on Friday [20 April].

The satellite, Cosmos-2074, is carrying scientific equipment intended to continue the exploration of outer space.

The satellite was placed into an orbit with the following parameters:

—Initial period of revolution—104.9 minutes,
—Maximum distance from the earth's surface (in apogee)—1,016 kilometers,
—Minimum distance from the earth's surface (in perigee)—982 kilometers,
—Inclination of the orbit—83 degrees.

Apart from the on-board equipment, the satellite is carrying a radio system for the accurate measurement of orbital elements and a radiotelemetric system for transmitting data on the work of instruments and scientific equipment to earth.

The on-board equipment is functioning normally. The command-and-computer centre is processing incoming information.

Launch of Space Factory Module Postponed

LD2004123190 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 20 Apr 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program]

[Text] The launching of the Kristal technological module to the Mir orbital complex scheduled for April has been postponed once again, this time until the beginning of June. This was reported by Yuriy Semenov, the chief designer of rocket and space systems.

The 20-tonne orbital minifactory is intended to reproduce various semiconductors and biomaterials in weightlessness. Right now it is at the Baykonur cosmodrome. Specialists want to be completely sure that the module is reliable so that it can dock safely with Mir.

Designer Comments on Postponement

LD2004201690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 20 Apr 90

[From the "Ultro" news feature; presented by Aleksandr Tikhonov]

[Text] [Tikhonov] In the past two months our program has been constantly reporting that in April a new, third module would be sent up to the Mir orbiting complex on which cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovyev and Aleksandr Balandin are working. This is a specialized workshop for producing especially valuable materials in space. The crew's main work aboard the complex was connected with it. And so it has become known that the launch of the module has been postponed until the beginning of June. Our correspondent Leonid Lazarevich asked Yuriy Pavlovich Semenov, the general designer of the Energiya scientific production association, and his deputy, Valeriy Viktorovich Ryumin, to comment on the situation which has arisen.

[Begin recording] [Semenov] Indeed, after the Kvant-2 module had been docked to Mir, 12 gyrodynes were deployed for the first time in world practice on board such a complicated system. This is a most complicated mechanical unit. When we used 12 gyrodynes, we switched on some of the equipment that had not been used during four years of flight. We needed time to analyze the situation that had arisen. What I must say today is that what I must frankly call breakdowns have been specifically detected.

Literally yesterday, we succeeded in obtaining all parameters—11-12 gyrodynes. I must say that 11 gyrodynes are capable of effecting the orientation of such a complicated cluster, whose control is designed for four modules—not for two modules, which we have today, but four. We have been fighting to have the certainty at last that there would be four modules. We have received such certainty.

Well, we have somewhat revised our program; and prior to the Kristall module, in the first 10 days of May, a Progress craft will be delivered that will supply the fuel already needed for subsequent work. It must be said that this is very difficult and complicated, and that one runs into all kinds of unforeseen circumstances. And we have to model this on earth. We will have to deliver some parts to the station. This is our usual procedure, and this does not frighten us.

[Ryumin] This is not unusual. Any equipment is entitled to break down. And during many years of working with stations we have accumulated sufficient experience to get out of such situations safely. For this reason, this has

not been anything unexpected for us. We are capable of maintaining the normal functioning of the station. [end recording]

[Tikhonov] Evidently, that is the case. There will be no lack of work for the cosmonauts aboard the complex. But prior to the launch it was said that the current expedition should become the first to make a profit, and these hopes were above all pinned on the module. Meanwhile, its launch is being postponed already for the umpteenth time.

'Mir' Cosmonauts Continue Experiments, Maintenance

LD2004165990 Moscow TASS in English 1203 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—Cosmonauts Anatoliy Solovev and Aleksandr Balandin are completing another working week on board the Soviet space station Mir.

The crew conducted a series of visual monitoring and photo sessions of several industrial areas in the southern European USSR and the Karakun Canal as well as parts of the world ocean.

Today, they began with routine medical check-ups, weighed themselves and examined the state of their muscles.

Later in the day, the flight commander and the engineer will have all-round examinations of their cardiovascular systems.

Solovev and Balandin will also carry out technical maintenance of the station's life-support system and conduct geophysical experiments to study northern lights and luminescent clouds.

They are scheduled to refuel the Progress-M-3 cargo ship.

The Mission Control Centre continues monitoring the flight of the Salyut-7 orbital station, which has orbited the earth for eight years.

In August 1986 it was deployed to a higher orbit to test its life-span. It is now flying at a height of 400 kilometers from the earth's surface, sending regular data to the Mission Control Centre.

Scientist Rules Out Repeat of Chernobyl 'Meltdown'

LD1904132190 Moscow TASS in English 1005 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] Kiev April 19 TASS—By TASS correspondents Dmitry Kiyansky and Aleksey Petrunya:

A repetition of the 1986 Chernobyl nuclear meltdown is impossible, according to a noted Soviet nuclear expert, who said that new precautions have been taken to rule out accidents.

Yuriy Tsoglin, chief of the nuclear safety department at the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences Institute of Nuclear Research, told TASS that reactors at the Chernobyl nuclear power station had become safer.

The design of safety rods has been changed and a more enriched fuel is being used. The safety system now works twice as fast. An additional safety system has also been installed, he said.

Commenting on the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet decision to close the Chernobyl nuclear power plant until 1995, Tsoglin said this will require lots of money and effort.

This has never been done before, he said, calling for the development of a programme setting the order of unit stoppages, fuel extraction, places of temporary storage and burial of low-activity wastes and processing of high-activity wastes (outside the republic).

A special remote-control technology is needed. Complete dismantling will take at least 10 years, Tsoglin said.

Military

Yazov Opens Conference on Great Patriotic War

LD1904150690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1430 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] A large conference in Moscow is dedicated to painting a true picture of the course of the Great Patriotic War and the situation which arose before its outbreak. It was opened today by USSR Defense Minister Yazov.

Military Leaders Sign Gen Burkin's Obituary

PM2304093990 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 22 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Obituary of B.Z. Burkin]

[Excerpts] Lieutenant General (retired) Boris Zakharovich Burkin, a participant in the Great Patriotic War, has died after a long illness. He devoted his entire life to the selfless service of the Soviet people and the Communist Party, which he joined in 1943.

B.Z. Burkin was born 17 March 1924 in Vladivostok. [passage omitted]

[Signed] A.D. Lizichev, V.I. Varennikov, A.S. Pavlov, A.N. Soshnikov, N.I. Shlyaga, N.A. Moiseyev, A.V. Betekhtin, D.A. Grinkevich, N.A. Batarchuk, A.A. Galkin, N.A. Merkushev, N.A. Zhuravlev, Yu.M. Potapov

Yazov, Others Sign Veteran Skvirskiy's Obituary

PM1804144190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 11 Apr 90 First Edition p 4

[Obituary of L.S. Skvirskiy]

[Excerpts] Retired Lieutenant General Lev Solomonovich Skvirskiy, who participated in the civil and Great Patriotic wars, died after a prolonged serious illness. [passage omitted]

L.S. Skvirskiy was born 15 September 1903 in the small town of Stepantsy in Kanevskiy Rayon, Kiev Oblast. [passage omitted]

[Signed] D.T. Yazov, M.A. Moiseyev, P.G. Lushev, K.A. Kochetov, A.D. Lizichev, Yu.P. Maksimov, V.I. Varennikov, I.M. Tretyak, A.N. Yefimov, V.N. Chernavin, M.I. Sorokin, V.M. Arkhipov, V.M. Shabanov, N.V. Chekov, V.L. Govorov, D.S. Sukhorukov, Yu.A. Yashin, N.V. Ogarkov, S.L. Sokolov, I.G. Pavlovskiy, S.P. Ivanov, A.F. Shcheglov, I.N. Rodionov, V.N. Konchits, D.A. Krutskikh, A.V. Shalnov.

Moiseyev, Others Sign Officer's Obituary

PM1804121190 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 12 Apr 90 First Edition p4

[Obituary of N.P. Semenov]

[Text] Lieutenant General Nikolay Petrovich Semenov, veteran of the USSR Armed Forces, has died suddenly. [passage omitted]

N.P. Semenov was born on 12 January 1938 in the village of Bolshiye Dvoriki, Staritskiy Rayon, Kalinin Oblast. [passage omitted]

[Signed] M.A. Moiseyev, B.A. Omelichev, G.F. Krivosheyev, A.N. Kleymenov, V.I. Gerasimov, A.A. Demidov, V.Ye. Skvortsov, A.F. Goloborodov, I.Ya. Solodilov, Ye.P. Maslin, V.I. Korotkov, S.A. Zelentsov, B.N. Baranov, Yu.M. Posin, B.M. Volkov, F.D. Barsukov, Ye.V. Boychuk, V.M. Yegorov, I.F. Sviridov, and A.G. Sandrikov.

Baltic Republics

Lithuanian Deputies Seek Negotiations in Moscow

LD2304124490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1050 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] A group of four deputies of the Lithuanian Supreme Council arrived in Moscow today. They will attempt to look into the possibilities of negotiations with Moscow. Romualdas Ozolas told CTK that they do now know yet who the delegation could meet. The delegation will look for contacts concerning economic links.

Deputy Medvedevas told AFP that they would stay in Moscow for a couple of days.

More on Lithuanian Delegation

AU2304131690 Paris AFP in English 1041 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 23 (AFP)—A Lithuanian delegation arrived here on Monday to try again to open negotiations with the Kremlin, as the Baltic republic's parliament was poised to discuss the deepening crisis caused by Moscow's economic blockade.

The delegation led by a vice president of the Lithuanian parliament, Bronus Kuzmickas, was expected to stay in Moscow for several days.

The Kremlin had still not reacted on Monday to Lithuania's decision to halt all shipments destined for Soviet exports in retaliation for Moscow's blockade of the Baltic republic.

Many items produced in Lithuania are already in very short supply on the Soviet market, particularly household electrical goods.

One of Lithuania's deputy premiers, Romualdas Ozolas, informed Soviet Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov that the cessation or reduction of deliveries of raw materials to Lithuania was forcing the republic to impose "a particular economic regime."

The economic situation in Lithuania continued to worsen on Monday as Moscow tightened its blockade, which now extends beyond cutting energy supplies.

The Lithuanian Government on Sunday night protested that "The Soviet Transport Ministry has taken measures so that no goods reach Lithuania, even those which could be delivered according to an agreement between individual enterprises."

It issued a statement calling on Mr.Ryzhkov and Railways Minister Nikolay Konarev to restore normal rail services.

At the outset, the blockade only affected deliveries from Soviet ministries or state organisations.

The Lithuanian nationalist movement, the Sajudis met late into the night on Sunday, but did not reach agreement on electing a new leadership. A spokesman said a decision must be taken in the next few days.

Vytautas Landsbergis, the republic's president, is standing down as president of the Sajudis, because his leadership of the nationalist movement is incompatible with his parliamentary mandate and position in government. Several other prominent members of the movement are also to resign.

The Lithuanian Sajudis, which the nationalist organisation has renamed itself, has decided to abandon aspirations to becoming a political party. It will remain an informal movement grouping various tendencies.

As Mr. Landbergis explained at the opening of the Sajudis' congress on Saturday, the decision was taken in the interests of suppressing political differences "in this difficult period in the republic's history."

Council Reports Delivery of Raw Material

LD2304132290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1030 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Today's meeting of the Council of Ministers to discuss control over the economic situation could be called the turning point meeting. The commission reviewed its work and stated that they have managed to soften the consequences of the USSR economic blocade on Lithuania. Not a single enterprise has yet ceased its operation and there is no panic among the population. The energy resources are evenly distributed. It has become possible to start looking for alternative sources of supply and raw materials. Ministries and departments are to prepare programs on how to radically change the operation of industries and their production, to be less dependent on the East.

News has now reached us that, on the basis of direct agreements, some very important raw materials have been brought in today from the Ukraine.

Unfortunately, the people of Lithuania do not fully understand what situation we are in. News has come into the Council of Ministers that rationing violations, especially for gasoline, are taking place. [passage omitted] Now listen to Irena Zubaviciute talking to Bronislovas Vainora, director of Mazeikiai oil refinery:

[Begin recording] [Zubaviciute] You said that the enterprise could operate for four days.

[Vainora] Today we will be in operation until the evening, when the operation of the enterprise will be stopped. [passage omitted] We will appeal to the Supreme Council of the republic urging concrete measures to establish contacts with Moscow. This is because we do not see any other way. To get oil from somewhere else and to refine it in Mazeikiai is not realistic at the moment. [passage omitted] Another possibility, perhaps, is looking for contacts with the West. We do not exclude

that. We know that the specifications which Denmark sent to us are on the way from Kaunas. We will look into it and in general we will consider anything feasible in order to get some oil. [end recording]

Landsbergis Message to Gorbachev on Citizenship

LD2304135290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1107 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] The first session of the Lithuanian Supreme Council continued its work today. A detailed account of the session and its documents are being published in the press. As you know, Lithuanian television has reported on a message from Vytautas Landsbergis, the chairman of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania, to USSR President Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev. Today we will broadcast a short summary of this message.

The document stresses that Lithuania cannot harm the perestroyka taking place in the Soviet Union, the process of deepening democracy, or the efforts to create a law-governed state. The Lithuanian Supreme Council has already expressed its attitude to the problem of young people from Lithuania serving in the Soviet Armed Forces. However, this problem involves more than just simply the spring call-up referred to in Gorbachev's telegram. This problem is much broader. According to Vytautas Landsbergis, this must be one of the most important subjects of the forthcoming political consultations and talks.

The message also talks about the granting of citizenship in the Republic of Lithuania. In accordance with the law on citizenship, adopted on 3 November last year, all inhabitants of Lithuania, regardless of their nationality, can become citizens. The citizenship document, which can be obtained by all citizens of Lithuania without exception, does not infringe anybody's rights or freedoms. Neither does it give anybody additional privileges.

In conclusion, the message stresses that the solution to all complications can and must be found on the basis of the principles of humanism, which is the sole foundation for a political dialogue.

Sajudis Official on Economic 'Blockade'

LD2304140490 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Excerpts] A press conference has been held at the Sajudis Congress press center: Ceslovas Jursenas, the Supreme Council press representative, answered journalists' questions. It was pointed out that the economic blockade has crossed the boundaries indicated earlier by the statement issued by Gorbachev and Ryzhkov. There is a blockade of railroad rolling stock, and no food supplies are being delivered. If fuel is not supplied, all enterprises will stop. When printing paper supplies become short, newspapers will be published only once a week.

Accounts with Lithuanian enterprises are not being settled through Lithuanian banks, and this is causing indignation among workers. [passage omitted] Girenko, CPSU Central Committee secretary, said that no economic blockade has been imposed; this is an humanitarian action aimed at saving the people of Lithuania.

Vilnius Radio Carries 22 Apr Sajudis Congress

Basic Rules Adopted

LD2204091990

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0700 GMT on 22 April begins live coverage of the second Sajudis conference being held at the Sports Hall in Vilnius. Aleksandras Abisalas is chairing this session. The announcer briefly reviews yesterday's work of the congress and says that certain draft documents are being distributed to the congress delegates.

At 0712 GMT a report is made on the draft Sajudis rules. It is proposed to change the name of the Lithuanian restructuring movement Sajudis; from now on it will be called simply the Sajudis of Lithuania. Questions follow the report on the rules at 0727 GMT.

At 0745 GMT questioning concludes. It is then proposed to take a vote on the draft rules. As the basis for further debates, Sajudis chairman Vytautas Landsbergis says that the rules were unadequately prepared, however, there is no other draft to discuss. Virgilijus Cepaitis says that bearing in mind the current political situation, it is a waste of time discussing the Sajudis rules. A vote is taken on the draft Sajudis rules. By the majority of votes, the draft rules are adopted as a basis for further debates.

Alvydas Medelinskas criticizes Sajudis Seimas for becoming an authoritarian organ within the Sajudis movement.

Fuel Supply Announcement Read

LD2204104190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0809 GMT on 22 April continues its live coverage of the Second Sajudis Congress being held at the Sports Hall in Vilnius.

Vytautas Landsbergis takes the floor to present his points of view on the draft Sajudis rules. Landsbergis says that the draft rules had not been adequately prepared and, therefore, a new commission should be set up to work out another version of draft rules.

At 0820 GMT Grazulis speaks about ethnic minorities taking part in Sajudis and their place in the work of Sajudis Seimas and Sajudis activities in general.

At 0834 GMT it is decided to postpone the debate on draft Sajudis rules for a later time and start discussion of

the next item on the agenda. A commission consisting of seven members is elected to prepare alternative draft rules of Sajudis.

The congress takes a break until 0915 GMT.

At 0845 GMT, during the break, Lithuanian radio correspondent Dora Petkauskaite makes an announcement for the Council of Ministers of the republic. D. Petkauskaite says: I have just spoken to the officials on duty at the Council of Ministers and a communique for today, prepared by the Council of Ministers, was read to me.

Petkauskaite continues: Today a regular sitting of the commission of the Council of Ministers of Lithuania was held. The people of Lithuania are informed that the gas enterprises are operating normally. However, oil products are in short supply. There is evidence of speculation in petrol supplies for the population.

From 23 April physically handicapped people will be give a ration of 100 liters of gas per month.

The power engineering enterprises are functioning normally. The first power unit at Ignalina Nuclear Electric Power Station has been put into operation. It is operating at full capacity.

Another bit of information about supplies of other kinds of goods to Lithuania was also given at the sitting. A regulation by Sojuzpishchepromsyryo banned for further supplies of various food products to Lithuania such as nuts, cocoa, and other such products. The commission of the Lithuanian government decided to stop supplies of confectionary goods to the Soviet Union. Construction materials such as glass, polystyrene, and other materials will not be taken out of the republic either. The Grigiskes Paper Production Amalgamation was ordered to stop supplies of timber fiber plates to the Soviet Union and centralized export. Part of the output of the light industry will not be supplied for centralized export.

Orders came from the Baltic railway district administration to the administration of Lithuanian railways instructing that cargo arriving from Kaliningrad should be transported as transit to other republics.

D. Petkauskaite goes on to say that a telegram will be sent by the Lithuanian Council of Ministers to Nikolay Ryzhkov, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR, concerning the work of railways. This instruction hinders the initiative of Lithuania to maintain direct links with enterprises at the USSR.

Lithuanian radio and television have been entrusted with the task of supplying daily information on the decisions and work of the commission, D. Petkauskaite concludes.

Draft Program Presented

LD2204115190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0915 GMT on 22 April resumes its live coverage of the second Sajudis Congress being held at the Sports Hall in Vilnius.

Aloizas Sakalas is now presiding over this session of the congress.

At 0919 GMT Zenon Poznyak, chairman of the Belorussian People's Front, gives a 10-minuute address to the people of Lithuania.

At 0929 GMT an appeal of the people of Lithuania, who speak languages other than Lithuanian, to the president of the USSR is read out in Russian by (Bolotin).

At 0934 GMT the first version of the draft Sajudis program is presented. Questions follow.

At 0947 GMT Bubelis presents an alternative draft program. Following this, questions follow. Some deputies suggest that discussions should be more about the current situation and about how to get out of this situation rather than concerning some theoretical issues in the program.

At 1016 GMT Zalatorius takes the floor. He asks the question: What are we going to do if it is announced that tanks have surrounded the Sports Hall; this question should have been asked a year ago. He says: We should have been thinking of this question all the time. He urges support for the government because this government had been elected with Sajudis support and the government is now implementing the ideas and aspirations that the people and Sajudis have always wanted. At 1031 GMT Albertas Zalatorius concludes his speech.

At 1034 GMT a proposal is made by Sigitas Silinskas to set up the party of the Independence of Lithuania, which could take over in case the present government is toppled by the military.

At 1037 GMT the congress is adjourned until 1200 GMT.

Draft Program Debated

LD2204143690

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1200 GMT on 22 April resumes live coverage of the Second Sajudis Congress at the sports hall in Vilnius.

At 1201 GMT a representative of the Leningrad People's Front begins an eight-minute address. She says that Lithuania and the Sajudis have paved the way to freedom for all nations in this empire. She says that after the election, the Leningrad People's Front came out as a winner. Today, however, Leningrad has no guarantees that a similar economic blockade will not be imposed on Leningrad one day.

At 1209 GMT a communique from the French Socialist Party on the situation in Lithuania is read out.

At 1210 GMT debates on the draft program of Sajudis continued. Eugeni Laurinaitis proposes to set up a provisional program of short-term action, which must be implemented now. The aim of the provisional program for short-term action is maximum decentralization of actions, so that each Sajudis member knows what he must do in the current extreme conditions of the economic blockade. A vote is taken on the proposal; and by the majority of votes it is decided that a commission will be set up to prepare such a document.

At 1224 GMT H. Apanavicius begins to speak. He says he did not support the political program of Sajudis because it is not specific enough. He says that despite changing the title or any other adjustments, the Communist Party should be declared immoral and must be banned.

At 1239 GMT Leonas Mildzius urges Sajudis to give more attention in the program to the urban areas and people living there. P. Cidzikas then says that everyone must be aware of the immense danger that is pending on Lithuania and that to remain in a state of euphoria is even more dangerous. He calls for unity and self-sacrifice for the cause. He says that hs is planning another hunger strike.

At 1259 GMT Reverand Algimantas Keina says that Sajudis must help the government implement the election program. Another objective in the program should be rallying all the people, regardless of their nationality, for the cause of independence. He also says that Sajudis should fight against moral degradation. Reverand Keina announces that a cross-carrying ceremony will take place in May. The cross will be carried from Vilnius to Siauliai Mount of Crosses, which is about 200 miles. This will be done by the M. Valancius Society of Sobriety which is run by the Catholic Church.

At 1305 GMT there is an appeal to young Lithuanians all over the world to render support to the cause of independence. Arvydas Zygas, a Lithuanian from the United States, urges young Lithuanians to do all they can to influence their governments to render support to Lithuania.

At 1310 GMT Vladimir Kruchkov, a delegate to the congress, addresses the congress. Debates follow.

At 1339 GMT a decision is reached to regard the first version of the draft program as a basis for further discussion.

At 1341 GMT the congress adjourns for a short break.

Democratic Appeals Read

LD2204182790

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1414 GMT on 22 April resumes its live coverage of the Second Sajudis Congress at the Sports Hall in Vilnius.

A.N. Brumel, representative of the Russian Democratic Forum, addresses the congress.

Several appeals are made to various democratic movements in the Soviet Union.

At 1445 GMT Albertas Zalatorius reads a resolution entitled: "Sajudis And The Government."

This is followed by proposals and discussions. Some theoretical reports are given which mainly deal with the problems and aspirations of a small country as opposed to a superpower. A fund for the economic blockade is started at the congress. This will be continued all over Lithuania and the Baltic republics.

At 1510 GMT the congress adjourns for a short break until 1530 GMT.

At 1530 GMT the congress resumes work and debates on the draft rules of Sajudis begin.

At 1620 GMT debates on individual paragraphs of the Sajudis rules are in progress.

Membership Quotas Debated

LD2204221190

Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1620 GMT continues its live coverage of the Second Sajudis Congress at the Sports Hall in Vilnius.

At 1620 GMT proposals are put forward, followed by discussion and voting on rayon city delegate selection. A discussion follows on proposals on quota and percentage structure for ethnic and church representation.

At 1705 GMT a 15-minute recess is called.

At 1720 GMT the session resumes, with proposals and discussion on whether quotas should be considered according to the number of local residents or number of Sajudis members. The results of the vote are unmonitorable. Additional quotas are proposed for cities such as Vilnius, Kaunas etc.

At 1750 GMT there is a discussion and a voting on various rules and procedural regulations.

At 1910 GMT a vote establishs Sajudis Seimas membership at 191 members.

At 1915 GMT the income from publications is discussed. Sajudis is permitted to be involved in publishing.

At 1929 GMT A vote on property liquidation is called. With one hour of work remaining, a vote is taken against holding another recess.

At 1940 GMT Sajudis' temporary program outline is presented, with five points. The proposed text of nine decisions outlining the course of action is read.

At 1945 GMT these proposals are thrown open for questions. Questions are raised and discussion follows.

At 1947 GMT the beginning of a musical program is heard.

Popular Movement Leaders Address Sajudis Congress

Belorussian Front Chief

LD2204125290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0919 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Address by Zenon Poznyak, Belorussian People's Front chairman, at the second Sajudis Congress, in the Sports Hall in Vilnius—live]

[Text] Esteemed delegates, esteemed ladies and gentlemen! I sincerely greet the distinguished Sajudis Congress on behalf of the Belorussian People's Front. [applause]

The republic of Lithuania is living through difficult but joyful times. Its freedom and independence have begun. These times have not yet come to Belorussia. Next door to the new Lithuania which is being reborn, there exists a republic which is well-known for its extremely conservative leadership and misanthropic communist party, which is characterized by a blind commitment to Moscow. When considering this situation, one should be particularly mindful of the fact that the fate of the independence of all the republics of the USSR is now being decided in Lithuania. At the same time, the total dependence of the Belorussian communist leadership on the imperial policy of the CPSU could lead to unpredictable actions.

Soviet Belorussia is being turned into a bulwark of party reaction in the western USSR. Reactionaries from the Baltics and Moscow meet there. The publications of Lithuania's Interfront, and the nighttime communist [in referene to the Lithuanian pro-CPSU Communist Party] press are printed there. The main military and militant veterans (?exchange views) there.

What is the reason for this unceasing conservatism in the Belorussian Soviet Socialist Republic [BSSR], this utter dependence? For almost 200 years now Belorussia has been the victim of a special geopolitical policy pursued by Moscow. Let us recall that Belorussia, its culture, language, churches, towns, its labor, its military organizations were at the center of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Russia, and Samogitia. This was a political force which made it impossible for Eastern aggression and tyranny to progress westwards. The tsarist empire and the CPSU state have always based their geopolitical policies on the danger of a political counterweight coming into being on their western borders.

The coming of independence to the Baltic region or even the Ukraine would be most unwelcome, but nevertheless not fatal to the USSR. The coming into being of a chain of free and—most important—politically interlinked states stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea, i.e. Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Belorussia, Ukraine, and Moldavia, would in practice mark the end of the party's imperial rule, because it would lose the opportunity for enlargement, i.e. the expansion of a parasitic existence. The USSR is not capable of internal self-development. This is all the more so in that the communist society has reached a dead end.

In this geographical situation, which has come into being by dint of history, Belorussia is a central link in the chain because of its position. With the destruction of this central link, all possible ideas of a counterweight to the Muscovite empire collapse. Therefore, the empire's aggressive sway over Belorussia is uncompromising and cruel. This is the destruction of a nation and its ethnic identity, its destruction as a political and cultural force. After the annexation of Belorussia by Russia at the end of the 18th century, tsarism eliminated the Magdeburg law used there, and destroyed the Uniate Christian religion, to which over 80 percent of Belorussians subscribed. They closed Belorussian schools and monasteries; they banned the Belorussian language and even the very name Belorussia.

Only in 1918 was the desired goal achieved: the independence of the Belorussian People's Republic was proclaimed. But the Bolsheviks destroyed our independence. Over 2 million people, the flower of the nation, were killed during Stalin's genocide in Belorussia. Members of the intelligentsia, scientists, and the most successful peasants were not the only ones killed. The core of local administrators and civil servants were killed. Functionaries from remote Russian oblasts were appointed in their place. They immediately joined in the struggle against the Belorussian people. They began to close Belorussian schools, to blow up churches, and to destroy cultural values. In this way the foundations of national nihilism, which became the political essence and ideology of the Belorussian communist organization, were laid. This is the explanation and reason for the truly misanthropic behavior and exceptional conservatism of the present communist leadership in the Belorussian SSR.

The communists are responsible for genocide, for Chernobyl, for the millions who have been murdered, for the destruction of our national culture and traditions, for the destruction of the land, for moral degeneration, and for the decline of religion and morality. An organization which is founded on an anti-human, anti-national ideology cannot be democratic. Those who have their own people cannot respect other peoples. Therefore, the negative attitude of the communist leadership of the BSSR toward Lithuania's independence should not surprise us.

But the real question is this: How long can Lithuania hold out, and can it, in the situation which has come about, attain real independence in isolation? One can only answer these questions by undertaking specific political actions, based on a certain philosophy. The Soviet Union and the United States long ago divided up the world the way they wanted to. Therefore, one should not be surprised at how they cherish their own [word indistinct]. It would be good to be independent from both of them. Because of differences in development, our integration into the Western economic system is virtually impossible. For this, we need time, the right conditions, and purposeful work on a high level. A full-blooded market among the Baltic countries is also an unrealistic hope. It remains for us to follow the course which is suggested by life itself, by the historic situation which has come about, and by common sense.

A political commonwealth of all the western republics of the USSR, stretching from Estonia to Moldavia, must be initiated immtediately on the basis of solidarity with an independent Lithuania [applause], on the basis of countering the economic blockade imposed on it by the USSR, and on the basis of drawing up and coordinating a common policy for the democratization of society and the attainment of sovereignty. The concurrence, solidarity, and specific joint political actions of pro-independence forces in all the western republics are essential, notwithstanding their different levels of achievemnt and the existence of reactionary, conservative regimes in Belorussia and the Ukraine.

It is easy to see that the full independence of the Baltic region could turn out to be illusory if a democratic Belorussia and a democratic Ukraine do not come into being. One can also assume that a political commonwealth of the western republics, provided they attain the same economic and technological level, and have an adequate and diverse supply of resources at their disposal, is capable of creating its own market, and above all, standing up to any kind of economic blockade or news blackout. [applause]

In conclusion, I wish to express the hope that Sajudis and the new leadership which will be elected at this congress will preserve and further creatively develop all the political and intellectual gains which it has made since it came into being less than two years ago. I wish you the successful conceptualization of new creative ideas and original actions, for the sake of the freedom and sovereignty of your republic, and for the sake of the triumph of justice and the independence of all nations.

Long live independent Lithuania! [applause]

Russian Democratic Leader

LD2204165190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1414 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Speech by A.N. Brumel, chairman of the Russian Democratic Forum, at the Second Sajudis Congress held in the Sports Hall in Vilnius—live]

[Text] Ladies and gentlemen, esteemed delegates, at this great moment in your fight for freedom I am sending greetings to the people of Lithuania from the Russian Democratic Forum, from our people and from all progressively thinking citizens in Russia. [applause]

Dear friends, at the request of Deputies (Vitaliy Urantsev) and Boris Yeltsin, may I convey greetings to your congress from the people's deputies of Federal Democratic Russia, this is the future name of our republic proposed by B.N. Yeltsin. [applause] The majority of Moscoviet deputies are also fully behind you. [applause]

Brother Lithuanians, it is vital to withstand any psychological pressure and threats from the conservative center; it is necessary to withstand the economic blockade. Don't give in! Retreat is not possible. [applause]

The fresh wind of the new era has penetrated the stagnant valleys of the communist system. On the brink of the second and the third millenium, everything that interferes with our life will be thrown into the garbage dump of history by this wind.

Quite often the words Angry Moscow, as a synonym for an aggressor or occupying figure is heard. It is not Moscow, but a reactionary alignment of the Kremlin leaders who carried out aggressions in the past, and which is hindering the democratic movement in our days.

Freedom is the most precious thing. Nobody can take away a nation's right to freedom. The time when justice will reign is not far away; totalitarianism will not succeed! Long live the sovereign Lithuanian state. Long live the free Lithuanian people! [applause] Democratic Russia is on your side! [applause, shouts] Hurray! We shall win!

Non-Lithuanian Speakers Appeal to Gorbachev

LD2204123190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0929 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Appeal from non-Lithuanian speaking citizens of Lithuania to Soviet President Gorbachev; read by (Bolotin) in Russian to the second Sajudis Congress at the sports hall in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpts] In response to your appeal, we citizens of Lithuania who speak languages other than Lithuanian make this statement, being aware of our responsibility that the process of restoring sovereignty and statehood to Lithuania proceed along democratic lines without violence or discrimination.

We link our future with the sovereign republic of Lithuania, and we express our solidarity with the act of restoration of the independent state of Lithuania, because this is an act that reinstates the justice which was violated in 1940.

We have not experienced any hostility from citizens of Lithuanian descent. This is not a Lithuanian tradition,

and this is why we do not expect any ethnic tensions in the future in Lithuanian territory. Therefore, we do not need the protection of our rights through military power. [applause] Attempts to block the sovereignty of Lithuania will only make our position worse, and the use of military force will promote the image of a Russian-speaking enemy in the minds of the Lithuanian people.

Unconditional recognition of the sovereignty of the republic of Lithuania, and negotiations with the current freely elected parliament of Lithuania, in order to preserve economic and cultural links between Lithuania and the USSR would help us the most. [applause] [passage omitted]

Today the troops that are in Lithuania are a source of fear and suspicion. The mighty Union will not solve its problems and will not win glory and honor for itself by attempting to suppress a sovereign Lithuania through military force. The might of a large country lies in its ability to sit down at the negotiating table with a small peace- and freedom-loving Lithuania. [passage omitted]

Sajudis Supporters Differ on Compromise

LD2204201990 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Correspondent S. Medvedev video report from Vilnius; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Medvedev] The Sajudis congress continued its work in Vilnius today. It discussed drafts of a new set of rules and a program for the national movement. As you see, the sitting was quite a tumultuous occasion, but during the break it was possible to relax a little and even do a bit of choral singing.

However, that was possible only so long as discussion did not come around to the situation in the republic today. Then resentment over the decision concerning oil and gas supplies began to show through in the words of congress participants and guests. They tried to demonstrate—not so much, it seemed to me, to journalists, but rather to one another—that for the sake of the idea that has brought unity to Sajudis supporters—that of restoring Lithuania's statehood—everything can be sacrificed.

[Unidentified man, in accented Russian] I would rather die than agree not to be free.

[Medvedev] There are many who side with such a point of view, and they are to be found not only at today's congress. All the same, there are other voices, too, that are beginning to make themselves heard more and more clearly. One has the feeling that the political and economic situation that has developed in Lithuania now is acting as a powerful catalyst for polarizing opinion, even among those who previously regarded themselves as like-minded, both in Sajudis and in parliament. However, opponents of a tough line are in the minority.

[M.Y. Stakvilevicius, delegate to the Second Sajudis Congress and member of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet] Now that we have gotten ourselves into an impasse, somebody needs to take a step back, but in so doing one needs to be careful not to depart too far from one's principles. Without that, without a normal dialogue—and here I am speaking as one who has worked as a teacher for more than 35 years—without that there is no way out of the situation.

[Medvedev] But in a recent address to the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet, Algirdas Brazauskas said that a political way out of the sitaution needs to be sought, and for that he was severely criticized. Do you share his view?

[Stakvilevicius] Yes, I share it, and I believe that excessive caution serves no purpose. A moratorium needs to be declared on some of the decisions passed since 11 March, without in any way affecting our independence declaration....

[Medvedev] Does the economic situation that has come about now not confirm yet again that Lithuania operates within a unified economic mechanism with the Soviet Union?

[Stakvilevicius] Yes, that is how it has operated and how it will continue to operate for very many years....

[Medvedev] At a press conference in Vilnius today, Comrade Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, emphasized that the measures taken by the USSR Government should not be viewed as a blockade. It is not in any way a question of that. Now the USSR president is patiently awaiting sober decisions from the republic's leadership.

TASS Reports Sajudis Congress Avoids Split

LD2204182390 Moscow TASS in English 1806 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius April 22 TASS—The need to change the strategy and tactics of its activity was high on the agenda of discussion at the Second Congress of Sajudis, which continued its work here today.

The Sajudis public movement emerged two years ago and won most seats in the republican parliament at the recent elections, taking over practically all power.

Nearly 3,000 delegates discussed the movement's rules and programme, the congress's resolution and a number of appeals. Despite predictions, no split occurred within the movement. Most of the participants of the congress were against turning Sajudis into a political party. The split would have deprived Sajudis of its present status of the leading political force in Lithuania.

Much attention was given by speakers at the congress to the social and political situation in the republic. Although speakers did not admit the need to repeal the decisions made by the republican parliament on March

11, some of them stressed the advisability to reconsider Sajudis's tactics and strategy in the future.

A number of speakers denounced the change of the nature of economic relations between Lithuania and the USSR.

Sajudis Delegate Assails Secession Law

LD2204152690 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1310 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Address by Vladimir Kryuchkov, Sajudis delegate, at the Second Sajudis Congress held in the sports hall in Vilnius—live]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] I should like to say a few words about what personally worries and alarms me most of all, and why I am speaking in Russian. I must say frankly that I am distressed to see the way the political situation is going. The leadership of the union and the leaders of Yedinstvo, the CPSU and now also of the USSR citizens' committee are urging people into a completely unjustified, disastrous, and pointless confrontation. And yet legitimate democratic elections were held. A legitimate parliament was elected to represent the whole people. All parties and movements excluding the CPSU went into the elections with a program for the restoration of state independence. And the enactment restoring independence was a natural consequence of the will of the electorate. It was adopted unanimously, and even the representatives of the CPSU did not vote against it. That is clear. And the policy of nonrecognition of the legitimate parliament following defeat at the elections is not only unwise, but also immoral. Aside from the fact that by his actions Gorbachev risks ruining his reputation as reformer and democrat, he is turning, whether he wants to or not, into someone who is perpetuating the former policy of diktat. And the image of enemies of Lithuanian independence is being artificially applied to all of us. Opinion polls convincingly show, however, that about half the Russians and two-thirds of the Poles support the rebirth of Lithuania. [applause] Apart from Yedinstvo, there is also the Russian cultural centre, there is the Lithuanian Interethnic Coordination Association, and there is also simply the silent majority of people who have not declared themselves.

But the main tone, regrettably, is not set by them. It is set by people who have never lived in Lithuania. They have always inhabited the mythical zone of exclusively Russian interests. And unfortunately Moscow hears only their voice. It is precisely with these peoplle in mind that the law on secession was drawn up so hastily. It is a law which turns the constitutional right of free secession for each republic into an empty phrase, since it is clear in advance that, thanks to a deliberate anti-nationalities policy, as it now turns out to be, in the majority of republics—and in the Baltic region only Lithuania is an exception—the non-indigenous population already amounts to more than 30 per cent. That is why such strong psychological pressure is now being put on the non- Lithuanian population. People are being intimidated by talk that they will be deprived of their pensions and their jobs, and will be turned into slaves. The conditions are artificially created for the successful manipulation of minds, something that our social scientists; in inverted commas, are past masters at. They are now diligently earning their daily bread.

All this demonstrates once again that the whole of Soviet policy was purely colonial. During the years this policy was pursued, expensive production facilities, economically unviable and unsupported either by local raw materials or human resources, were set up. The Russians and people of other nationalities brought into the republic became the hostages of this policy. It seems to me, therefore, that for the non-Lithuanian section of the population, the question of independence is shifting from the political to the moral plane. I believe and understand our moral and ethical duty to be to give the Lithuanian people an opportunity to address this matter for themselves. Whatever the resolution of today's extremely difficult and grave situation is going to be, we have to live in this land and together with this people. And at this difficult time, our attitude to this most vitally important matter for the Lithuanian people, the matter of restoring an independent state, will determine the Lithuanian people's attitude to us and our children for many eyars to come. And all of us, and particularly Russians, need to think about this very seriously. [applause]

Vilnius Radio Carries 21 Apr Sajudis Congress

Agenda Adopted

LD2104103190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0900 GMT on 21 April begins its live coverage of the Second Sajudis Congress from the Sports Palace in Vilnius. There is a slight delay in getting the microphones in the hall switched on, and the presenter fills the time saying that there are 514 delegates attending the congress, which is also being televised by Lithuanian Television.

At 0904 GMT coverage starts with Deputy Vaclovas (?Aliulis) in the chair proposing a munite of silence to remember those Sajudis members who have died since the first congress two years ago.

At 0907 GMT he proposes the following agenda:
report on Sajudis activity,
examination and adoption of Sajudis rules,
examination and adoption of the Sajudis program, and
examination and adoption of Sajudis documents.

The agenda is adopted at 0916 GMT with the possibility of amendments later.

At 0921 GMT Virgilijus Cepaitis takes the rostrum to report on Sajudis activity. He describes the work of the Sajudis Seimas after the first congress, quoting excerpts

from some Seimas statements and decisions. The Seimas Council has been very active and meets almost every week. The Seimas Council consists of 35 people but many of them have had to take part in the USSR Supreme Soviet and now in the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania. Some have been appointed ministers. Sajudis has financially helped Armenia after the earthquake and spent money on restoring churches. A lot of money was spent in organizing the Supreme Council elections. He describes the collection of signatures in various actions concerning the liberation of Lithuania. The council maintains good relations with the corresponding organizations and deputies in Latvia and Estonia. Cepaitis emphasizes the impotance of the Baltic Concil's work. Sajudis representatives have taken part in various meetings and demonstrations in other republics, he says. Relations with Lithuanian emigres have been strengthened.

The greatest task of Sajudis at present is to preserve Lithuania's independence, he says in conclusion.

Landsbergis Speaks

LD2104120890

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian continues its live coverage of the Second Sajudis Congress from the Sports Palace in Vilnius.

At 0940 GMT Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania, takes the rostrum to make a political report. Landsbergis speaks for 37 mintues.

At 1024 GMT Chairman of the Estonian Council of Minsters Edgar Saavisar is invited to the rostrum. He starts his speech in Lithuanian and then continues in Estonian with passage by passage translation into Lithuanian. He stresses the importance of cooperation between Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia and of the recent signing of an agreement on the Baltic market. Both Lithuania and Estonia want negotiations with Moscow concerning their independence. Estonia is ready to share with Lithuania the hardships of the blockade. Together we will be victorious, he says. When Sajudis is strong, Lithuania will be strong, too. He presents Landsbergis with a symbolic gift—a sword made in Estonia, he says, to defend Lithuania.

At 1036 GMT the chairman says that there are many guests who would like to greet the congress. If time will allow, they will be given the opportunity.

At 1039 GMT a draft appeal to the Lithuanian people, the Supreme Council and the Lithuanian government is read, and at 1045 GMT this appeal is adopted by 810 votes.

At 1047 GMT the congress adjourns until 1200 GMT.

Unity Discussed

LD2104135290

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1200 GMT resumes its live coverage of the Second Sajudis Congress from the Sports Palace in Vilnius.

Aleksandras Abisalas is in the chair and proposes that an appeal to friendly governments throughout the world be read. Sigitas Geda, a poet, reads the appeal.

At 1216 GMT it is decided to submit the draft appeal to the editorial commission for amending.

At 1218 GMT Mecys Laurinkus, in his capacity as Sajudis secretary, thanks everyone who has helped him in his duties.

At 1226 GMT Antanas Terleckas greets the congress on behalf of the Lithuanian League of Freedom. He calls for unity, stating that attempts to drive a wedge between the league and the Sajudis are criminal. In his opinion the Lithuanian Communist Party still remains Moscow's fifth column in Lithuania and decent communists should leave that organization.

At 1237 GMT Justas Paleckis, on behalf of the Lithuanian Communist Party, greets the congress. The greeting is attributed to Algirdas Brazauskas. He confirms that the Lithuania Communist Party will always support independent Lithuania and will never oppose the resolution of 11 March.

At 1239 GMT Stasys Malkevicius urges the people of Lithuania to endure the blockade and be united.

AT 1248 GMT the chairman says the delegates have the draft regulations of the Sajudis in hand. There are two versions. The author of the first version delivers his report, which is followed by a report on the second version.

At 1315 GMT questions from delegates on the regulations are answered.

At 1335 GMT various announcements were made. Greetings from Prague, from Dubcek, were read.

At 1339 GMT a 20-minute break is called.

Regulations Debated

LD2104170590

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1400 GMT on 21 April continues its live coverage of the Second Sajudis Congress from the Sports Palace in Vilnius. The congress resumes its work, with a deputy reading an appeal to set up a blockade fund.

At 1405 GMT Landsbergis makes a statement on the political situation.

At 1411 GMT debates begin on how to discuss the regulations. The chairman announces that 39 delegates have asked to speak on this issue.

At 1422 GMT debates on the regulations begin.

At 1520 GMT a brief telegram of greetings to the Polish Solidarity Congress is adopted.

At 1525 GMT a Ukrainian delegate conveys greetings from the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka (Rukh).

At 1540 GMT a 20-minute interval is announced.

At 1600 GMT the session resumes, with a member of the Latvian Duma describing Latvia's advance toward independence and conveying greetings to the congress.

At 1609 GMT a greetings message is conveyed by the republican movement for the elimination of the consequences of Chernobyl.

At 1612 GMT Vytautuas Radzvilas once again describes some aspects of the version of the regulations before continuing the debates.

At 1624 GMT debates continued, with the procedure for electing members of the Sejmas being discussed.

Debates Continued

LD2104200390

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1655 GMT on 21 April continues its live coverage of the Second Sajudis Congress from the Sports Palace in Vilnius, with debate continuing on the Sajudis regulations.

At 1720 GMT the question is raised whether to continue discussions today or to continue tomorrow. By a majority vote, it is decided to continue the discussions today.

However, at 1730 GMT the live relay of the congress proceedings is discontinued.

Registration of Members Debated

LD2104204390

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 1800 GMT on 21 April resumes its live relay of the Second Sajudis Congress from the Sports Palace in Vilnius, with debates on the Sajudis regulations continuing.

At 1854 GMT a vote is taken to discontinue the debate. The majority of delegates favor concluding the discussion, but in spite of this the discussion continues.

At 1856 GMT a delegate whose name is not heard maintains that members of various parties and religious confessions should belong to Sajudis.

At 1900 GMT the session chairman proposes that those delegates who wish to speak should submit their proposals to the editorial commission in writing.

At 1902 GMT Delegate Peceliunas speaks on the registration of members. A debate on the issue ensues and a vote is taken on the necessity of registering members. The proposal is adopted by a majority vote. However, this is not the final vote and voting on all sections of the regulations will take place on 22 April.

At 1913 GMT a vote is taken to register members only in the lower sections of the organization. The result of the vote is inconclusive; the issue will be voted on again on 22 April.

At 1919 GMT Delegate Burdulis announces that clergymen do not intend to take part in Sajudis' activity. This is not accepted by the delegates because there are clergymen among them.

At 1919 GMT the congress adjourns until 0700 GMT 22 April.

Landsbergis Addresses 21 Apr Sajudis Congress

LD2104160890 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1405 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Speech by Vytautas Landsbergis, president of the Lithuanian Supreme Council, at the Sajudis Congress in Vilnius—live]

[Text] Esteemed congress, I thought perhaps I should describe very briefly the telephone conversation I had during the break with Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene. She is currently in Copenhagen with Foreign Minister Saudargas. She telephoned from the residence of the Danish prime minister. They are being received in Denmark and Norway in accordance with their rank, with very official protocol welcomes at airports, with presentations in parliament, and in government-level negotiations. [applause]

There was a very great gathering in Norway of the international information media, the like of which has not been seen since the visit by Khrushchev, according to the Norwegians. After consultations in the Danish capital today, the Danish Foreign Minister left for Dublin, where the foreign ministers of the twelve European countries are meeting on the problems of Lithuania and the Baltic. He will return tomorrow and will describe to our ministers what has been decided. Tomorrow, a meeting of the Northern Council on Lithuania will be held in Copenhagen, and they will take part. Then the Swedish foreign minister, who will take part in the meeting, will take the esteemed Prunskiene and Saudargas in his plane to Stockholm for further negotiations. [applause] These negotiations will take place on Monday. On Monday afternoon, they fly via Moscow. As you know, on Monday the Supreme Council delegation headed by Deputy Chairman Bronius Kuzmickas goes to Moscow, striving for consultations that could prepare

future negotiations. In the evening, they will hold a press conference. [passage indistinct]

I also want to read to you a text datelined Paris, 19 April of the current year, concerning my appeal to the French president. This is his reply:

France, as you remind us, had close relations with the Republic of Lithuania. It has never recognized the illegal annexation of August 1940. Lithuania's right to independence is indisputable. Fifty years of history have created complex ties between Vilnius and Moscow. Only negotiations can solve various arising problems. Dialogue is the only way recognized by France and other states of the European Community. This was the message the foreign minister conveyed to the Soviet leaders on 30 March at my request. Please accept, Mr. President, my great respect.
[Signed] Francois Mitterand. [applause]

As you see, this is a simple answer stating what has been said by the French president and the French Government, but the fact of the letter itself is, I think, very significant. Therefore I wanted to read it to you. Perhaps Moscow's joy that the world does not recognize us will end soon. [applause]

More on Landsbergis Speech

LD2104152190

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian at 0940 GMT on 21 April carries live a 37-minute political report by Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania, at the Second Sajudis Congress held at the Sports Hall in Vilnius.

Landsbergis devoted much of his report to the history of Sajudis, describing the work of the Sajudis movement, of its Seimas Council from the early days of the organization. He then continues: The question arises how Sajudis should continue its functions in the Lithuanian political panorama. After having been in the opposition, at present the candidates supported by it constitute a majority in the Supreme Council. But the assertion that Sajudis is on principle an opposition organization and must always remain in the opposition does not seem to be justified. This would no longer be Sajudis, but some kind of experimental laboratory. Sajudis, of course, has its opposition functions. It must remain in opposition in some rayons, where the conservative forces have won local elections.

Landsbergis goes on: Sajudis as an organization is essential. It must continue to arouse and implement the hope of Lithuania's independence. Sajudis is a new phenomenon which we have seen and see widely spreading in Eastern Europe in recent years. It has spread and is felt to be part of a large democratic movement. At the beginning we did not understand it, we did not understand that there were Estonians and Latvians—that we were together. This part of the earth has a common fate toward which we are advancing together. Our relations with Polish Solidarity have demonstrated that we are a representative organization, at the beginning informal, later registered, but in these relations nobody asks whether you are registered or not. Today it is as the representative of this nation. [passage indistinct] At that time there was no Hungarian Democratic Forum, the East German New Forum, no Czechoslovak Citizens Forum, and others. But Sajudis was there already. And these countries used to ask us how we were acting. Maybe, they took some examples from us.

In concluding my speech I would like to say that Sajudis should orient itself into that sphere which is very essential both to Lithuania and others, into what we now call people's diplomacy, into the interaction of mass movements, mutual contacts. It is not sufficient to enjoy the fact that a new Supreme Council has been elected democratically, that the Sajudis representatives are in the majority. In important international relations, if they are left to a score of parliamentarians who can not always leave their direct duties, nothing will get done. The Foreign Ministry which is being organized will also not be able to do this. We need more people who are prepared for international diplomacy. [words indistinct] Sajudis has a great deal to do.

Landsbergis concludes with the wish that Sajudis always remain young.

Sajudis Member Interviewed on 21 Apr Congress

LD2104090990 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0827 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius (ADN)—The Second Congress of the Lithuanian "Sajudis" movement opened in Vilnius today. The 950 delegates intend to adopt a new program and, possibly, new rules as well, change its organization structure, and elect its leading bodies.

Large parts of the program have already grown obsolete since the founding congress two years ago, Seimas member Virgilijus Cepaitis stated in an ADN interview. The new program document, of which there is two versions, is based extensively on the election plaform with which Sajudis won the legislative elections in March. The foundation of a strong Sajudis party, sought by only a fraction of the delegates, has not been put on the congress agenda for now, because of the danger of a split connected with it. However, there is already extensive agreement that there should be no place in the movement's new leading bodies for any of the Sajudis representatives elected to the Supreme Council or serving in the government. An exception might be made for head of state Vytautas Landsbergis, who, contrary to earlier statements, intends to stand again for chairman of the Sajudis Seimas.

Sajudis Congress To Decide Membership Issues

LD2104201290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Video report by special correspondent Aleksandr Shashkov from the Sajudis congress held at the Palace of Sports in Vilnius on 21 April; from the "Vremya" newscast—recorded; first two paragraphs are announcer-read introduction]

[Text] Two congresses are at work in Vilnius today, and both of them are, in my view, important. At one of them members of Sajudis, the public organization that currently has very considerable influence in the republic, have gathered, while members of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU platform gathered at the other one.

Our special correspondents in Vilnius describe these events. It is evident in the interviews they conducted that the assessments of the situation in the republic were given by people holding completely different stances.

[Shashkov] The Sajudis congress, which is to decide what Sajudis is to be like from now on, opened today in one of the largest halls in Vilnius, the Palace of Sports.

It is now impossible even to say how many people the delegates are representing. There is no registration of supporters in Sajudis, and this issue is almost the most important principal on the agenda of the congress. After all, if a decision is taken to introduce membership, Sajudis will be transformed from a national movement into a political party. It is primarily the way this problem is addressed that will dictate the draft rules and programs that are to be examined by the participants in the congress. They will also have to elect a new leadership, as many of the movement's current leaders are now working in the republic's Supreme Soviet and government.

What will be the main issues around which the discussions will unfold at the Sajudis congress?

[Z. Potasinkas, congress delegate, identified by caption] The discussion will be about the two drafts on membership. One of them is based on the desire to have a more precise, definite membership of Sajudis. The other, however, is—as we had before—a Sajudis membership that is not clearly delineated. I think that it will in fact be the latter concept that remains, because Sajudis is a very broad movement that embraces all the strata of Lithuania's inhabitants, including Russians, Poles, and Belorussians. I think that it will be this that allows everyone to find his place in Sajudis, in tackling the social and cultural programs.

[Shashkov] Does the appearance of these two currents signify a split in Sajudis?

[Potasinkas] That is simply unlikely to happen, because some people are planning for some graver situation here, yet we are proceeding from the view that the democratic process will continue both in Lithuania and, we assume, in the Soviet Union. [video shows exterior of hall; delegates assembled in hall, standing and singing; congress under way; clergyman speaking from rostrum; interviewee in foyer].

Lithuanian Sajudis Congress Calls for Endurance

LD2104120190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0921 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Speech by Virgilijus Capaitis reporting on Sajudis activity since the first congress, at the Second Sajudis Congress at the Sports Hall in Vilnius—live]

[Exceprt] [passage omitted] At present, when independence has already been reached, Sajudis is facing completely new tasks—preserving independence and preventing its destruction. The Supreme Council will not be able to do this without your support. Lately the press, dominated by the Lithuanian Communist Party although it calls itself independent, has tried to discredit the Supreme Council and its individual deputies, it tries to prove that a mistake was made on 11 March, that the Supreme Council must amend its resolution. There are voices that we should give up our independence for oil.

But one can view the blockade in a different way. In breaking off economic relations with us, Moscow recognizes our independence de facto and itself dismisses us from the Soviet Union. [applause]

There is only one way left for us: Endure and start creating real independence by reorganizing our industry and agriculture. Enterprises which are swallowing fuel oil and gas are essential not to Lithuania but to Moscow. In any case. Enterprises of this type will have to be transformed [perprofiliuoti] sometime in the future.

Then let us do it now. Many collective and state farms work with losses. Thus let us encourage private management of farms which does not depend on centralized suplies. Lastly, if Moscow, wishing to destabilize our market, does not give us its paper rubles, let us introduce our litas [Lithuanian currency] as soon as possible. Let us all feel as though we live in an independent country, and those who dream of returning to the embrace of the Soviet Union which promises them, and only them, a life without cares, should be left alone with their conscience. [passage omitted]

Sajudis Congress Appeal on Economic Blockade

LD2104180590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1039 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Appeal to the Lithuanian people, Supreme Council, and government adopted at the Sajudis Congress session in Vilnius—live]

[Text] Dear people of Lithuania, our striving for freedom has encountered a serious test. The Soviet Union has begun an economic blockade of Lithuania. We must believe that it will use other methods, as well,

making our situation even more difficult. We expected this. Not a single nation has regained independence without great efforts and sacrifices.

It would suffice for the Lithuanians to remember two cruelly suppressed uprisings in the 19th century, and the 1918 independence act, about which the world heard only a few years later. Our forefathers knew how to make sacrifices, and they endured. Will we not be worthy of their memory?

In applying economic sanctions to Lithuania, the Soviet Union wishes to deal a blow to everybody's life, hoping that material interests will take the upper hand, that dissatisfaction will be provoked, and that Lithuanian society will be set against its democratically elected government. Moscow wishes to prove that we cannot live without Soviet socialism.

Sajudis understands that not all Lithuania's inhabitants are equally strong, conscious and devoted, but believes that this reborn Lithuania, which expressed itself for independence in meetings of hundreds of thousands and demonstrated self-determination in the elections, will keep its word and attitude with honor.

Sajudis also believes that the people of Lithuania creative and tenacious enough to work in a productive manner, even limiting their everyday need for such important things as fuel and power. Sajudis urges that rumors about future unemployment and poverty be ignored. Many people could have doubts if they had choose to between the two values—freedom or prosperity—but we do not have such a choice. We are seperating ourselves from an economically poor empire embraced by general chaos.

What then are our risks? We may experience new hardships, but if we fear them, we will condemn ourselves to the fate of a lodger in a poor country for centuries. Let us not think only about ourselves, but also about our children, like book carriers and post-war partisans were thinking about us. Only moral strength, unity, and tenacity will be valued.

Esteemed leaders of the republic of Lithuania! We support your decisions and believe in your collective wisdom. We understand that at the beginning of your work it is not easy to precisely calculate each tactical step. Furthermore, as it is essential to work in an atmosphere of constant threat, some steps might have created doubts in society, but we are pleased at your firm stand on the main issue of independence. Bearing in mind the Soviet Union's economic pressure, we urge you take new concrete steps to save energy sources in production and everyday life. We propose to seek ways of avoiding unemployment, to draw up as soon as possible an action plan against all possible unfriendly actions by the Soviet Union, including a new occupation of Lithuania.

We draw attention to the fact that an economic blockade makes our situation more difficult only from outside, but essentially eases it. The Soviet Union, behaving in this way, seperates us from itself. This demonstrates the value of its declarations about peoples' friendship and humanism. We assure you that the majority of the people of Lithuania will understand correctly if the government asks them to live more thriftily and modestly for the time being. Let us be guided by the great aim and led by the hope of a brighter future! Long live independent Lithuania!

TASS Reports on Lithuanian Sajudis Congress

LD2104211390 Moscow TASS in English 2102 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius April 22 TASS—By TASS special correspondents:

The Second Congress of the Lithuanian Sajudis Movement started its work here Saturday.

The movement, which emerged some two years ago, enjoys confidence and support of a considerable majority of the republic's population. It received the overwhelming majority of seats in the Lithuanian parliament at the latest elections and concentrated all power in the republic in its leadership's hands.

Many political observers spoke of the possibility of a split at the Congress. Views of participants in the Congress on the movement's future have parted. Some of them see Sajudis as a political party, others as a movement. Still others believe a party should be formed on the basis of the movement.

Many members of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party believe that the reorganisation of Sajudis into a political party would be in their interests as this would make clear the distribution of political forces in the republic.

Many Communists support the movement and if a new party emerged, they will have to choose between Sajudis and the Communist Party.

The delegates failed to come to a final decision Saturday and will continue the discussion Sunday.

The delegates also discussed the rules of Sajudis.

Lithuanian President and Chairman of Sajudis' leadership Vytautas Landsbergis, speaking at the congress, assessed the social and political situation in the republic.

Although speakers did not discuss the abrogation of the decisions taken by the republican parliament on March 11, some of them spoke in favour of reassessment of Sajudis' and the Lithuanian leadership's tactics and strategy.

The congress will continue its work Sunday.

Sajudis Congress To Review Strategy

LD2104071990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0650 GMT 21 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Kazis Ustsila]

[Text] Vilnius, 21 Apr (TASS)—The Second Congress of the social movement Sajudis began work in the Lithuanian capital today.

This movement, which arose around two years ago, enjoys the trust and support of the significant majority of inhabitants of the republic. In the recent elections it received the overwhelming majority of seats in Lithuania's Supreme Soviet and has practically concentrated all power in the hands of its aktiv. Naturally, the need has arisen to review the strategy and tactics of its activity, which will be the main theme of the conversation at the congress. Congress delegates are also to decide if Sajudis is to be a new, additional party, or if it is to preserve as before its status of social movement. It is intended that the congress will work for two days.

Lithuanian Party, Sajudis Congresses Open

LD2104085190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Here are two reports from Vilnius. The Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU platform has just opened there. Its delegates represent 37,000 of the republic's communists. The congress is being conducted in three stages. Today sees the start of the first stage, during which the political report of the Central Committee will be pronounced and the leading bodies will be elected.

The congress of Lithuanian Communists is taking place in difficult conditions. This applies also to the organizational aspect: The sittings are taking place in premises which clearly are cramped. Despite the unfavorable propaganda about the party by certain mass media in the republic, all correspondents have been accredited at the congress without discrimination or limits.

Comrade Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, is taking part in the work of the Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform.

The Sajudis congress opened an hour ago, also in the capital of Lithuania. The creation of a political party based on sajudis will be debated, and there will also be discussion of draft rules and of an alternative program. The agenda includes electing a new chairman since Landsbergis, the current leader of the movement, has become chairman of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet.

Lithuanian Communist Party Elects Leaders

LD2204185490

[Editorial Report] Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian at 1100 GMT on 22 April broadcasts a report on the 21st Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party (CPSU Platform), which took place on 21 April. The congress ended with the adoption of a number of documents dealing with the political situation in the republic, including an appeal to communists and all working people of the Soviet Union, and an appeal to parents, mothers, and young people in the republic.

A secret, closed vote was then held, in which 750 delegates took part. Originally, 789 delegates were elected to the congress. Virtually all the delegates who arrived for the congress took part in the voting, but some were unable to, either because they were ill or because work commitments obliged them to depart early.

A Central Committee and a Control and Auditing Commission were elected. The election of the leading bodies followed. All the delegates took part in the voting. A 16-man bureau was elected which includes representatives of all social groups and nationalities: Lithuanians, Russians, Poles, workers, collective farmers, and members of the intelligentsia. Mykolas Burokievicius was elected first secretary. Vladislav Nikolayevich Shved was elected second secretary. The secretaries elected include Valentin Antanovich Lazutka, first secretary of the Vilnius City Party Committee.

The congress will continue its work in early June.

New Party Secretary Interviewed

PM2104205190 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 22 Apr 90 First Edition p 2

[Interview in Vilnius with M. Burokievicius, first secretary of the Interim Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee, by special correspondent A. Solarev; date unspecified: "Opposition to Separatism", first paragraph is editorial introduction]

[Text] The 21st Congress of the Lithuania Communist Party (on the CPSU Platform) opened in Vilnius 21 April. Before it began our correspondent interviewed M. Burokievicius, first secretary of the Interim Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee.

[Solarev] Does the congress' ordinal number constitute further emphasis on the continuity of the traditions of the Lithuanian Communist Party, which was founded in October 1918?

[Burokievicius] Undoubtedly. The Lithuanian Communist Party, which is part of the unified CPSU together with other union republic communist parties, continues that party's tradition. It is now being proposed that we register as a new party. But this was done 26 June 1940, when Lithuanian Communists emerged from underground. And we are the heirs and continuers of their work. Registration is impossible for two other reasons. First, we do not recognize the legality of the Lithuanian republic, which was declared unilaterally, nor do we recognize the current Supreme Soviet as a legitimate state organ. Second, the previous convocation of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme

Soviet recognized the legality of the Lithuanian Communist Party's 1940 act of registration.

[Solarev] How will the congress itself be held?

[Burokievicius] We have decided to hold it in three stages. At the first stage—that is, today—we will hear a political report on the position in Lithuania and define our strategy and tactics. The party's permanent leading organs will also be elected. The congress will resume in approximately a month's time. We will then discuss the draft platforms for the 28th Congress and the CPSU Statutes, and choose delegates for the congress. The third stage will come after the 28th congress: We will adopt the Lithuanian Communist Party action program and the status of the party.

[Solarev] In what atmosphere is the 21st Congress being held?

[Burokievicius] A very complex atmosphere. The USSR Constitution is still being violated in the republic, and all the Supreme Soviet's laws and resolutions run counter to its provisions. The reactionary wing of "Sajudis," which has seized power in the Supreme Soviet, has embarked on the path of political adventurism and is leading Soviet Lithuania into a political dead end and the Lithuanian people down the road to tragedy. The republic has been hit by a wave of nationalist euphoria. All Supreme Soviet decisions are made in the people's name, yet only 41.2 percent of voters on the electoral rolls voted for the current deputies. The voters either didn't vote or voted against. This means that the Supreme Soviet has no right to speak on behalf of the entire people. And it is not just talking about doing things, but actually doing them. The appeals from the USSR president and the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers are rejected, again on behalf of the entire people. Despite the assurances given by the leaders of the Supreme Soviet and "Sajudis" about the future equality and free development of representatives of all the nations and ethnic groups living in Lithuania, there is growing ethnic tension in the republic. People do not believe these vocal, attractive words.

[Solarev] The republic's mass media have now launched a slander campaign against the Communist Party leadership and against ordinary Communists.

[Burokievicius] Indeed, an atmosphere of moral and psychological terror has been created against us in the republic. A real witch-hunt is under way against certain Central Committee secretaries and the leaders of a number of city and rayon party committees. What price the following article in a youth newspaper: "A deserter fleeing the Army with a rifle was asked: 'Why'd you take the rifle?' 'To kill Burokievicius,' was the answer." Anecdotes, crude insinuations, and slanderous fabrications are all present in every publication. Moreover, our party committees are having their premises taken away from them. There are more than 7,000 members of our party in Klaipeda, for instance. And there are around 3,000 in the independent Lithuanian Communist Party. Yet the the gorkom [city party committee] premises were totally taken over by them, and our comrades were simply not allowed in. The other day a disgraceful thing happened at the "Lyaliya" Production Association in Vilnius. Under the leadership of B. Dzedavichyus, general director of the association, everything—furniture and documents—was thrown out into the corridor from the party committee premises, where five women party committee members were present along with Secretary G. Komarova. The chairs were literally torn from under the women sitting on them. That's no longer moral and psychological terror—it's terror plain and simple.

Around 900 delegates have been elected to the congress, and, with guests and the press, there will be around 1,000 people there. But we were unable to lease premises of a suitable size in the republic's capital. Isn't that discrimination against us? That's why we're having to hold the congress at the Higher Party School, whose assembly hall can hold 600 people—the rest will be housed in neighboring auditoriums with a radio linkup.

[Solarev] But, despite all the difficulties, the party is increasing its numbers and gaining strength.

[Burokievicius] Yes, we now have more than 40,000 Communists. That is considerably more than at the start of the year. The number is increasing literally every day. And not only through those who were already party members—there are entirely new members too. It is particularly gratifying that young people are joining the party. Currently around 100,000 former Lithuanian Communist Party members have still not determined their party allegiance. Many of them do not risk joining our party for fear of the moral and psychological terror reigning in the republic with respect to our party members, as I have already mentioned. Nonetheless, party committees have been reestablished in 33 of the republic's rayons—that is, the overwhelming majority.

[Solarev] Has the leadership of the independent Lithuanian Communist Party been invited to the congress?

[Burokievicius] No, we have not invited them. Look, we take entirely different ideological positions. Our ideology is Marxism-Leninism and our goal is to fundamentally change the status of Lithuanian statehood within the USSR. Their aim is to restore a bourgeois Lithuanian state, and their ideology is social democracy with clear elements of nationalism. They like to crow about and praise that state's historical legacy in both the historical and cultural spheres. So there are no independent Lithuanian Communist Party representatives at our congress, just as there are no correspondents from those local publications which adopt anticommunist and anti-Soviet positions.

[Solarev] How will the congress be covered?

[Burokievicius] Our newspaper, SOVETSKAYA LITVA, which is published in three languages—Russian, Lithuanian, and Polish—will provide detailed reports on the congress in its ordinary issues. Unfortunately, this

will be a week later, since the newspaper is currently published weekly and printed outside the republic. Regrettably, the pluralism which the "Sajudis" leaders loudly trumpeted on coming to power does not exist today. A highly paradoxical situation has come about: Party publishing houses belonging to the CPSU are today printing publications which are waging a widespread slander campaign against that party. Yet we who uphold the CPSU Platform are not allowed to publish our newspaper at these printing centers. There is also no hope with local TV and radio. The "Sajudis" Congress is currently being held too, and this means that all TV and radio time will be taken up by that. So before the next issue of SOVETSKAYA LITVA we are very much counting on help from the union mass media.

Report on Pro-Moscow Lithuanian Party Congress

LD2204154190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1418 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] The first stage of the 21st Congress of the Communist Party [CP] of Lithuania on the platform of the CPSU has ended in Vilnius. A report from our special correspondent in the Lithuanian capital, Aleksey Kalachev:

[Begin recording] [Kalachev] The 21st congress of the CP of Lithuania was conducted in rather difficult conditions, as regards the organizational aspect of the matter, as well as the atmosphere, I mean the propaganda atmosphere which was created around it by some of the mass information media in the republic. Nevertheless, the congress took place. About 900 delegates came to it, representing almost 37,000 members of the CP of Lithuania on the platform of the CPSU. The documents adopted here point out that the time which has elapsed since the 20th congress of the CP of Lithuania is convincing confirmation that the schism of communists in the republic occurred through the fault of forces which in essence reject the idea of scientific socialism, and deny Marxist-Leninst methodology of evaluating and directing social processes. It was repeatedly stressed here, and was also pointed out in the documents, that through making a critical assessment of the experience accumulated, and drawing the due conclusions from the errors committed, the party is full of determination to carry out its renewal and affirm its independence of action.

It was decided to conduct the 21st congress of the CP of Lithuania on the platform of the CPSU in three stages. Only the first stage of it ended on 21 April. During this first stage, the political report of the CP Central Committee to the 21st congress of the CP of Lithuania was heard. The congress will end, however, on 21 July, after the 28th CPSU congress has been held.

I invited to the microphone Mykolas Burokevicius, first secretary of the CP of Lihuania on the platform of the CPSU.

[Burokevicius] The central committee of the CP of Lithuania will build its work in such a way that the party's decisions and resolutions and program documents are consistently fulfilled; it will consistently conduct work on organizing the decisions of the CPSU Central Committee and the decisions of the coming 28th congress of the CPSU, tht is, the documents of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. [end recording]

Lithuanian Party Platform Condemns Separatists

LD2104181590 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1720 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius, 21 April (TASS special correspondents report) The need to preserve and strengthen Soviet power in the republic, the socialist statehood of Lithuania, and the entire Soviet Union as a federative state was discussed today at a congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania (on the CPSU platform) which opened in the Lithuanian capital. Mikolas Burokevicius, first secretary of the provisional Central Committee, delivered a report to the forum.

Burokevicius said the congress is taking place in difficult conditions: there is a schism in the ranks of the communists of the republic, the sociopolitical situation is more acute, and the socialist orientation of Lithuania's development is threatened.

In the view of the congress participants, in order to overcome the crisis situation in Lithuania it is essential to resolve the issue of satisfying the everyday needs of the Republic's population, supplying it with housing and consumer goods.

The congress believes that the communist Party of Lithuania on the CPSU platform is involved in the process of the democratization and renewal of the CPSU, and advocates the real state sovereignty of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic in a federation of peoples of the USSR who are undergoing renewal, and advocates the economic and spiritual independence of all peoples living in Lithuania.

Addressing the congress, Andrey Girenko, CPSU Central Committee secretary, noted that the CPSU Central Committee well understands the conditions in which Lithuanian Communists who maintain their loyalty to the ideals and principles of the CPSU must operate. He laid out his position on the sovereignty and independence of Lithuania. Today, this is a fundamental question, the CPSU Central Committee secretary noted, a question which penetrates all spheres of public and individual consciousness. Andrey Girenko said the party, which speaks decisively against any attempts to destroy the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and divide the CPSU into national sections, confirms its adherence to the right of a nation to self-determination.

From the tribune of the congress calls were heard for the resignation of Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the

Lithuanian Republic's Supreme Council, and of Kazimiera Prunskiene, chairman of the Council of Ministers. Speaking about a way out of the crisis which has come about, many deputies spoke in favor of introducing presidential rule in the Republic.

The resolution "On the 20th Congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party" says, in part, that the separatist and schismatic activities of the leaders of the reorganized Lithuanian Communist Party have placed the very existence of a Leninist Communist Party in Lithuania under real threat.

The congress decisively condemned those who, under the flag of patriotism, are slipping into nationalism, whereby the reorganization of the party is in fact becoming its liquidation, and it categorically rejected attempts to accuse Communists of betraying the interest of the Lithuanian people.

Brazauskas, Landsbergis Speak at 20 Apr Council

LD2004232590 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Lithuania's Supreme Council devoted today's sittings to the problems connected with the economic blockade started by the Soviet Union. The debates were often heated and outspoken and resulted in the decision to set up a state commission to resolve the issues connected with the economic blockade. Vice Premier Algirdas Brazauskas, who is chairman of a special State Commission to provide the economy with fuel and other power resources, gave a detailed account of the situation. Rations have been fixed for separate groups of transport. In this way we can hold out for a month, said Algirdas Brazauskas. The [word indistinct] thermal power plant which uses fuel oil is operating at a very low capacity. The fuel resources will be exhausted in 12 days. For the past 24 hours Lithuania has still been receiving electric energy from the Soviet Union. These supplies have not been cut off as yet. As to gas, the critical limit has been reached already. We get only about 15 percent of the usual amount which is enough for consumer needs. Getting gas are the food, glass industries, and the production of television tubes with non-stop technological processes. A shortage of liquid gas which was supplied by the Mazeikiai oil refinery is also to be felt. These aren't just power problems, but with each day the supplies of raw materials and different products are reduced, too. Algirdas Brazauskas said that it was impossible to go on under blockade conditions for a longer period of time. He urged the Supreme Council to give serious thought to new possible political decisions which would permit to find a way out of the deadlock.

The deputies followed up with lots of questions, some of which regrettably sounded like accusations of the government. Opinions varied ranging from urges to make not the least condescension to proposals to discuss even Lithuania's independence with Moscow, knowing that we shall not give it up just the same.

Taking part in the debates was also chairman of the Supreme Council, Vytautas Landsbergis. He said among other things that certain compromises had been proposed to Moscow through unofficial channels, but they were not reciprocated. Vytautas Landsbergis said that those efforts need not be discussed in public as this might only do harm. Answering the deputies' questions, the chairman said that up to now the attempts to establish contacts with Moscow had been unsuccessful. New unexpected facts were revealed, however. Vytautas Landsbergis said that he had proposed in a private letter to meet the Kremlin leaders but received no answer. It turned out that he had been twice invited formally to take part in sittings of the Soviet Union's Federational Council, Lithuania being considered part of the Federation, and Vytautas Landsbergis chairman of its Supreme Soviet. Vytautas Landsbergis said he had explained in a private letter that he would have gladly come if the invitation even to that very sitting had been formulated differently, not interpreting Lithuania still as part of the Soviet Union.

Landsbergis, Brazauskas 'Clash' Over Blockade

LD2004181790 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1738 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 20 (TANJUG)—Lithuanian deputy prime minister and leader of the splinter Communist Party of Lithuania clashed with Lithuanian Parliament President Landsbergis in parliament today. The reason for the clash was the decision of the Lithuanian Parliament's stand on the growing pressure from Moscow.

Brazauskas today suggested that Vilnius, at the demand of President Mikhail Gorbachev and Prime Minister Nikolay Ryzhkov, again review the laws it recently adopted—on the obligatory path of allegiance to the current leadership, on Soviet property in Lithuania and the law under which Lithuanians can decide for themselves whether they will serve in the Soviet Army.

Landsbergis accused Brazauskas of selling out the republic to Moscow, describing the current economic blockade of Lithuania as an open dictatorship and threat to the whole world.

In the meantime, rumours about Lithuania's alleged readiness on a two-year moratorium on its decision to secede were denied today. A group of Americans of Lithuanian origin suggested the idea about a moratorium to Landsbergis, believing that it would enable peaceful negotiations with the Kremlin on the republic's future independence.

Moscow has broadened the economic sanctions against Lithuania, so now, along with oil and gas, it has discontinued the delivery of a number of other products.

According to Brazauskas Lithuania can endure only two weeks of such a blockade, which will be followed by complete economic collapse.

Brazauskas Urges Revision of Lithuanian Decisions

LD2004153590 Vilnius Domestic Service in Russian 1200 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Studio Interview with Algirdas Brazauskas, deputy prime minister of the Lithuanian SSR, by unidentified correspondent on 20 April—live or recorded]

[Excerpts] [passage omitted] [Brazauskas] Cardinal decisions must be taken within the next two weeks and the blockade lifted. Otherwise I cannot even imagine what will happen. I by no means wish to intimidate radio listeners. I wish to say that we all must be mobilized and organized. The way out will be found, I have no doubts about it. [Passage omitted]

[Correspondent] You said that the situation should be solved within the next two weeks. What is the way out?

[Brazausaks] The main way is a revision of political decisions in the Supreme Council. I cannot see any other way to solve this conflict and ease the siuation, only by way of adopting new decisions or revising them, the decision which have been adopted. [passage omitted]

Landsbergis Reaffirms Stand on Independence

LD2204075390 Hamburg DPA in German 0715 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Excerpt] Moscow (DPA)—Lithuanian President Vytautas Landsbergis today refuted reports that the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet might be prepared to suspend its 11 March declaration of independence. Landsbergis told DPA in a telephone conversation this morning that there has so far been no talk of such a proposal. "If there are any suggestions from Moscow we will, of course, discuss them. However we cannot rescind the decision of 11 March. That is impossible for legal and moral reasons."

On possible measures against Moscow's tightening blockade, Landsbergis said that Lithuania is holding negotiations with the other Baltic republics of Estonia and Latvia on aid measures. However there are limits to aid from this quarter. It has just become known that the Soviet Union has forbidden Estonia to support Lithuania.

Landsbergis went on to say that Lithuania can do "very little" on its own. The Lithuanians can only try to keep the economy going and solve the problem of unemployment. "Moscow intends to create artificial unemployment in Lithuania, but that will be a blow against the working class."

Landsbergis also did not rule out a catastrophic situation developing in Lithuania within one to two weeks. "Factories will be at a standstill, there will be more and more unemployed, and great shortages will occur. All that will be a great spectacle for the Western democracies," he added. [passage omitted]

Lithuania Issues Appeals To Soviet Leaders

To Gorbachev

LD2004224390 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Taking into consideration today's events in Lithuania, the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Council agreed upon the text of two letters. One of the messages, approved at the meeting of the Presidium today, is addressed to the radical inter-regional group of deputies in the Supreme Soviet of the USSR. The second is a message to the Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev. Late tonight a press conference was held at the Lithuanian Supreme Council at which its chairman, Vytautas Landsbergis, acquainted the Lithuanian and foreign journalists with the text of the new appeal to Mikhail Gorbachev. It says the following in particular:

The Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania remains faithful to the flexible and mutually acceptable spirit of negotiation, whichever [as heard] is possible under the current circumstances and which might give an opening to real prerequisites for bringing closer the stands of the two sides.

The Supreme Council of the republic of Lithuania realizes the concern of the Soviet leadership, arising from the refusal by Lithuanian young men to serve in the Armed Forces of the USSR. The Lithuanian Supreme Council has already expressed its stand on this problem and has taken upon itself the moral responsibility for the consequences of the possible refusal to do military service. However, it is not only the present spring call-up of Lithuanian youth that gave rise to the problem, as you point out in your telegram. The problem is one of a much wider scope and in our opinion this is one of the key objects in the future political consultations and negotiations. Those youths who express their will to serve in the Armed Forces of the USSR will encounter no obstacles.

We would also like to understand correctly our decision on the certificates of the citizens of the Republic of Lithuania. You are aware of the law on the citizenship of the Lithuanian Republic, adopted on 3 November, 1989, by which all the permanent residents of the republic, irrespective of their nationality, can become citizens of Lithuania without any restrictions. Certificates for the citizen, which can be issued to all citizens of Lithuania without any exception, do not infringe any rights or freedoms of any person, nor do they grant any special privileges. Our laws have it clearly stipulated that all the residents of Lithuania enjoy and will enjoy in the future equal social and economic rights and freedoms. This is to be guaranteed by a special decree now in the process of drafting on the status of the citizens of the USSR and the Republic of Lithuania.

All countries big and small, powerfully armed and unarmed, can and must find a solution worthy of civilized societies to any complication if these countries are guided by the principles of humanity. And it is only

political dialogue that must underlie the search for the wisest solution. That is even more true in cases of property disputes between public and political organizations. We have no doubt that brutal assault and battery of ordinary people, like the one that was launched by units of the USSR Armed Forces in Vilnius today, will call forth your condemnation and that those guilty of the offense will be published accordingly.

These are the concluding words of the letter which the Presidium of the Lithuanian Supreme Council addressed to the president of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev.

To Ryzhkov

LD2204153190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1350 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] Today is the fourth day of the Soviet Union's economic blockade on Lithuania. Restrictions on supplies have spread to other areas. Measures are being taken by the USSR Ministry of Transport so that no goods can reach Lithuania, even those which could be delivered according to an agreement between individual enterprises. These actions do not correspond to the measures the USSR Government had announced.

An appeal was made by the Lithuanian Government to Ryzhkov, the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, and Konarev, the minister of transport for the USSR, demanding that they restore normal railway operations as regards Lithuania.

In the present situation, utilizing all available resources is of great importance. Businesses, organizations, and everyone living in Lithuania must use everything with great thriftiness: electricity, gas, oil products, and other goods.

The Council of Ministers appeals to the Supreme Council of the republic to prepare without delay legal measures which will enhance the responsibility for the violation of the instructions of the commission on regulating the economic situation in the republic.

Local self-administration organs are urged to monitor how the regulations concerning the rationing of oil products are being implemented.

From today, as a result of the economic blockade, Lithuania has been compelled to stop the export of any produce which had been agreed upon by the USSR with other countries.

EC Issues Statement on Lithuania Assistance

LD2304101290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0930 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] The situation in Lithuania was among issues discussed at a one-day meeting of European Economic Community countries foreign ministers held in [Dublin] the Irish capital. In a joint statement, the ministers called upon the sides to display the maximum restraint. They expressed the conviction that a solution of the problem lies by way of dialogue alone. At the same time, the Dublin meeting showed that the EEC countries do not intend to recognize Lithuania as an independent state; they will not render it economic assistance, nor resort to economic sanctions against the USSR.

Lithuania's Prunskiene Arrives in Stockholm

LD2204200290 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1927 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] Stockholm, 22 Apr (TASS)—Kazimiera Prunskiene, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, arrived in Stockholm on Sunday evening at the invitation of Swedish parliamentary parties. On the same day, she had meetings with representatives of the leadership of the Swedish Social-Democratic Labor Party and of the Center Party. On Monday, the contacts will continue with leaders of other parties represented in the Swedish Riksdag.

Earlier, K. Prunskiene visited Norway and Denmark.

Meets with Government, Party Officials

LD2304104490 Stockholm International Service in Swedish 0930 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene yesterday arrived in Stockholm for talks with parties in the Swedish Riksdag. The visit began with a dinner with Prime Minister Ingvar Carlsson and Foreign Minister Sten Andersson, and was followed by a short meeting with the mass media. [passage omitted]

After receiving a cautious statement from the EC ministerial meeting in Dublin, and the failure to get a joint statement from the Nordic ministers in Copenhagen, Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene has come to Sweden. Yesterday evening she had talks with representatives of the government, and later with the Center Party. Before yesterday's talks, Foreign Minister Sten Andersson said that the meeting was mostly an informational one. He maintained that Sweden's task now is not to take measures against the Soviet Union, but to help create a dialogue between the Soviet Union and Lithuania. Neither Prime Minister Prunskiene nor Foreign Minister Sten Andersson said they were disappointed about the failure to get a joint statement from the Nordic ministers. However, the proposed statement was too vague, Sten Andersson said. [passage omitted]

Today Lituanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene will hold talks with the VPK [Party of the Left-Communists], the Moderate Unity Party, the Liberal Party, and the Environment Party.

Lithuanian Premier Expects Western Aid

AU2004185090 Mainz ZDF Television Network in German 1700 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Interview with Lithuanian Premier Kazimiera Prunskiene by ZDF correspondent Kristina Hansen in Oslo on 20 April—recorded]

[Text] [Hansen] What do you expect from the West? What kind of specific aid do you expect?

[Prunskiene] In addition to political aid, in addition to the demands posed to Moscow, we also expect practical economic aid.

[Hansen] What should this be?

[Prunskiene] For instance, deliveries of crude oil and other important raw materials. Financial aid and various other things, if this becomes necessary as a result of a longer economic blockade by Moscow.

Prunskiene Interviewed on 'More Flexible Tactics'

TA2004163990 Jerusalem Domestic Service in Hebrew 1405 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Report on telephone interview with Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene by Tatyana Hoffmann on 19 April—recorded]

[Excerpts] [Hoffmann] The powerful verbal support accorded to the Lithuanian prime minister's visit to Oslo generated no fresh supply of either oil or gas to embargoed Lithuania. The Oslo government did not wish to be the guinea pig of the entire NATO front by supplying Lithuania with oil, although Norway is the number two oil exporter outside OPEC. Norway, which has natural gas as well, cannot transfer it to Lithuania.

Last night, after the first round of talks in Oslo, Kazimiera Prunskiene must have realized that no firm contracts were about to be made.

[Prunskiene in German followed by Hebrew translation] We are not seeking any definite contracts here. We arrived on an invitation from three Norwegian coalition parties, and we are discussing the situation in Lithuania and our future relations with Norway. But now we have problems with the supply of oil and gas, and we are indeed probing the possibility of acquiring oil from Norway and from other western countries—Scandinavia and North America—in the event the Soviet Union does not end the embargo. We will buy from any source that gives us good terms and with which we have mutual interests.

[Hoffmann] The appeal to other countries is no simple matter. What was so far bought from Moscow with rubles will in the future be paid for with foreign currency which, in the meantime, is lacking. Although the West has expressed concern about the Soviet embargo, no country is willing to tip the delicate balance between east and west.

Although President Bush, who met yesterday with President Mitterrand in Key Largo, declared that he was considering taking the appropriate steps, nothing else has happened. Denmark, too, has so far refused to help, and similar responses were received from Japan and Australia. Is Israel also on the Lithuanian Government's list?

[Prunskiene] So far, we have not discussed it with Israel on a governmental level, but if Israel shows interest in holding a dialogue with us and in inviting us, we will gladly accept. This will certainly result in favorable developments for Lithuania. [passage omitted]

[Hoffmann] Lithuanian independence has not risen to the level of international relations as yet, but the establishment of diplomatic relations may well be one of Vilnius' first steps toward proving its independence. The Lithuanian prime minister's reply reflects her status as a relative novice in international diplomacy.

[Prunskiene] It depends on the State of Israel more than on us. In our opinion, there is no reason why this should not happen. And if the Soviet Union persists in its harsh attitude toward us, we will be freer in our ties with countries which do not have very good relations with Moscow.

[Hoffmann] Ironically, the first to suffer from the halted flow of oil and gas will be Red Army bases and Soviet plants. The scope of the expected Soviet sanctions is still unclear, as are Lithuania's alternatives.

[Prunskiene] To assess our ability, we need more information from the Soviet side. We do not know whether the Soviets intend to deprive us only of products supplied in the framework of central planning, or other products as well.

[Hoffmann] [passage omitted] What kind of compromise is Lithuania willing to accept?

[Prunskiene] We have already announced several proposed compromises. For instance, we will allow Soviet residents of Lithuania to serve in the Soviet Army. We have passed legislation exempting Lithuanians from such service, but Moscow has demanded the law be rescinded. We are ready to pass laws to guarantee other rights of Soviet citizens; to maintain a double border in the transitional period, which means that Soviet checkpoints will remain there; and to set up new economic relations in anticipation of joining the world market. The Soviet side, however, simply refuses to launch a direct dialogue and is resorting to unilateral punishment instead. They have not even explained what their next steps are going to be.

[Hoffmann] [passage omitted] Prime Minister Prunskiene, do you feel you are on the winning side?

[Prunskiene] We believe our declaration of independence was the right thing, and we are not willing to

discuss any withdrawal from it. We are, however, willing to discuss more flexible tactics for the future, in order to resume the negotiations.

TASS Reports on Denmark's Refusal To Sell Oil

LD2004205390 Moscow TASS in English 2036 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Copenhagen April 20 TASS—Lithuania should not hope that Denmark will help it with oil deliveries out of political considerations, Danish Minister of Energy Jens Bilgrav-Nielsen told the RITZAUS NEWS AGENCY.

"If we are asked to render assistance to it, following the visit to Denmark on Saturday of Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene, we shall respond by saying that the Danish Government does not sell oil," he said. The Danish minister of energy stressed that, similar to what happened in Norway, he would suggest that Lithuanian representatives turn to private companies.

Prunskiene Interviewed on Possible Negotiations

LD2104075390 Hamburg DPA in German 0355 GMT 21 Apr 90

["Prunskiene Expects Negotiations"—DPA headline]

[Text] Hamburg (DPA)—In the conflict between the central Government in Moscow and the Baltic republic of Lithuania, Lithuanian Prime Minister Kazimiera Prunskiene has expressed confidence "that, despite everything, we are moving in the direction of negotiations".

Gorbachev's possibilities with regard to Lithuania "are already almost exhausted," the prime minister said in an interview in the magazine DER SPIEGEL. The economic blockade represents, "rather, a lessening of Moscow's most aggressive ambitions," for the Kremlin had, after all, "threatened to use the army." The demand that Lithuania be placed under direct presidential rule had also "really worried us a lot." She expects the West "to demand of Moscow that it lift the blockade and agree to normal negotiations. We also expect economic aid if the blockade persists."

The economic boycott is also causing difficulties for the Soviet Union itself, Mrs. Prunskiene noted. For example, it can no longer meet its commitments to deliver oil products to the West via the (Lithuanian) ports of Klaipeda and Ventspils [as received, Ventspils is in Latvia]

A copy of the interview was conveyed to DPA in advance

Prunskiene Holds Copenhagen News Conference

LD2104152590 Stockholm Domestic Service in Swedish 1445 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] [Announcer] The Lithuanian prime minister, Kazimiera Prunskiene, has just completed a news conference in Copenhagen. Our reporter there is Vladislav Savic, speaking directly on the telephone from Copenhagen. What did the prime minister say about the hope of obtaining aid from Denmark?

[Savic] Well, first, the visit to Denmark is the first indirect contact with the EC, and this happened when Prunskiene came to Copenhagen in the morning and met Danish Foreign Minister Uffe Ellemann-Jensen, and described the situation in Lithuania. Uffe Ellemann-Jensen left later for Dublin to attend the earlier planned EC meeting of foreign ministers. The message Prunskiene gave to the Danish foreign minister is that the EC should, first, adopt a more concrete stance on the situation between Lithuania and the Soviet Union and in some way try to break the sanctions. It was not specified in detail what this would mean. The second point was that the EC should recognize Lithuania diplomatically. At the news conference, which has just ended, Prunskiene was very reticent, not saying much about what this actually concerned. She seemed to be awaiting the return of Uffe Ellemann-Jensen and his report on how the EC responded to these questions.

[Announcer] There will also be a Nordic foreign ministers' meeting in Copenhagen tomorrow. This Lithuanian question will also be discussed there. Have you received any information about what the prime minister expects from this meeting?

[Savic] What was said about the Nordic countries was that Prunskiene is thankful for the support given by the Nordic countries, but I believe that even this question will have to wait until the EC ministers have made any possible decisions on the question of Lithuania. What was said is that more concrete support from the EC, from the Nordic countries, is needed. What kind of support it should be, it is difficult to say just now; Prunskiene was very cautious at the news conference.

[Announcer] Prunskiene will now come to Sweden on her tour?

[Savic] Yes, she is expected to arrive tomorrow evening, late afternoon, and Sweden was mentioned at the news conference, only extremely cautiously. One should not speak about those who have issued an invitation before it is seen what happens there. This was more or less her reply concerning what is expected of Sweden.

[Announcer] Thank you Vladislav Savic, our reporter in Copenhagen, at the just ended news conference of the Lithuanian prime minister.

20 Apr Print Works Incident Summarized

LD2104100690 Vilnius International Service in Lithuanian 2100 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Excerpt] Soviet soldiers carried out an act of violence today in Vilnius. At about 1330 in the afternoon Lithuanian time some 50 armed soldiers wearing camouflaged paratroop uniforms attacked the print works in Maironio Gatve belonging to he Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee and housing the editorial offices of the magazines SVYTURYS, MOTERIS, JAUNIMO GRETOS, and others.

The first attacked were volunteers guarding the premises who had authorizations from the Lithuanian Supreme Council. The volunteers did not resist. They joined their hands to block the entry and placed rolls of paper at some entrances.

Soldiers armed with rubber truncheons and automatic weapons were ordered to beat people and push them out into the street. Four or five soldiers attacked each volunteer, beating, threatening, and pushing them out into the street. The brutality reached such a stage that some people were undressed. Kicked, beaten with rubber truncheons, they were dressed again and pushed out into the street.

Witnesses saw a woman beaten with a truncheon on the head; she had only wanted to leave the building. All people who were there at the time of the attack were beaten.

Lithuanian Deputy Procurator Gedgaugas Norkunas reported that nine people were injured. Zigmas Vaisvila, deputy of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and the USSR people's deputy, was also harmed.

A representative of the Ministry of Internal Affairs reported this evening that 25 people harmed by the soldiers have approached him. According to medical workers who treated the injured people, some were seriously injured. One had a concussion and another a broken spine.

Windows and doors in the print works and editorial offices were broken. Some journalists succeeded in talking to these soldiers. They said that they were brought from Fergana to introduce order in Lithuania. According to them they are carrying out orders from USSR Council of Ministers Chairman Nikolay Ryzhkov on protecting party property. After the attack on the print works, people were not allowed to enter or leave the premises. People wanted to stay in the editorial offices and in the print works through the night and protect property. They were not successful. At 1800 the workers from the SVYTURYS editorial office were ordered by soldiers to leave and were threatened with force.

Lithuanian Deputy Procurator Gedgaudas Norkunas has reported that the incident is being invetigated and criminal proceedings have started. He noted that it is difficult to speak of the future of this case because it really should be examined by the military procuracy and military tribunal. Lithuania's Procuracy is carrying out investigations and striving not only to punish the culprits, but also collect material about crimes committed by the soldiers which could in the future be submitted as accusations against the occupation army of occupation government. [passage omitted]

TASS Reports on Incident at Print Works

LD2004192790 Moscow TASS in English 1907 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Vilnius April 20 TASS—A group of 27 Sajudis members with green arm-bands, led by Lithuanian People's Deputy and Chairman of the Area Protection Commission Vajsvila, penetrated into the territory of the Central Committee Publishing House's old building on the Mirone Street, Vilnius, at 12:30 today.

They were assisted by some workers who opened a rear entrance.

When the guards offered the group to leave the building, they categorically refused to do so and stated they would themselves guard it. Unit commander Colonel Mironenko brought a reinforcement of 53 men to the publishing house.

The trespassers were offered again to leave the building, and they refused again. Then they were pressed out of the structure boundaries.

Some people were injured, according to a central television report.

By a decision of the USSR Council of Ministers, units of Interior Troops took under protection a number of structures which are the CPSU property, including the Central Committee Publishing House, on March 30.

There were no accidents before April 20, nobody penetrated into the territory of the publishing house, only on April 8 hooligan elements smashed a number of windows, TASS has been told at the interior unit political department.

Violence at Vilnius Print Works Denied

LD2004174390 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1700 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] In Channel Two's "Panorama" program today—live on events in Lithuania—there was some information that internal troops had seized a print works that printed magazines for women and children, and that several people were beaten up during this incident. In connection with this report, Channel Two turned to the political directorate of the internal troops. Here is what the duty officer at the political directorate, Lieutenant Colonel (Merkhanov), said the following in reply to a question from our correspondent:

[Begin recording] [Correspondent] (Viktor Shakhirovich), what can you say regarding the report that was heard beyond Lithuania in one of Channel Two's broadcasts?

[Merkhanov] I state responsibly that the information broadcast was false. According to reports from our officers who are directly in Vilnius, in fact everything took place completely differently. The guard of one of our units, guarding the publishers, together with reinforcements who arrived, removed 20 men who got into the building and who tried to establish their own order in that institution illegally. The use by the reserve of sticks against women, the breaking down of doors, and the smashing of windows, as the report said, are fabrications. [end recording]

Fuel Situation, Print Works Scuffle Reported

LD2004195290 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Report over video by correspondent Sergey Medvedev in Lithuania; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] Following yesterday's report that deliveries of oil to Lithuania have been stopped and that deliveries of gas have been limited, we already this morning discovered changes in our lifestyle. First, we found the radiators were cold in the apartment where we are staying. Later, it was confirmed that indeed the heating in all the buildings in the republic had been turned off. And most car owners, as you can see, did not risk taking their cars out on to the road. [video shows correspondent standing near a residential area's parking lot]

However, the fuel quota for private car owners is not so small—30 liters. And ambulances, vehicles which transport foodstuffs, and special vehicles will operate under the previous system. [video cuts to show filling station scenes] Industrial enterprises are going over to a reduced gasoline ration.

As for natural gas supplies, it is sufficient to report that the republic's compressor stations have been stopped. Today Lithuania is receiving 3.5 million cubic meters of gas a day instead of 18 million. [video shows compressor station scenes; then cuts to show correspondent interviewing Ye. G. Vorobyev, head of the Vilnius line production administration of main gas pipelines, identified by caption, outside a compressor station]

[Medvedev] Yevgeniy Grigoriyevich, rumors are already circulating in Vilnius that possibly in the near future there will be no gas going to apartments, either. What can you say about that?

[Vorobyev] Well, I would like to say that such rumors are unfounded. Since noon on 19 April, a quantity of gas has been supplied for the republic which will fully meet the needs of residents for natural gas and which will provide for communal services.

[Medvedev] But industrial consumers of oil and gas are far from happy. [video shows Lithuanian Deputy Minister Agirdas Brazauskas speaking at Lithuanian Supreme Soviet and President Vytautis Landsbergis making a point from the floor] The republic does not have the $5 million a day necessary for the normal functioning of Lithuania's fuel and energy system, Algirdas Brazauskas stated. His report today at the session of the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet caused heated debates.

Also today, an incident occurred in mid-afternoon at the old building of the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee's printworks. Ministry of the Interior troops, as you see, became involved in scuffles with Sajudis volunteers who are on watch here. It is reported that some people were injured. The Ministry of the interior now controls the building. [video shows armed troops evicting civilians from a building; soldiers and policemen on a street; a crowd assembled on the street]

All of these events took place on the eve of the Sajudis congress and of the congress of the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU Platform, both of which open tomorrow. The leaders of the latter also held a press conference today. [video shows press conference in progress]

Briefing Details Lithuanian Fuel Situation

PM2004160190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Morning Edition p2

[Report by correspondent Aleksandr Protsenko under the rubric "Direct Line": "Fuel Supplies Enough for 14 Days"]

[Text] Vilnius—A press conference for Soviet and foreign journalists has been held in the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, where they were informed on the situation in the republic's economic life.

As is well known, oil supplies to Lithuania have been completely cut off, while gas supplies have been cut from 18 million to 3.5 million cubic meters per day.

The situation has been complicated by the fact that the day before, 18 April, the first reactor unit—the only one operational—at the Ignalina Nuclear Power Plant was shut down for five days to rectify a small defect. The second reactor unit is undergoing scheduled repairs until 20 May. True, there are some mazut [fuel oil] reserves for heat and electric power plants and boiler houses. The warm weather made it possible to start turning off heating at industrial enterprises and in residential buildings on 19 April.

Nevertheless, it is estimated that Lithuania's energy reserves will last for two weeks. What will happen after that is unclear.

Appeals to the West do not appear to be successful at the moment. It is now known that the Government of

Norway, where Lithuanian Prime Minister K. Prunskiene is at present, considers her visit unofficial and has made it clear that the question of oil supplies must be decided directly with the oil companies and the supplies paid for in hard currency.

Meanwhile, the republic's Council of Ministers has set up a special commission for fuel distribution. It is headed by A. Brazauskas, deputy prime minister. The most stringent limits are being set for all energy consumers. It is possible that some industrial enterprises will have to stop work, while others will have to limit their program to meet the needs of an extremely strict energy-saving regime.

It has been promised that gas will be supplied without interruption to residential buildings, enterprises in the food industry and municipal sectors, agricultural enterprises, and to meet the domestic needs of rural inhabitants. However, the reserves of liquefied gas, used in rural areas, will only last 17 days.

Motorists' needs are being restricted to a minimum: They are allowed to fill up with no more than 10 liters at petrol stations.

If there is no change in the situation, no motorist will be able to claim more than 30 liters of petrol per month in future. According to other reports, these 30 liters could prove to be the last until oil supplies are resumed.

What was surprising about the press conference? The discussion there made it seem as if there had simply been an accident on an oil supply line and that all people had to do was sit tight "until the repair workers have removed the defect." The discussion never got onto the subject of a political solution to the problem.

While the government was explaining the situation in the republic to journalists, a rally organized by the union of exiles and the league of freedom was being held in the square next to the Supreme Soviet building. It was addressed by V. Landsbergis, chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, and Vice Premier R. Ozolas.

A plenary session of the republic's parliament was held on 20 April, at which A. Brazauskas analyzed the situation. Only political decisions taken by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet can save the situation now, he said. A. Brazauskas stressed that there can be no question of abandoning the republic's independence and sovereignty but that there is possibly some sense in thinking about suspending some of the legislative acts adopted by the Lithuanian parliament.

Sajudis Official Interviewed on Petroleum Blockade

LD2104162790 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1400 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Interview with Andrius Kubilius, acting general secretary of Lithuania's Sajudis, by Jozsef Barath; place and date not given; Kubilius' statements in Lithuanian with superimposed Hungarian translation—recorded]

[Excerpts] It is still an open question whether Moscow and Vilnius will manage to reach a compromise. The latest developments are reported by Jozsef Barath, who managed to interview by telephone the acting general secretary of Sajudis.

[Barath] [passage omitted] When I telephoned Andrius Kubilius I asked him first of all how the people of the republic reacted to the Moscow decision [to restrict supplies].

[Kubilius] Well, do you know how they reacted? I would say they reacted naturally. The government immediately introduced restrictions on the use of gasoline and gas. They stopped the supply of heating and warm water. Only kitchen stoves are still operating. [passage omitted] As for the Council of Ministers, it is looking for foreign contacts with governments and big enterprises to make up for the missing Soviet deliveries. [passage omitted] We understand that we can not now immediately get the kind of help we will need. The Soviet deliveries can not be replaced immediately by Western ones; that is obvious. However, certain Norwegian enterprises are willing to cooperate. And yesterday we received a telefax form a Danish company which proposes that we sit down to discuss the possibility of our processing Danish oil at the oil refinery in Mazeikiai, which is now redundant. [passage omitted]

[Barath] What do you think? Howq many days can Lithuania survive without oil and gas?

[Kubilius] Well, the calculations show that with very serious thrift we might even last one month.

[Barath] An entire month? TASS wrote that the Mazeikiai refinery has reserves sufficient for at most four or five days.

[Kubilius] This applies to the oil awaiting processing, but the republic does have other kinds of reserves as well.

[Barath] My impression is that Moscow is striving to provoke dissatisfaction among the population, so that it should itself force the government and parliament to withdraw. Is there any chance of this? In Lithuania there live a significant number of Russians and Poles, on whom Moscow can rely.

[Kubilius] Yes, of course that is so. There is such a danger. For the time being, however, the reverse is the case. People understand the difficult conditions. They have received the difficulties in a disciplined, calm manner and have reacted by joining forces.

Mechanics of Lithuania Oil Embargo Detailed

PM2104164390 Moscow SELSKAYA ZHIZN in Russian 21 Apr 90 p 3

[TASS report: "Shipments Stopped"]

[Text] Moscow, 19 Apr—Oil supplies to Lithuania have been stopped. Here is how this fact was commented on by various ministries and departments:

USSR Ministry of the Petroleum Industry: On government instructions yesterday, 18 April, at 2230 Moscow time, supplies of raw material to the Mazheykyay Oil Refinery were halted. Prior to this 35-40,000 tonnes a day had been supplied on a regular basis. There had even been a 2,000-tonne increase in the daily supply. The oil is currently going to special storage facilities, and its redistribution to pipelines running in other directions will begin in the very near future.

USSR Ministry of the Chemical and Petroleum Refining Industry: The Mazheykyay Oil Refinery is the only enterprise in the Baltic which produces petroleum products. It dispatches these products not only to Lithuania but to Latvia, Estonia, Kaliningrad Oblast, Belorussia, and a number of other parts of the country. Some diesel fuel is exported. The director of the Mazheykyay Refinery told the ministry today that he only had four to five days' stocks of raw materials left. After this the refinery will have to be shut down.

USSR Gossnab [State Committee for Material and Technical Supply]: Despite the ending of oil supplies to the Mazheykyay Refinery, supplies of petroleum products to consumers in neighboring regions are unaltered. Oil will be redistributed to nearby enterprises in Russia, the Ukraine, and Belorussia. Their capacities are quite adequate to process the additional quantity of raw material which will be sent to them in connection with the stopping of oil supplies to Lithuania. The petroleum products produced by these enterprises will be supplied mainly to enterprises and organizations "registered" with the Mazheykyay Refinery.

Lithuanian Embargo Situation Updated

LD2104222490 Vilnius International Service in English 2130 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Lithuania is living through the third day of its economic embargo. A governmental commission has been set up in Vilnius on regulating the economic situation here in Lithuania. And I would like to note here that besides the total stoppage of crude oil supplies and the turning down of natural gas flow to Lithuania to only 15 percent of its previous amount, the Soviet Union has also cut off the supplies of wood, metal, chemical substances, imported raw materials, and technological material and equipment.

The governmental commission stated today that the one day rationing of petrol has been (?exceeded). A lot of petrol is being used by office clerks.

Natural gas is being supplied according to the new quantity standard set up by Moscow. Some of the enterprises were suggested to switch over to nightshift work so as to distribute the energy supplies more evenly. The energetic [as heard] facilities of Lithuania have been functioning normally up until now. The first power unit of the Ignalina nuclear power plant is going to be put into operation in several days time.

At today's sitting of the governmental commission, the Lithuanian trade minister has informed about food stocks here in the republic, for the Soviet Union is starting an embargo on various food products as well.

The Lithuanian government has issued a communique on the economic situation in Lithuania stating that the aims of the economic embargo imposed upon Lithuania by the Government of the Soviet Union are now becoming more distinct. Moscow is trying to destablize Lithuanian economy, deteriorate the living standards of the Lithuanian people, and thus provoke them to expressing nonconfidence in the present leadership of Lithuania and its policies.

The Soviet prime minister, Nikolay Ryzhkov, is going to be informed that Lithuanian enterprises will not be able to fulfill their contracts with other Soviet enterprises because of the cutoff of crude oil and gas supplies. However, even this crisis of the Lithuanian economy has its bright side. Namely, it will be now orientated not only towards the East, but the West as well. And besides, ineffective economic structures will be dropped altogether.

Girenko Denies Soviet Blockade of Lithuania

LD2204171990 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1500 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] The Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania [CPL] on the CPSU platform has ended its work in Vilnius. The name of the party has been changed, by the way. It is now the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPSU). The forum participants justified this decision by the fact that, as the successor of the Communist Party of Lithuania formed in 1917, the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPSU) has remained true to Marxist-Leninist ideas.

At the end of the congress, a plenum of the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPSU) Central Committee was held. In the presence of delegates who had the right of the deciding vote at the plenum, the buro of the Central Committee was elected. The 63-year-old historian Burokevicius became first secretary of the new party's Central Committee.

Speaking at a press conference today on the results of the first stage of the Congress of the Communist Party of Lithuania (CPSU), Girenko, secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, said, among other things:

[Begin Girenko recording] For the CPSU and Communist Party of Lithuania, the 21st Congress, which has just been held, is a very meaningful event. For Lithuanian communists it primarily means that it has ended the stage of self-determination of communists that was engendered by the split of the Communist Party of

Lithuania into two parts at its 20th congress. The significance of this congress lies in the fact that it revives and confirms the Communist Party of Lithuania in the sociopolitical sphere of the republic and the country.

I wish to most decisively reject the definition of the measures currently being taken with regard to the blockade of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic. The fact that Lithuania is not receiving all its oil and gas...[sentence left incomplete] This is but an insignificant part of the supplies which the Lithuanian Republic has received and is continuing to receive from other republics of the Soviet Union.

It is superfluous for me to explain, I think, what kind of situation the country is in—it is indeed in a very difficult economic situation—and with how our foreign trade balance is shaping up; it is under great strain. There is still a great deal that needs to be obtained from abroad, and what is more, even everything we purchase is not enough for any of the republics of our country.

Therefore, in the case at issue, these measures should be regarded as measures relating to protecting the interests of the entire Soviet people, and nothing more. There are no plans for a full economic blockade.

The leadership of the country, and first and foremost the president personally, is explaining and acting in a most restrained and patient way, counting on the fact that there is among the leadership of the republic such forces and figures who in the final analysis will make a realistic evaluation of the situation and the possibilities, and will bring the process into the sole possible channel, that of dialogue, and to the solution of all issues on the basis of the Constitution of the USSR. [end recording]

Gas, Fuel Supply Difficulties Described

LD2204161290 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 1100 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Summary] The Commission on Economic Affairs attached to the Council of Ministers of the republic of Lithuania is meeting today for the fourth straight day. We are expecting a more detailed report on this meeting, and we will definitely pass it on to you when it comes. Today we got in touch by telephone with one of the departments of the Lietuvosdujos [Lithuanian Gas] Association, and this is what we were told:

The situation today is quite complex. Some enterprises are making no effort to save fuel. The TV screens plant, for example, which is a union factory, has not reacted in an adequate fashion to the restrictions which have been imposed. Meanwhile, food enterprises are not getting enough gas for their needs, or for the needs of the population. There is not enough gas.

Electricity is another type of energy which we simply cannot do without. The (?Vilnius) power station is operating at minimum output. But today is a Sunday, when it does not matter so much. The problems will come later. All we can do is save fuel. Some fuel oil and gas reserves is left for power generation. Every day Lithuania needs almost 49 million kwh to meet the reasonable needs of industry, agriculture and the public. Today, a Sunday, much less is being generated—probably about 30 million kwh. So far it has not been necessary to cut supplies severely. But consumers must save as much as they can.

Now for a few words about railway transport. The duty controller for the Vilnius division of the railways has told me that trains are leaving Vilnius for all destinations, in accordance with the normal time table. Movement of goods and passenger trains is in accordance with the timetable. This is being managed on the existing supplies of fuel.

'New Measures' in Lithuanian Blockade Reported

LD2304075190 Vilnius Domestic Service in Lithuanian 0700 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] Today is the fourth day of the economic blockade. Public transport in Vilnius is functioning normally. However, fewer private vehicles are seen on the streets. More people are traveling by trolleybus, and many went to work this morning on foot or took out bicycles that had been put away in the attic.

There have been no reports from our listeners or radio correspondents that the work of bakeries, slaughter houses, or dairy production enterprises has been disrupted.

Urgent measures have been taken by the government to regulate the distribution of gas, petrol and other energy resources and the economical use of these resources.

New measures have been added to the blockade: On orders of the chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers and the Minister of Transport, transportation of raw materials into Lithuania by rail from other republics and rayons has been banned. These supplies had previously been delivered according to the contractual obligations with our republic's enterprises.

Lithuanian people on their path to freedom and independence are ready for anything, and they have a correct understanding of the present situation. They are calm and living their regular everyday lives.

Developments in Lithuania Summarized, Reviewed

PM2204201790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 p 1

[Own correspondent V. Zarovskiy report: "Lithuania: The Week's News"]

[Text] Vilnius—It was the first day after Easter. In the foyer of the Vilnius House of the Press there were three monitoring forces checking each other: representatives of "Sajudis," the republic's militia, and the internal forces. All carrying out official assignments. They are

lined up one after the other. Priority is now given to active public figures. They admit people at their own discretion. In contrast to IZVESTIYA's own correspondent, I was extremely lucky. I went round the editorial floors, just as I had done two or three years ago when I worked here. But now I was dogged by a kind of uncertainty. Imagine: The elevator stops at the floor you need, the door opens—and suddenly you see young militiamen sitting opposite. And at every entrance and exit they have walkie-talkies, they are in full uniform and carry tape recorders, and the Sajudis members have television sets. And outside the windows, on the lawns some people are on inflatable mattresses, others are on blankets—the public keeping watch.

A note appeared in the TIESA newspaper by M. Mileshki, senior consultant at the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee Secretariat, in which the author tried to explain to whom the House of the Press belongs. "The start of the publishing house story can be regarded as 12 February 1941. The publishing house was set up at a nationalized printing facility. As the publishing house accounts office said, as of 1955 R28.5 million had been taken from the party budget and given to the Lithuanian Communist Party Central Committee publishing house (of this R20 million were for the House of the Press and the new printer's), and R97.5 million had been switched to the party budget. It is clear that this is mainly money from Lithuania's newspaper readers, therefore our national wealth." But this explanation does not satisfy everyone. As before, SOVETSKAYA LITVA is being published in Minsk. Its leadership is unwilling to register the newspaper in accordance with the republic's Law on the Press and thus regard EKHO LITVY as the rightful successor to the SOVETSKAYA LITVA which was published until recently. Besides, the new SOVETSKAYA LITVA calls itself the organ of the Lithuanian Communist Party, and the Lithuanian Communist Party itself has spoken out sharply against this, recalling that the newspaper represents the Lithuanian Communist Party on the CPSU platform. It was told: "You have stolen the name."

Meanwhile Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia have signed an agreement about economic cooperation aimed at creating a Baltic market. Members of the republic's Supreme Soviet, chairmen of the standing commissions, and also government members have been sworn in. They swore "with all their might to strengthen Lithuania's independence and honestly serve the motherland and democracy for the good of Lithuania's peoples." And in conclusion: "May God help us!" In the newspaper RESPUBLIKA, A. Kiselyus stated that "smoking is the very low culture of the Russians. Smoking is the beginning of prostitution. Lithuanians must be cured of smoking."

Now there are two prosecutors in Lithuania. Or three. In fact, it is difficult to determine how many there are. Barauskas, appointed last year, is one; Paulauskas, appointed in March by the republic's parliament, is the second; and Petrauskas, sent at the end of March by the USSR prosecutor, is the third. The first has already written a statement asking to be released, but he is still in post; "the center does not recognize" the second; and the republic prosecutor's office personnel are not heeding the third (the acting prosecutor). There are only a few people subordinate to the third man. They are based in the republic Prosecutor's Office which is being guarded by troops. They have the press, but no power. And those who have the power have no press. A trifling matter? By no means.

A diarchy is also being maintained in the military commissariats. Or more precisely: The military commissariats are subordinate to the Ministry of Defense. The republic's military commissar (he is now a supporter of the CPSU) was appointed by the old Lithuanian Council of Ministers, and the new one ordered the city soviet executive committee to stop financing and equipping the military commissariats. Guys began receiving draft papers, parents were in tears, and parliament said to them: Whether you join the army or not is your own business: It is an occupying army, and we will not be able to defend you if you decide to hide from the draft. At one press conference a colonel in combat uniform gave assurances that there would be no evading military service.

Adults, please listen: both those who are willing to carry out the order and those who have been building a new Lithuania for more than a month. Doesn't this remind you of a sacrifice of innocent creatures for a new temple? And will there be calm and democracy in the temple? Surely political wisdom will replace the political daring which you have shown (now the entire country is showing it—that's nothing).

Expressing the opinion of a large group of deputies, Deputy V. Berezovas (formerly Berezov) stated at the session on Tuesday that they ought to begin talks with Moscow on the spring draft: Let our guys serve in Lithuania in military construction units, in the militia, and others can do alternative service. Deputy E. Bichkauskas proposed that the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet stop the implementation of the Act on the Restoration of Lithuania's Independence before 1 May for the duration of the consultations on the conditions of the talks with the USSR, not adopt in this period legislative acts demanding bilateral accords, propose to the Soviet government that for this period it should refuse to adopt any measures regarding Lithuania, and send a delegation to Moscow invested with full negotiating powers.

But there have been few such speeches in the parliament. More often those who think differently from the majority are silent. In order to express a different viewpoint, and especially to defend it, you need not simply boldness but the confidence that people will understand and support you. Alas, this still does not exist.

On 7 April 300,000 Lithuanians gathered in Vingis Park in Vilnius, in answer to V. Landsbergis' words "Do you know what you want?", said: "Freedom."

"Will you give up the peaceful path you have chosen, and will you abandon your goal?"

"No!"

"Great difficulties and trials face us. Will you overcome them?"

"We will!"

About 10 days ago the republic's inhabitants began to quietly buy up gasoline. On 4 April R. Kozyrovichyus, Lithuania's minister for material resources, said in an interview to the newspaper VECHERNIYE NOVOSTI: "We have long-term programs for all events and, naturally, against an economic blockade. There are plans as to which enterprises we will have to close down if this happens, which we must convert, and what output should be increased, or, conversely, reduced. But I don't want to believe that a blockade is inevitable." And K. Prunskene, chairman of the Council of Ministers, flew to Norway a few days ago "in search of alternative sources of fuel."

Girenko Stresses Legal Secession for Lithuania

LD2204123490 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1135 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Excerpt] Vilnius, 22 April (TASS)—TASS correspondents Vyacheslav Zenkovich and Kazis Uscila report: "Lithuania has the right to secede from the USSR, but this can only take place in a legal way," Andrey Girenko, CPSU Central Committee secretary, stated here today at a press conference on the results of the first stage of the Lithuanian Communist Party (on the CPSU platform) which ended late yesterday evening. [passage omitted]

Report on Delayed Lithuanian Secession Cited

LD2104214690 Moscow Television Service in Russian 2050 GMT 21 Apr 90

[From the "Television News Service" program]

[Text] The situation around Lithuania is again among the main events of the day. Although most enterprises in Lithuania should have been working on Saturday, according to their schedules, today they were at a standstill. The republic's government has introduced a harsh regime to save fuel and natural gas. According to estimates, the amount of fuel in Lithuania might suffice for two weeks. There are also reports of limitations on supplies of some other goods to Lithuania.

Unofficial information has just come in from Lithuania that the republic might delay its secession from the Union for two years. The information has not yet been confirmed.

There are also reports from Lithuania about talks which are being held in Vilnius with the premier of Estonia. So far it is known that only possible forms of assistance to Lithuania from Estonia are being discussed. Prunskiene, who chairs the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, arrived in Denmark some hours ago from Sweden. Here she is also seeking support for Lithuania's course of breaking away. However, Denmark will probably only agree to supply oil to Lithuania at commercial prices.

Ministry Sends Protest Note to Landsbergis

LD2104135790 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1159 GMT 21 Apr 90

[By TASS Correspondent Boris Sopelnyak]

[Text] Vilnius 21 Apr (TASS)—The Internal Troops Unit's Political Administration reports that a protest note has been sent today to Vytautas Landsbergis, chairman of the Supreme Soviet of the Lithuanian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], and Kazimiera Prunskiene, chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Lithuanian SSR. The protest notifies them, and not for the first time, about continued provocations with respect to guards from the Internal Troops of the USSR Ministry of Internal Affairs which, in accordance with a decision of the USSR Council of Ministers, guard installations belonging to the CPSU.

On Friday [20 April], the protest stresses, a group of people including USSR People's Deputy Zigmas Vaisvila, burst into the building of the publishing house of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Lithuania, thereby attacking the guard and the guarded building.

The nature of the event, the presence of television crews and photojournalists, and also the instigatory appeals to the citizens of the republic on the radio network indicates a provocation that was planned and prepared beforehand.

Categrorically protesting against similar actions that might lead to tragic consequences, the unit command warns that guards have been instructed to act in strict accordance with the rights and duties of Internal Troops as laid out in USSR laws.

Yeltsin Says Gorbachev 'Too Tough' on Lithuania

LD2104220190 Madrid Domestic Service in Spanish 2100 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] We are with Lithuania; Deputy Boris Yeltsin, leader of the reformist Interregional Group and candidate for the presidency of the Russian Federation, told Spanish Television's "Weekly Report" program that Gorbachev should have been less tough in the case of Lithuania because suffering is going to occur among the population:

[Begin Yeltsin recording in Russian, fading to superimposed Spanish translation] He should have been less tough. Dialogue should have been sought, and during the negotiations the Lithuanians also could have suspended the laws on military service and citizenship which they adopted in their parliament after 11 March. Agreement ought to have come, bearing in mind that the Soviet

Constitution endorses the right of the republics to self-determination. I believe that the measures adopted by Moscow are too tough. They are going to make people suffer, and that is already a violation of human rights. [end recording]

Soviet Opposition Leader on Reforms, Lithuania

OW2104004090 Tokyo NHK General Television Network in Japanese 1223 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Interview with Yuriy Afanasyev, member of the Soviet Congress of People's Deputies, who is visiting Japan, by NHK newscaster Hatsuhisa Takashima—live; Afanasyev in Russian with simultaneous translation into Japanese; Afanasyev is seen sitting at desk in unidentified room in Tokyo; from the "NHK News 21" program]

[Text] Mr. Afanasyev, a leader of the reformist faction and a member of the Congress of People's Deputies has broken with and left the Communist Party. He arrived in Tokyo today to attend a symposium. I will now interview him. Mr Afanasyev, why did you leave the Communist Party?

[Afanasyev] At first, I supported the direction of the reform Gorbachev had set. However, the policies of Gorbachev and his government have become shallow and half-way measures. They have no clear-cut strategy and the reform is inconsistent and in a state of hit-or-miss. This has made many people, including myself, oppose him and take the opposition position.

[Takashima] Are you going to create a party?

[Afanasyev] A founding congress will be held in May to create a new party with a democratic platform. This party will be an opposition party capable of making concrete efforts for bringing about a change in power to replace the CPSU.

[Takashima] Regarding your efforts to create a new party, what is the attitude of the CPSU and the Soviet authorities? Are they obstructing your efforts.

[Afanasyev] They are not obstructing my efforts. The CPSU is sending letters to all party members, criticizing as abominable the position of the democratic faction. What is more, the letters publicly call for the ouster of those who belong to that faction. Today's newspaper carried an article slandering me. I believe that this reveals the CPSU's intolerance of dissent.

[Takashima] President Gorbachev is now imposing economic sanctions against Lithuania. Mr Afanasyev, if you were president, how would you deal with the Lithuanian issue?

[Afanasyev] Regarding this issue, I already have expressed my position of firmly and unconditionally supporting Lithuania's autonomy and independence. I believe that all of the people of Lithuania are taking this position. I also believe that the Lithuanians will never compromise. They will not change the path they have chosen. Therefore, if I were in a position to decide this issue, I naturally would stand by the position of Lithuania and would do my best for the sake of Lithuania's autonomy and independence. I would do this for the sake of maintaining economic and cultural exchanges with Lithuania.

[Takashima] Thank you very much.

Trade Union Congress Endorses Independence

LD2104114790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0900 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] The Congress of Trade Unions of Lithuania, which comprises about 2 million people, ended in Vilnius on 20 April. The creation of a confederation of free trade unions of the republic was declared and its program and rules were adopted. These documents unconditionally support the act of independence adopted on 11 March by the Supreme Council of Lithuania. Fifty-two year old (Ryadzavicius), candidate of economic sciences and a teacher at the Vilnius Polytechnical Institute, was elected chairman of the confederation. He said in an interview with a correspondent of the all-union radio that the Lithuanian trade unions will seek ways for dialogue with the AUCCTU [All-Union Central Council of Trade Unions], orienting their activities on the program, aim, and tasks of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions and in the future aspiring to join it. I add that the AUCCTU is member of another organization—the World Federation of Trade Unions.

Estonian Foreign Minister Reacts to Gorbachev

LD2004163490 Helsinki International Service in Finnish 1500 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Excerpts] [Announcer] Estonia considers it impossible to agree to the conditions of the Soviet president, Mikhail Gorbachev, for talks on the position of Estonia. [passage omitted]

[Unidentified reporter] Estonian President Arnold Ryuytel says Gorbachev had particularly wanted Estonia to rescind the decision that the Soviet Constitution will not apply in the transition period before independence. Estonian Foreign Minister Lennart Meri went into more detail about the background to Ryuytel's statement. Meri emphasized that the basis of Estonian's policy is now a democratically elected national representative body. According to an document on the premises of Estonian foreign policy given by Meri to the radio news, for the first time since World War II Estonia is conducting a foreign policy planned in and executed from Estonia. Meri's document says that this foreign policy is one of transition, which will conclude with the establishment of legal state bodies in the Estonian republic and the restoration of the Estonian Republic, whose independent status the Soviet Union recognized in the Treaty of Tartu in 1920, the document emphasizes. Gorbachev's proposal conflicts with this recognition. Foreign Minister Lennart Meri:

[Begin Meri recording] Actually, the Soviet Union has already done it. It has recognized the independence of Estonia, as well as that of Latvia and Lithuania, in 1920. I emphasize that this is the Peace Treaty of Tartu, and in Article One of the Treaty of Tartu Estonia is spoken of as an independent state, and Russia has renounced all the rights of the tsarist state to the Baltic lands. [passage omitted] [end recording]

[Unidentified reporter] The Estonian Parliament will gather on Monday to consider a response to Gorbachev. Meri says that the first thing to be settled is the principle on which negotiations will be held. If the Soviet central leadership acknowledges the occupation of Estonia, Estonia is ready to negotiate, as Meri puts it, on everything.

[Begin Meri recording] In principle, if the other side is ready to accept that viewpoint that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania were illegally occupied in 1940, we can negotiate on everything. [end recording]

[Unidentified reporter] Foreign Minister Meri does not want to describe possible Soviet countermeasures if Estonia does not accede to Moscow's proposals. Meri says that Gorbachev would, however, lose that goodwill that the world now feels toward the Soviet reform policy.

[Begin Meri recording] If the world's largest state begins aggressive countermeasures against three small states, it would lose a great part of that favor that the whole world—the Baltic nations, too, up to now—has demonstrated toward Gorbachev's reform policy. [end recording]

All-Latvian Assembly of Deputies Convened

LD2104173990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1700 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] Riga, 21 April (by TASS correspondent)—More than 8,000 deputies of all levels—from the USSR Supreme Soviet to the village soviet, representing all the towns and rayons of Latvia—gathered at the Daugava Stadium today for an all-Latvian assembly of people's deputies, convened at the initiative of the People's Front Duma. This initiative was backed by the Presidium of the republican Supreme Soviet, in order more fully to elucidate and take into account the will of the people of Latvia in adopting political and legal documents on measures relating to restoration of the state sovereignty of the Latvian Republic at the first session of the Supreme Soviet of the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic of the new convocation.

The assembly was opened by Daynis Ivans, chairman of the Latvian People's Front, USSR people's deputy. The deputies who spoke at the assembly pointed out the need for restoration of the state sovereignty of Latvia, (?and for) restoration of the Latvian Republic. The participants at the assembly adopted by a majority of votes an address to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the people of Latvia, and also a resolution in support of Lithuania and Estonia.

Latvian 'Soyuz' Founding Congress Held 22 Apr

LD2204164590 Moscow TASS in English 1633 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] Riga April 22 TASS—The Latvian "Soyuz" (union) association of deputy groups was established by the founding congress in Riga today. The association's members are of 307 people elected to soviets and councils of different levels. They prioritise universal human values above national and class ones.

This is why they think it necessary to coordinate their actions in the name of democracy, equal rights of all citizens and freedom of the individual.

It was stressed at the congress that the immediate secession of the republic from the Soviet Union would lead to a sharp fall in the living standards and the aggravation of inter-ethnic conflicts.

The idea of proclaiming independence at the forthcoming first session of the newly-elected parliament, it was said at the congress, lacks a sensible economic programme, just like in Lithuania.

The Soyuz movement has mapped out the basic forms of its activity—it will create voters' clubs and factions and groups in the soviets, conduct public opinion polls and analyze social problems. Plans are also being made to start an independent publication of its own.

Future of USSR-Latvia Relationship Viewed

PM2104210490 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent Irina Litvinova report: "What Path Will Latvia Choose?"]

[Text] Riga—The republic's press has published a report on the meeting between the USSR president and a Latvian delegation.

The delegation visiting Moscow comprised USSR People's Deputies I. Bisher, deputy chairman of the Soviet of Nationalities; A. Gorbunov, chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet; V. Bresis, chairman of the Latvian Council of Ministers; and D. Ivans, chairman of the Latvian People's Front.

The article states the following. The USSR president was informed of the firm position held by most of newly elected Latvian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet that Latvia's state independence should be restored. In the discussion about the possibilities for further developing Latvian statehood the republic's representatives defended the opinion of the most of the

Latvian people that it is necessary to restore state independence. An independent Latvia would be prepared to establish the closest relations with the USSR on an equal basis.

The meeting participants report that the USSR president stated that he sees two main ways of further building mutual relations between the USSR and Latvia. If Latvia wants to gain independence outside the USSR it should precisely meet the requirements of the USSR law on the procedure for resolving issues relating to a union republic's secession from the USSR. For its part, if Latvia expressed its consent to remain in the USSR, the Soviet leadership would agree to enter into talks on considerably expanding the republic's political and economic independence.

Responding to the objection that the proposed solutions will not meet with support among the Latvian people, the USSR president allowed for the following possibility: Latvia could obtain special status within the USSR, allowing it to base its relations with the USSR on confederative principles. In this context N. Ryzhkov, chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, expressed readiness to resolve the question of Latvian young men doing their military service on the republic's territory.

At the end of the discussion both sides were of the unanimous opinion that experts should look into the possibilities for implementing both options, and the Latvian people should make their choice.

The USSR president noted that, in the event of the Latvian Supreme Soviet's unilaterally declaring the republic independent, no talks would be continued.

A. Gorbunov, chairman of the republic's Supreme Soviet, also expressed his personal opinion of the results of the meeting. He believes that this is probably the first time that it has been stated at such a high level that Latvia could have special status. From that standpoint, the meeting will have been a great step forward.

Latvia's Kezbers Sends Open Letter to Gorbachev

LD2004173190 Riga International Service in Latvian 1730 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] An open letter from Ivars Kezbers, chairman of the newly created Independent Communist Party of Latvia, to CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev was published in the newspapers today. It appeals for developing cooperation between the CPSU and the new Independent Communist Party of Latvia on foundations of equal rights and partnership.

The letter also states that the participants at the congress of adherents of the Independent Communist Party of Latvia, having discussed the situation in the party, and taking into account the historical changes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, regard that a cardinal turning point in the activity of the Communist Party of Latvia is necessary, and that they are manifesting the view for establishing a permanent party for left-wing forces in Latvia.

Describing the results of the recent 25th Latvian Communist Party congress, Ivars Kezbers writes in the letter to Gorbachev that, in fact, a conservative revolution in the republic's CPSU organization has taken place. A victory has been gained by those forces that are against a true renewal of society and the party, and are trying to usurp power by taking a stand against it being handed over to the people's lawfully elected organs of representation. Ivars Kezbers writes that these forces are usurping the authority of the party, and of Mikhail Gorbachev personally.

In the letter to the CPSU general secretary, Ivars Kezbers expresses hope for the early start of a dialogue between the CPSU and the new Communist Party of Latvia, which he leads.

Latvian Leader Responds to Special Status Offer

AU2004180890 Paris AFP in English 1744 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, April 20 (AFP)—Latvia's Popular Front has rejected an offer from Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev for special status, and will seek independence as in neighbouring Lithuania, the nationalist group's leader said Friday.

Dainis Ivans told AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE that the Front would seek an independence vote when the Latvian parliament meets in Riga on May 3.

Mr. Ivans, a member of a Latvian delegation which met Thursday with Mr. Gorbachev in Moscow, said he would give details of the meeting later on television and would outline the Front's strategy.

"We are going to explain to Latvians the fundamental principles of our declaration of independence and the fundamental laws which the parliament plans to pass, notably a law defining Latvian citizenship", he said.

"Mr. Gorbachev made two suggestions: to stay within a renewed federation (or) to leave the union but in the context of rules defined by the Supreme Soviet.

"We told him that most Latvians favoured establishing an independent state by parliamentary means on the Lithuanian model," Mr. Ivans said.

The main problem for Latvia is that "there is no guarantee that Mr. Gorbachev's successor will not change what has already been decided" and that "even with a special confederal-type status for Latvia, the centre (Moscow) would have ways of imposing its law", he said.

Mr. Ivans also said that Mr. Gorbachev told the Latvians he "would take identical measures" against them as against Lithuania.

Supplies of oil were cut off and natural gas sharply reduced to Lithuania this week, after Mr. Gorbachev threatened sanctions if Lithuania did not scrap some of the legislative moves taken to bolster its March 11 independence declaration.

Nationalist sources in Riga Thursday said that in talks with Latvian President Anatoly Gorbunov, Mr. Gorbachev emphasised at length the political and economic advantages which would accrue to Latvia if it refrained from breaking with the Soviet Union.

RSFSR

Gavriil Popov Elected Moscow City Mayor

LD2004184890 Moscow TASS in English 1837 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow April 20 TASS—By TASS correspondents Lev Aksyonov and Dmitriy Polunin:

Gavriil Popov was elected today chairman of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies. At the first session of the new Moscow Soviet, which is under way here, 280 out of 442 deputies voted for him and 162 against.

The new mayor of Moscow, an ethnic Greek, is 54 years old. He is a member of the Soviet Communist Party and has a scientific degree of doctor of sciences (economy). Popov is a USSR People's Deputy and a deputy to the Moscow City Soviet. He is one of the leaders of the Inter-Regional Parliamentary Group. Gavriil Popov is known as a supporter of market economy.

Plans Market Reforms

LD2104191690 Moscow TASS in English 1846 GMT 21 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Dmitriy Polunin]

[Text] Moscow April 21 TASS—The new Moscow Soviet leadership intends to introduce elements of the market economy in the Soviet capital to resolve acute social, economic and ecological problems it faces, chairman of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies and USSR People's Deputy Gavriil Popov told a news conference for Soviet and foreign journalists today.

The news conference was also attended by USSR People's Deputy Sergey Stankevich who was elected deputy chairman of the Moscow City Soviet at its first session today.

The new city leadership intends to reject out-of-date administer-by-command methods of economic management, Popov said. In his opinion, a transfer to the market economy and the development of cooperation will help draw Moscow's economy out of the current difficult situation.

Identifies Priorities

LD2204073790 Moscow TASS in English 0705 GMT 22 Apr 90

[By TASS correspondent Lev Aksenov]

[Text] Moscow April 22 TASS—Gavriil Popov, a well-known economist and people's deputy of the USSR and the Moscow City Council, was elected as mayor of Moscow at the first session of the Moscow City Council on Friday. The doctor of science won 280 votes of the people's deputies of the Moscow City Council. The choice was not easy to make. In giving their support to Popov, deputies had to realise that they approve in advance a series of measures which may appear to be very unpopular.

The introduction of a free market, which is advocated by Popov, can entail a hike in the price of consumer goods. It will likewise cause a reduction in the number of jobs, which, in turn, will trigger unemployment and a decline in the living standards.

True, Popov considers that special economic mechanisms to compensate the low-income people for the drop in the living standards should immediately be developed.

Popov has already defined the priorities in his activity. These are normalising the ecological situation in the city, developing housing construction, and streamlining municipal finances. Being a realist, Popov believes that serious shifts for the better in the life in Moscow should not be expected within the next three year to four years—the burden of problems inherited by the new municipal authorities is too heavy.

By the way, Popov himself has encountered one of the problems only recently: his Volga car was seriously crippled when hitting a pit in asphalt.

Presidential Decree Issued on Moscow Mass Events

LD2004161190 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1515 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] Moscow, 20 Apr—A decree of the USSR president has been promulgated here today. It states that the regulations on the holding of mass events (demonstrations, rallies, parades, and others) within the Sadovoye Koltso ring-road of the city of Moscow are to be enforced by the USSR Council of Ministers. The reasons for this are that Moscow is the capital of the USSR and that the top bodies of state power and union administration are located in the Kremlin and elsewhere in the city center.

Text of Decree

PM2104163990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[USSR presidential decree: "On the Regulation of Mass Events on the Territory of Moscow Within the Ring Road"]

[Text] On the basis of the fact that, in accordance with Article 172 of the Soviet Constitution, Moscow is the capital of the USSR, and bearing in mind the location of the USSR's supreme organs of state power and administration in the Kremlin and other areas in the Moscow City center, it is decreed that the regulation of mass events (demonstrations, rallies, parades, and so forth) within the Moscow City Ring Road shall be implemented by the USSR Council of Ministers.
This decree takes effect from the moment of its adoption.
[Signed] M. Gorbachev, president of the USSR.
Moscow, the Kremlin, 20 April 1990

Leningrad Preparing for Oblast, City Conference

LD2004204290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 1800 GMT 20 Apr 90

[Text] The people of Leningrad are preparing for a joint conference of the oblast and city party organizations. Medvedev, member of the Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, took part in the preparations. He met engineers, workers, and secretaries of workshop party organizations of the Elektrosila association and visited the Pozitron association. He talked to representatives of the creative intelligentsia in the Hermitage. He met scientists, lecturers, and students from the university.

Comrade Medvedev participated in a session of the buro and in a joint plenum of the Leningrad Oblast and City Party Committees. He spoke at the Lenin readings in the assembly hall at the Smolnyy. There was a meeting with the first secretaries of the Leningrad oblast party organization city and rayon committees.

Today Comrade Medvedev ended his four-day visit to the city.

Congress Preparatory Panel Holds Final Meeting

PM2304083590 Moscow SOVETSKAYA ROSSIYA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Single Edition p 1

[TASS report under the general heading: "Logic of Agreement. Preparatory Commission of Russian Deputies Ends Work"]

[Text] The deputies' commission preparing the First Congress of RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] people's deputies and the first session of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet has ended work.

The concluding plenary commission session held 20 April discussed the draft agenda and standing orders for the congress, proposals to set up its working organs and RSFSR Supreme Soviet standing commissions and committees, and a list of priority legislative acts to be examined at the congress and the republic's Supreme Soviet session. The documents drawn up by the preparatory commission will be put to a conference of representatives of RSFSR people's deputies which it is planned to hold before the start of the congress.

The preparatory commission session was chaired by V.I. Vorotnikov, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and chairman of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Congress Debates Formation of Russian Party

LD2104235790 Moscow Television Service in Russian 1700 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Video report by correspondent V. Batalov in Leningrad; from the "Vremya" newscast]

[Text] [Announcer] A congress to prepare for holding a constituent congress of the Communist Party of Russia within the CPSU began work in Leningrad today. I will not anticipate our correspondents' report. I would just like to ask you to watch this piece attentively. From it one can see the fairly heated atmosphere in which the discussions are taking place, and in my opinion it is not yet entirely clear what decisions its participants will arrive at.

[Begin recording] [V. Batalov] A month ago, the draft theses of the program for reviving the Russian Communist Party was submitted for discussion by the primary party organisations. This document is also known as the program of the 32, from the number of members of the initiative committee where it was adopted. There are a considerable number of contentious and, I would even say, unacceptable clauses in the draft. For this reason, it has been subject to sharp criticism.

[First unidentified man] Now you have come out without understanding, without knowing history and without understanding our people's destiny. You are like a bourgeois lackey who has been bought off.

[Second unidentified man] Who is Georgiy Ivanovich Ivanov? Ivanov is a Stalinist! And I have really come here to set up a truly communist party, a party of the working class, not a party of opportunists. [video shows delegates arriving at congress hall. Inside, they pick up copies of a bulletin: Issue 2, April 1990, of "What Is to be Done? Publication of the United Front of Workers of Russia." Outside, among a small crowd, two people can be seen carrying placards, one reading: "Russian Communist Party (United Front of Workers), you cannot bring the dictatorship of the proletariat back from the rubbish heap of history!" and the other reading "Bolsheviks, do not carry things too far. Remember Romania!" The owner of this second placard is harangued by the first unidentified speaker mentioned above.]

[Batalov] More than 600 people representing about 1.5 million working people in the republic have come to Leningrad. The main aim of the congress is to revive the Russian Communist Party within the CPSU's composition.

The first day's agenda was adopted without comment. Work could have started here, but one of the participants, citing conversations, asked for an explanation for

why Nina Andreyeva was refused a mandate. The chairman's reply did not satisfy those assembled. By a majority vote, they decided not to waive the principles, and to invite Nina Andreyeva, who had been rejected. After that, everything took its course.

During the congress' days of work, the republic's socio-economic and political situation and ways out of the crisis will be discussed, and proposals on the draft platform of the CPSU Central Committee and on the CPSU program and rules will be formed. It is proposed to outline measures on the organizational formation of the Russian Communist Party.

The draft theses for your party's program have given rise to a fair number of disputes and differences, specifically one point in it whereby the Russian Communist Party, which has not been set up, is already laid down as the leading party. Do you agree with this clause in theses?

[V.A.Tyulikin, member of the Leningrad Executive Committee] I would reply that these theses must be regarded as material which is, well, in a sense normal for a pre-congress discussion, since it is one of the only documents that has been published. Our initiative committee alone has a number of alternative documents. Unfortunately, we have not had an opportunity to publish them for wide-scale discussion. For this reason, criticism, too, is good within the framework of the exchange of opinions.

Thus, I think that the accumulation of ideas today will be constructive and will be to the benefit of the common cause. I will stress this again: All discussions will take place within the framework of a pre-congress discussion—the preparation for the 28th party congress. And of the majority of those attending here, at least everyone whom I have met and been able to talk to in the two days of registration, no one is even thinking of setting up some independent party. What is involved is uniting the detachments of Communists of our Russian Republic, in the CPSU—united and indivisible with one program and one set of rules. [Video shows congress in session; speakers; voting. Tyulkin interviewed outside the building.] [end recording]

Russian Party Congress Ends

LD2204154990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1455 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] Leningrad, 22 Apr (TASS)—The participants in the initiating congress of the Communist Party of Russia [RCP], which ended today in the city on the Neva [Leningrad], announced the existence of a Russian Communist Party within the CPSU. The forum brought together 615 representatives from more than 40 oblasts, seven autonomous republics, and five krays in Russia. Envoys from the Ukraine, Moldavia, Lithuania, and Estonia were among the guests at the congress.

To complete, in organizational terms, the formation of the Communist Party of Russia, the only one of the 15 Union republics without its own communist party, the initiating congress put forward a proposal to hold a congress of the RCP within the CPSU on 19 June of this year. In order to prepare for this, it has been decided to hold the second stage of the initiating congress on 9—10 June of this year.

Perm Residents Discuss Underground Nuclear Tests

LD2204173790

[Editorial Report] Moscow Domestic Service in Russian at 1500 GMT on 22 April broadcasts a report by Perm correspondent Mikhail Klepov entitled "The Secret of the Nuclear Tests." He speaks about his recent visit to the northernmost town in Perm Oblast, Krasnovishersk, with USSR People's Deputy Anatoliy Afanasyevich Shchelkonogov, who was meeting voters. Among the questions asked were some pertaining to the level of radiation in the rayon, and the prospect for further tests there. The correspondent asks Shchelkonogov to speak about the issue of nuclear tests in the area in great detail.

Shchelkonogov recalls that he had to investigate the ground nuclear tests carried out in the north of Cherdynskiy Rayon during the grandoise program for pumping the waters of northern rivers to southern rivers. He says: "Two ground nuclear tests were carried out and still today, over twenty years since those tests, the level of radiation at the site of the tests exceeds by more than ten times the natural background." He explains that residents were afraid to ask questions about the tests at the time. There was a similar situation more recently nearer to Krasnovishersk, but again no consideration was taken of the concerns and wishes of residents.

He then expresses his thanks to Lev Dmitriyevich Ryabev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, who sent a commission made up of representatives of the USSR Academy of Sciences, the USSR Ministry of Health, professionals in the oil industry, and geologists, and agreed to any number of residents of Krasnovishersk being included on the commission. He concludes: "And this commission, having examined in detail the whole state of affairs, signed a definite act, and gathered people together in the largest hall in the town of Krasnovishersk. The conversation, the exchange of views went on for a long time. Additional measures for radiation safety and a monitoring system, and so on, have been worked out. I received an assurance from Comrade Ryabev, deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers, that it is not planned to carry out further underground nuclear tests in this region."

Yaroslavl Oblast Farms Threaten 3-Day Strike

PM2004154190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Mikhail Ovcharov report: "Rural Strike Committee"]

[Text] Yaroslavl—A peasants' strike committee has been set up at an enlarged session of the Yaroslavl Oblast Kolkhoz Council.

"The countryside has been driven into an impasse," Pavel Penkin, chairman of the strike committee and chairman of the Kutuzov Kolkhoz in Gavrilov-Yaoskiy Rayon, told me. "This is the reason for our action. We cannot tolerate this attitude toward us any longer. They are robbing us of our share of metal, cement, and even bricks, which the oblast produces in very great amounts. They pressure us with taxes and price hikes and craftily take the money allocated by the state by way of subsidy for agricultural output and switch it to the construction of buildings in cities."

To ensure that the peasants' demands are heeded they are prepared to call a three-day warning strike. This means that supplies of milk to stores in Yaroslavl and other cities will stop for that period. Of course, this will not affect children's institutions, hospitals, old people's homes, and public catering enterprises.

Ivanov Elected New Mayor of Novgorod

LD2204143990 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 0820 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Novgorod, 22 April (TASS)—TASS correspondent Viktor Troyanovskiy reports:

The three-week "electoral marathon", as the election of the chairman of the executive committee of the Novgorod City Soviet of People's Deputies was called here, ended unexpectedly. A candidate for the post was sought everywhere, but eventually the choice fell on the person who had already sat at the table of the presidium at the city soviet session and conducted its sitting for several days. [passage omitted]

And so Viktor Ivanov became mayor of Novgorod. He will turn 40 years old this year. He is a communist, an engineer-technologist by profession, and sess his main task in the new function as improving city services, and restoring and maintaining the unique monuments of old Novgorod, which are the pride of all Russia.

Western Republics

Rukh Official Denies Rumored Security Force

90UN1528C Moscow LITERATURNAYA GAZETA in Russian No 16, 18 Apr 90 p 2

[Article by "Studinform" correspondent Vitaliy Podolskiy: "A Formal Informal"]

[Text] The peculiarity of the elections held was in the obvious shift of voter sympathies toward so-called "democratic forces"—people's fronts, "democratic platforms," and perestroyka movements.

In the Ukraine, the famous Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka], until recently an "informal" movement, was highly successful. However, at present its members cannot be referred to as "informals," and not just because the movement has been registered by the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic Council of Ministers, and, according to some estimates, the number of its activists goes into six digits, but also because it has been developing its own internal structures and becoming a regular "formalized" organization. In this reference, the withdrawal of Rukh writer-leaders from the ranks of the CPSU appears to be no accident.

Still, how formal is the "informal" Rukh? Our correspondent discussed this with D.V. Poizd, secretary of the movement.

[Podolskiy] Let me ask you straight out: Are you in favor of the Ukraine seceding from the USSR?

[Poizd] In brief, we are in favor of a democratic rule-of-law state, a multisectoral economy, ecologically pure production, and equal rights for all people regardless of their nationality. We advocate restructuring the USSR and the political and economic sovereignty of the Ukraine. I believe that the future belongs to a confederation of free republics. They should be the ones to determine the powers which are delegated to the center in the sphere of defense, politics, and the economy.

[Podolskiy] Rumors are circulating to the effect that Rukh has its own "intelligence" and "security service." Is this true?

[Poizd] Naturally these are fabrications. We have Department 2 which is involved in the defense of social justice. Our authorities are fond of presenting themselves as being almost the main proponents of this idea. What is really happening? How many officials abuse their official positions with impunity and commit crimes under the safe cover of their positions, party membership cards, and even deputy badges? The people are aware of this, as well as of the complete indifference of the law enforcement organs. They come to us as their last resort.

[Podolskiy] But why do you need your volunteer detachments, about which many disturbing rumors circulate? For example, one former militia employee reported that there are 10,000 commandos reporting to you with motor vehicles and radios...

[Poizd] This is pure disinformation. Its purpose is to discredit Rukh, to scare the people with a forthcoming terror, and to hang on to power. We have a Rukh volunteer detachment for maintaining order during mass events. You must have already noticed that there are very few people in uniforms at the rallies. The presence of the militia makes the situation very tense, and we arrange for its units to be located in buses outside the field of vision of the people. Meanwhile, our detachment maintains order. There have been dozens of rallies and processions and virtually no violations of public order and law.

Procuracy Counteracts Post-Chernobyl Crimes

90UN1528A Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 17 Apr 90 Second Edition p 3

[Unattributed report: "In the USSR Procuracy"]

[Text] On 16 April, the collegium of the USSR Procuracy reviewed the issues of compliance with the legislation aimed at eliminating the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES [nuclear electric power station].

It was noted that, along with considerable work done in this sphere, major shortcomings and derelictions have occurred. The Procuracy has consistently found cases of criminal neglect of the rules of radiation safety, distortions in reported data on the provision of health services, theft, as well violations of the rules of paying compensation, providing benefits, medical examinations, and treatment.

In two and a half years, 350 attempts to haul assets contaminated with radionuclides from the city of Pripyat have been aborted only after the intervention of the Chernobyl Procuracy Station. Sixty criminal charges have been filed in cases of entering dwellings located in the 30-kilometer zone. At the request of the Procuracy, more than 500 people have been disciplined and fined.

Cases were mentioned in which kolkhozes [collective farms] secretly purchased cattle contaminated with radionuclides for subsequent sale to the state and in which metal products with a high radioactivity level were shipped out for subsequent use in the national economy on the instructions of a number of officials.

An end has been put to these and other violations of the law by means of prosecutorial injunctions. In conjunction with them, criminal cases have been initiated and are being investigated which the USSR Procuracy monitors specifically.

The collegium sharply criticized the operation of the Procuracies of the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic], Belorussian SSR, and Bryansk Oblast which have not always responded with dispatch and in a principled manner to the violations of law which were allowed to occur, and demanded that they, as well as the procurators of the RSFSR [Russian Soviet Federated Socialist Republic] and the chief military prosecutor, take resolute measures aimed at stepping up procuracy oversight, and use the entire arsenal of measures set forth in the law—criminal, administrative, financial, and disciplinary penalties—against the guilty.

The USSR Procuracy has developed specific measures for reinforcing the real influence of procuracy oversight on the elimination of the consequences of the accident at the Chernobyl AES. In particular, special procuracies are expected to be set up in these zones, as well as independent groups in the superior republic and oblast procuracies which will be charged with overseeing compliance with the legislation on radiation safety at the AES. A program for the professional improvement of these cadres is being developed.

A special commission has been set up in the USSR Procuracy for coordinating activities with a view to the expeditious and comprehensive resolution of issues arising while eliminating the consequences of the accident, as well as while ensuring radiation safety at the AES. The procurator general has submitted a report to the Council of Minister.

Lithuanian Sympathizers To Be Prosecuted

PM0904185190 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 10 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Sergey Tsikora report under the rubric "Direct Line": "Echo of Confrontation"]

[Text] Kiev—Proceedings have been instituted against 50 persons and four others have been cautioned for organizing and staging in the Ukraine on 31 March and 1 April unsanctioned rallies in support of the decisions recently adopted by the Lithuanian Supreme Soviet on "restoring an independent Lithuanian state."

Moreover, material on 58 deputies and seven candidate deputies is being sent for examination by the relevant soviets of people's deputies and electoral commissions.

These figures are cited in a report issued by the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee Press Center and in an information report on a sitting of the Ukrainian Prosecutor's Office Collegium. Here are a few extracts from the above documents. "The Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee address and the Ukrainian Council of Ministers statement on the decision by the Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka [Rukh] leadership to organize rallies... should not be interpreted in a simplistic fashion as a ban. They (i.e. the address and statement—editorial note) were necessary to clearly set out the stand taken by the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee and the republic government and to enable them to categorically dissociate themselves from the decision taken by the Rukh leadership...."

And here is the Ukrainian Prosecutor's Office assessment of the events: "Attention is drawn by the fact that several people's deputies of the USSR, the republic, and local soviets were both organizers of and active participants in the unsanctioned rallies.... The public prosecutors of the city of Kiev and of Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, and several other oblasts have rightly applied to the relevant soviets to consent to the prosecution, as stipulated by law, of Ukrainian People's Deputies I. Drach, M. Goryn, A. Shevchenko, L. Skorik, Z. Duma, B. Rebrik, and several others. Moreover, they have raised the question of repealing illegal decisions to fly blue and yellow flags from soviet buildings."

As I was informed by the republic prosecutor's office, similar applications for prosecution have been made to the USSR Supreme Soviet with regard to Deputies D. Pavlychko and V. Yavorivskiy.

Ukrainian Statement on 'Separatist' Acts

90UN1542A Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 19 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Article by Sergei Tsikora under the rubric "Direct Contact: IZVESTIYA Correspondents Report In": "Statement by the Ukrainian Leadership"]

[Text] **Kiev—The Ukrainian Communist Party and the Ukrainian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium and Council of Ministers have issued a statement.**

This document says that unbridled nationalist propaganda is being carried out lately under slogans of the rebirth of national self- consciousness in Lvov, Ivano-Frankovsk, and Ternopol oblasts. The idea of a "Galician autonomy" has surfaced, and there have been numerous calls for the secession of the Ukraine from the USSR and for the creation of an "independent Ukrainian state." There is increasingly serious concern over the intensifying conflict between Catholics and members of the Orthodox Church in these rayons.

The document emphasizes that all these processes are taking on a dangerous character because they are often directed and organized by the newly created organs of power and people's deputies are taking direct part in them. The first rulings and practical steps of the organs of power, particularly in Lvov, the cities of Chervonograd and Stryy in Lvov Oblast, Ivano-Frankovsk, and Ternopol, already testify to their destructiveness and their separatist quality. Measures are being worked out with regard to forming a blockade and to nonexecution of government decrees and rulings, and symbolism and state attributes are being changed.

A wide-scale campaign to discredit the Communist Party has been devised, and psychological pressure on communists is increasing: They are threatened with dismissal from work and are being forced to leave the CPSU. Practical steps are being taken for their removal from enterprises, institutions, and educational institutions of party and Komsomol organizations.

And this is taking place at the same time that democratic processes are spreading more and more widely and practical steps to affirm the political and economic sovereignty of the Ukraine are being implemented.

The statement says that the deputies of the local soviets must, independent of their political orientation, acknowledge their responsibility for the moral and political circumstances and the situation in the economic, social, and spiritual spheres and that they must foresee the consequences of their activities and the decisions they are making. When people's fates are in question, there can be no room for emotions and political ignorance.

What do the republic's organs of central power intend to do? The statement says: "The rulings adopted by the local organs of power are destabilizing the situation, aggravating relations between the nationalities, and threatening the territorial integrity of the republic, and they will be regarded as anti-constitutional and will be revoked. The local soviets are not authorized to revoke or discontinue the actions of Soviet laws."

Earth Day Marked in Ukraine at 'Meetings'

LD2204233590 Kiev International Service in English 1800 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Excerpts] Today the entire world marked the Day of the Earth, which begins a decade of the environment. [passage omitted]

Such action has been held in this country for the first time. Upon the decision of a joint organizing committee which involves the Peace Committee, the Rukh, the Green World, and a number of other public organizations, Day of the Earth 90 became a day of the beginning of a Week of Chernobyl in the Ukraine. With the framework of this week there took place mass commemoration actions of Chernobyl, as well as conferences, arrangement of material aid to those who suffered as a result of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power plant. [passage omitted]

The initiators of the week have naturally held numerous meetings today with the public. Speaking at one of such meetings, the Green World activist Nina Preobrazhenska said in part:

[Preobrazhenska in Ukrainian with superimposed English report] At present we have very much work to do. The Ukraine's Minister of Health Protection Spizhenko has acquainted us with large concept for the further development of medical aspects. It is being currently examined in the Green World. Then one should not forget about such a large association as The Rescue. Our representatives of the Green World have set up this organization jointly with the residents of the affected areas. We are also well aware of the radiation situation, as well as the problems of food and water. Along with the associations Children of Chernobyl and Chernobyl, we frequently visit the Institute of Clinical Radiology. Our actions include not only meetings. We have held a roundtable on the atomic stations in the Ukraine. This is also our work, and we also have grand plan ahead, said Green World activist Nina Preobrazhenska.

More on Earth Day Demonstrations

LD2304123490 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2100 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Excerpts] A meeting and demonstration devoted to Earth Day was held in Kiev today. Editor Dmtryo Palamarchuk reports:

[Palamarchuk] The meeting was sanctioned by the first session of Kiev's newly elected city soviet and took place within the framework of the Chernobyl Forum in connection with the fourth anniversary of the incident at the Chernobyl power station. It was convened by the joint committee of public organizations, such as the Green World Association, the Chernobyl Society, Rukh, the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, and others.

Nearly 60,000 people participated in the meeting, which was opened by Volodymyr Yavorivskyy, USSR and Ukrainian people's deputy, and afterwards addressed by USSR people's deputy Yuriy Shcherbak. [passage omitted]

Yuriy Shcherbak stated in his speech: [Begin Shcherbak recording] It is precisely today, on Earth Day that I would like to announce the creation of the Ukrainian Green Party [applause]. The idea of creating such a party has been supported by USSR people's deputies from Chernovtsy, Zaporozhye, Dnepropetrovsk, Donetsk, and other regions. [end recording]

[Palamarchuk] Following this, Yuriy Shcherbak acquainted the meeting with the manifesto of the Ukrainian Green Party and informed that the constituent congress of this party will be held in the fall. [passage omitted]

Then the microphone was given to writer Serhiy Plachynda, who urged the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet, which will meet on 15 May, to declare the political and economic independence of the Ukraine. Then he announced that the Ukrainian Peasants Party is in the process of being created. At present, the iniatory groups for creating such a party are actively working in Kiev and Lvov. [passage omitted]

However, gradually the ecological meeting has turned openly political one. Many speakers subjected the republic's leadership and communist party to sharp criticism. The event was concluded by a demonstration, with nearly 100,000 Kievites and guests of the city taking part in it. It was headed by USSR and Ukrainian people's deputies and deputies of the Kiev city soviet and of the soviets of other oblasts and towns of Ukraine. That it was an ecological procession one could only learn from posters carried by participants. But the slogans chanted by those in the moving columns, consisting mostly of members of the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth and the Ukrainian Helsinki Union, lent this procession an essentially anticommunist and anti-Leninist character. On reaching the monument to Lenin, the participants threw down Lenin's works and text-books on Marxism-Leninism. The lines of militiamen and internal troops which encircled the monument did not respond in any way. The monument to the October Revolution in the center of Kiev and also the Lenin museum, outside of which participants of the demonstration, again mostly members of the Union of Independent Ukrainian Youth, burned a portrait of Lenin; were guarded similarly. The militia detachment showed great restraint here as well.

Ukrainian Multiparty Political System Examined

LD2703153290 Kiev in English to Europe 1800 GMT 26 Mar 90

[Excerpts] The multiparty system, until very recently a taboo, and the ideological challenge to the ruling communist party and the state institutions run by it: This issue is now transformed from discussion matters to real life. Conventions are being held by the Social Democrats and Anarcho syndicalists, by the Constitutional Democrats and the Liberals. And declarations on forming the party have been made by the Rukh [Ukrainian People's Movement for Perestroyka]—the national movement of the Ukraine—and the Ukrainian Helsinki Association. However, the Rukh Greater Council voted against transforming that movement into the party. That's the latest news that we got. Similar announcements on forming the agrarian party and the green party have also been made. We'll talk about it later, but now let me say that it means not simply a change of view, but a totally different rainbow of life in the Ukraine and in other socialist soviet republics.

Emotionally, this situation is a bit strange, particularly for the older generation, raised in the spirit of intolerance and rigid opposition to anything which at least theoretically could cast doubt upon the absolute truth from Marx, Engels, and Lenin. [pasage omitted]

Here's secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and People's Deputy Leonid Kravchuk:

[Begin Kravchuk recording in Ukrainian, fading to announcer's superimposed English paraphrase] We know that there is a crisis in the party, that complex developments are going on, and that inside the party there is no party unity, says Leonid Kravchuk. Now we can see three real forces inside the party: the conservatives, the radicals, and the centrist. And these forces are represented not just in the communist party of the Ukraine. This is our reality. [end recording]

Many explain such reality by the crisis of ideology. Doing so, many nod to eastern Europe to prove their point. Others explain it by the personality crisis, rather than the crisis of ideas. This is the view of Vladimir Yavorivskiy, people's deputy and one of the founders of Rukh:

[Begin Yavorivskiy recording in UKrainian, fading to superimposed English translation] We don't agree that the party today is headed by the people who have lost their prestige completely. The party lost its prestige

because of such people, so you have to get rid of the shackles which these shameless people are.

A way out of this situation is the creation of the new parties. This process has acquired special pace after the elections to the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine represent the democratic platform, says Ivan Drash. So in what way should they act in parliament? What can we expect of the would-be government? Now we have a committee to organize a new party. [passage omitted] We want to build a new party. Perhaps it will be called the Independent People's Party, or the Democratic Party, or the Revival of the Ukraine. [end recording]

However, the majority of the Greater Council of Rukh voted against its transformation into a political party. As to its status, Rukh should be a structure above the party, and serve as a consolidating force. That decision was made after the Rukh session in the town of Khust in Transcarpathia.

The leaders of one part of Rukh, which is the Ukrainian Helsinki Association, announced at its session that they decided to reorganize that association into a political party. This is why Radio Kiev invited one more people's deputy to take part in this program. And he is the newly elected deputy of the Supreme Soviet of Ukraine, member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Union Executive Committee, Oleg Shevchenko. He shares his opinions as to the future of Rukh:

[Begin Shevchenko recording in Ukrainian, fading to superimposed English translation] Rukh will exist as a nonparty consolidated structure, uniting representatives of different parties. It will not exclude the possibility of leaving Rukh for some circles of democratic trends, which might form independent political parties. I think in the nearest future we shall have at least two or three political parties. This may happen this coming spring already. [end recording]

Among the new parties that appeared on the political horizon of the Ukraine is one party having many chances for the broadest grassroots support, but very little chance to come to power. I have in mind the Green Party, and its future leader, People's Deputy Yuriy Shcherbak, will officially declare its foundation on April 26th, the chernobyl Memory Day, but Yuriy Shcherbak doesn't think that a multiparty system is the aim in itself:

[Begin Shcherbak recording in Ukrainian, fading to superimposed English translation] Of course, it's not enough to shout about forty or fifty parties in the Ukraine or in the Soviet Union. We should think over the following aspects: What society we shall have if it is based on a multiparty system. And I propose to work out the resolution on civil society and a multiparty, representative, democratic system. These are very important problems. How shall we register the new parties? What percentage of votes do they have? What is the quota to enter the parliament? Maybe, as in West Germany, it will be five percent. This is a very important complex of problems. [end recording]

We should realise, however, that the ruling Communist Party so far has the greatest experience in solving such problems, not only because of the Article Six of the Constitution that stated the leading role of the CPSU not long ago, and which was taken out of the Constitution upon the initiative of the Communist Party. And there are grounded reasons to foresee the subdivision of the Communist Party into several groups. Even now, it has both the Democratic Platform, a radical faction in the Communist Party of the Ukraine, and the Union of Political Clubs. The situation when the members of one party are not like-minded people is quite unique, but even this party, far from being consolidated, got nevertheless the greatest number of votes during the elections. Consequently, it has the democratic right for a leading role in society, even without Article Six of the Constitution, said people's deputy of the Supreme Soviet of the Ukraine and secretary of the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party Leonid Kravchuk:

[Begin Kravchuk recording in Ukrainian, fading to superimposed English translation] For the first time in the history of our society, the party refused from its monopoly for the power, for the truth, and declared that it is ready to work in the conditions of political pluralism with other political parties, without any constitutional guarantees of its right for leadership. And this is not just a refusal from Article Six. It means that the party chooses a new form of (?accord). It chooses the way of real democracy and political plurality. [end recording] Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine Leonid Kravchuk.

It is not easy to make forecasts now about the ways of how the multiparty system will develop, about the numnber of parties we'll have, and about the practical results of their activities for the people, but there is one thing that we can say for sure: Our society can no more be measured with an abacus; we have entered a totally different dimension.

Lvov City Soviet Elects Officials

LD0904102790 Kiev International Service in English 2330 GMT 8 Apr 90

[Text] The session of the Lvov city soviet has ended in Lvov. Vasyl Shpitser, member of the Ukrainian Language Society, nonparty member, was elected chairman of the city soviet.

Bohdan Kotyk, member of the CPSU, was re-elected chairman of the city soviet's executive committee.

Jewish Paper Published in Kiev

LD0604213890 Kiev International Service in Ukrainian 2100 GMT 5 Apr 90

[Excerpts] The first issue of the information bulletin of the Kiev branch of the Society of Jewish Culture in Ukraine has been published. Our correspondent, Mykola Marynenko, reports:

REVIVAL [VIDRODZHENNYA]—Such is the title of this new paper. In my view, its appearance is the logical continuation of the programme for reviving the traditions of Jewish culture in Ukraine. [passage omitted] I met with Anatoliy Gelman, the paper's chief editor.

[Begin recording] [passage omitted] [Marynenko] The paper is published in Russian. Why? [Gelman] Yes, it comes out in Russian because many people of our nationality regretfully do not speak their national language. Another snag is that in all Ukraine there is only one printing shop that has Yiddish typeset. And third, the paper will also circulate abroad, within the Jewish diaspora. Many Jews there have a better command of Russian than Yiddish. But later, after we settle down, we intend to publish this paper in Yiddish. [end recording]

Moldavian Deputies Protest Removal of Petkov

LD2004111690 Moscow World Service in Russian 0930 GMT 20 Apr 90

[From the "Soviet Chronicle" feature of the "Soviet Union Day by Day" program; report attributed to INTERFAX]

[Text] As reported by the INTERFAX correspondent, more than 60 people's deputies of Moldavia have protested about the persecution of Ivan Petkov, a correspondent of the USSR State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting, organized by a group of parliamentarians at a session of the republic's Supreme Soviet. The demand that Petrov should be removed from the auditorium where the sitting was being held, their statement says, is regarded by us as contradictory to the principles of glasnost and pluralism of opinion and aimed at the establishment of antidemocratic control over the mass media.

Pickets Hector Moldavian Deputies; Newsman Beaten

PM2004093190 Moscow TRUD in Russian 20 Apr 90 p 4

[Own correspondent P. Rashkov report: "Kishinev Again Uneasy"]

[Text] Kishinev, 19 Apr—The Moldavian Supreme Soviet session is into its third day of work in the republic capital. A whole package of laws in the main areas of the republic's activity on which a decision will make it possible to achieve Moldavia's real sovereignty has been submitted for discussion by the deputies. But it has to be said that the work of parliament is making very slow progress. In particular, the question of the deputies' powers had still not been resolved by today.

The atmosphere around the session itself also remains complex. People in the country are accustomed to pickets now. But it seems to me that in Kishinev they are particularly emotional, not to say aggressive. It is not a question even of the posters with all sorts of contents, ranging from neutral to far from inoffensive. It is a question of verbal appeals and slogans. They are shouted at those deputies whose position is not to the liking of the people who have gathered in front of the parliament building. On both the first and the second day of its work deputies asked the city authorities to instill order and protect them from strong-arm pressure, but the situation has remained practically unchanged.

Moreover, when one of the older deputies—V. Yakovlev, a representative of the "Unitate-Yedinstvo" movement—mounted the session rostrum and reported that he was being subjected not only to insults but also to direct threats of physical violence (incidentally, shortly before the session opened, two deputies had already been attacked outside the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee building), many deputies not only did not support him but, on the contrary, would not let him speak, and V. Yakovlev had difficulty in overcoming the noise in the hall and carrying his thought through to its conclusion. A live relay was being conducted over the republic radio at this time, and the people gathered outside the building where the Supreme Soviet was sitting could hear the reaction of those deputies who are lenient toward manifestations of an essentially extremist kind.

Another point. Yesterday's evening session began with one deputy demanding, in the name of his own voters and of those with whom he had met during the session's work, that I. Petkov, Central Radio and Television's own correspondent in Moldavia, be ejected from the hall and deprived of the right to cover the session. In their opinion he has recently been providing tendentious and unobjective coverage of the events in the republic. The debate which developed in this regard lasted almost an hour and ended with a decision to continue it later, when a discussion of the question of the mass media and the republic's radio and television begins. And not the least role was played by a report by Deputy P. Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party Central Committee, that the question of I. Petkov's removal from coverage of the republic's problems had been agreed with the leadership of the country's State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting...

I would not like to directly link the debate at the republic Supreme Soviet session with what happened in the evening in the square adjacent to the parliament building after the close of the sitting. And yet... A group of aggressive pickets attacked the State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting's own correspondent in Moldavia, struck him on the legs, and cut open his forehead...

I write these lines and, quite honestly, I am not sure that after their publication the same "sanctions" will not be applied to me as to my colleague. I am pushed toward this conclusion by the atmosphere which has unfortunately taken shape at the session itself and around it, when literally every word that is at variance with the viewpoint of the majority is given a hostile reception.

...Meanwhile, discussion of the agenda is continuing. The preparatory group proposed something of the order of 30 items. To all appearances, the number will have increased after approval, and the discussion promises to be very stormy. This is because, despite a warning from individual deputies that the formulation of some of them runs counter to the USSR Constitution (for example, on the republic prosecutor and members of the prosecutor's office collegium), it has nonetheless been decided to submit them for discussion.

Moldavian Public Group's Roundtable

LD0904215690 Moscow TASS International Service in Russian 1655 GMT 9 Apr 90

[Report by TASS correspondent Anatoliy Golya]

[Text] Kishinev, 9 Apr (TASS)—A "roundtable" of public movements and organizations began its work in the capital of Soviet Moldavia today. Its initiator was the bureau of the republican Communist Party's Central Committee.

"The idea of such a meeting has been hanging in the air and it has been dictated by life itself," Petr Luchinskiy, first secretary of the Moldavian Communist Party [MCP] Central Committee, told me. "In conditions of democracy and pluralism, when more and more new public movements and formations with different and at times directly opposing points of view are entering into political life, one needs to take into consideration the opinion of each entity in republican political life and to seek optimum solutions to disputes in a civilized manner. We believe that a roundtable dialogue could become the crucible through which the most diverse ideas may pass. I believe that a discussion of them will help us to begin work at the upcoming session of the newly elected republican Supreme Soviet in a more prepared manner."

The leaders of the 17 political movements, organizations and formations taking part in the work of the "roundtable" today presented their "visiting cards" and delivered a program summary of their objectives and current tasks. But the political "palette" of the republic has so far not been presented here in full. Absent are representatives of the Moldavian People's Front, the most widespread of the movements. However, present at the negotiating table were the leaders of political formations who until recently had come out under the banner of the People's Front—the Christian-Democratic League of Women, the Kishinev Humanist Club, and the Organizing Committee for the setting up of a Social-Democratic party.

After the debates on the first day of the "roundtable's" work, a program was worked out which included, among other things, such issues as the true safeguarding of the sovereignty of Soviet Moldavia, republican citizenship, and the advisability of creating national army subunits.

Moldavian Decree Seen as 'Discriminatory'

PM0604115590 Moscow KRASNAYA ZVEZDA in Russian 5 Apr 90 First Edition p 3

[Own correspondent Colonel N. Mulyar report under the "Direct Line" rubric: "Moldavia: Military's Rights Being Infringed"]

[Text] The rallies and hunger strikes near the Stephen the Great Memorial, which produce more and more new demands, show no sign of abating. For example, they demand that all young people be drafted for service only within the borders of Moldavia, that Lenin, Marx, and Pushkin monuments and busts be removed, that street names be changed, and that the Soviet Army be withdrawn from Moldavia.

Last Sunday was no exception. A large group of people headed by someone by the name of V. Tutunaru (who was, incidentally, sentenced to 12 years imprisonment for murder) organized a rally in Kishinev, a procession along Lenin Prospekt, and the collection of signatures in support of Lithuania.

But now for an event of a different kind. The other day a Moldavian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet Presidium decree suspended the operation of USSR Council of Ministers resolutions under which officers, warrant officers, ensigns, and regular servicemen discharged into the reserve or retired on pension are provided with housing for a 3 month period after arrival in their chosen place of domicile. This right is henceforth reserved only for people called into the Army from the republic.

"The Moldavian SSR Supreme Soviet decision," said Colonel V. Semenchuk, deputy military commissar of the republic, "has made reserve officers indignant. The military commissariat's telephones do not stop ringing, and the disgruntlement knows no bounds. And that is understandable, since there are 150 reservists waiting for housing in Kishinev alone. And more than 400 in Moldavia as a whole."

"The decision can only be described as discriminatory toward military servicemen. It deals a body blow to us war and labor veterans," Reserve Colonel N. Lebedev, chairman of the republican Military Commissariat's Committee for Assistance to War and Labor Veterans, stressed during an interview.

Caucasus

Armenia-Azerbaijan Rail Link Broken

LD2204063790 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0600 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] Once again, rail communication between Azerbaijan and Armenia has been broken. Abdullayev, head of the Azerbaijan railway, has informed us that the most resolute measures must be taken on the division of the main line which passes through Armenian territory in

order to ensure safety. Once more, the working rhythm of the Azerbaijan railway has been interrupted.

Freight Trains Fired On

LD2204084190 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0800 GMT 22 Apr 90

[Text] Alarming news was received today from Baku. Railway communications between Azerbaijan and Armenia have been cut again. Two goods trains were fired on by automatic weapons late in the evening on 20 April, near Megri and Karchivan stations in the Armenian SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]. It was only thanks to good luck that the engine drivers and the military personnel accompanying the trains were uninjured. As Abdullayev, the head of the Azerbaijan railway, told our correspondent, a passenger train was sabotaged a month ago in the same place. After that incident, emergency measures were instituted on that section of track. However, even this failed to produce the desired results.

Baku Railway System Stabilizing

LD2104124290 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0700 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] A report from Baku on stabilization of the work of the railways says that twice as many wagons are being sent now from a big station at Kishly, on the Baku branch of the Azerbaijan railway, every 24 hours. Unloading has doubled, too. Collectives of joint-stock enterprises helped to restore the work of the station. Now wagons are immediately sent to the spur tracks of industrial enterprises of Baku. To accelerate work, considerably more loaders and motor vehicles are being allocated. Volunteers from almost every motor transport, construction, and trade organization of the city, which are directly interested to get goods quickly, are assisting. All this tells on the rhythm of the main railway.

Armenian Appeal Could Have 'Positive' Impact

PM2304090990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 22 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 3

[Own correspondent Sergey Bablumyan report: "Appeal From the Intelligentsia"]

[Text] Yerevan—Twenty-two eminent representatives of the Armenian intelligentsia have issued a statement which could have a positive impact on the political situation in the republic.

The statement makes a balanced assessment of the prevailing situation in the republic and proposes ways to extricate it from its crisis. It discusses above all the need to achieve national consensus, to which end it is proposed to immediately begin a frank dialogue between representatives of the public, informal organizations, and the authorities. The violent actions, political adventurism, and ambitious aspirations of various destructive forces which are pushing the people willy-nilly to the brink of civil war are resolutely condemned.

The representatives of the intelligentsia who signed the statement believe that the only acceptable methods of achieving their aim are parliamentary struggle or other actions consonant with the concepts of genuine democracy recognized in the civilized world.

The authors of the statement are convinced that in the current circumstances it would be shortsighted to raise the question of seceding from a Soviet federation which is renewing itself. Armenia should strive for political and economic autonomy and sovereignty, making the utmost use to this end of all the possibilities afforded by federation, and should seek the creation of a confederative system.

Armenian Presidium Discusses Nairit Chemical Leak

PM2304084990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Own correspondent Sergey Bablumyan report: "Dangerous Chemicals"]

[Text] Yerevan—An emergency session of the Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium has had to be convened at the demand of a public alarmed at the accident which occurred at the "Nairit" Science and Production Association.

The first signs of the accident were detected by light aircraft pilots. Taking off early in the morning, they noticed an acrid smell on board which forced them to land. Slightly later the alarmed people of Yerevan started phoning each other to ask why they had headaches and were feeling nauseous. Unfortunately, their assumptions were confirmed: There had been a discharge of liquid chemicals at "Nairit."

What was the cause of the accident? A definitive answer to that question will be produced by the investigation, but for the moment one thing has been established: Explosive substances had been left in industrial tanks and warehouses at the science and production association. When "Nairit" was shut down these should have immediately been made safe and removed. This should have been handled by the Commission for the Closure and Conversion of Production Facilities, whose work has been deemed unsatisfactory by the Armenian Supreme Soviet Presidium.

Criminal proceedings have been instituted in connection with the discharge.

The Presidium instructed the republic's Council of Ministers to resolve together with central departments the question of dismantling the "Nairit" Science and Production Association within one month.

Azerbaijan Supreme Soviet Presidium Mends Laws

LD2304041690 Moscow Domestic Service in Russian 0330 GMT 23 Apr 90

[Text] The Presidium of the Supreme Soviet of Azerbaijan has introduced amendments and additions to some of the republic's legislative acts. Being dealt with first and foremost is increased responsibility for infringement on the equal rights of citizens and for the forcible violation of the unity of the USSR territory, and the legal based regime for a state of emergency. A number of amendments and additions have also been introduced into the republic's criminal code.

Kuliyev Elected Chairman of Society for Knowledge

NC2304093590 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] The fourth joint plenum has been held of the republic level and Baku City organizations of the Society for Knowledge and the council of popular universities in Azerbaijan. The plenum examined the main directions their work is now taking.

The plenum heard a report by Nevzat Kuliyev, deputy chairman of the Society for Knowledge. The plenum also looked at organizational issues. Nevzat Kuliyev was elected chairman of the Society for Knowledge Executive Committee.

(?Kalachev), first deputy chairman of the All-Union Society for Knowledge, addressed the plenum. Ratib Zeynalov, secretary of the Azerbaijan Communist Party Central Committee, participated in the plenum's work.

Baku Views Arrest of 21 'Armed Bandits'

NC2304093290 Baku Domestic Service in Azeri 1730 GMT 19 Apr 90

[Text] As reported by the press organs, a group of 21 armed bandits were captured by USSR Interior Ministry troops and Soviet Army units on the border between Armenia and Azerbaijan on the night of 5 April. [Words indistinct] and most of them were residents of Yerevan and Stepanakert. These bandits, who were fully armed, raided the towns of Kubatlinskiy Rayon, opened fire on peaceful people, and increased the number of the victims of the interethnic discord.

The operation to capture the bandits was carried out in such a determined and skillful way that no one was wounded. Arms, field radios, [word indistinct], and a large quantity of provisions and [word indistinct] were seized from the bandits.

Georgian Trade Council Abolishes Party Organization

PM2004160990 Moscow IZVESTIYA in Russian 20 Apr 90 Morning Edition p 2

[Besik Urigashvili report: "Party Organization Abolished"]

[Text] Tbilisi—By decision of the party meeting of the Georgian Republic trade union council apparatus, the party organization there will be abolished.

Initially the question was not included on the meeting's agenda. It was tabled by a communist who cited the concept and basic guidelines of the Georgian trade unions' activity, specifically that provision which speaks about the depoliticization and deideologization of trade union organs. The proposal to abolish the trade union council's party organization was adopted by an absolute majority.

Central Asia

Kazakh Health, Power Ministers Appointed

LD2204132190 Alma-Ata Domestic Service in Kazakh 1400 GMT 21 Apr 90

[Text] By decree of the Presidium of the Kazakh SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet, Bolat Gazizogly Nurdzhanov is appointed minister of power and electrification of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.

By decree of the Presidium of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet, Aksultan Amanbayogly Amanbayev is appointed minister of health of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic.

The Presidium of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet released Comrade Kazachkov from his duties as minister of power and electrification of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, in connection with his retirement on pension.

The presidium of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic Supreme Soviet released Comrade Izmukhambetov from his duties as minister of health of the Kazakh Soviet Socialist Republic, in connection with his transfer to another job.

U. Sydykov Elected Osh Obkom Head

PM2304082990 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian 21 Apr 90 Second Edition p 2

[TASS report: "Plenum Held"]

[Text] Osh, 20 Apr—A plenum of Osh Kirghiz Communist Party Obkom [oblast committee] was held today. The plenum relieved R. Kulmatov of his duties as first secretary in connection with his election as first deputy chairman of the Kirghiz SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic] Supreme Soviet.

U. Sydykov, who had previously been first deputy chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers, was elected first secretary of Osh party obkom.

Kirghiz Supreme Soviet Announces Appointments

LD2004201990 Frunze SOVETTIK KYRGYZSTAN in Kirghiz 11 Apr 90 p 1

[Text] Decree of the Kirghiz Soviet Socialist Republic [SSR] Supreme Soviet:

The Supreme Soviet of the Kirghiz SSR resolves:

To appoint Comrade Absamat Masaliyev as chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.

[Signed] R. Kulmatov, first deputy chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.
[Dated] City of Frunze, 10 April 1990.

The Supreme Soviet of the Kirghiz SSR resolves:

To appoint Comrade Renat Satarovich Kulmatov as first deputy chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.

[Signed]A. Masaliyev, chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.
[Dated] City of Frunze, 10 April 1990.

The Supreme Soviet of the Kirghiz SSR resolves:

To appoint Comrade Mikhail Ilich Logvinov as deputy chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.

[Signed] A. Masaliyev, chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.
[Dated] City of Frunze, 10 April 1990.

The Supreme Soviet of the Kirghiz SSR resolves:

1. To take cognizance of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers on relinquishing its power to the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.

2. To entrust the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers to continue to fulfil its obligations until the formation by the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet of a new Council of Ministers of the Kirghiz SSR.

[Signed] A. Masaliyev, chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.
[Dated] City of Frunze, 10 April 1990.

The Supreme Soviet of the Kirghiz SSR resolves:

To appoint Comrade Apas Dzhumagulov as chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Council of Ministers.

[Signed] A. Masaliyev, chairman of the Kirghiz SSR Supreme Soviet.
[Dated] City of Frunze, 10 April 1990.

Namangan Obkom Replaces Second Secretary

LD2204143890 Tashkent PRAVDA VOSTOKA in Russian 4 Apr 90 pp 1,2

[Summary] A plenum of Namangan Oblast party committee [obkom] has released N.V. Ryabov from his duties as obkom second secretary in connection with his transfer to other work outside the republic. M.M. Rasulov was elected by secret ballot to the vacant post.

Pesticides Contaminate Mushrooms in Uzbekistan

PM2304080790 Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 20 Apr 90 p 1

[V. Pozhogin report: "Killer Mushrooms"]

[Text] Uzbek SSR [Soviet Socialist Republic]—The Uzbek newspapers have reported that the republic's chief public health physician has banned the picking and sale of mushrooms.

There are more than enough grounds for these extreme measures. For instance, 43 people were hospitalized with severe food poisoning in Kashka-Darya Oblast's Dekhkanabadskiy Rayon following a meal of fried mushrooms. The saddest part is that 37 of them were children. Unfortunately, the doctors were unable to save two of the kids....

This is yet another result of the thoughtless poisoning of the soil. After all, the people were eating what seemed to be edible mushrooms. But... toxic chemicals, pesticides, and other muck that had leached into the soil following many days of rain had made the tasty mushroom dish deadly.